

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

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By

KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

VOL. II.

Edited by

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PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHERS

37, COLLEGE STREET :: CALCUTTA-12

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First Impression

MAY, 1958.

8872 103
STATE CENTRAL LIBRARY
WEST BENGAL
CALCUTTA
18-9.61

Published by S. K. Basu of Progressive Publishers, 37 College Street,
Calcutta-12 and Printed by B. K. Sen at The Modern India Press,
7 Wellington Square, Calcutta-13.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

The second volume of *Studies in Philosophy* is now presented after about twenty months since the issue of the First volume. For this inordinate delay the Editor alone is responsible. The Publisher tried his level best to expedite the publication, but owing to a number of circumstances which were beyond the control of the Editor, it was not found possible to bring it out at an earlier date.

This volume contains the fourteen tracts mentioned in the Preface to Vol. I, but in a slightly varied order. As in the case of the other volume, the order is not a chronological one.

In (1) *The Subject as Freedom*, the author works out his conception of Spiritual Psychology and the theory of the subject as freedom, and attempts to trace out the progressive stages of cognitional freedom. In (2) *The Concept of Philosophy* we have an analysis of the nature of philosophy and the conception of Philosophy as symbolic thinking not amounting to knowledge. (3) *The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms* elaborates the doctrine of the trinal absolute. (4) In *Knowledge and Truth*, we have an analysis of the distinctive level of consciousness occupied by theory of knowledge and of the theory of the mutual implication of knowledge and truth. (5) *Fact and Thought of Fact* attempts to give a definition of fact without assuming any fact and seeks to establish the position that fact does not admit of an impersonal definition. (6) In *Correction of Error as a Logical Process*, the author develops the Advaita theory of illusion and emphasises that correction is an epistemic function without any unitary logical content and that falsity has no reference to the time-position of a cognition. In (7) *The False and the Subjective*, the author elaborates the thesis that the false and the subjective imply one another. In (8) *Some Aspects of Negation*, the author presents a non-subjectivistic interpretation of the position that 'truth is manifold' and tries to establish that there are radically different types of logic based on incommensurable views of negation. (9) *Place of the Indefinite in Logic* lays down the thesis that the indefinite is not merely a subjective entity and that logic should find a place for the absolute indefinite. (10) In *Definition of Relation as a Category of Existence*, an attempt has been made to formulate a definition of 'relation' in purely objective terms as against the subjectivistic interpretation of Green and

others. In (11) *Objective Interpretation of the Percept and Image*, an attempt has been made to translate the subjective terms 'perceived' and 'un-perceived' into objective terms. (12) In *Reality of the Future*, the author develops the thesis that the reality of the future expected on a known ground cannot be said to be an object of knowledge and that the future is real only to will and to faith. (13) *The Concept of Value* gives an analysis of the concept of value in its different forms, and establishes the position that value is absolute and that speakability of value as information is a necessary illusion. (14) *The Studies in Kant* gives us a speculative interpretation of a number of Kantian themes. As with the other constructive interpretations contained in Vol. I, we have here also quite a large number of improvisations.

In the Introduction to this volume, the Editor has made an attempt to analyse the major philosophical doctrines of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya. The analysis has been done, as far as possible, in the author's own words. This is for two reasons: first, the Editor was not sure that he had got at the exact logic of Krishnachandra's writings in a large number of places; secondly, and this is to some extent connected with the first, he felt that his own language was far less effective and elegant than that of the author, even when the latter's manner of presentation was quite thoroughly severe.

The Editor regrets that he has not been able to capture the inspiration or the insight that saturates almost all the writings of his father. It is because of this that he has all along felt that it was presumptuousness on his part to have undertaken this editorial work.

The Editor feels that he would be failing in gratitude if he did not emphasise that all the credit for this publication belongs to his friend, Sri Sushil Kumar Basu of Progressive Publishers. The undertaking would never have been completed but for his unfailing generosity, constant encouragement and spirit of dedication.

The Editor.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CAAF	— The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms.
CP	— The Concept of Philosophy.
CV	— The Concept of Value.
CELP	— Correction of Error as a Logical Process.
DRCE	— The Definition of Relation as a Category of Existence.
FS	— The False and the Subjective.
FTF	— Fact and Thought of Fact.
KT	— Knowledge and Truth.
OIPI	— Objective Interpretation of Percept and Image.
PIL	— Place of the Indefinite in Logic.
RF	— Reality of the Future.
SAN	— Some Aspects of Negation.
SK	— Studies in Kant.
SF	— The Subject as Freedom.
CPR	— Critique of Pure Reason.
CPrR	— Critique of Practical Reason.
CJ	— Critique of Judgment.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION TO VOL. II.

The published writings of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya date from the year 1908, but his characteristic philosophical position assumes definite shape in the writings during the years 1928-1936. The publications of this period outnumber and far outweigh those that fall during the previous twenty years. Of the twentyone tracts published in these two volumes, as many as fourteen belong to this later period, the other seven covering the previous years. The earlier writings are not indeed entirely unrelated to the subsequent ones. Some of the salient positions elaborated in the author's later and maturer thinking are to be found adumbrated therein.

For the purpose of this Introduction, it would be convenient to present the author's philosophical position under the following heads:

- I. The nature of Philosophy.
- II. Theory of knowledge.
- III. The theory of the subject and grades of cognitional freedom.
- IV. The theory of the trinal absolute.

I. THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY.

a. The Concept of Philosophy.

The nature of Philosophy is elaborated in 'The Concept of Philosophy', published in 1936. Philosophy is there taken to be an expression of theoretic consciousness which, at its minimum, is the understanding of a speakable. But since what is spoken must be in the first instance believed, theoretic consciousness always involves belief in something as known. Philosophy is theoretic thinking. It is not, however, literal thinking. Literal thinking can be expressed as genuine judgments, but philosophical thinking cannot be so expressed. A genuine judgment is that in which the predicate either amplifies or explicates the meaning of the subject that is already believed. In philosophy, however, we do not have judgment of this genuine brand. What we have is pseudo-judgments, that is to say, statements which are 'self-evident elaborations of the self-evident'. The content of philosophical thought is necessarily speakable; it is yet independent of the spoken belief of an individual mind. It is in the sense of possessing this kind of independence that a philosophical content has been

described as 'self-evident'.¹ Again, the elaboration of this self-evident as we have it in philosophy is itself self-evident. To explain. A believed content that has necessary reference to the speaking of it is not spoken of as information or, in other words, as a judgment in the proper sense of the term. In a judgment proper, the subject never presupposes the predicate. But in the apparent judgments that constitute the body of philosophy, the subject is understood as presupposing the predicate. Philosophy is, in this sense, a kind of self-evident elaboration of the self-evident.

It has been said that the contents of philosophical thinking are speakable, but they are not literally thinkable. Now, if a content is literally thinkable in a judgment, the belief in it is actual knowledge. If it is only symbolically thinkable, it should not be said to be *known* but to be only believed as known. In philosophy, the content is spoken as at least partially symbolised. Philosophy cannot, therefore, be regarded as a body of knowledge. It is concerned only with contents that are not actually known but are believed as demanding to be known without being literally thought. Philosophy is thus systematic symbolism.

Philosophy is the elaboration of different kinds of spiritual experiences. The abstractions of high-grade metaphysics are based on spiritual experience and derive their whole value from the experiences which they symbolise. No metaphysical concept is entirely intelligible without reference to the spirit.

b. The organon of Philosophy.

According to the author, the organon of philosophy is 'reflection' which is a sort of subjective activity yielding immediate knowledge. This insight-yielding activity has been described as a sort of 'experimentation with the knowing activity'.² It is an introspective exercise that 'can be specifically regulated'. Logical reason is its accessory. Inference does not enable us to reach philosophical beliefs, though it has value as an instrument of exposition. Metaphysical reasoning is only the systematic exposition of symbolic concepts. The elaborate parade of deductive proof in metaphysics is just a 'make-believe'.³

c. The scope of Philosophy.

Philosophy is a form of theoretic consciousness involving the understanding of a speakable. Theoretic consciousness is of four

¹ C.P. 9.

² SK. Ch. III.

³ C.P. 29.

grades : (a) *empirical* thought which involves reference to an object perceived or imagined to be perceived; (b) *pure objective* thought which has reference to an object but not necessarily to a perceived object; (c) *spiritual* thought which has no reference to an object and is subjective; and (d) *transcendental* thought which has reference neither to the subject nor to the object. Philosophy is based on the last three kinds of thinking.

It has been said that philosophy is the elaboration of the self-evident or that which is independent of the spoken belief of any mind. Now this self-evident may be spoken in the objective, in the subjective and in the transcendental attitudes. Pure objective thinking is concerned with the self-evident in the objective attitude and its content may be called the 'self-subsistent.' Subjective or spiritual thinking is concerned with the self-evident in the subjective attitude and its content is the 'real'. Transcendental thinking is concerned with the self-evident in the transcendental attitude and its content is the 'truth' or the absolute.

These self-evidents are all speakables. The objective self-evident is spoken as 'the relation of A and B is' where the 'is' means an objective content that is self-subsistent or existing apart from relations. Here the objective attitude is retained in its fulness. The subjective self-evident is spoken as 'I am' where 'am' means reality or something that is subjectively 'enjoyed'. Here the objective attitude is explicitly dropped and the content is spoken as though it were objectively contemplated. The transcendental self-evident is spoken as 'the absolute self is'. Here the self-evident is not even literally spoken as in the above two cases. Still it is not meaningless and it symbolises 'truth' i.e., what is belived and is not literally speakable.

In the author's view, the self-subsistent object demands to be known in absorbed contemplation; the real 'I' demands to be known in the unobjective attitude of 'enjoyment'; the transcendental 'truth' demands to be reached in speechless realisation. It is to be noted here that the precise nature of this 'demand' is not explicated by the author.

d. *The branches of Philosophy.*

Corresponding to the three attitudes and the threefold nature of the philosophic content, there are fundamentally three grades of philosophy, viz., the philosophy of the object, the philosophy of the subject and the philosophy of truth. Under 'philosophy of the object' the author places metaphysics and logic. Empirical psychology and

axiology, it may be presumed, will also come under the same rubric. The 'philosophy of the subject' or philosophy in the subjective attitude covers epistemology in the current sense and also in the author's special sense of the term. The 'philosophy of truth' is a distinctive discipline quite other than either metaphysics or epistemology. The author's *Transcendental or Spiritual psychology* appears to be a blanket term for the last two grades of philosophy.

e. Philosophy of the object.

In his CP the author takes 'fact' to be that in which the reference to the subject or the speaking function is not necessary. This fact is dealt with in science. The object that has necessary reference to the subject is called by him the 'self-subsistent' and is taken to be what is dealt with in philosophy. 'Objectivity' which is common to these two objects is itself no fact, being only the self-subsistent form that is elaborated in logic. The spoken fact and the spoken self-subsistent agree in having certain unavoidable speech-created forms. Logic presents a system of these unavoidable forms. The concept of the object is first reached by contrast with the subject as the self-evident content of spiritual consciousness. The object is thus understood as self-subsistent before fact is understood as object. Since the object is apprehended before the form, logic may be said to presuppose metaphysics. And since metaphysics presents alternative theories in connection with the object, there may conceivably be alternative systems of logic. Logic is thus no science but only a branch of objective philosophy. The pure object whose forms are discussed in logic is the metaphysical object. Logic and metaphysics are thus the two basal branches of the philosophy of the object. It is to be noted here that metaphysics involves the objective attitude and there is no metaphysics of the subject.¹

f. Metaphysics and Science.

Metaphysics has been characterised as philosophy of the object and is taken to be based on the thought of the *pure* object. This raises two questions: (a) what is this *pure* object; and (b) is there any discipline which is concerned with the non-pure object. It appears that, according to the author, the 'pure object' is the self-subsistent object i.e. to say, the object as object considered apart from its usability. It is to be noted that there is a dualism in the author's conception of the 'self-subsistent'. The self-subsistent has two features—one extrinsic and the other intrinsic. Extrinsically, it is that

¹ SF. II; CP. 28.

which is believed to exist without being knowable or usable. Intrinsically, it is that which has necessary reference to the subject. Per contra, the non-pure object would be that which is believed to be necessarily knowable and usable and which has no reference to the subject. It is the task of the first grade of philosophy to view the object as self-subsistent i.e., not as necessarily knowable and usable. In science, however, the object is just what is known and though it may be unknown, there is no question of its being unknowable. Science has no interest in formulating the concept of the self-subsistent object and it implicitly believes in the necessary knowability or usability of the object. Philosophy questions this implicit belief and offers a speculative theory of the object. Science may be said to be 'predatory' in so far as it believes that the object exists only to be used or exploited and the concept of the self-subsistent object is taken by the author to be the first corrective that philosophy offers of the predatory outlook of the scientific intellect. The attitude of philosophy is thus contemplative or aesthetic while that of science is frankly utilitarian. As a sort of corollary, the author believes that many problems which are usually regarded as philosophical are wrongly taken to be so. He lists three such main problems in his CP :—(a) the problem of piecing together the results of the sciences into a world-view, (b) the problem that is connected with the so-called philosophy of Evolution, and (c) the problems concerning the formulation of the postulates or the structural concept of science.

g. Philosophy of truth.

The contrast of logic with metaphysics suggests the distinction between the self-subsistent and the real. The forms of thinking discussed in logic are a kind of entity that must be said to be believed in, but they are believed in as not real and yet as not nothing. The suggested distinction between self-subsistence and reality is verified in the 'enjoying' consciousness of a content. The content of this 'enjoying' understanding is understood neither as fact nor as the self-subsistent object. It is understood as what object is not, as the speaking subjectivity, as 'I'. The study of all contents enjoyed in explicit reference to the subject 'I' may be called 'philosophy of the spirit'.

h. Philosophy of truth.

There is, according to the author, a theoretic consciousness of 'I am nought'. But the denial of 'I' is possible because we already be-

lieve that the absolute is. The absolute is a positively believed entity that is only negatively understood as what the subject 'I' is not. It is an entity that cannot be understood as it is believed and is speakable only by way of symbolism. The positive character of the absolute is expressible only by the negation of 'I' and, as such, is not literally expressible at all. If then it is said that the absolute *is*, the 'is' means not reality but 'truth'. Reality is enjoyed but truth is not. The consciousness of truth as what is believed in but not understood either in the objective or subjective attitude and as a speakable in a non-literal or symbolic way is transcendental consciousness. Truth is believed as independent of speaking i.e., as self-revealing. 'Truth' then is absolute. But the absolute is not to be equated to truth. It may be 'truth' as in Advaita-Vedānta; it may be what truth is not or the absolute 'freedom' beyond being as in the so-called nihilistic Buddhism; it may again be 'value', or the indetermination of truth or freedom as in Hegel. The study of this triple absolute belongs to the transcendental grade of philosophy.

II. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

a. The concept of 'knowledge'.

In presenting the author's theory of knowledge it is desirable to start with a clarification of what he means by the term 'knowledge'. It is well-known that the word has been used in a wide variety of senses. But, whatever the variety, it is generally not in dispute that knowledge is a kind of awareness. In one usage it is identified with awareness as such. But our author does not accept this usage and has often contrasted knowledge to mere awareness. Awareness is of two fundamentally opposed types—, awareness in the objective attitude and awareness in the subjective attitude. The former is primarily exemplified by the awareness of physical objects, where what one is aware of is distinguished from the subject that has the awareness. The latter is primarily illustrated by one's awareness of oneself and of one's 'knowing', where what one is aware of is not so distinguished. Following this difference in attitudes, we may have studies in the objective attitude and those in the subjective attitude. Theories of knowledge and metaphysics of the subject are usually regarded as coming under the former class. Our author, however, deviates from this prevailing view and holds that any study about knowing and the subject must be carried on in the subjective attitude. Not merely that:

he speaks of a 'cultivation'¹ of the subjective attitude and the interpretation of objects from the subjective attitude. He goes even further and appears to hold that awareness in the subjective attitude is far more authentic than the other kind of awareness. The subjective attitude, in his view, yields the self-evidencing truth.

Of the two types of awareness, it is the one in the objective attitude that the author primarily takes to be what is signified by the term 'knowledge'. Not that the other type of awareness is altogether denied that appellation. The awareness of the subject—which is an awareness in the subjective attitude—is taken to be a case of knowledge. The awareness of the knowing 'function' and other functions of freedom like feeling, willing etc. is definitely not knowledge. But though knowledge is chiefly awareness in the objective attitude, it is not co-extensive with objective awareness. It is only one species of the latter, there being other kinds, as for example, thought, feeling, imagination, memory etc. Objective knowledge is distinguished from these latter varieties in having intuition (in the Kantian sense) as one of its elements.² The author here appears to accept the Kantian convention that intuition and thought are the two necessary elements of what properly should be termed 'knowledge'. He further draws a distinction between knowledge and belief. Knowledge involves belief, to be sure; but as distinct from mere belief, it involves the distinctness of the believed object from the belief.³ There is finally the distinction, presumably on the scope of validity, between knowledge on the one hand and illusion and imagination on the other. Thus it appears that the word 'knowledge' in the author's usage stands *primarily* (and not exclusively) for a valid and certain awareness in the objective attitude, having intuition for one of its factors and involving the distinction of the object known from the knowledge itself. Primarily, because the author is quite categorical that one's awareness of oneself is an instance of knowledge, even though it is neither objective awareness nor intuitional in character. One thing is not clear however, and that is whether the author would agree to describe what he calls 'knowledge' as a state or as a 'function'. That would perhaps depend on whether he would like to designate awareness itself as a 'state' or a 'function'. If knowledge were to be regarded as a 'state', it would have to be regarded as a sort of precipitate of the 'knowing'-function. If,

¹ SF. 16.

² SF. 49.

³ SF. 33-34.

however, it were to be described as a 'function', it would be just the function of 'knowing' itself. There is not surely a knowledge-function over and above the knowing-function. Certain trends in the author's mode of thinking would seem to favour the assumption that, according to him, knowledge and knowing-function are one and the same thing. But the editor is not at all sure on the point.

About the nature of knowing or 'to know', the author is quite explicit. Knowing is a function and not a passive state of the subject, as many would have it. 'Function' appears to be a sort of activity. To know is to act or to do something. But it is activity neither in a physical nor in the volitional way. It appears to be *sui generis* and the author says that it is activity only in a symbolical sense.

Knowing activity is a 'free reference of the subject to the object'. It represents, according to the author, a positive mode of freedom of the subject to relate to object without *getting related* to it.¹ The freedom of the subject lies precisely in the fact that it is known by itself and that in relating to the object, it does not get related to the latter. That the subject has really such freedom is, as it appears, a matter of immediate certainty to the author. It might be suggested that the position is paradoxical, for if A relates to B (freely, it may be) it cannot but get related to B. It does not appear, however, that to the author this presents any paradox. To him it is not self-evident that the function of relating precipitates the state of relatedness, especially when it is free functioning. It is rather the case that the subject has an immediate feeling of relating itself to the object without having a feeling of getting related to it.

b. The object of knowledge. The theory of psychic fact.

Knowledge is primarily of a definite object and is to be distinguished from the awareness of the indefinite. The author is positive that the indefinite is as much an object as the definite and is exemplified by such entities as the aesthetic object, alternation, the image as being formed, the 'fringe' of a psychic fact etc.

Knowledge or cognition in the objective attitude is either of the physical fact or of the psychic fact. The author accepts the ordinary view of the physical fact, but as to the nature of the latter, he deviates widely from the usual view of the matter. In the ordinary and prevailing view, a psychic fact is a purely mental occurrence. It is just anything that happens in the mind, and, if immediately accessible, it

¹ SF. 13.

is accessible only to introspection. In the author's account, however, a psychical fact is never a pure mental event. It is not a 'pure' mental entity, because it is always an aspect of the non-mental object. Not that it is itself non-mental, as advocated by the Behaviourist. Neither is it any 'experience-unity of subject and object' as we have it in Ward.

It has been said that the psychic fact is an aspect of the non-mental object. This requires clarification. The object has certain 'modes of relatedness' to the subject, e.g., knownness, feltness etc. This relatedness viewed as a character of the object is, according to our author, the so-called psychic fact.¹ Knownness or relatedness is 'a floating adjective like beauty'.² A psychic fact constituted by this relatedness is a character of the physical object and exists, like the object, even apart from introspection.

Two negative criteria are laid down in this connection :— (i) what does not involve 'knowledge' of object is no psychic fact;³ (ii) what introspection does not reveal is no psychic fact.⁴ It follows from the above that the following kinds of awareness, among others, do not come within the author's definition of a psychic fact :—

- (i) the awareness of the imaginary,
- (ii) the awareness of the illusory,
- (iii) the introspective state or process,
- (iv) objectless feeling,
- (v) belief in the past fear of some illusory object.

These are placed in a separate category and designated as 'non-psychic fringe of a psychic fact'. It is to be noted that though they are non-psychic, they are not for that reason physical entities. It is unfortunate, however, that the author has not given us any hints as to the precise status which he ascribes to these fringe-entities.

c. *Presentation.*

Psychic fact is essentially 'presentation' as embodying belief. It is thus not imaginary or non-factual. It is not, however, completely accomplished as fact but only to be accomplished.⁵ It is not completely accomplished as fact in the sense that it is not isolated or freed from the object.

It is necessary to explain what the author means by the term 'presentation'. Knowledge involves belief but, as distinguished from mere belief, it involves the awareness of the distinction of the object

¹ SF. 25.

² SF. 25.

³ SF. 27.

⁴ SF. 28.

⁵ SF. 40.

believed from the belief.¹ This distinction is something more than *the object itself and is what the author calls 'presentation' of the object.*² *Presentation as a psychic fact and object as a non-psychic entity are mixed up with each other in a peculiar way. The object is given as distinct from the presentation. The latter, however, is not given as distinct from the former: it is only abstracted or distinguished from the object in introspection. It is to be noted that it is in non-perceptual knowledge only that the object appears distinct from its presentation and not in perceptual knowledge. In perception, again, the presentation is not known as distinct from the object but it is believed and symbolised as what should be distinct.*³

Presentation is not necessarily perceptual. In addition to external perception, we have presentation in the following modes: (i) feeling of the body from within; (ii) immediate apprehension of absence; (iii) memory of an object as past; (iv) imagination of the object as formed or becoming formed to be a perceptible object; (v) inference of the perceptible object as involving the unperceivable character of necessity etc.

Perceptual knowledge is, to the author, the actual standard of knowledge. The other modes of presentation imply it and involve a belief in something not yet known but which may be known in some ideal mode of realisation.⁴ Perception not only lends cognitive character to the other modes of presentation: it prevents them from reaching their ideal completion.⁵ Contrasted to perception, the other modes are knowledge of certain adjectival facts or floating adjectives. They are not known as substantive though they are wanted to be so known.

d. Belief, thought and feeling.

It has been said that the author does not take the word 'knowledge' to mean any and every awareness. Knowledge is only one kind and is contrasted to certain other kinds of which belief, thought and feeling are the most frequently mentioned. It is necessary to distinguish these different kinds. Belief is the awareness of a fact as fact. Thought is a presentation that does not exclude belief in the object. Its object is presented as unpicturable meaning. Thought is a completed product and is about a definite object. It is 'complete' in the sense of being dissociated from the forming or ideal timing that

¹ SF. 33.

² *Ibid.*

³ SF. 56.

⁴ SF. 38.

⁵ SF. 39.

characterises the image. Thought is a form of theoretic consciousness which involves the understanding of a speakable. It is either literal or symbolic. Literal thought appears to be identified with 'empirical thought'. The latter is explained as consciousness of a content involving reference to an object that is perceived or imagined to be perceived.¹ Symbolic thought is other than this literal thought and is of three kinds, the nature and object of which have already been explained in connection with the author's conception of philosophy.

By 'feeling' the author appears primarily to mean the intuition of of the Intuitionists—i.e. an awareness that is non-sensuous, immediate and completely certain. But far from agreeing with the Intuitionist in taking this feeling to be a superior type of 'knowledge' he does not regard it as 'knowledge' at all. In knowledge, there is almost always reference to an object, while feeling is explicitly unobjective. It is a positive subjective fact without any reference to any objective fact² and is typically exemplified by the feeling of the body from within or of freedom. It is an awareness in which there is no conscious reference to the object even in the way of dissociation from it.³ It is not denied that feeling has any content whatsoever. It has indeed one, but this content is unthought and unmeant and appears to introspection as only distinct in itself and not as distinct from feeling. A psychic fact like thought is distinguished in introspection from its object and is accordingly believed to exist also outside introspection. But as feeling is not thus distinguished from its content, it cannot be believed to exist outside introspection as a merely conscious fact.

In feeling there is the positive consciousness of detachment from meaning. 'Feeling is the knowledge of the purely unknown as such, the unknown that is not even meant'.⁴ It is only symbolised as knowledge of the unknown. It is to be noted that as the unknown here is the unmeant, the preposition 'of' in the phrase 'knowledge of the unknown' has no meaning and is used as a mere exigency of language.

e. Theory of introspection.

It is necessary at this stage to advert to the author's theory of introspection. Introspection is usually taken to be internal perception or the non-inferential awareness of a mental fact, and so far as its character of immediacy is concerned, it is placed on a par with the sense-perception of the physical object. According to the author,

¹ CP. 8.

² SF. 101.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ SF. 106.

however, introspection is a process of abstracting from the object of its character of 'relatedness to the subject'. The author agrees that a psychic fact is what is introspected. He does not agree, however, that the psychic is a purely mental fact. He holds that it is a character of the physical object, like knownness feltness etc., and that introspection consists in the distinguishing of knownness etc. as an abstraction from the object.¹ The author deviates from the ordinary view of introspection on another important point. In the ordinary view, perceptual states no less than the non-perceptual ones are accessible to introspection: in the author's view, there is no direct introspection into perceptual knowledge², and the knowledge that we have of perceptual presentations is obtained through our introspection into non-perceptual presentations.

This introspection is called 'psychological' introspection and is to be differentiated from 'spiritual' introspection which consists in distinguishing the functions of knowing etc. as other than the character of knownness etc.³ A function like 'knowing' represents a mode of freedom from the psychic fact of knownness, and to the author, the consciousness of modes of freedom like knowing is as direct as that of a psychic fact like knownness.

In the above account which is found in SF, the author appears to recognise psychological introspection in the objective attitude as a variety of introspection. In CP, however, he withdraws this recognition and confines the term 'introspection' only to what he calls 'spiritual introspection' which is there identified with the 'enjoying understanding' of the subject or the 'I'. Here 'introspection' is awareness in the subjective attitude, and the author is quite definite that 'introspection proper is a form of theoretic consciousness that implies an abjuration of the objective attitude'.⁴

Spiritual introspection is speaking in the first person—either actually or ideally—and involves the explicit consciousness of *being* what is spoken. In KT, the author speaks of 'epistemological' introspection, i.e., a species of introspection which is at the basis of epistemology, especially of the Kantian type. The particular method by which Kant passed from the logical forms to the apriori functions is, according to the author, a self-evident process in self-consciousness and, as such, should be taken as a kind of introspection which is quite other than internal perception or psychological introspection in the usual sense of the term. Epistemological introspection is possible

¹ SF. 17.

² SF. 34; 36.

³ SF. 17.

⁴ CP. 32.

only in the subjective attitude and appears thus to be a variant of spiritual introspection. The so-called psychological introspection in the objective attitude is either not introspection proper or is only a degeneration of spiritual introspection.¹

f. The concept of 'Truth'.

The author has used the term 'truth' in at least two quite distinct senses. In one usage the term means that which is self-justifying or self-revealing (viz. the absolute) and has 'real' for its antithetic term.² In the other usage, it stands for true or valid cognition and is contrasted to error.³ The author holds that the doctrine of truth and error should belong to a discipline other than logic or epistemology.

In connection with 'truth', it is held that knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other, the former as what alone is true and the latter as what alone is known.⁴ Three consequences follow from this : There is, in the first place, no such thing as false knowledge. Since knowing is known only as the implicate of the awareness of truth, to know an object is to know it as implicitly true. Truth cannot be taken simply as additional confirmation of what already is known indifferently. The second consequence is that there is no knowledge of objects as merely distinct and not otherwise related to one another. The known content must be explicitly coherent and not merely co-existent with other known contents. The third consequence is that interpretations of knowing in terms of feeling or willing do not amount to knowledge.

g. Analysis of error.

The author has devoted more attention to the problem of error than to that of truth. The first analysis is found in his Vedāntic tracts where we have explicitly the Śaṅkarite analysis of perceptual error or illusion. The second analysis—largely independent—is to be found in his CELP. The problem recurs also in SF and FS.

In analysing the phenomenon of illusion the author deals chiefly with the following problems :—(i) the stages constituting an illusion and its correction; (ii) the nature and status of the content that is corrected and (iii) the precise nature of the corrective process. The analysis, it is to be noted, is fundamentally on the lines of the Advaita-Vedānta school, though the author has always something of his own to say on a number of important points.

¹ C.P. 32-33.

² C.P. 39.

³ KT.

⁴ Ibid. 8.

In the first analysis, the stock Vedāntic example of mistaking a rope for a snake is analysed in three stages :—(a) The snake is presented and believed to be real. (b) The belief is corrected by the perception of the rope as rope. The objective snake of the first stage now loses its objectivity and persists only as a possible object. The past percept as a subjective fact is, however, not yet questioned. (c) The snake is contemplated not only as non-existent now but as non-existent even when it appeared to be perceived. *That* snake is no possible object and there is a doubt even about the past perception of it is a subjective fact. *That snake* is thus shorn of its objective reality in the second stage and of its reality either as objective or as subjective in the third stage. It is still given to us as a positive unthinkable and in absolute mockery of all thinking.

In the second analysis, the author makes out the following points. (i) The correction is an epistemic function without any unitary logical content. It cannot be adequately expressed by any single sentence like 'this that I believed as this snake is not snake'. It has to be expressed in two sentences. There is no unitary logical form to express correction. (ii) Falsity has no reference to the time-position of a cognition at all and what is taken as false cannot be specified in purely objective terms. (iii) Taking the disbelief implied in correction to be adequately expressed in the form 'this snake is not', the *this* in it would not mean a perceived substrate or the snake-character. *This*, here, is not even a believed substrate but only an imagined specification of an imagined snake. *This* in 'this snake' stands for no fact at all. The disbelief is absolute and is not capable of being expressed as a negative judgment. It cannot, again, be said that 'what *this* was believed to be was not presented, nor that it was presented as *this*'. 'I cannot now describe in objective terms what I then believed, nor can I say that there was only the subjective fact of contentless belief. I believed in a content that was neither fact nor absolute nought'.

So much for the author's analysis of error. He has also something to say about the relation between the false and the subjective. According to him, the consciousness of the false and the consciousness of the subjective imply one another. The false is what is corrected and disbelieved. The content said to be disbelieved cannot be expressed except as 'what was believed'. Correction has thus to be taken as a form of reflective consciousness. Again, the consciousness of the subjective is consciousness of a belief. There is no consciousness of a subjectivity that is not consciousness of a content referred to fact. Now the consciousness of belief is the consciousness of hav-

ing the belief *as past* for present rejection or re-affirmation and is never a mere non-committal consciousness of the content as merely subsistent.

III. THEORY OF THE SUBJECT AND GRADES OF COGNITIONAL FREEDOM.

a. *Theory of the Subject.*

The subject or the self is conceived after Advaita-Vedānta as consciousness and is interpreted as free-function or freedom. This, according to the author, is Kant's view also. But while to Kant this self is only thinkable and is never knowable, to Krishnachandra it is never literally thinkable though it is knowable. It is not, however, ordinarily known in itself, though the possibility of its knowledge will have to be admitted.

That the self is not literally thinkable follows from the author's definition of 'thought' which, in his view, must *mean* or refer to some object. Since the subject is other than the object and the object is just what is meant, the subject cannot be a meant something. That the subject cannot be anything meant follows also from the author's conception of 'meaning'. A word is taken to *mean* something when the speaker and the hearer could use the word to understand the self-same entity. But the word 'I' cannot be so used. As used it has a uniquely singular reference.

Though the subject is not the object, it is somehow found blended with the latter. The object is given in various stages and correspondingly there are various grades of subjectivity. Spiritual realisation is the realisation of these different grades as dissociated from the object.

The subject as consciousness is not, as has just been stated, realised in its purity in common consciousness. It is, however, recognised to be present throughout the different stages of objectivity. In his *The Subject as freedom*, the author makes an attempt to trace out in detail these different grades of subjectivity. What follows here is largely a summary, practically in the author's own words, of his general position as developed in this treatise.

b. *Grades of cognitional freedom.*

There are three broad stages of subjectivity :—(A) the bodily, (B) the psychical and (C) the spiritual.

(A) The subject is primarily intended by the word 'I' and as the body is identified with the 'I' it is permissible to speak of the

'bodily subject'. The bodily stage has three substages :—(i) the body as externally perceived, (ii) the body as internally felt and (iii) the absence of object known as a present fact. In the bodily or sub-psychic stage, the body as observed and felt is the subject in relation to the environment. (i) Though the body represents a stage of being of the subject, yet one's own body, even as a perceived object, has a unique singularity. The objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their space-position relatively to the percipient's body. It is not, however, so with the percipient's own body which is in this sense dissociated from the external world. A person's own body is uniquely different from other perceived objects and has no place in the objective world that he conceives to be presentable to him. Even if the subject is taken as nothing but one's own perceived body, it involves knowledge of something that cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible object in the merely objectivistic attitude. (ii) There is the awareness of the body from within in the 'feeling of the body'. The felt body cannot be distinguished from the perceived body though the latter is distinguished from the former. The felt body is, in this sense, potentially dissociated from the perceived body. It is, again, imperfectly dissociated from the perceived object and the latter is fully distinguished from the former. The feeling of detachment from the object is the feeling of freedom and the first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body. (iii) There is such a thing as a sense-conditioned cognition of an absent object, or of the absence of an object. It is not ordinary perception and is yet undissociated from it. It is a kind of imaginative perception conditioned by conscious non-perception of that which is cognised. The subject that imaginatively perceives the absence of an object is, like the felt body, not consciously dissociated from the perceived body; but the subject that knows absence through conscious non-perception is consciously dissociated from it. Conscious non-perception is thus a transitional stage between body-feeling and imagination with which the psychical stage begins.

(B) The psychical stage has four substages :—(i) image, (ii) idea-image, (iii) pictorial idea and (iv) non-pictorial idea. The image of the object whose absence is known in conscious non-perception marks the transition to the psychic stage. The image appears as a substantive something from which the object is distinct. The psychic stage begins when attention is shifted from the objective fact of absence to the image. As attended to, (i) the image appears as imaging or the forming of a form, the process and the product being

presented at once. The consciousness of the form as evident in the forming process and as a product that does not yet come in time *after* it is (ii) the idea as undissociated from the image. A later stage is (iii) the idea as dissociated from the image; it is pictorial thought which wants to be imaged and is definite so far as it is imaged. (iv) Non-pictorial thought comes next. It is thought that is definite in itself and has properly no image, though an image may serve as its symbol. These grades of image and thought are the grades of presentation which is explicitly felt to be dissociated from the object. Such dissociated presentation is known in introspection to have no space-position and is at least not known to have time-position. The image still appears, however, as though it has spatial form and to be forming as though it were a temporal process. Some trace of this quasi-temporal process may persist in thought, but thought as a non-pictorial meaning is felt to be free from it and to be eternally complete. Still such meaning appears as though it were object. Its presentational character is explicitly indicated by the consciousness of the absence of accomplished meaning in the phenomenon of *trying to think*. This may be taken as pointing to the positive freedom from objective meaning such as characterises non-presentational or spiritual subjectivity.

(C) Spiritual subjectivity has three substages :—(i) feeling, (ii) introspection and (iii) beyond introspection.

(i) Feeling.—The introspective awareness of meaning as distinct from the image is awareness of the explicitly unobjective. Feeling is also explicitly unobjective. The consciousness of the merely unknown as distinct from what is known as object that is also unknown is 'feeling'. It is purely subjective in the sense that there is no conscious reference to object even in the way of dissociation from it. In introspection into feeling, the distinction of feeling from its presentative content is appreciated as definitely not known but only felt and symbolised. With this awareness of meaning as the symbol of feeling, the objective reference lapses altogether.

Feeling is the positive consciousness of detachment from meaning. It is the awareness of a content as *unmeant*. But as it is non-denial of a possible meaning, it is not without the persisting will to objectification. When a feeling has purged itself of this will, there is the awareness not merely of the unmeant but of the unmeanable as well. This is exemplified from the analysis of the experience of the illusory. The content there is the 'indescribable'. Two stages of feeling can thus be distinguished : the lower stage where there is free-

dom from actual thought and the higher stage where there is freedom from possible thought.

The feeling of not having a feeling is itself a feeling : it is the feeling of a feeling. We are aware of the un-meanable in two stages, as the meant unmeanable and as the mere function of meaning. The knowledge implied in the former is of a contradiction while that implied in the latter is not of anything : it is merely knowing. The feeling of feeling is the former kind of awareness, while the latter is just introspection which is the pure knowing *function* and is a complete detachment from felt being.

(ii) Introspection.—Introspection into feeling implies the possible detachment from the being of feeling. This possible detachment from all distinct being is introspective awareness. The self is taken by Kant as the thinking function and also as an accomplished meaning. But in the author's view, the self is identified with the function of introspection and detached from thinking and feeling. It is the first person 'I' which is neither meanable nor unmeanable. The word 'I' has a meaning-function but not a meaning. It is the expression of introspection or the I-function. The meaning function of the word 'I' is to the speaker his actual introspection, but the understanding of the word by the hearer is indicative of a form of consciousness subtler than introspection. It is the awareness of a possible introspection.

(iii) Beyond introspection.—Actual introspection is unrealised knowledge because it is actually only self-evidencing to another and not self-evident to itself. One's own self should be self-evident and should be intuited by oneself even as it is intuited by another. The self should be at once self-evidencing and self-evident, but as a matter of fact the self is self-evidencing and evident to another. The other self is to the self-evidencing self a possible introspector whose intuition of the latter is a possible intuition to the latter. The awareness of these possibles in oneself indicates the necessity of a spiritual discipline of realisation of the self already implied by introspection.

Introspection into the awareness of a possible subjective state is a possible or imaginary introspection. It is half-dissociated from the actually introspective self. Complete dissociation from this actual awareness is reached when the content of it is a subjective state that is illusory. There are actually illusions about the subjective just as there are illusions about the objective.

Ordinarily, introspection is the awareness of a subjective fact as owing its facthood to itself and is, in this sense, its appropriator. But

there are experiences where one gets the hint of an introspection that is not appropriative. This kind of introspection would be self-intuition. The possibility of a silent self-enjoying 'I' is intelligible only because we are aware of certain subjective modes previously appropriated as utterly unappropriable and as appearing only as though they are distinct. The absolute intuitable self is only understood if the non-being of distinction is understood. This non-being is finally understood in the awareness of subjective illusion which is the explicit awareness creating a distinction that is no fact at all.

c. *The Subject as Freedom.*

It is in introspection that we are aware of the demand for the consummation of the freedom that is felt in every grade of subjectivity in respect of the object presented to it. The introspective subject is free from possible objectivity and is thus freedom itself. But it knows itself not as itself but as a distinct subject that is only possibly identical with itself. It is thus aware of a demand to know this subject as *actually* itself. This demand is for the intuition of the subject as absolute freedom. The subject is understood as freedom that is real. The idea of realising the subject arises only because we are identified with the body while we are introspectively aware of ourselves as not objective and yet as definitely positive. We do not *know* ourselves as dissociated from the object, yet we are aware of a possible dissociation or freedom. Actual freedom from the object is *known* in some measure in bodily subjectivity. In higher stages, there is only the *feeling* of it. The higher the stage of subjectivity, the less is the freedom felt to be achieved though the more assured is the faith in its achievability. In the introspective stage, the feeling of achieved freedom lapses altogether, but the faith in its achievability is completely assured.

IV. THEORY OF THE TRINAL ABSOLUTE.

Although the term 'absolute' in the sense of the unconditioned or the non-relative occurs frequently in the earlier writings of Krishnachandra, a distinctive theory of the absolute is to be found only in two of his later writings, viz., '*The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms*' and '*The Concept of Philosophy*'. The present account is based chiefly on the former. In CAAF, the absolute is defined as 'what is free from the implicational dualism of content and consciousness'. The definition requires to be clarified. Consciousness is always the consciousness of a content and we are reflectively aware of the

content as distinct from and in necessary reference to consciousness. This peculiar relation between content and consciousness is described as 'implicational dualism'. An entity that is free from such dualism would be an entity that is distinct but not in necessary reference to consciousness. Such an entity seems to be what the writer designates as the absolute. Now, as consciousness is of three kinds—knowing, feeling and willing—the implicatory distinction is also threefold. There are, again, three ways in which freedom from this distinction can be understood : (a) the content may be freed from its reference to consciousness and we have *truth*—the absolute for knowing; (b) consciousness may be freed from the content and we have *freedom* of the will—the absolute for willing; (c) the implicational relation of content and consciousness may be freed from their distinction as a unity and we have *value*—the absolute for feeling. In the case of knowing, the absolute would be a content that has to be understood as what need not be the content of any knowing, i.e., as utterly unrelated to knowing. In the case of willing, the reality of willing has to be understood as the negation of being or of an emergent distinct. In the case of feeling, the being of value has to be understood as a being from which known being is distinct; it is to entertain an indifference of being and non-being. All the three—unrelatedness, negation of the emergent and the indifference of being and non-being—are unmeaning modes of negation to reflection. But to admit the absolute in any form is to admit a negation that is unintelligible to the logic of the understanding.

The absolute has to be formulated in a triple way. It is meaningless to assert, however, that there are three absolutes or one absolute, for the absolute is not a *known* content and it is only about anything known that the question 'one or many' has any meaning. There is no sense, again, in speaking of the absolute as the unity of truth, freedom and value.

It will be seen that the absolute of Krishnachandra's conception is not the same as the overpersonal reality that is enjoyed in religion. It means what the subject 'I' is not. It is a positively believed entity that is only negatively understood. It is an entity that cannot be understood as it is believed and is speakable only by way of symbolism.

The absolute as transcending the enjoyed reality of religion is positive being (truth) or positive non-being (freedom) or their positive indetermination (value). In the author's opinion, the absolute is conceived as truth in Advaita-Vedānta, as freedom in Buddhist nihilism' and as value in Hegel.

The absolute, it has been said, has to be formulated in a triple

way as truth, freedom and value. Each is absolute, but what are here understood as *three* are only their verbal symbols : they themselves are understood together but not *as* together.

The author describes the mutual relation between truth, value and freedom as 'alternation', and employing the term, 'reality' to mean freedom, he offers the following explanation. "... it appears meaningless to speak of truth as value, of value as real or of reality as true; while we can significantly speak of value as not false, of reality as not valueless or of truth as not unreal, although we cannot positively assert value to be truth, reality to be value and truth to be reality. . . . In one direction their identity and difference are alike meaningless and in another direction their identity is intelligible though not assertable. Truth is unrelated to value, value to reality and reality to truth; while value may be truth, reality value and truth reality. The absolute may be regarded in this sense as an alternation of truth, value and reality". For further clarification of this relation, the reader is referred to sections 44 to 47 of CAAF.

It appears that 'alternation' in the present context is not merely epistemic, and truth, freedom and value are not just alternative descriptions of the absolute. 'Alternation' in the author's view appears to be constitutive of the absolute. But if, as the author holds, it is *meaningless* to assert that the absolute is one or many, it is difficult to see how the absolute can be asserted to be of the nature of an 'alternation' in the ordinary sense of either-or, or in any other extraordinary sense that can be conceived.

The above is a quite imperfect and inadequate report of the major aspects of the philosophy of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya. It will be seen that though it is possible to recognise traces of Vedāntic or Kantian influence here and there, the philosophy as a whole is remarkably original. There are undeniably obscure points which the editor would have liked to clarify if he could. But despite this occasional obscurity, in going through these studies there is the ineradicable feeling that one is in the presence of an extra-ordinarily powerful and wonderfully inventive mind.

THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM

PREFACE

This book is a revised and slightly amplified form of the lectures delivered by the author at the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner in 1929.

The subject or subjectivity is conceived here after Vedānta as conscious freedom or felt detachment from the object. The general standpoint in its orientation to modern thought is indicated in the two introductory sections. The stages of freedom from objectivity as elaborated in the rest of the book may be taken to constitute a rough sketch of transcendental psychology, conceived as the legitimate substitute for the so-called metaphysic of the soul.

ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

THE NOTION OF SUBJECTIVITY (SEC. 1—24)

(1) The 'object' is what is meant by the 'subject', and the subject is other than the object. The subject cannot, therefore, be a meant entity, yet it cannot be denied that there is some awareness of the subject. This awareness must then be something other than meaning-awareness. (2-3) (i) A word is said to *mean* an entity or produce a meaning-awareness when the speaker of the word and its hearer could use that word to understand the self-same entity. The word 'I' cannot be so used. It cannot then be said to *mean* anything. Yet it is undoubtedly understood by the hearer. This understanding is thus produced through the word but not through the meaning of the word. (ii) Again, the communicating act of the speaker is never a part of what is meant by a word. But when a person uses the word 'I', it is not his self only but the self as speaking or expressing itself that is understood. His self-consciousness is not merely expressed but is also *incarnated* in the word. (4) The term 'I', as *used* has a uniquely singular reference, but as *understood* it is general. It is thus unlike a term meaning an objective content which has the same reference to the hearer as to the speaker. What is meant by 'this' is not what is conveyed by 'I', though the latter may be indicated by 'this'. (5-8) The object is meant by 'this' and the subject is indicated by the three personal pronouns. There are six possible equations of 'this' with the three personal pronouns. But of these six possibles, three (*viz.*, 'this is I' 'this is you' and 'he is this') are not believed, and the three that are believed (*viz.*, 'I am this', 'you are this', and 'this is he') represent a felt but not a known content. None of the six equations is thus logically intelligible. (9) The object is known as distinct from the subject while the subject is known in itself. The subject is not known as related to the object : it is at best dissociated from the object with which it was identified. (10) The subject understood as the unique speaker of 'I' and the object that is meant as distinct from the subject are the two things that are known. But the object is not known with the same assurance as the subject. The unreality of an object or that

which is meant is perfectly intelligible : it is meaningless, however, to speak of the unreality of the subject. But the subject as a known fact is always a spoken fact unlike the object which may be known without being named.

(11) There is properly no metaphysic of the subject. The awareness of the subject is midway between mystic intuition and the consciousness of a meaning. The exposition of it is, accordingly, midway between mysticism and metaphysic. As, however, the subject is communicable by speech, it cannot be taken as falling outside philosophical enquiry. (12) The attitude of metaphysics is objective. It seeks to know reality as distinct from the knowing of it. Knowing is not known as a distinct fact, being only distinct through the self-conscious act of distinguishing it. To realise that the distinctness of knowing is entirely through the distinguishing of it is to realise knowing as a self-evidencing fact. (13) There is nevertheless the belief in the facthood of knowing as a 'function' i.e., as a positive something which can be literally expressed only in the negative way as what the known object is not. The awareness of this unmeant something involves, however, a higher certitude than the belief in the meant object. The knowing 'function' is only as the free reference of the subject to the object. (14) This felt reference is the positive freedom of the subject having different felt modes—like knowing, feeling or being—which can be symbolised by objective meanings. (15) In speaking of its function, the subject believes in it neither as meant nor as unmeant but as being constructed as fact by being spoken. The speaking creation of a system of subjective functions constitutes a study other than metaphysics and Epistemology.

(16) This new study may be called Spiritual or Transcendental Psychology which elaborates the believed facthood of the subjective functions into a system of symbolisms. The symbolism is the form of the non-theoretic or spiritually practical mode of escaping the objective knowing attitude and of cultivating a subjective attitude. Spiritual psychology symbolises the subjective attitude by the objective attitude from which it seeks to be freed. (17) The distinguishing of 'knownness' as an abstraction from the known object is *psychological* introspection and the consciousness of the subjective functions of 'knowing' etc., as other than this abstraction may be called *spiritual* introspection. These functions represent the modes of freedom from the corresponding psychological abstractions, and the philosophical study of these functions may be called Spiritual psychology. (18-19) The metaphysical problem—what it is in the object that determines its

known appearance—is only a problem in meaning and is outside the scope of spiritual psychology. The business of such a Psychology is two-fold : (a) to interpret Empirical psychological in terms of the felt and believed freedom of the subject from objectivity; (b) to elaborate modes of freedom that have no reference to object at all and thus to assign a place to spiritual mysticism. (20) Kant's Critical philosophy may be taken as a disguised form of Spiritual psychology as thus conceived. But the Kantian epistemology does not abandon the objective procedure of metaphysics and the sciences, and it thus misleads so far as it presents the function as an objective meaning and does not recognise that it is believed without being meant. (21) The persisting objective attitude of Kant explains his disbelief in the possibility of a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason through which self-knowledge may be attained.

(22) According to Kant, the self can only be thought and not known. The view presented here is that the subject is known though neither thought nor intuited. The subject is known by itself and believed as relating to the object, the modes of relating being the modes of freedom from objectivity. (23) Spiritual progress means the realisation of the subject as free. According to some, this realisation involves a specific activity of the subject. There is a demand for some kind of activity of the subject towards itself. There is the demand that the subjective function of knowing which is only believed and not known as fact has to be known as the self-evidencing reality of the subject itself. This would be the supreme method of cognitive inwardising. (24) The possibility of such a method has to be exhibited in spiritual psychology. The steps involved in the method should correspond to a gradation of subjective functions or modes of freedom from the object. The stages of freedom are in the following order : (a) Bodily subjectivity; (b) Presentational subjectivity; (c) Non-presentational or Spiritual subjectivity. Each of these stages would comprise substages. The elaboration of these stages of freedom in Spiritual psychology would suggest the possibility of a consecutive method of realising the subject as absolute freedom.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHIC FACT (SEC. 25-56)

(25) Psychological introspection is the process of abstraction from the object of its modes of relatedness to the subject. This relatedness viewed as a character of the object is the so-called psychiç

fact. 'Knownness' as one such psychic fact is a floating adjective like beauty and is an abstraction of the second degree. (26-30) Psychic fact is a character of the object and is bound up with object-cognition. (a) What does not involve *knowledge* of object is no psychic fact. (b) Again, what introspection does not reveal is no psychic fact. The consciousness of the imaginary is not revealed in introspection : it is not, therefore, a psychic fact. The feeling of an object that is believed to be illusory cannot also be asserted to be a psychic fact. (31-32) A mode of consciousness like the above is only a *fringe* of some psychic fact. The fringe may epistemologically be primary or secondary in respect of the psychic fact but it never stands by itself.

(33) A psychic fact involves not merely the *belief* in an objective fact but also the *knowledge* of it. Knowledge as distinct from mere belief involves the awareness of the distinction of the object believed from the belief. This distinction is just what is called 'presentation' of the object in which while the object is *given* distinct from the presentation, the presentation is only abstracted from the object. (34-37) Perceptual knowledge and perceptual illusion represent two extreme cases of this relation between presentation and object; and intermediate between perceptual knowledge and perceptual illusion are the other forms of knowledge involving a conscious distinction of the known object from its presentation. The distinctness of the object from the presentation does not, however, mean the distinctness of the presentation from its object.

(38) There are different grades of non-perceptual knowledge implying different modes of presentation, e.g., the knowledge of the body from within, the immediate apprehension of absence, memory, constructive imagination and inference. (39) Perception as the actual standard of knowledge not only lends the cognitive character to the other modes of apprehension but also prevents them from reaching their ideal completion. The objects of the non-perceptual modes of knowledge are adjectival characters of the perceptually knowable object. They are, however, necessarily symbolised as substantive by objective metaphors.

(40-41) In perceptual knowledge, though the presentation is not known as distinct from the object, yet it is believed or symbolised as what should be distinct. The psychic fact or the presentation is thus not accomplished as fact but only to be accomplished as such. As such the presentation may be said to be known as unknown and as to be known as object. (42) The complete accomplishment of psychic facthood is conceivable as implying presentation that is wholly turned

into known object. It would mean the conscious objectivity of what in presentation is more than the sense-given object or the *metaphysical*. (43) The Kantian objection that the appearance of objectivity of the metaphysical element is only illusory cannot be accepted. The appearance is incomplete but not illusory and the demand to know it is quite legitimate. (44-45) To take the metaphysical as merely illusory is to assume the object to be alone knowable and to be incapable of being *known* freely. It is to deny the facthood of the constructive function by which the perceivable object comes to be for the subject. (46) The distinction of the object that is non-perceptually known from its knownness is just its character of being unknown. The known object is thus a problem to all knowledge other than the perceptual one. Non-perceptual knowledge is knowledge of the object as phenomenal with belief in a reality constituting it.

(47-49) To know the phenomenon is not *not* to know the reality but to know it as unknown. The knowledge of the unknown as such is the pre-condition as much of moral or aesthetic realisation as of cognitive realisation. (50) The knowledge of the unknown is what starts the actual problem of realisation whether in the cognitive or in the non-cognitive direction. The non-cognitive mode does not demand the belief that it is the only mode and that the cognitive mode implies a fanatical conceit or a theosophic illusion. Any denial of the cognitive mode would argue the impossibility of the non-cognitive modes as well. (51-52) To Kant, the metaphysical reality is only thought and is not really knowable. We agree that the introspective awareness of the metaphysical in the presentation is not knowledge of knowing but is only imagination of knowing the metaphysical. There is no question of turning this imagined knowing into actual knowing by sense-perception. It can be actualised, if at all, by the concreting activity of imagination itself. In this cognitive realisation, the metaphysical would have to be known as that of which the object is a free efflux and the empirical would have to be known not by being given but by the self-shining, substantively existent cognition of it.

(53-54) Psychic fact ordinarily appears as more concrete than objective fact only in promise and not in actuality. It does not, however, appear as co-ordinate with objective fact: it is what should be more real but is actually less real. The psychic is more concrete than the object in the sense that it can freely put forth the lesser reality. Nature is to the Psyche a magic or playful appearance. (55-56) The ordinary view of the psychic as co-ordinate with the object, the Hegelian view of it as comprehending the object as a real element and the

theory of an experience-unity of subject and object have to be definitely rejected. The duality of psychic fact and objective fact is not again secured any better by making a distinction between the 'enjoying' and the 'contemplative' modes of knowing. The duality is not *known* but is only a symbolism for the felt dissociation of the psychic fact from the object.

CHAPTER III

BODILY SUBJECTIVITY (SEC. 57-66)

THE BODY AS PERCEIVED AND FELT

(57) Perceptual knowledge is not directly the object of introspection and is not a psychic fact. There is, however, an awareness of the 'subject' even in this sub-psychic stage. The body as observed and felt is here the subject in relation to the environment. (58) Though the body represents a stage of being of the subject, yet one's own body, even as a perceived object, has a unique singularity. The objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their space-position relatively to the percipient's body. It is not, however, so in the case of the percipient's own body which is in this sense dissociated from the external world. (59) One's own body is uniquely different from other perceived objects and has no place in the objective world that he conceives to be presentable to him as a solipsistic observer. Even if the subject is taken as nothing but one's own perceived body, it involves knowledge of something that cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible object in the merely objectivistic attitude. It implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which subjectivity consists.

(60-62) One's own body is not only perceived from outside : one is sensuously aware of it also from within in the 'feeling of the body'. This body-awareness is indeed sensuous, but it can hardly be called 'sense-perception'. The felt body cannot be distinguished from the perceived body though the latter is distinguished from the former. (63) The relation between the felt body and the perceived body is similar to the relation of presentation and its object in non-perceptual knowledge. There is, however, the difference that introspection into such knowledge is possible because the presentation is felt to be dissociated from the object, while there is no introspection into body-feeling, as we are not aware of it as dissociated from the perceived body. Body-feeling may, accordingly, be regarded as not psychic fact but the

potentiality of it. (64-65) The relations of body-feeling to (i) psychic fact, (ii) introspection of psychic fact, (iii) perceived body and to (iv) perceived object may here be considered. (i) The felt body is only half-distinguished from psychic fact and the latter is only potentially dissociated from the felt body. (ii) In introspection into psychic fact, this potential dissociation becomes imperfectly actual and the felt body begins to get resolved into a bodiless psychic feeling. (iii) The felt body is potentially dissociated from the perceived body because the latter is only half-distinguished from the former. (iv) The felt body is imperfectly dissociated from the perceived object and the latter is fully distinguished from the former.

(66) The feeling of detachment from the object is the feeling of freedom and the first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body. This first given feeling is what all freedom of higher grade involves. Subjectivity apart from spiritual discipline is rooted in body-feeling. The realisation of freedom from the felt body is the pre-condition of all distinctive spiritual activity.

CHAPTER IV

BODILY SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.) (SEC. 67-79)

KNOWLEDGE OF ABSENCE AS A PRESENT FACT

(67-68) Like the feeling of the body, the perception of absence as a present fact is a fringe of object-perception. In both, again, there is a feeling of detachment. The feeling of the body is a detachment from the perceived object other than the perceived body. The direct knowledge of the present absence of an object is a detachment both from the perceived object and the perceived body but not from the felt body. (69) The sense-conditioned cognition of absence is not ordinary perception and is yet undissociated from it. The cognition is a fringe either of the perception of the locus or of the perception of the body and is in either case undissociated from the feeling of the body.

(70) Two cases of a direct cognition of absence in a locus may be distinguished : (a) one of the *absence* of an object and (b) the other of an object as being absent. Neither cognition need imply the other, yet each may develop into the other cognition. The two are, therefore, distinct; and each as primary may involve the other as secondary. (71) In (a), the perceived locus of absence is imagined

in the very perception of it as without the absence, and the absence is thus only a floating adjective that is felt to be dissociated from the locus. There is a suggestion of the absence being outside the space where the locus stands and of its being *nowhere* though it is believed to be objective fact. The suggestion is not actual imagination of positionless objective fact but only the feeling of detachment from objective space. This sort of perception of absence may be called aesthetic or imaginative perception. (72) In (b), the knowledge of the fact of a particular object as absent is present with the conscious imagination of the object as found being distinct from it as absent. It thus implies the feeling of the present fact being outside objective space altogether. Such knowledge may also be called imaginative perception. (73-74) The primary cognition of absence may be followed by the secondary cognition of the absent; and the primary cognition of the absent may be followed by the secondly cognition of absence. The secondary cognition in each case is not imaginative perception and has to be recognised as a new mode of knowledge called conscious non-perception.

(77) The relation of these two modes of cognition, viz., imaginative perception and conscious non-perception, with the apprehension of the body is remarkable. The primary is related to the perception of the body as the secondary is related to the feeling of the body. (78) The relation of the perceived body in imaginative perception and of the felt body in conscious non-perception to the known absence is like the relation of the perceived body to the felt body. (79) Conscious non-perception is a transitional stage between body-feeling and imagination with which psychic fact begins. It is free from space but not from the present. It is the distinguishing of the present from the detached presentation and is the immediate pre-condition of the felt detachment of the presentation from the present. Starting with object-perception as the actual standard of knowledge, the first clear hint of the subjective fact would be realised in the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHIC SUBJECTIVITY (SEC. 80-93)

THE IMAGE

(80-81) It cannot be denied that the image appears presented as a substantive something from which the object is distinct. It

cannot also be denied that the image is a fact in a sense in which the object is not. The nature of facthood appears to change with different grades of fact. (82) (a) The facthood of the perceived object is constituted by position relatively to the percipient's body. (b) The lack of this relative perceived position is what constitutes the facthood of one's perceived body. (83) (c) Interiority or felt space constitutes the facthood of the *felt body*. (84) (d) Perceived *absence* as a fact is on a level with the felt body though its position is on the level of the perceived body. (85) (e) Absence that is known by conscious non-perception is not known as with position, though it cannot be said to be known as without position.

(86) The image has to be compared to absence. While absence as in (e) is not known with position, the image is known to be without position. Again, absence is known as *now*, while the image is not known as *now*. The image has thus no space-position and it cannot be asserted to have a time-position. (87) In the perception of the object, in the perception of one's own body and in imaginative perception of absence, the image involved is not felt to be dissociated from the percept. In the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception, the image of the absent object is felt to be dissociated from the felt body but not from the present absence. But in imagination as a free psychic fact even the present absence is distinguished from the image. (88-89) The image proper is not known to be in time and is not felt dissociated from the present absence though it is potentially dissociated. The potential dissociation of the image from the *now* is realised in thought. (90) The image appears as a ghostly object. Its awareness is bound up with the perceiving attitude and is not introspective. (91) The distinguishing the object from the presentation is a phase of object-knowledge. The presentation as thus distinguished from is an indefinite quasi-object, and except in its lowest phase an image is felt also as not in time. In the thought of an objective fact, however, the meaning which is the presentation is not only not referred to time, its existence in time is meaningless.

(92) When the image is introspectively attended to, it changes its character and appears as imagining, as being formed though not as unformed, as functional without ceasing to be substantive. (93) The forming or the incomplete character of the image is not like the incomplete character of a perceived object. The incompleteness of a percept is in reference to a fuller percept: the image, however, is incomplete in itself. The image under introspection is a standing

process where the forming is not chronologically prior to the form and yet appears distinct from the form which is its interpretation. The consciousness of the finished form that interprets the forming is called the *idea* which as dissociated from the image would be the next psychic stage.

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHIC SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.) (SEC. 94-100)

THOUGHT

(94-95) The idea of an object that cannot be defined or con-creted into image is thought proper that is definite in itself and is fixed in the mind by the images it may call up. It is other than pictorial thought which lies between the definite form and the definite intelligible and its object is definitely presented as unpicturable meaning. (96) The image implies a belief in its possible objectivity but thought involves a complete detachment from objectivity, though it is still about the object. (97) Non-pictorial thought which is definite independently of the image may be sought to be metaphorically or symbolically indicated by the image. Thought in its higher grade is detained in the mind by the word and not by its figurative representation. (98) Thought as distinct from the forming image under introspection is a completed product. It is complete as dissociated altogether from time and is in this sense eternal. Still it is about the object and as such should be called a presentation. (99-100) Thought is attained meaning and that it is a presentation comes out if it is contrasted to possible meaning which is exemplified in our consciousness of *trying* to think. This trying to think is beyond thought or meaning and is beyond all presentation.

CHAPTER VII

SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY (SEC. 101-111)

FEELING

(101) The introspective awareness of meaning as distinct from the image is awareness of the explicitly unobjective. Feeling is also explicitly unobjective. It is not, however, merely negative but positive as *subjective* fact without any reference to objective fact. The consciousness of the merely unknown as distinct from what is known as

object that is also unknown is feeling. It is purely subjective in the sense that there is no conscious reference to object even in the way of dissociation from it. Feeling, again, involves belief in the unmeant as a distinct content. (102) In the awareness of thought, the content of thought appears distinct from thought, but in the awareness of feeling, the unthought content of feeling appears as only distinct in itself and not as distinct from feeling. Again, while thought or other psychic fact is believed to exist outside introspection, feeling is never outside introspection as a merely conscious fact.

(103) Introspection into feeling is an awareness of the feeling as apparently distinct from the awareness. But while introspection into psychic fact is a *distinguishing* of the fact which appeared undistinguished from itself, that into feeling is an *identifying* of the feeling which appeared to be outside introspection. Feeling is bound up with thought and imagination and is the awareness of their detachment as presentation from their objects. In introspection into feeling, the distinction of feeling from its presentative content is appreciated as definitely not known but only felt and symbolised. With this awareness of meaning as the symbol of feeling, the objective reference lapses altogether. Feeling as detached from meaning is awareness of the meaning as its symbolism and may be taken as implicitly introspective. (104) If feeling represents the complete dissociation from objectivity, willing means the free identification with objectivity. Willing starts as the free or playful expression of feeling. The freedom from thought is as much a progress as a regress, as much a willing as a feeling. With the cancellation of the objective attitude, there is the consciousness of being free, of being unrestricted by the object, whether for withdrawal from it in feeling or for conquest over it in willing. (105) Knowing means freedom both from blindness and from error. The freedom implied in knowledge means the outgoing of the positive attitude of not knowing, of conscious entertainment of the unknown—which is feeling—and of *conscious* projection of objectivity—which is willing.

(106-107) Feeling is the positive consciousness of detachment from meaning. It is the awareness of a content as *unmeant*. But as it is non-denial of a possible meaning, it is not without the persisting will to objectification. When a feeling has purged itself of this will, we have the awareness not merely of the unmeant but of the unmeaningable. This is exemplified from the analysis of the experience of the illusory. The content there is the 'indescribable.' (108) Two stages of feeling can thus be distinguished: the lower stage where there is freedom from actual thought and the higher stage where there is

freedom from possible thought. The lower grade is the feeling of self-being and the higher grade is one of self-negation. (109-110) The feeling of not having a feeling is itself a feeling. It can only be characterised as the feeling of a feeling. It is not introspection but the stage prior to it. It is the self-negation of feeling and is already the attitude of knowledge of what is neither felt nor unfelt, or of the unmeanable. (111) We are aware of the unmeanable in two stages, as the meant unmeanable and as the mere function of meaning. The knowledge implied in the former is of a contradiction while that implied in the latter is not of anything, being merely knowing. The feeling of feeling is the former kind of awareness, while the latter is just introspection which is the pure knowing function and is a complete detachment from felt being.

CHAPTER VIII

SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.) (SEC. 112-119)

INTROSPECTION

(112) The introspective awareness of a psychic fact is the awareness of its *distinction from object* and, therefore, of its distinction in itself also as existing apart from introspection. The introspective awareness of a feeling proper, on the other hand, is the knowledge of its *distinction in itself* only and is the recognition of the distinction as being entirely through introspection. (113) Introspection into feeling is just the function of meaning the feeling. It is a subjectivity that is detached both from being and negation, and it is positive as *freedom*. It is the positive of which the negation is not even tried to be meant. It is something which can only be sought to be impugned by the imaginary problem of conceiving its negation and is, therefore, never actually impugned. (114-115) The object and every subjective fact that is introspectively believed is capable of being doubted, but introspection as a function of believing or meaning which is not itself meant even as the unmeanable is not actually doubtable. It is just the first person 'I' and is not a believing in the 'I'. It is simply the function of speaking.

(116) Introspection into feeling implies the possible detachment from the being of feeling. This possible detachment from all distinct being is introspective awareness and is the conscious identity without being of the self. (117) The self is taken by Kant as the thinking function and also as an accomplished meaning. But here the

self has been identified with the function of introspection and has been taken to be detached from thinking and feeling. The self is a believing which is a self-knowing. (118) The self is the first person 'I'. The 'I' is neither meanable nor unmeanable. The word 'I' has a meaning-function but not a meaning. It is the expression of introspection or the I-function. (119) The meaning function of the word 'I' is to the speaker his actual introspection, but the understanding of the word by the hearer is indicative of a form of consciousness subtler than introspection. It is the awareness of a possible introspection.

CHAPTER IX

SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.) (SEC. 120-126)

BEYOND INTROSPECTION

(120) The word 'I' has no meaning either to the speaker or to the hearer and yet it stands like any other word for the same thing to both. This 'standing for' is not only not meaning but not also mere symbolising. The word 'I' may be said at once to symbolise and to be symbolised by my introspective self. It is this characteristic of a word other than its meaning-value or merely symbolising value that indicates a grade of self-consciousness higher than our actual introspection. (121) Actual introspection is unrealised knowledge because it is actually only self-evidencing to another and not self-evident to itself. One's own self should be self-evident and should be intuited by oneself even as it is intuited by another. The self should be at once self-evidencing and self-evident, but so far we have only the self as self-evidencing and evident to another. (122) The other self is to the self-evidencing self a possible introspector whose intuition of the latter is a possible intuition to the latter. The awareness of these possibles in oneself indicates the necessity of a spiritual discipline of realisation of the self already implied by introspection.

(123) Introspection into a possible mental state involves understanding of a word meaning the mental state. To mean a mental state is not, however, to think it but to remember it, to want it or to dreamily wish it. All these may be regarded as a stage of introspection prior to the introspection into an actual mental state and are capable of being themselves introspected into.

(124-125) Introspection into the awareness of a possible subjective state is possible or imaginary introspection and is half-disso-

ciated from the actually introspective self. Complete dissociation from this actual awareness is reached when the content of it is a subjective state that is illusory. There are actual illusions about the subjective just as there are illusions about the objective.

(126) Ordinarily, introspection is the awareness of a subjective fact as owing its facthood to itself and is in this sense the appropriator of it. But there are experiences where one gets the hint of an introspection that is not appropriative. This kind of introspection would be self-intuition. The possibility of a silent self-enjoying 'I' is intelligible only because we are aware of certain subjective modes previously appropriated as utterly unappropriable and as appearing only as though they are distinct. The absolute intuitable self is only understood if the non-being of distinction is understood. The non-being of distinction is finally understood in the awareness of subjective illusion which is the explicit awareness *creating* a distinction that is no fact at all.

CHAPTER X

THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM (SEC. 127-135)

(127) It is in introspection that we are aware of the demand for the consummation of the freedom that is felt in every grade of subjectivity in respect of the object presented to it. The introspective subject is free from possible objectivity and is thus freedom itself. But it knows itself not as itself but as a distinct subject that is only possibly identical with itself. It is thus aware of a demand to know this subject as *actually* itself. This demand is for the intuition of the subject as absolute freedom. (128) The subject is understood as freedom that is real. The idea of realising the subject arises only because we are actually indented with the body while we are introspectively aware of ourselves as not objective and yet as definitely positive. We do not *know* ourselves as undissociated from the object, yet we are aware of a possible dissociation or freedom. (129) Actual freedom from the object is *known* in some measure in bodily subjectivity. In higher stages there is only a *feeling* of it. The higher the stage of subjectivity, the less is the freedom felt to be achieved though the more assured is the faith in its achievability. In the introspective stage, the feeling of achieved freedom lapses altogether but the faith in its attainability is completely assured. (130-135) The three broad stages of subjectivity and the several substages under each stage recapitulated.

CHAPTER I

THE NOTION OF SUBJECTIVITY

1. Object is what is meant, including the object of sense-perception and all contents that have necessary reference to it. Object as the meant is distinguished from the subject or the subjective of which there is some awareness other than the meaning-awareness. The subjective cannot be a *meaningless* word: to be distinguished from, it must be a significant speakable and yet if it be a meant content, it would be but object. It can thus neither be asserted nor denied to be a meant content and what cannot be denied need not be assertable. Apparently, the significant speakable is wider than the meanable: a content to be communicated and understood need not be meant.

2. A meaning that is conveyed by a word must be intelligible to the hearer as what he would himself convey by the word. What the speaker means by a word must be capable of being meant by the hearer if he were to use it. The word *this* as used by a speaker means primarily what he perceives; and although the hearer may use it of some other object, he can use it of the same object. A general term is always understood by the speaker and the hearer to mean the same thing but such identity of the general meaning is possible only because it applies to the same individual thing, the same perceived *this* to both. The word *this* may accordingly be taken as the symbol of the object or what is meant.

3. The word *I* as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he would himself convey by the use of it. If he used the word, he would intend himself and not the speaker. Actually, however, when he understands the word *I* as used by the speaker, he understands it to stand for the speaker. He may accordingly be said to understand the thing intended by the speaker through the word but not through the *meaning* of the word. The thing is not meant by the word for the further reason that the communicating act of the speaker which is never a part of the meaning of a word is itself conveyed by the word *I*. When the object-consciousness of the speaker is communicated, the object and not the speaking of the object is what is understood to be meant. But when his self-consciousness is communicated, it is not his self only but the self as speaking, communicating or expressing itself that is understood. His self-

consciousness may in this sense be said to be not merely expressed but incarnated in the word *I*. What is here intended by the speaker is not only what the hearer can never intend by the word if he were to use it : it is also the thing-subject—as expressing itself and not as merely expressed. What then is meant and is expressible as *this* is not what is conveyed by the word *I*.

4. Object as symbolised by the word *this* may be an individual object or a generality. The word *I* as intending the subject is not definitely either singular or general. It is indeed *used* to indicate not only one thing at a time but a thing which cannot be indicated by more than one speaker ; but then different speakers can be *understood* to use it—each of a distinct thing viz., himself—by the same hearer and understood to use as he would use it. As used, the term has a uniquely singular reference ; but as understood, it is general in the sense the term *unique* is general. It is thus unlike a term meaning an objective content, which has the same reference—singular or general—to the speaker as to the hearer. What is meant by *this* is distinct from what is intended by *I*, though the latter may be intended or indicated by *this*. The object is not the subject but the subject may be spoken of though not meant as object. The subject may be incarnated in the spoken word *I* which is objective. As incarnated in the object, the subject is the object which yet is distinct from it. In terms of *I* and *this*, we may say that the statement 'this is I' is false while the statement 'I am this' cannot be denied.

5. If *this* stands for a perceivable object including my body, there is no occasion to make the statement 'this is I' or 'I am this'. But *this* may stand for myself who *spoke* the word *I* ; and in answer to the conceivable question 'who is this speaker', I may say 'this is I'. The answer would imply not a judgment but a correction ; it would mean 'this speaker is not *this* or object to myself, *this* as distinct from me is here false, the fact being I'. So one may say 'that snake is but a rope' where what is meant is that the snake is illusory, the rope being the fact. But the statement 'I am this speaker' or 'I said I' would not be false in such a context : it would be a mode of expressing what is called personal identity. Nevertheless it is not a judgment : my consciousness of personal identity is not a recognitive judgment as it is ordinarily taken to be. In my answer 'I am this speaker', the predicate does not appear to me, as it appears to the questioner, as what the subject may not be. The pastness of the subject, moreover, as implied in the predicate—this speaker being I who *spoke*—is not consciously relative to the presentness of the subject.

In saying 'I spoke', I make no assertion at all about myself being *now*, the pastness of 'spoke' being consciously distinguished only from the present *objective* situation. The belief in my pastness can never be formulated *by me* as the judgment 'I who am now am I who was then'. It is only another person who can assert my personal identity in a recognitive judgment. I cannot deny the judgment and may take it as a symbolic expression of my felt belief. My personal identity, however, is to me only a felt content which though not false is not *asserted* by me. The equation of *I* and *this* is then logically unintelligible, being the rejection of *this* in the form 'this is I' and only a felt content in the form 'I am this'.

6. The object can be pointed out without the use of a word but it is expressible by the single word *this*. The subject cannot be indicated except by a word and the word for it is not *I* only but any personal pronoun (or any word the use of which is ultimately explained by a personal pronoun). The subject is what is intended by the words *I*, *you* or *he* and though it is always what can call itself *I*, the use of *you* or *he* is as directly intelligible as the use of *I* and need not be explained by it. There is, however, a characteristic difference between the first person and the other persons. If *this* means the object, there is no occasion to consciously identify it with *I*, though *I* may be implicitly identified with my body. But I am somehow conscious of an identity between another person and his body, conscious of them as distinct and yet one. The relation accordingly of *you* and *he* to *this* and *I* requires closer examination.

7. *You* and *he* are to me subjects individualised in the objective body, the body being, however, as much distinguished from them as from myself. Like their bodies they also can be spoken of as individual, but while the individuality of *he* is evidently derived from his body which is *this* to me, the individuality of *you* appears to be prior to that of your body. You are individual to me primarily through my act of addressing and only secondarily through what appears to my imagination as your identification with or appropriation of your body. *He* is individual to me only through his body being imagined as identified with or appropriated by him. *This* body is presented to me first through which I apprehend *this* subject or *he*. It may be—though it is not necessary—that before I can address you, I have to apprehend you as *this* subject or *he*; but *this* subject appears to me as *you*, only as I address. To say 'this is you', is to mean, in fact, that this person is not *this* person, the third person or *he*: it is to imply a correction as in the statement 'this is I'. The

statement 'this is he', however, implies a belief though like 'I am this', it represents a felt content and not the content of a judgment. My identification of a body presented to me first with the subject *he* is not the knowledge of this object being identical with him, since the object is as much distinct from him as from me though I cannot assert his distinction from his body. I apprehend the third person as distinct from me, only as I take him to be individualised in his body. Conceived apart from his body, he would be known neither as distinct from me nor therefore as identical with me but only as one who can call himself *I*; and there would be as little occasion to say of him that he is his body as to say of me that I am my body. The statement 'he is this' is thus excluded but the statement 'you are this' would, like 'this is he', represent a belief that is not knowledge, a felt content that is only symbolised as a judgment. The apprehension of *you*, however, logically precedes while that of *he* follows the apprehension of *this* or the body appropriated. There is no occasion to say, as has been explained, either 'this is I' or 'I am this', where *this* stands for my body: and where *this* means a temporal determination of myself, the former represents a correction and the latter a felt and believed content.

8. Thus of the six possible equations of *this* with *I*, *you* or *he*, three are excluded and the three that are believed viz., 'I am this' (in the sense of myself as then), 'you are this' (your body) and 'this (his body) is he' represent a felt or imagined content that is not known. The object as meant by *this* is known as distinct from the subject as intended by a personal pronoun; and the subject may also be said to be known in itself, being what is either illusorily or imaginatively spoken of as *this* but is not known to be related to *this* either in the way of identity or distinction. The correction implied in the statement 'this is I' indicates the nature of the subject such as it is aware of before it calls itself *I* and incarnates itself in the spoken word. *This* here means myself who spoke and was in the past and the correction is to the effect that the this-ness or pastness is not really mine and only illusorily appears so, that not *this I* but the unspecified *I* should be taken as the subject. There is no denial, however, of the subject being objectifiable as *this* or *then* but the objectification is an incarnation in which the projected objectivity is not known as a determination belonging to the subject, the subject being felt to be dissociated from it. The subject as *you* or *he*, so far as known, is not known as *this* or the appropriated body. You, as addressed and conceived to be logically prior to your body, are not known by me like

your body as distinct from me, being only felt to be the subject that I am distinct from. So, too, if *his* body is known to be distinct from him and from me, *he*, if conceived at all apart from his body, is known not as distinct from or identical with me but as only distinct. *You* and *he* are to my knowledge as much unique as what is intended by the word *I*, being, in fact, understood simply as one who can call himself *I*. The three persons are not known to be distinct from or identical with one another.

9. The object is known as distinct from the subject but the subject is only known in itself and felt to be free or dissociated from the object. I feel dissociated from the object as I feel dissociated from the subject *you* or *he* that appears to me somehow 'identified' with the object. I am aware of alienating you by the fact of addressing and of him being alienated from me as his body is alienated. I actively 'dissimilate' you and, therefore, also the body that you appropriate and feel unable to 'assimilate' him and, therefore, his body with which he is found identified. The object in either case is a body somehow one with a subject which I would not or cannot identify with myself. With regard to my own body, I only do *not* feel actually dissociated from it and am not *consciously* identified with it. I am indeed individualised in my body but I am not introspectively aware of it. I am aware of myself as *this* not in the sense of my body but only in the sense of myself in a temporal position, myself as having been, for example, in the past and having spoken of myself as *I*. *This* is here only thought and not known as distinct from myself and I am conscious not only of being dissociated from it but also of its distinction from myself being illusory. Thus everywhere the subject is known in itself and not as related to the object, being at best felt to be dissociated from the object with which it was identified.

10. The subject, understood as the unique speaker—actual or possible—of the word *I*, and the object that is meant as distinct from the subject are the two things that are known. The reality of what is meant can always be doubted and so the object is not known with the same assurance as the subject that cannot be said to be meant. There may be such a thing as an illusory object; and in the statement 'this is I', as already explained, *this* is understood as an objectivity that is annulled. The idea of a possible annulment of objectivity being there, an object that is given as distinct from the subject can be conceived to be not distinct, though the distinction may not be actually cancelled. The denial of reality is intelligible only about what is meant, the negation of the meant being also either actually or problematically meant.

The unreality, however, of the subject as intended but not meant by *I* is meaningless. It is not only inconceivable like the opposite of an axiom ; it is not even tried to be conceived, a content being taken to be inconceivable only after it has been tried to be conceived. The word *I* expresses a unique and unanalysable content from which all that is meant is distinct and which yet is understood and unquestioningly believed. The belief cannot be called a grammatical superstition, though the fact believed is inexpressible except in language by a grammatical pronoun. The subject appears as a known fact, only as it is spoken of through a personal pronoun or conceived to be so speakable. One's private awareness of *I* before its expression in speech is indeed knowledge but the *I* here does not appear as a known fact distinct from the knower. To be aware of the subject as a known fact is to be aware of it as a spoken fact. It is not so about the object of which one may be aware as known even if unnamed. The subject as spoken fact is, however, a meant fact.

11. The metaphysical controversy about the reality of the subject is only about the subject viewed in some sense as object. The thinnest sense in which it is objectified is 'being taken as meant'. Ordinarily the validity of this degree of objectification of the subject is not questioned, nor therefore the possibility of a dispute about its reality. If, however, the subject is taken, as explained, to be what is expressed by the word *I* as expressing itself, it is not meant or at best meant as unmeant and is accordingly above metaphysical dispute. There is properly no metaphysic of the subject, if by metaphysic is understood an enquiry into the reality conceived as meanable. Even the unknowable thing-in-itself of Spencer and Kant is not taken to be unmeanable. It is at worst taken to be a problem in meaning. The knowable is meant and the negation of the knowable is, if not meant, tried to be meant, being not a gratuitous combination of words but a believed content that is problematically formulated. The subject which is also believed is formulated as *I* which is, however, understood as unmeanable though not as a mere word like *abracadabra*. The understanding here is not a mystic intuition though it may point to its possibility, nor the intuition of a meaning that can be a term of a judgment, nor yet the thought of a meaning that is not known because not intuited or that is known without being intuited. It is somewhere midway between a mystic intuition and the consciousness of a meaning, being the believing awareness of a speakable content, the negation of which is unmeaning and which, therefore, is not a meaning. What is claimed to be mystically intuited is speakable only in metaphor which

presents a contradiction in meaning and what is affirmed or denied in metaphysic is a meanable. The subject as I is neither contradictory nor meanable and the exposition of it accordingly is intermediate between mysticism and metaphysic. As, however, the subject is communicable by speech without metaphor, it cannot be taken as falling outside philosophical enquiry.

12. The attitude of metaphysics like that of the sciences including psychology is objective. It seeks to know reality as distinct from the knowing of it, as objective, at least, in the sense of being meant. Knowing as a fact from which the known is distinct is not properly the subject either of psychology or of metaphysics. Psychological introspection is at best awareness of the *knownness* of the object, the knownness being meant as an accident of the object, as an abstraction from the known object, as the difference between the object as known and the object that is only believed, or as the object *coming* to be known. If there be a metaphysic of the psychological fact of knownness, its problem would be to determine what it is in the object that makes it known and not what the subject should be in order that it may know. Knowing from which all that is known or objective is distinct is dealt with in epistemology which distinguishes it as a function from the object but does not, therefore, take it to be a known fact. Knowing is not given as distinct to introspection nor inferred as distinct, being only distinct through the self-conscious act of distinguishing it. Knowing cannot be known as a fact unless the distinguishing of knowing be the knowing itself, unless, in fact, the distinctness of the knowing from the distinguishing of it appears illusory, even as *this* appears illusory in the apparent judgment 'this is I'. To realise that the distinctness of knowing is entirely through the distinguishing of it is to realise knowing as a self-evidencing fact, as not distinct from the object known but as unrelated or illusorily related to it, as not the knowing *of* object but as the solitary fact of the subject itself. Knowing is not thus known in epistemology which, however, does not disbelieve in its facthood. Were it known as a meanable fact, there would be room for the metaphysical inference of the subject as the ground of it. As it is, knowing is only symbolised as an activity; and the inference of the subject as the agent is rightly characterised as involving a grammatical superstition. There is no room for metaphysics after epistemology has worked itself out of the objective attitude of metaphysics and the sciences by distinguishing knowing from the object known.

13. At the same time the belief in the facthood of knowing is

there, as epistemology is not an enquiry into the significance of the mere phrase 'knowing of object'. The belief is in the facthood of the knowing function, function being a metaphor for a positive something which is literally expressed only in the negative way as what the known object is not and being thus not even an accomplished meaning. The awareness of this unmeant something involves, however, a higher certitude than the belief in the meant object. Epistemology claims this certitude though it cannot justify it and has to recognise it to be other than the certitude of knowledge. Thus it appears that while the subject can be said to be known by itself and the meant object to be known as distinct from the subject, a subjective function like knowing is only believed though it may be with greater assurance than the object. The knowing of an object is not given as distinct from the object and *is* only in being distinguished from it, as relating and not as related to it, as not distinct from the distinguishing but not therefore as identical with it, as the free reference of the subject to the object. The subject is, as explained before, free from the object in the sense of being known by itself and not as related to it either in the way of identity or distinction. The knowing function represents a positive mode of this freedom, the freedom of the subject to relate to object without getting related to it, which is believed to be more certain than the object but is not known. We are aware of knowing a content when it is formulated and believed to be independent of our formulating, speaking or distinguishing act. It is so believed when it is felt either to be a given distinct—as in the case of the object known—or to be 'incarnated' in the formulation, in the sense explained, of being expressed as expressing or self-revealing—as in the case of the subject. Subjective function or the positive freedom of the subject to refer to the object is felt to be neither and is accordingly said to be only believed. The belief is bound up with the knowledge of the self-evidencing subject and as belief in a content which is like the subject itself not presented as meant, it is incapable of being doubted and is more certain than the knowledge of a meant object.

14. The three believed contents—the subject, the positive freedom of the subject and the meant object—are all speakable and it is from the speakable that we have to start in philosophy. The subject is taken to be known, as one who says *I* is immediately understood by the hearer through the word but not as meant by the word. The speaker is understood as revealing himself to another of whom he is positively aware as distinct but not as independent of his distinguish-

shing. The positive awareness may be called feeling of alienating the subject *you*. What is known is the body of the other subject as an object distinct from the speaker. The speaking subject may thus be said to have a feeling of relating itself to the object, of addressing itself to it as though it were *you*. This felt relating is the positive freedom of the subject having different felt modes like knowing, feeling or being which though not objectively meanable can be symbolised by objective meanings. Such symbolic elaboration of the felt or believed spiritual functions would be a procedure of philosophy intermediate between the recognition of the subject purely through the intention of the word *I* and the inferential inquiry into the reality behind the meant object which is called metaphysics.

15. There is properly no metaphysic of the subject and the apparent problems about the existence of the subject and its relation to the object are really illegitimate. The question if the subject is real is unmeaning, for the subject as *I* is not a meaning. The reality of the subject is known in the direct understanding of the word *I* as used by a speaker, which is neither the understanding of its meaning nor a mystic intuition of an unspeakable content. There can be also no relation of subject to object if the subject is not objectively meant, the subject being only aware of its function of *relating* or *referring* to object. The subject may believe itself and the object without speaking of them but it believes its relating function only as it speaks of it. If it speaks of the object, it believes in it as meant and if it speaks of itself as *I*, it believes in it as unmeant. But in speaking of its function it believes in it neither as meant nor as unmeant but as being constructed as fact by being spoken. A believed content that is spoken appears objective but while the appearance is denied of the spoken subject and asserted of the spoken object, it is only not denied of the spoken function. The speaking creation of a system of subjective functions or the symbolising elaboration of the positive freedom of the subject constitutes a special study which as not asserting meanable and justifiable truth cannot be called metaphysic and as yet inviting to believe and exhibiting the interval between the self-evidencing *I* and objectively knowable truth has to be taken as coming within philosophy.

16. There is no theoretic passage from what is meanable or objectively knowable to the subjectively knowable *I*; metaphysics cannot pass out of the region of meanings. Epistemology indeed deals with the subjective function behind the accomplished meaning but it does not assert it as fact. It *assumes* the facthood of the function—knowing of

object—and only paraphrases the intention of the preposition *of* in reference to the different modes of knownness of the object such as are presented in psychology. The facthood of the knowing function and of subjective function in general is believed though not known and is elaborated into a system of symbolisms in a new philosophical study which may be called Spiritual or Transcendental psychology. The symbolism is fact in the sense of being the form of the non-theoretic or spiritually practical mode of escaping the objective knowing attitude of which the meaning attitude represents the subtlest stage. No meanable truth is self-evidencing, its negation being at least a problem in meaning and yet the self-evidencing I is the type of truth. The implication is that meanable truth which cannot be denied to be truth has to be realised as self-evidencing, not by being objectively thought again but by the spiritual cultivation of a subjective attitude. As the positive freedom of relating—which is an objective attitude—is to the objectively meant relation, so is the negative freedom in the cultivation of the subjective attitude to the positive freedom of the objective attitude. Spiritual psychology symbolises the subjective attitude by the objective attitude from which it seeks to be freed. The modes of subjectivity are the modes of freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity.

17. Hence comes the justification of the name Spiritual *psychology*. Psychology, as has been pointed out, deals not properly with knowing but with knownness as a character or aspect of the object. It deals, as we may say generally, not with subjective function but with the object regarded explicitly as distinct from it, as known, felt or willed. If there be a metaphysic of psychology, its problem would be what there is in the object to make it known, felt or willed. We are aware of an object that was only believed as coming to be known though its existence is not asserted or denied before the knowing. The metaphysical problem about the objective knownness, feltness etc., is intelligible though it may not be capable of objective solution. The distinguishing of knownness etc., as an abstraction from the object, as the objectivity of the object is what is called psychological introspection. The distinguishing of the subjective function of knowing etc., as other than this abstraction of objectivity may also be called introspection and, it may be, with greater right. If psychological introspection be an abstracting from the object, this introspection is a creative symbolising, the functions being subjective facts and not mere abstractions, though they are only believed and not known. The symbolising of the subjective function

is by a mode of objectivity like knownness, dissociation from which is precisely indicated by the word function. Thus the functions represent the modes of freedom from the corresponding psychological abstractions. The consciousness of freedom is as direct as that of such abstraction and its content can only be indicated as some sort of negation of the abstraction. If the consciousness of the abstraction be called psychological introspection, the consciousness of freedom may be called spiritual introspection and the philosophical study that is based on it may be designated Spiritual psychology.

18. The metaphysical problem—what it is in the object that determines its known or felt appearance—assumes that an appearance of object that is not unreal is caused by object, which implies further that object has an assured reality independent of the subject. It has, however, been indicated that the reality of object is not incapable of being doubted like the reality of the subject ; and even if object be as real as the subjective process that refers to it, it is not necessary that its relatedness to the subject should be caused at all. The emergence of such relatedness of an object is an event in time, only so far as it is not other than the emergence of the object or of an objective situation comprising it. The knownness or feltness of an object is an abstraction, the problem of the causation of which is illegitimate. Change in the object, as distinguished from the object, is also an abstraction but it is still understood as objective fact though unseparated from the object. Knownness etc., or the objectivity of the object is an abstraction that has no objective meaning at all by itself and about which, therefore, the demand for causal explanation is meaningless. The explanation of the emergence of the object *as related* to the subject is an ordinary objective or scientific problem and no separate explanation can be demanded for the emergence of the abstraction of relatedness. The metaphysical problem is thus apparently only a problem in meaning—how relatedness to the subject can be spoken of as a character of the object.

19. Spiritual psychology, however, has a place because its business is not to explain or to solve a problem. Its business is in the first place to interpret empirical psychology in terms of the positively felt and believed freedom of the subject from objectivity ; and next to elaborate modes of freedom that have no reference to object at all, to conceive the possible illusoriness of all objects and thus to assign an intelligible place to what is ordinarily scouted as spiritual mysticism. In the objective attitude, the knownness or feltness of the object appears positive and knowing or feeling appears as its problematic

negation. In the subjective attitude, the case is reversed : freedom is positively believed and the relatedness of the object to the subject—its objectivity—appears as constructed, as not belonging to the object in the sense change belongs to it and is thus understood as the self-negation or alienated shadow of the subject. In the objective attitude again, *this* or object appears to exist beyond its *this-ness* or relatedness to the subject, while in the subjective attitude not only is the transcendent *this* rejected as meaningless, *this-ness*—meaning the so-called psychological entities, knownness or feltness—appears also not to be *given* as distinct to introspection but to exist only as distinguished or constructed, this distinguishing or constructing being felt as less certain than the self-evident subject behind it. The object or *this* beyond objectivity, *this-ness* or relatedness to subject is sought to be known not only in the metaphysic of psychology, but in all metaphysic. From the standpoint of spiritual psychology, this transcendent object is simply meaningless and metaphysic is the quest of a chimera. All so-called metaphysical problems are to it symbolisms for modes of freedom, the forms of spiritual discipline by which the objective attitude has to be renounced and the positive subjective functioning has to be reversed in direction towards the realisation of the subject behind it.

20. Kant's critical philosophy may be taken as a disguised form of spiritual psychology as thus conceived. The elaboration of the three modes of belief—theoretic, practical and aesthetic—is transcendental psychology, the spiritual equivalent offered by him for dogmatic metaphysics. The start is from epistemology which assumes the reality of the subject and subjective function though it does not explicitly confess in the case of the knowing function that it is only assumed or believed to be real and presents instead a make-believe of inference in the so-called transcendental deductions. The other functions are, however, definitely asserted to be only believed : the reality of the willing function, for example, is taken to be apprehended in the willing consciousness only. The confession is not made about the knowing function because epistemology is to Kant not so much a branch of transcendental psychology as a prolegomena to it, concerned not with the presentation of subjective fact but with the meaning of the preposition *of* in 'knowledge of object', the facthood of which is implicitly taken for granted. Its interest is still in the object, in the knownness or objectivity of the object which it seeks to understand theoretically as knowing. It does not abandon the objective procedure of metaphysics and the sciences, even though it sets itself to correct the conceit of independent objectivity. The objective procedure may be

necessary to show up the seamy character of objectivity and may also imply the truthful admission that we do not get rid of our actual belief in the independent object by the mere thinking criticism of it. But it misleads so far as it presents the function as an objective meaning and does not recognise that it is believed without being meant. Epistemology might be mistaken as only a philological study, unless it is consciously viewed as rooted in the faith in the facthood of the knowing function and unless the so-called deduction that it presents is definitely known to be not inferential and not literally meant but to be the mere symbolisation by logical form of what is immediately believed as spiritual fact.

21. The persisting objective attitude of Kant in his first critique explains not only his admission of the thing-in-itself and his denial of self-knowledge but also his disbelief in the possibility of a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason through which self-knowledge may be attainable. From the subjective standpoint, object beyond knownness, *this* beyond *this-ness* is, as explained, meaningless. It may be that, wedded as we are to our body, we cannot get rid of the objective attitude and the tendency to look beyond the constructed object to the purely given. But not to be able to deny need not imply admission and though the Kantian disclaimer of idealism as accomplished knowledge is intelligible, his admission of the unknowable reality appears to be an unwarrantable surrender to realism. After the resolution of the objectivity of the object into the knowing function, the independence of the object becomes inconceivable though it continues to be believed. Such a belief cannot be asserted though it cannot also be rejected. Realism should, therefore, be held as suspect though idealism is only a faith and not knowledge. But the faith has to be cherished and there should be a subjective discipline to get rid of the persisting realistic belief. Kant does not admit such a discipline at least for the theoretic reason.

22. Self-knowledge is denied by Kant : the self cannot be known but only thought through the objective categories—unity, substantiality etc., there being no intuition of it. The view presented so far is that the subject is known though neither thought (meant) nor intuited. It is known as what the speaker of *I* is understood to intend by it. The understanding is a direct believing in something that is not meant but revealed as revealing itself, a question about the reality of which does not arise and is unmeaning. The subject is thus known by itself, as not meant but speakable and not as either related or relating to the object. It is, however, believed as relating to object and sym-

bolised as such by the objective relations. The modes of relating are at the same time the modes of freeing from objectivity, the forms of the spiritual discipline by which, it may be conceived, the outgoing reference to the object is turned backwards and the immediate knowledge of the *I* as content is realised in an ecstatic intuition.

23. Spiritual progress means the realisation of the subject as free. The realisation may or may not involve a specific activity of the subject. There are those to whom it is only a resultant experience. One lives an objectively good or full life and finds his self correspondingly realised. Others, however, recognise a specific discipline or consecutive method of activity for such realisation. The consciousness of perfection, freedom or salvation as the end is to them a demand for some kind of activity of the subject towards itself. This cult of the subject, as it might be called, takes various forms but they all involve a feeling of dissociation of the subject from the object, an awareness of the subject as what the object is not. The specific activity demanded is primarily in the inwardising direction and secondarily, if at all, in the direction of creating objective or social values. One demand among others—all being absolute demands—is that the subjective function being essentially the knowing of the object as distinct from it, this knowing which is only believed and not known as fact *has* to be known as fact, as the self-evidencing reality of the subject itself. This would be the cult of the subject *par excellence*, a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason, a method of cognitive inwardising, the possibility of which, as indeed of any method of realisation, is not ordinarily recognised.

24. The possibility of such a method has to be exhibited in Spiritual psychology. A method implies a series of consecutive steps for the realisation of an end. The steps in this case should correspond to a gradation of subjective functions, of modes of freedom from the object. Identified as we are with our body, our freedom from the perceived object is actually realised only in our bodily consciousness, though even this, as will appear later, is only imperfectly realised. Bodily consciousness may as well be called conscious body, there being no dissociation at this stage of the subject from the body, though the extra-organic object is known to be distinct from it. The next stage of freedom is suggested by the distinction of the perceived object including the body from the ghostly object in the form of the image, idea and meaning which may be all designated 'presentation'. Consciousness as undissociated from such presentation, but dissociated from the perceived and felt body may be called presentational or

psychic subjectivity. The dissociation of the subject or consciousness from this presentation conceived as a kind of object, would be the next stage of freedom which may be called non-presentational or spiritual subjectivity. The three broad stages of subjectivity would then be the bodily, the psychical and the spiritual and each would comprise substages. Wedded as we are to our body, actual freedom is felt only in bodily subjectivity and freedom in the higher stages as suggested by psychology is believed not as what is actual but as what has to be achieved or realised. The grades of subjectivity imply grades of objectivity, the terms being conceived in a relative sense. To spiritual subjectivity, the psychical is objective and so to psychic subjectivity, the bodily and to bodily subjectivity, the extra-organic is objective. The objective at any stage is known as distinct from the subjective next to it, which, however, is not known as distinct from the objective but only felt and believed to be free or dissociated from it. The elaboration of these stages of freedom in spiritual psychology would suggest the possibility of a consecutive method of realising the subject as absolute freedom, of retracting the felt positive freedom towards the object into pure intuition of the self.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHIC FACT

25. The facts of empirical psychology have to be interpreted from the subjective standpoint in spiritual psychology. What is called psychological introspection is apparently a process of abstraction from the object of its modes of relatedness to the subject. This relatedness, viewed as a character of the object, is the so-called psychic fact. There is a difference, however, between this objective character and other objective characters. A character of a thing is an abstraction distinguished from it but not imaginable as separated from it. As distinct *in* the thing, it is a fact; but as spoken of by itself, it need not mean a fact. An abstraction like colour, for example, means a fact while an abstraction like intensity does not mean a fact though the intensity of colour as in the colour is a fact. These two kinds of abstraction may be designated respectively as of the first degree and of the second degree. Knownness or any other mode of relatedness of object to subject, as taken by itself, is an abstraction of the second degree : it does not mean a fact though the object as thus related is a fact. There is a difference, again, between this relatedness and intensity as abstractions. In the knowing of a bright colour, colour is not known as distinct from brightness, being only spoken of as distinct while in the knowing of the knownness of an object, the object—at least as non-perceptually known—is known as distinct from its knownness or presentation. Knownness or relatedness is a floating adjective of the object like its beauty or like the absence of an object as a character of the object in which it is absent. The so-called psychic fact, as abstracted from the object by psychological introspection, may thus be taken as a floating abstraction of the second degree. It is interpreted from the subjective standpoint in spiritual psychology as a subjective function that is a fact.

26. To psychological introspection with its objective attitude, psychic fact is a character of the object, existing like the object even apart from introspection. It is, however, only quasi-objective : unlike the object which when not perceived is known to exist in some other mode of cognition, psychic fact that is believed during introspection to exist is believed on the testimony of the same introspection to exist also apart from it. The perception of an object is immersed in the object and as such is not, as will appear later, knowable in *direct in-*

trospection. As the object is only indirectly known to be distinct from the perception of it, perception cannot be taken as a given psychic fact for purposes of psychology. Feeling, again, is a psychic fact only as the feltness of a known object and as bound up with its knownness; and if there is feeling not bound up with object-cognition, it cannot appear to introspection to exist apart from it and as such cannot be called psychic fact. To start with at any rate then, the term *psychic* has to be restricted to modes of subjectivity that lie between sense-perception on the one hand and such objectless feeling on the other.

27. Psychic fact is either the knownness of object or the feltness etc., of known object, being fact from which object is distinguishable. What does not involve the knowledge of object is no psychic fact. Is mere imagination then—imagination of the *imaginary* which is no known object—to be regarded as psychic fact? What is imagined need not be imaginary and even what is taken as imaginary is not wholly imaginary. The imagination of a golden mountain involves not only the awareness of what never is but also the belief in the possibility of a mountain being made of gold, in the compatibility of the objective facts, *golden* and *mountain*. This compatibility is not imaginary, is not merely an imagined relation of two images but is an objective fact expressed in an abstract and periphrastic way. The imagination of golden mountain is a psychic fact so far as it implies an unrejected belief in such objective fact.

28. But is the awareness of the content as what never is, to be taken as psychic fact? The belief in the absence of what is at some time somewhere is still knowledge of objective fact. Even the awareness of what never is, where there was wrong belief in it or a real question about it, implies an unrejected belief in some objective fact. But golden mountain is imaginary in the sense that it not only never is but that it does not even suggest a real question about its existence. The awareness of such an imaginary content implies the rejection of all belief in objective fact. Introspection is belief in the psychic fact of believing in an objective fact. Is there a belief in the absence of objective belief or, in other words, introspection into the consciousness of the imaginary? There may only be disbelief or no-belief in believing and so there seems to be no introspection into *mere* imaging, the awareness of it being other than, though on a level with, introspection. What introspection does not reveal is no psychic fact and hence the consciousness of the imaginary is no psychic fact.

29. Is there such a thing as objectless feeling, feeling that does not involve knowledge of an objective fact? The feeling that we introspectively believe as being a fact outside introspection is the feeling of an object as known, from which indeed the knowledge is distinguished but which is not itself distinguished from the knowledge. Objectless feeling, if such there be, would be like introspection itself only a non-psychic fringe of some psychic fact. The general possibility of such feeling will be exhibited later but it may be asked at this stage if the feeling of an object that is believed to be illusory should be taken as psychic fact. The past belief in the snake, for example, which is now known to be only a rope, was bound up with a feeling of fear. Is the fear now believed as a past psychic fact? Obviously, we do not believe it now as the fear of *that* snake. But it may be said that although *that* snake is not believed, the characteristic feeling of bodily reaction in the past is believed, which is just the past fear of the snake. A feeling, however, is essentially individual and its individuality is constituted by the belief in the individuality of its object. The reduction of what was taken to be the fear of snake to the feeling of bodily reaction would be the disbelief in *that* feeling. Belief in the past fear of some object, indeed, remains over with the belief in the past bodily condition. But it remains over only in the sense of not being rejected and not of being asserted, and it remains over not by itself but as only the non-psychic fringe of the memory of the past bodily condition.

30. When we speak of the feeling of an object, we are not introspectively aware of the feeling as distinct from and accompanying the belief in the object. We do not distinguish the feeling at all from the belief though we may be aware of the belief without the feeling. The feeling, in fact, refers to the object as directly as the belief and along with it. It is artificial to understand it to refer to the object in the first instance related to the belief in the object and, therefore, to take the fear of the snake now believed to be illusory as fear related to the past belief in snake as distinct from the snake. We cannot say that the fear of the snake was just as real as the past belief in the snake. The false belief, now that it is corrected, is known to have been a fact, for the correction can be expressed in the form 'what *was believed* to be snake was not snake but rope.' It cannot be said, however, about the fear that it was fear of the rope or of *that* snake or of that idea of snake or that it was fear of nothing at all. The rope was the cause but not the object of the past feeling; so, too, was the idea of the snake while *that* snake cannot be called

its object because it is now disbelieved. Nor can we take the object to have been snake-in-general, for fear of such a generality is, at best, a disposition to feel and not an actual feeling. We believe, indeed, in the past feeling of a characteristic bodily reaction but a bodily feeling is not the consciousness of the body as its object, there being as little conscious distinction between bodily feeling and felt body as between perception and perceived object, while the past feeling in this case was distinctly consciousness of something as object. We cannot say that the fear was of nothing at all, since we do not remember the feeling as unformulated. After the belief in the snake has been corrected, it is impossible to describe as past *fact* what was called fear of the snake when it was believed. It may be arbitrary to deny that the fear was a fact but it cannot be asserted to have been fact because its object is now indescribable. The feeling then of an object now believed to be illusory cannot, at least, be asserted to have been a psychic fact.

31. A psychic fact involves belief in an objective fact and introspection into it is a belief in such belief. The awareness of the imaginary as such, being a disbelief in objective belief, has been shown to be other than but on a level with introspection. Are these modes of subjectivity to be taken as psychic facts? A psychic fact may involve belief in another psychic fact but it is primarily a belief in some objective fact. One may remember, for example, an objective event and also be aware of the subjective fact of its having been previously known. Such awareness is not memory unless the past knowing of the event was itself known in the past and should be taken accordingly as nothing but introspection. It is no psychic fact by itself but is only the transitive fringe of the substantive fact of objective memory. Introspection is always awareness of a psychic fact that is past though the psychic fact need not be known as past as in this case and may persist at the time of introspection. In any case introspection into it is bound up with another psychic fact like memory as in this case, which is primarily a belief in the object and need not have this fringe. Like introspection which is belief in believing, disbelief in believing also—the consciousness of the imaginary, which is not introspection but may be taken as co-ordinate with it—is a non-psychic fringe of a substantive psychic fact. The correction of an objective illusion appears to present a difficulty, since in it we are aware not of the past object but of the past belief in object, the awareness being also introspection. It implies, however, a present disbelief in the object which as implying in every case an unrejected belief in something objective is psychic fact and

the introspective belief in the past fact of belief is the non-psychic fringe of this psychic fact.

32. 'So then we conclude that a form of consciousness which does not involve belief in an objective fact is no psychic fact but is only the fringe of some psychic fact that involves such belief and need not have the fringe. The fringe may epistemologically be primary or secondary in respect of the psychic fact but never stands by itself. Introspection, for example, is primary in respect of the psychic fact of which it is a fringe while the awareness of an illusory object is secondary in respect of the belief that remains over after the correction. Again, the individual feeling that cannot be denied as bound up with the past belief in the object that is now taken to be illusory is primary in respect of the remembered body-feeling and may be taken as secondary in respect of the present remembering of the bodily feeling.

33. A psychic fact is or involves not merely the belief in an objective fact but the knowledge of it. We are aware of a belief as having been belief in an object as now formulated if the object is now either known or disbelieved. It is in introspection into knowledge or in the consciousness of the unreal object as such that we realise that we believed before we knew or disbelieved and that there was then no awareness of a distinction of the object believed from the belief. Knowledge as distinct from mere belief involves awareness of the distinction, this being testified by introspection into knowledge even about such knowledge as precedes introspection. The distinction that is presented to introspection is believed to exist also apart from introspection. The distinction of the object from the belief in it is something more than the object itself, though it cannot be said to be not objective. It is just what is called presentation of the object, which is taken as a psychic fact only as it is in introspection abstracted from the object. Presentation and object are so related that while the latter is given distinct from the former, the former is not given distinct from the latter, being only abstracted or tried to be distinguished in introspection.

34. Two extreme cases have to be considered in understanding this relation of presentation and object. In perceptual knowledge, the object does not appear distinct from its presentation; and in perceptual illusion, there is apparently the presentation only, with no object distinct from it. We do not, indeed, introspectively distinguish perceptual knowledge from its object but still such knowledge is not mere belief inasmuch as in it the object is given as distinct in itself though not from its presentation and has not to be distinguished, as in the case of mere belief, in a later act of knowledge. The object explicitly ap-

pears distinct from its presentation in non-perceptual knowledge, such distinction being the condition of possible introspection into it. There is accordingly no introspection into perceptual knowledge, though other knowledge, when introspected into, may be distinguished from perceptual knowledge. Still the perceived object being consciously distinct in itself may *be* distinct from its presentation, though it is not consciously so appreciated. Knowledge involves only the conscious or evident distinctness of the believed object, whether or not there is the consciousness of the presentation as that from which it is distinct.

35. Perceptual illusion presents another kind of difficulty. The perceived object being disbelieved is not removed altogether from consciousness. The appearance may be still presented though such presentation would not embody belief in an object. Like mere imagination, mere perceptual presentation is no psychic fact at all to which object may be related in the way of distinction: the awareness of it is only the fringe of perception as a fact. In the correction of an illusion as expressed in 'not snake but rope', the rope is utterly unrelated to the mere presentation: the word *not* in it means rejection only and no distinction, the rejection being the fringe of the present perception of rope. The awareness of the mere presentation is not belief in it, though unlike mere imagination the presentation is not explicitly disbelieved. The mere presentation as this equivocal something that is neither believed nor disbelieved is very different from the presentation from which the object is said to be distinct in knowledge and which is definitely believed in introspection and taken to embody belief in an object. It should, in fact, be designated by some word other than presentation.

36. Intermediate between perceptual knowledge and perceptual illusion are the other forms of knowledge involving a conscious distinction of the known object from its presentation. It is in the awareness of the illusory that the presentation definitely emerges from the perceived object into which it was merged. But this emergence or freedom is also the death of the presentation in the sense that it no longer embodies belief. The presentation is a fact to introspection so long as the object presented is believed and distinguished from it. Introspection into non-perceptual knowledge is thus a belief in presentation. As introspection is the belief that its content is a fact even apart from introspection, the presentation is a fact, the facthood of which consists in its being a belief in a distinct objective fact. As there is no direct introspection into perceptual knowledge, there is no consciousness here, but not therefore a denial, of a presentation from

which the object is distinct. Introspection into non-perceptual knowledge is such consciousness of presentation of object from which object is distinct. '

37. The distinctness of the object from its presentation does not mean the distinctness of the presentation from its object. The introspective belief in the presentation is belief in the object as well and so presentation is not not-objective, not illusory nor purely subjective. As the object, however, is distinguished from it in non-perceptual knowledge, it is the perceivable object and something more that is believed in, something that is not known but is wanted to be known. The knowledge of the distinction of the object as imagined to be perceived from the presentation is the belief embodied in presentation in something that cannot be imagined to be perceived but appears still as adjectival to the perceivable object. This believed something is, if known, known as unknown and as only wanted to be known.

38. There are different grades of non-perceptual knowledge implying different modes of presentation or belief in object. By 'perception' is meant here external perception of object. What is the knowledge of the body from within, body as internally felt and not externally observed? The observed object including the observed body is distinguished from the internally felt body which thus is no part of the observable world and yet is believed not as other than the observed body but as its character of internality. Again, there is the immediate apprehension of the absence of an object which cannot be said to be known by external perception, at least, in the ordinary sense and yet is known as a present objective fact. There is memory which is belief in the perceivable object as past, pastness being an unperceivable character of the object. Imagination so far as it involves belief is non-perceptual apprehension of the object as forming or becoming formed to be a perceptible object. Inference, again, is belief in the perceivable object as involving the unperceivable character of necessity. None of these non-perceptual forms of apprehension is mere belief; the object cannot be said to be not known in them and yet each is a belief in something that cannot be known by external perception and, being still about the object and indefinite, is wanted to be somehow known or realised. Perceptual knowledge is the actual standard of knowledge. The other modes of apprehension imply it, are not taken in introspection to be mere belief and involve further a belief in something not yet known but which may be known in some ideal mode of realisation or intuition.

39. Perception as the actual standard of knowledge not only lends the cognitive character to the other modes of apprehension but also prevents them from reaching their ideal completion. 'The internality of the felt body, absence or pastness, forming or necessity as facts are wanted to be known as the object is actually known in perception. Yet these are facts of such a kind that if they were so known, the perception of the object could not remain unaffected in its cognitive character. So far as these modes of apprehension are knowledge, they are knowledge of these facts as adjectival characters of the perceptually knowable object. These facts however, as shown about the general character of knownness, are floating adjectives from which the object to which they are ascribed are distinct though as abstractions of the second degree, they have to be referred adjectivally to the object as substantive. They are, however, necessarily symbolised as substantive by objective metaphors, being not merely thought but sought to be believed as though they were substantive objects. If they could be known as such, the actual perceived object would be, at best, a particular manifestation of a more essential object. They are, however, not known as substantive and there is only the metaphysical *aspiration* to extend and deepen the conception of the object. They are not known because as a matter of fact, though not necessarily, we are wedded to the body and to the perceptual object that is organic to it. The identification with the object is so deep-rooted that, though not necessary, it is not annulled by any logic and may be regarded for all ordinary purposes as a 'permanent illusion'.

40. The believed object as perceived or imagined to be perceived is distinct from presentation but the presentation is not distinct from its object. In perceptual knowledge, if the object is not consciously distinct from its presentation, its distinction is yet knowable through some ordinary non-perceptual mode of knowledge. But if the presentation is not known as distinct from the object, it does not come to be known as such by any logic or in any ordinary form of knowledge. It is believed and symbolised as what should be distinct: the distinction here, not being a character of the object, cannot exist unconsciously. It can exist only in being achieved or realised subjectively. The psychic fact, being essentially presentation as embodying belief, is on the one hand not imaginary or non-factual and on the other not accomplished as fact but only to be accomplished. It is at once known and unknown, its facthood being what has begun to be achieved and is yet to be completed. Introspection is belief in the psychic, not as utterly unknown but as only not isolated or freed from objective fact. The complete

knowledge and facthood of the psychic has to be achieved by such isolation but the demand itself is roused by such knowledge as has already begun.

41. Psychic fact involves knowledge of object and such knowledge exists outside introspection as presentation from which object is distinct but which is not distinct from the object. Presentation is the object and more than the object, embodying, as it does, belief in something that can never be perceived by sense, from which the perceived object is distinct but which yet appears as a character of the object. As such, this presentation may be said to be known as unknown and as to be known and has to be symbolised as object, including, as it does, the object as its manifestation or appearance in some sense. Psychic fact accordingly is that of which the facthood is at once accomplished and to be accomplished, unlike the facthood of objective fact which is only accomplished and the reality like that claimed for the moral *ought* which is only to be accomplished.

42. The complete accomplishment of psychic facthood is conceivable as implying presentation that is wholly turned into known object, which would mean, not the lapse of the conscious distinction of object from presentation such as characterises sense-perception, but the conscious or evident objectivity of what in presentation is more than the sense-given object and suggests a metaphysical reality—what in ordinary psychic fact is only not denied as objective and may be conceived to be subjective. The image of a believed object, for example, is more than the perceivable object in the sense that it appears *being* formed and not given as formed. The forming is presented as a process of the object itself and yet somehow prior to its existence as formed. There is no ground to take it as merely subjective, for it appears to be seen in the non-introspective attitude though the object as formed is distinct from it. As a becoming of the object prior to its accomplished being, it implies a metaphysical fact that is not known as intelligibly related to the object, appearing as it does as an un-objective character of the object which is a contradiction. It is in this sense known as unknown in the object and felt as dissociated from it. If imagination were to be realised, this contradiction would disappear, the becoming would be evident as a substantive fact and the object would be seen as its contingent manifestation. The image would then be dissociated in knowledge and not in mere feeling from the object and would be said to have achieved a free existence. Similar suggestions of metaphysical reality and the possibility of realising it would be presented by psychic states higher than the imagination.

43. To such a view a Kantian may be supposed to object that the metaphysical reality thus adumbrated in the presentation is only subjective though it appears real in the object by illusion; by a permanent illusion which we can critically correct without being able to remove. The critical correction may only be sought to be strengthened in a non-cognitive way—the moral or aesthetic way—with the entertainment of the metaphysical reality in faith. Our contention would be that the appearance of its objectivity is incomplete but not illusory; that the illusion is to take it as known but not as knowable; that if it were unknowable, it could not be entertained in faith even for non-cognitive realisation and that the demand to know it is legitimate if not necessary. The thought of the metaphysical entity is a conscious problem but the problem is soluble in a mode of knowledge in which the object would appear as its free efflux, as what it can be but need not be. The metaphysical would appear in such knowledge as an evident real, as the existent fact of knowledge itself, with the object as its free possibility and as negated in its actuality.

44. That metaphysical reality is subjective is admitted in the sense that it is not an *object* behind the perceivable object. The objective attitude of metaphysics should terminate with the recognition of something that is known as unknown in the object, of the contradiction in the presented unobjective character of the object. But this unknown something that is known as such and formulated is not *merely* subjective in the sense of being illusory or in the sense of being the content of a faith that can never be turned into knowledge. To take it as merely subjective is to assume the object to be alone knowable and to be incapable of being *known* as put forth subjectively or freely. It is to deny the facthood of the constructive function by which the perceivable object comes to be for the subject. The epistemological functions are indeed believed and not known but they are not believed as merely subjective. They are, no doubt, symbolised by objective metaphors but the symbolism is necessary and has to be entertained in faith. The demand to entertain the objective symbolism in faith is inconsistent with the *denial* of the knowability or objectivity of the functions. To be aware of a description as metaphorical but necessarily so is to take it to be unknown in the sense of being unrealised, of being imagined to be known but not yet known. It implies the possibility of knowing not indeed by any logical procedure but by a specific self-realising activity of the imagination itself. It argues a gratuitous diffidence to take such activity to be a mystic chimera. The imagination of knowing or the symbolising faith would

not be faith at all if the possibility of such subjective achievement of the feeling of knowledge were to be denied.

45. A faith that is spiritually demanded to be entertained cannot be taken to be incapable of being turned into knowledge. The moral postulates of Kant, for example, are such faiths. There is indeed no *moral* demand to entertain them, for they proceed from the demand for moral willing and there is no obligation on the part of the will to contemplate their objects. But when they have proceeded, are they mere speculative luxuries? Is the formulation of their objects with an *as though* spiritually indifferent or does it suggest a hope and a discipline to realise the hope of there being a grade of subjective realisation higher than the moral? Such a grade may be admitted as 'religion within the limits of pure reason' but the conceit of possible metaphysical knowledge, it may be said, need not, therefore, be reinstated. The conceit would be to Kant a moral impurity and critical honesty as essential to moral purity is essential to moral religion. But the conceit that implies intellectual dishonesty is the belief that metaphysical reality is known, not that it is knowable. To take the spirit as finally known when its reality is to be achieved would be to take away the will to achieve. But if the spirit is believed to be unknowable, is not the will to achieve equally taken away? The will to realise the self, whether in knowledge or otherwise—for there may be different modes of realisation, implies at any stage the knowledge of the self as not known and the belief that it is something more than as it is known. It cannot imply a belief in the self that is not knowledge at all, far less a belief in the self as unknowable.

46. The distinction of the object that is non-perceptually known from its knownness, presentation or idea is just its character of being unknown which is believed and sought to be isolated by introspection. The known object is thus a problem to all knowledge other than perception. Perception is at once full knowledge, and restricted knowledge, full in so far as no lack of knowledge is felt in it and restricted because nothing beyond the object is necessarily suggested by it. In imaginative knowledge, as in higher forms of non-perceptual knowledge, there is a felt lack of intimacy with the object known while something is known in the object—its becoming before being, for example,—which is unknown in the sense of not being as evident as the perceived object and of being incapable of being perceived. It is believed as constituting the reality of the perceivable object, the object being its appearance which is not unreal and in this sense a phenomenon of the reality. Non-perceptual knowledge is thus

knowledge of the object as phenomenal with belief in a reality constituting it.

47. There is no explicit belief in metaphysical reality except as thus implied in the knowledge of the phenomenal. To know the phenomenon is not *not* to know the reality but to know it as unknown and, it may be, as wanted to be known. Belief that is not knowledge at all is either unaccompanied by an idea of the object as distinct from the belief or is false belief. It is not possible, therefore, to say about the postulates of moral or aesthetic consciousness that they have only to be believed and cannot be known. They are, in fact, known as unknown, known as objects that are not to be rejected as permanent illusions but to be contemplated as symbols of the reality to be known. What in the case of the understanding is known as phenomenon is in the case of the reason known as symbol, neither of which can be taken in our ordinary consciousness to be illusory though they would be realised as illusory if the reality that is known as unknown were to be completely known.

48. It would indeed be wrong to say that what is known as unknown is necessarily wanted to be known, that there is a necessity for the idea of a believed object to get transformed into knowledge. The knowledge of the unknown as such is the precondition as much of moral or aesthetic realisation as of cognitive realisation. It would be equally wrong on the other side to say that for non-cognitive realisation it is necessary to give up faith in the knowability of the unknown. Belief in the unknowability of reality is not only not demanded ; it is impossible and although in a sense the unknowable real can be conceived, the confusion of this mere conceiving with belief will exclude the possibility of all spiritual realisation. We know or believe the reality to be unknown but we cannot believe it to be unknowable. We can doubt the knowledge of the phenomenon or symbol such as is implied in the knowledge of the unknown reality ; but either such doubt does not amount to disbelief or if it does, the belief in the unknown reality also disappears, for that stands so long as the knowledge is not doubted. While the belief in the reality persists, the doubt is only an imaginary doubt, only the conceiving of a disbelief—no psychic fact at all but only a fringe of it—a conceiving of the totally unknown that is yet real. The concept of the totally unknown reality is the imaginary concept of the unknowable.

49. The factors of actual knowledge can never be proved to be necessary to all knowledge. A content that is claimed to be known may be shown afterwards to have been only believed or to be known

as unknown but cannot be shown to be unknowable in the sense of being totally unknown and yet demanded to be believed. So long as it can be spoken of and believed, it is not to be regarded as totally unknown on the ground of some factor of actual knowledge being wanting. If the thing-in-itself or an Idea of Reason is spoken of and believed, it is already known as unknown; and because of the two factors of actual object-knowledge—thought and intuition—either is wanting in this case, one has no right to doubt such knowledge as is there already or—what amounts to the same thing—to doubt the knowability of the unknown. To know something to be unknown implies, in fact, a demand to find a condition of its being known and if the conditions of other admitted knowledge be not there, it is a call to revise our epistemology and not to reject the knowledge of the unknown that sets the problem.

50. The knowledge of the unknown is what starts the actual problem of realisation whether in the cognitive or in the non-cognitive direction. The demand for either mode of realisation is absolute, though there is a spiritual choice—which is not merely the free choice of a will—between them. The non-cognitive mode does not entertain the demand that the unknown that is known as such should be known as known, that the belief in the reality has to be turned into the knowledge of it as evident. Not that it therefore demands that there should be a belief in its unknowability: it would, in fact, be impossible with such a belief. What is demanded for any mode of spiritual realisation is that there should be the knowledge of a reality as beyond the known and that it should not be known as unknowable. The non-cognitive mode of realisation does not demand the belief that it is the only mode and that the cognitive mode implies, as Kant would have it, a fanatical conceit or theosophic illusion. The impossibility of the cognitive mode would argue the impossibility of the non-cognitive modes as well.

51. Thus we meet the Kantian difficulty. Psychic fact, we said, involves presentation from which the perceivable object is distinct and which accordingly is object and more than object. It is *more* in the sense of being a metaphysical reality constitutive of the object which is its phenomenon, a reality that is known as unknown and as knowable, though the complete knowledge of it need not be demanded. Psychic fact as embodying belief in such reality is at once real and realising, realising as being already real, this being the objective counterpart of knowing the object as unknown. To Kant, metaphysical reality—what in presentation appears to be known as

unknown in the object—is only thought and believed and appears to be known by an inevitable or permanent illusion. We agree that the introspective awareness of the presentation as distinct from the object is not knowledge of knowing but only imagination of knowing the metaphysical. The imagination, however, is not an illusion but only incomplete or unrealised knowledge and hence the imagined knowing appears as the knowing of the unknown as such in the object. There is no question of turning this imagined knowing into actual knowing by sense-intuition : it can be actualised, if at all, by the concreting activity of imagination itself. Metaphysical reality is only symbolised in objective terms : it is not literally objective though the symbolising may be a step towards knowledge of it as a subjective reality and need not be in the service of willing or feeling only. The subject may be sought to be realised morally or emotionally and the conceit of knowing the reality may be dropped but there is no necessity to drop it. Cognitive realisation of the metaphysical reality as subjective has to be admitted, at least, as an alternative spiritual possibility.

52. In this cognitive realisation, the knowledge of the unknown as such implies the demand to know the metaphysical reality not as an object hidden behind the perceivable object but as that of which the object is a free efflux and to know empirical fact as real not by being given but by the self-shining substantively existent cognition of it. What appear as characters of the object—characters like forming, pastness or necessity revealed by imagination, memory or inference—would in such realisation cease to be adjectival and appear substantive. Psychic fact would not only appear isolated from its object in the stage of introspective realisation proper to it but would cease to be distinguished from introspection as its object, shining out as a mode of introspection itself, as a self-evidencing functional fact. The phenomenal object—the object as imagined to be perceived—would appear to be a possibility that is not actual by its own right, being negated or turned into illusion in this sense though not in the sense that when put forth, it is not real at all.

53. Psychic fact appears to our ordinary unrealised introspection as more concrete than objective fact only in promise and not in actuality. It does not, however, appear as co-ordinate with objective fact: it is what should be more real but is actually less real. To be more real is not to be a whole of which objective fact is an element, for the unobjective element of psychic fact that is known in introspection as the unknown character of the object is what constitutes the reality of the object. Psychic fact contains within it objective fact

as a possibility but it would be wrong to say that the realisation of the psychic *must* mean the actualisation of this possibility. Actualisation of a possible is, indeed, a necessity to knowing, provided we choose to know or to adopt the cognitive mode of realisation. Object is a possibility within the psychic only in the sense that it *can* be actualised, not that it will or need be actualised. It is not comprehended in the psychic in the Hegelian sense.

54. The Indian conception of a specific activity of realisation on the part of the individual spirit is alien to modern philosophy generally and specially to Hegelian philosophy. The individual spirit is supposed in the latter to be individual so far as he is subject and does not know his subjectivity objectively. He knows it objectively only as he finds it through non-cognitive spiritual activity. He asserts it non-cognitively but does not in such assertion will *towards* it as what is to be developed, does not know it and stand outside it in spiritual willing though in the consciousness of the resulting fulfilment, he knows the subjectivity to have been developed. To the absolute spirit, however, his will to realise his subjectivity is knowledge of his subjectivity *in* the willing and not *after* the willing : realisation in the Indian sense is thus admitted in the absolute spirit alone. So far as it is admitted, it is understood as cognitive, non-cognitive activity being only a stage or constituent function in it. So the object, so far as it is known as unknown in the psychic state, would be taken by the Hegelian to be known by the individual as eternally known by the Absolute, as what not only can but will be unfolded by the psychic, being eternally unfolded in the Absolute. It is this necessity that is denied here as against the Hegelian : object as an ideality within the psychic is what can be unfolded but need not be. The psychic is more concrete than the object in the sense that it can freely put forth the lesser reality; and even as it does put forth, it does not lend to it its whole reality but keeps itself still as more concrete than the manifested object. Nature is still to the Psyche a magic or playful appearance.

55. The parting from the Hegelian view is suggested at a comparatively late stage. But the view of the psychic as co-ordinate with the object and still more the view of it as comprehending the object as a real element have to be rejected at the very start. There is a tendency in certain recent developments of psychology to reject the ghostly psychic fact as co-ordinate with objective fact either in favour of an experience-unity of subject and object or in favour of the biological unity of the organism and its environment. We are not con-

cerned with the latter for the present. The experience-unity of subject and object is supposed to be known in introspection. It is the psychic fact as implying the object as a real element, the presentation which is not not-object and from which the object is differentiated out by 'inter-subjective intercourse'. Now the question is if this experience-unity is rightly claimed to be known by introspection, known so unambiguously that it can be proposed to be substituted for the current duality of subject and object. All that can be admitted is that we do not distinguish the presentation from the object as we distinguish the object from the presentation: we only cannot deny that the presentation is object though the object is other than presentation. The distinguishing of the object from its presentation is definite knowledge but the non-denial of the identity of presentation with its object does not amount to the knowledge of it. The presentation, in fact, cannot be known except as what the object is distinct *from*. By itself it is believed in introspection and it embodies belief in the object. Psychic fact as bound up with presentation cannot be asserted to *include* the object on the ground that presentation is not known as not-object or implies belief in the object.

56. The ordinary view of the ghostly psychic fact as co-ordinate with objective fact ignores the experienced non-distinction of presentation from its object while the view of experience-unity unwarrantably asserts it as identity. Is the duality of psychic fact and objective fact secured any better by the recognition of the distinction between the 'enjoying' and the 'contemplative' modes of knowing? For one thing, it is doubtful if the enjoying knowledge of the psychic fact should be called knowledge at all. Even if it be taken as knowledge of it as objectively unknown, the difficulty is to relate the content of it with the content of contemplative knowledge. The distinction of objective fact from presentation or psychic fact may be taken to be itself an objective fact that is contemplatively known. But the distinction of psychic fact from the object, to be known, would have to be enjoyingly known. All that, however, can be said to be enjoyingly known is the psychic fact as distinct in itself. Its distinction from the object is only symbolically thought by an illegitimate extension of the reversible character of the relation of distinction within contemplative knowledge. It is not known but is only a symbolism for the felt dissociation or freedom of the psychic fact from the object.

CHAPTER III

BODILY SUBJECTIVITY

THE BODY AS PERCEIVED AND FELT

57. Psychic fact has been taken to be fact of which we are introspectively aware as capable of existing apart from introspection. Introspection is the distinguishing of the presentation from its object, the object being given as distinct from the presentation. In perceptual knowledge, the object is not given as distinct from its presentation and hence perceptual knowledge is not at least directly the object of introspection and is not a psychic fact in this sense. We are, however, aware of the subject even in the sub-psychic perceptual stage. The body as externally and internally perceived, as observed and felt may be regarded as the subject in relation to the environment and psychology has to start with this bodily subjectivity.

58. The materialistic view that the subject is but the body is true in so far as the body represents a stage of being of the subject. But it ignores the unique singularity of one's own body even as a perceived object. No merely objectivistic account can do justice to this singularity. The objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their position relative to the percipient's body which itself, therefore, cannot be taken to be so constituted. To the percipient, his body is an object situated in space relatively to some other percipient's body as imagined, being not perceived by himself in a space-position though not known, therefore, as non-spatial. The percipient as in his body or as his body is, in this sense, dissociated from the external world, being what his perceived world is distinct from. At the same time he cannot help imagining himself as included in the world though it may be as a privileged object.

59. One's own body is only half-perceived, the rest being eked out by imagination. The unseen face of a solid object that is perceived is imagined by the percipient by imagining his own body being placed in a different position. To imagine the unseen half of one's own body, however, the observer does not imagine his own body thus placed differently. He imagines *another* observing body, not his own, as thus placed. In this respect also his own perceived body is uniquely different from other perceived objects and has no place in the objective world that he conceives to be presentable to him as a

solipsistic observer. The world as a construction out of the views or perspectives of many observers cannot be simply identified, with the world constructed out of the views of the same observer in different positions. The former is not, indeed, known as other than the latter ; but it is a world organic to a subject that feels dissociated from his body, a world therefore that has no perceivable position and involves a space that he as percipient cannot take to be objective to him. Thus even if the subject is taken as nothing but one's own perceived body, it involves the knowledge of something unknown as such in the object, something that cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible object in the merely objectivistic attitude. It still implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which subjectivity consists. What is intended by the word *I* cannot be characterised even in the lowest stage of subjectivity as simply *this* object.

60. One's own body is not only perceived from outside : one is immediately or sensuously aware of it also from within in what is called 'feeling of the body'. This feeling is not, like the feeling of an object, a psychic fact from which the object known is distinguished. The bodily feeling is but the felt body which is not known to be other than the perceived body. Yet the perceived body is distinct from it so far as it is an 'interior' that is never perceived and cannot be imagined to be perceived from outside. Introspection, indeed, is sometimes taken as nothing but sense-perception of the interior of the body. But the interior cannot be understood here as the interior that one may imagine oneself seeing. To say that it is the same spatial interior, only appearing indefinite, is to ignore the qualitative difference that is felt between the indefiniteness of a perceived position and the indefiniteness of a felt position, the position, for example, of a pain in the perceived body. Our knowledge of objective space may have been developed from the felt spread of the body or the felt location in it but we are always aware of such felt space as only *partially* defined into perceived space and, therefore, cannot assert the former to be nothing more than the latter. Perceived space, however it may be extended and complicated by the geometric imagination, can at best symbolise the uniquely felt space that sets the problem of objective interpretation and is always in advance of the interpretation. It is even as the uniquely singular *I* is symbolised by the objectively singular *this*, being never adequately interpreted by it.

61. Objective space that is indefinitely perceived is the same as the objective space that is definitely perceived and the definition does not involve any fresh objectification. But felt space is indefi-

nite in the sense that it is more than the objective space it is defined into, *more* in the sense already explained in which the presentation of an object is more than the object. The felt interior of the body may thus be regarded as the prototype of the observable interior, not merely the latter as presented indefinitely but what can only be symbolised by the latter in its full definiteness. Definite objective space is related to felt space as the objective exterior is related to the objective interior, the latter relation being, in fact, the reflection of the former relation.

62. The awareness of the body from within is, indeed, sensuous but it can hardly be called sense-perception. It is only not denied to be perception, though the perceived body as an object among objects is distinguished from the body as felt from within. The body is felt as extending from a vague interior to the outer surface that may be both felt and perceived. But the perception of the body stops at the surface and if it is extended by the imagination of the interior, the interior is still imagined as an external surface. The perceived and imagined body is always an exterior which may also be felt but the felt interior can never be imagined as perceived. Thus the felt body cannot be distinguished from the perceived body though the latter is distinguished from the former.

63. The relation between the felt body and the perceived body is similar to the relation of presentation and its object in non-perceptual knowledge. There is, however, the difference that introspection into such knowledge is possible because the presentation is felt to be dissociated though not known to be distinct from its object while there is no introspection into body-feeling, as we are not aware of it as dissociated from the perceived body. Body-feeling and felt body are only verbally distinct; and the awareness of the felt body is not the awareness of anything but the perceived body though the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body. As in the case of the perception of objects, there is no conscious duality of presentation and object in body-feeling and as in the case of non-perceptual knowledge, the perceptible object—here the body—is distinguished from something which however here is the felt body and not presentation and is not suspected like presentation as the possibility of anything other than the perceived body. Body-feeling may accordingly be regarded as not psychic fact but the potentiality of it. The problem of dissociating it from the objective body does not yet arise, as it arises in the case of psychic fact. But the possibility of dissociation is there, in the actualisation of which body-feeling may be conceived to be transformed into psychic fact.

Actually in body-feeling, we are not interested in withdrawing from the environment : it is only an interest derived from higher stages of subjectivity that suggests such withdrawal.

64. We may consider body-feeling in relation to psychic fact and introspection into psychic fact on the one hand and to the perceived body and perceived object on the other. The perceived body is only potentially dissociated from the perceived object inasmuch as it is not merely like presentation not denied to be object but is positively known as object. There is no explicit awareness of dissociation from the object but since position relative to the body, which is a constitutive character of the object, may not be analysed out in perception, the object is only half-distinguished from the body, the body being, therefore, only implicitly or potentially dissociated from it. The object, however, is fully distinguished from the felt body: the perceived object presents exterior surface only, its so-called interior being, as perceived or imagined to be perceived, still an exterior. Corresponding to this full distinction from the felt interior, there is the actual but imperfect dissociation or freedom of the felt body from the perceived environment. The felt body, however, does not appear even imperfectly dissociated from the perceived body. It is only potentially dissociated because the perceived body is half-distinguished from the felt body in the sense one who observes his body as exterior to him may not feel it.

65. Again, the perceived body is fully distinguished from psychic fact—from the imagination of the body, for example—which however is imperfectly but consciously dissociated from it. There may be consciousness of the body as *mine* and at the same time as not other than myself, unlike the consciousness of the object which if felt as *mine* is felt as not *me*. The felt body is, however, only half-distinguished from psychic fact, since it is the feeling of the body on the one hand and is not actually dissociated from the perceived body on the other. Psychic fact accordingly is only potentially or implicitly and not actually or explicitly dissociated from the felt body. In introspection into psychic fact, this potential dissociation of the psychic fact from the felt body becomes imperfectly actual : there is no awareness of the psychic fact as not involving bodily feeling at all though bodily feeling as the felt body itself is other than the psychic fact. The felt body begins to get resolved into a bodiless psychic feeling in introspection and may be conceived to be fully resolved when introspection gets realised as assured knowledge. Meantime our ordinary introspection involves awareness of the felt body as

not other than the perceived body from which, however, psychic fact is felt to be completely detached. It is in this sense only that introspection may be taken as the sense-perception of the bodily interior. Strictly speaking, it is the awareness of a psychic fact felt as fully detached from the perceived body or the bodily exterior and half-detached from the felt bodily interior which also is half-detached from the bodily exterior.

66. The facthood of the subjective is constituted by this feeling of detachment or freedom. The first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body. In the perception of the object, there need not be the knowledge of the object being distinct from the body. Developed perception may involve such knowledge but still the body is taken as perceived object. When the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body, the exterior from the interior, we have an explicit feeling of distinction, detachment or freedom from the perceived object. Apart from the specific activity of realisation which subjectivity suggests, the first given feeling of freedom in body-feeling is what all freedom of higher grade involves and derives its meaning from. Subjectivity apart from spiritual discipline is rooted in body-feeling and is only imagined to be dissociable from it. Psychic fact is then fact because of the knowledge of object or the presentation that it involves, because of the consequent felt detachment of it from the perceived body and of its non-detachment from the felt body. In introspection, indeed, there is the initial detachment of psychic fact from the felt body but introspection itself is fact only as a fringe of some psychic fact which is undetached from the felt body. This initial detachment here is only imagined, for the felt body is not yet turned into a psychic feeling, introspection being only the faith that the detachment can be realised. The realisation of this freedom from the felt body is the pre-condition of all distinctively spiritual activity.

CHAPTER IV

BODILY SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.)

KNOWLEDGE OF ABSENCE AS A PRESENT FACT

67. The perception of objective fact does not imply a distinguishing of the object from the presentation of it. That there is a presentation here from which the object is distinct is not directly known by introspection. Perception as a psychic fact is known only in introspection into non-perceptual knowledge. In memory, for example, there is the distinguishing of the past object from the presentation (image) of it and in introspection into memory, there is the further distinguishing of the past perceptual presentation of the object from the present image of it, the object being thus known as having been unconsciously distinct from the past presentation. The perceived object may, however, be directly distinguished from the felt body which, as has been pointed out, is like the perceived object undistinguished from presentation but yet involves a feeling of detachment from all object other than perceived body. The feeling of the body may accordingly be taken to be an implicate of developed perception, of the perception of the object as distinct from the felt body and to be only a fringe of perceptual knowledge. The knowledge of absence as a present fact that now comes up for discussion is similarly a fringe of object-perception of a higher grade, involving like all perception no distinction of the fact from the presentation of it. The absence of object that is immediately known as a present fact is just midway between the body felt to be present and the presentation that is felt to be detached from present fact in non-perceptual knowledge.

68. Objective fact may be said to be present as external, as internal and as absent. The felt body is objective fact in its internal aspect. An object may be also directly known to be *now* absent, to be 'present as absent' in this sense—a paradoxical phrase to be justified presently. All these three aspects may be said to be known in connexion with sense and involve no distinguishing from presentation. A present object as external may be distinguished from other present objects as external, from a present object as internal or from the present absence of itself. The feeling of the body is already a detachment from the external object though not from the body as

external. The direct knowledge of the present absence of an object is a detachment not only from the object but also from the perceived body though not from the body as internally felt. The absence of an object, so far as it is located, is located like its presence in reference to the body but the reference is in opposite directions. The object as present is there away from my body. In the case of absence, the object being missed or unreachd by my body is what my body is away from: the absence is where my body is not. Thus the body as external is distinguished from the object as absent and not the latter from the former. Corresponding to this distinction, there is the felt detachment from the body of the present absence of the object or of the object as now missed, the consciousness of the absence or the absent being thus removed from the space round the body.

69. The sense-conditioned knowledge of an object being now absent is not to be confused with the memory, expectation or imagination of the object. None of these need involve knowledge of its *present* absence. An object may be remembered, expected or imagined though it is now present: non-perceptual knowledge of it may co-exist with perceptual knowledge. There are cases, again, in which there is no distinct image of the absent object at all and where yet we may be aware of the perceived locus of the absence as empty or devoid of an indefinite something. A consciously imagined object as now absent or the absence of an object not consciously imagined that characterises a perceived locus as empty is known in connexion with sense and known, if not in perception, in a cognitive mode undissociated from perception. The cognition is a fringe either of the perception of the locus or of the perception of the body and is in either case undissociated from the feeling of the body.

70. The cognition of an object as now absent may but need not involve the cognition of its absence as characterising a locus and the latter also may but need not involve the former. The two cognitions are, therefore, distinct and each as primary may involve the latter as secondary. A field, for example, was observed in the past with a tree standing on it, which might not have been particularly noticed at the time. The observer comes to the place when the tree has been removed and finds a new bare look about the place. He may not know that it is absence of the tree that makes the difference but he notices the difference, bareness or absence. To take another example, a person is looking for a book in a room but does not find it. He knows the book to be absent without being conscious of any empty look about the room and without, in fact, consciously referring the

absence to the room at all. The former example would be a case of cognition of the *absence* of an object (tree) and the latter of cognition of an object (book) being *absent*. Neither cognition here need imply the other and both are direct sense-conditioned cognitions of objective fact. Yet each may develop into the other cognition: what is absent may come to be realised as tree in the first example and the absence of the book may come to be realised in explicit reference to the room in the second.

71. Should the primary and secondary cognitions in each case be called perception? In the first case, the absence of the tree is known as a character of the locus, the perceived field where the tree stood. The tree may not be definitely remembered but if remembered it is recognised to be the specification of the absence that continues to be known, the place not ceasing to wear the bare look because of the definite memory. As the place is perceived, absence as a character of the place may also be claimed to be perceived. There is, however, a distinction between the sense in which absence is a character and that in which a quality like colour is a character of the place. The place in being perceived with the bareness or absence is, if not perceived, at least imagined as what need not have the character, being presented as with a new look or, in other words, as distinct from what it might be. But to perceive the place with a colour is not necessarily to imagine that it might be without it. The perceived locus of absence being imagined in the very perception of it as without the absence, the absence is only a floating adjective that unlike colour is felt to be dissociated from the locus. There is a suggestion of the absence being outside the space where the locus stands—the space round the body, of its being *nowhere* like an image, though it is believed to be objective and not psychic fact. The suggestion is not actual imagination of positionless objective fact but only the attempted symbolising of the feeling of detachment from objective space. The absence cannot be said to be not known as objective but it is implicitly felt to be dissociated from objective space. The perception of it as a character of the object in the feeling that it is not a character and with the conscious distinguishing of the object from it may be called aesthetic or imaginative perception to distinguish it from ordinary perception.

72. In the second example, what is known in the first instance is not the absence of the book but the book as absent. The book is not found and the room where it is not found is not perceived, at least immediately, to have any empty look owing to the absence.

The book as absent is immediately known as a present objective *circumstance that is neither remembered nor merely imagined*. The missing of the imagined book is a characteristic experience, implying a feeling of the body not reaching it, which is interpreted as the objective fact of the book being absent. The knowledge of this fact of the book as absent is with the conscious imagination of the book as found being distinct from it and implies the feeling of the present fact being outside objective space altogether. Such knowledge also may, therefore, be called aesthetic or imaginative perception. The difference from the previous case is that what is imaginatively distinguished within the perception is not the perceived locus of the absence from the absence but the imagined object-as-present from the perceived object-as-absent. In neither case is the positive object distinguished from a presentation as in non-perceptual knowledge. It is distinguished in both cases from the objective fact of absence or the absent and not from a psychic fact. This objective fact that is distinguished from may thus be said to be perceived.

73. The primary cognitions of absence and the absent which are both perception may be followed by secondary cognitions. The perception of the absence of the tree in the first example may develop into the cognition of the tree as absent and the perception of the book as absent in the second example into the cognition of the absence of the book imagined explicitly as the book *in the room*. The interest may shift in the former case from the bare look of the locus to what was in it but is no longer existing and in the latter case from the book that is missed to the locus which might have been but is not with the object. Are these secondary cognitions also perception?

74. When after the perception of the absence of the tree as a character of the place, the tree as remembered is known to be now absent, there is no missing of a looked-for object like the missing of the book in the second example. If an object is looked for and not found, the object as it might be now, with presentness as its adjective, is perceived to be absent. Again, when absence is known as a character or adjective of a present locus, it is taken to be perceived. But when as in this case *that* object tree is known to be *now* absent, the presentness is not adjective either to the object or to the locus but is only an adverbial mode of the adjective *absent*. What is consciously referred to as *now* is neither the object nor the locus but the absence only. *That* object is not now perceivable and the perception of this place is irrelevant to the knowledge of the tree as absent.

Such knowledge is not perception : there is no perception that is not or does not consciously imply apprehension of a concrete as present.

75. The secondary cognition of *that* tree as now absent is not perception, though it is immediate and sense-conditioned cognition of the present. What is known to be *now* absent is known in the consciousness of not perceiving it, with the belief that it would have been perceived had it been present. Not that it is, therefore, *inferred* to be absent : the consciousness of not perceiving what, it is inferred, would have been perceived is itself no inference and is at once the objective knowledge of the present fact of absence. Present absence by itself is then immediately known in connexion with sense and inference by what may be called conscious non-perception. This has to be recognised as a new mode of knowledge and is comparable with the pure perception of object, conceived as that to which the object is not given but before which it floats up like an image and is none-the-less believed. Conscious non-perception is, indeed, in connexion with sense but what is perceived by sense is irrelevant to its content.

76. The secondary cognition in the second example is also a case of conscious non-perception. To make it more readily intelligible, we may vary the illustration and consider the absence of a beloved person instead of a book that is looked for in a room. When such a person is missed or imaginatively perceived as now absent, there may not be any relevant reference to the locus viz., the room. But one may come to imagine the room as with the person and then realise his absence in reference to this imagined content. To imagine an object in a perceived locus is a special form of imagination in which the present locus is viewed as characterising and not as characterised by the imagined content. The belief in the absence of the object as thus characterised by the locus, the absence here of the imagined room as sentimentally associated with the beloved person, is immediate knowledge but not perception. The absence is not taken to be fact *in* the present locus ; and as the presentness of the absence is not the presentness of any concrete thing, it cannot be said to be perceived. The secondary cognition is conscious non-perception, the room that is perceived by sense being turned into the imagined character of location of the imagined person.

77. The primary cognition of absence and the absent is imaginative perception and the secondary cognition of them is conscious non-perception. The relation of these modes of cognition with the apprehension of the body has now to be brought out. The primary cognition is related to the perception of the body as the

secondary cognition is related to the feeling of the body. The absence of the tree in the first example is where its locus is. The tree as absent, however, is not essentially referred to the locus, being felt in fact as outside the space round my body, as detached from reference to the perceived body. The positionlessness is felt and believed as a mode of my body-feeling which is dissociated from the object. The *now* or presentness of the absence is the *now* or the presentness of the body-feeling. But while the *now* of the body-feeling is not distinguished from the *then* as remembered or the *might be* as imagined, being only an implicit *now*, the *now* of the absent tree in this case is so distinguished. The *absent-now* is felt dissociated from the perceived body as the felt body is not. Thus the felt body is imperfectly distinct from the *absent-now* which, therefore, only appears to be a mode of the felt body, being undetached from it but really represents a stage higher and just falling short of the detached image. There is a similar relation of the primary and secondary cognitions in the second example to the perceived body and the felt body.

78. In the imaginative perception of absence and the absent, there is no explicitly felt dissociation from the position of the perceived body, which however is imperfectly distinguished from the imagined position of absence or of the absent. In conscious non-perception, there is the explicitly felt dissociation from the perceived body but not from the felt body, though the felt body has begun to be distinguished from the fact of absence or the absent. The relation of the perceived body in the former case and of the felt body in the latter to the known absence is like the relation of the perceived body to the felt body. The perceived body is half-distinguished from the felt body which, however, is not felt to be dissociated from the perceived body. Absence imaginatively perceived is thus on a level with the felt body, both being felt undissociated from the perceived body which however is half-distinguished from them. Absence known by conscious non-perception is on a higher level, being felt half-dissociated from the perceived body which, however, is fully distinguished from it and undissociated from the felt body which is half-distinguished from it.

79. Conscious non-perception then is a transitional stage between body-feeling and imagination with which psychic fact begins. It is the consciousness of presentness without space-position, the same as the presentness of the felt body but distinguished from such absence of the perceived object as is realised in imagination, memory or expectation as the *might be*, the past or the future. It is free from

space but not from the present and accordingly does not imply a presentation of the object as dissociated from the object. Psychic fact begins with the distinguishing of what the present is not. Conscious non-perception is the distinguishing of the present from the detached presentation and not reversely and may be taken as the immediate pre-condition of the felt detachment of the presentation from the present. Were one to start with object-perception as the actual standard of knowledge, the first clear hint of the subjective fact would be realised in the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHIC SUBJECTIVITY

THE IMAGE

80. Psychology does not begin till the perceived object is distinguished from the half-perceived body. The body may not be felt as dissociated from the objective world but it is still realised as a uniquely central object round which the world is disposed. To those who would not go farther in psychology, introspection is only observation of the indefinite body-interior and psychic fact is only a bodily attitude, the beginning of the behaviour of an organism to the environment. Some, however, would go one step farther and admit the image as a unique fact, appearing as a quasi-object from which object including the body is distinguished. Psychology to them cannot ignore the image, even if it be only ancillary to bodily behaviour. The image may be functional in character as a reference to the object, the reference being ultimately a behaving mode ; but that it appears presented as a substantive something from which the object is distinct and exists in a sense in which the object does not exist cannot be denied.

81. The meaning of facthood appears to change as we pass from the perceived object as fact to the image as fact. This is realised if we interpose between them the three entities so far discussed—the perceived body, the felt body and absence of object as known in conscious non-perception. Each later term in the series appears to be fact in a sense different from the term before it—the perceived body from the perceived object, the felt body from the perceived body and so on. Facthood as an abstraction has an unformed symbolic meaning : its actual meaning depends on the nature of the content that is taken as fact. Fact in general means only what is believed or asserted but what fact means as a predicate applied to a content apart from the subjective function of assertion is indeterminate. Its meaning depends on the form of knownness of the content, the knownness that is its constitutive character and is abstracted by the so-called psychological introspection. The object is object to us so far as it is given and not self-evident like I, so far as it is presented and believed as more than it is known, so far, in fact, as it is known

to be unknown. Knownness as an abstraction emerges only with this positive awareness of the unknown and has meaning only in reference to it. If the abstraction by itself has a meaning, it stands for an indeterminate which is not given nor yet is self-evidencing like the knowing I, being at best what is to be known. The concept of fact in general or knownness by itself is thus a problem in meaning and not an accomplished meaning. Meantime facthood is but a name for many grades or modes of fact which have no *actual* relation of similarity or point of similarity. We have accordingly to begin by accepting the different grades of fact as implying different meanings of facthood.

82. A perceived object is necessarily a spatial object having a position relatively not only to other perceived objects but also to the percipient's body. The perceived parts of his body are to him like outside objects situated relatively to some part of his body that he does not perceive nor even imagine himself perceiving but imagines only as perceivable (by another) and yet as continuous with the part that he perceives. His perceivable body as a whole is not perceived by him as situated relatively to the object. The perceived positional relation of one object to another is reversible but that of the object to the percipient's body as a whole is not reversible. Position relatively to the percipient's body is a character that constitutes the facthood of the perceived object, but his body as a perceivable fact is not constituted to his perception by position relative to the object though it is imagined by him as situated relatively to another spectator in a perceived objective position. This lack of perceived position is what distinguishes the facthood of one's perceivable body from the facthood of the objects perceived by him.

83. The imagined position of the perceived body is in objective space, space that is all exterior to the actual or imaginary percipient. Interior and exterior within objective space are understood relatively to two spectators: what the same actual spectator perceives is only the exterior. What he apprehends as interior is the felt space: his felt position consists in withdrawal from objective space, though it is not known as other than the imagined position of the perceivable body. The body is still felt to have a position which objective position is not but which is not, therefore, known as other than objective position. The interiority of the felt body is what distinguishes its existence from that of the perceived body.

84. The absence of an object is immediately known as a present objective fact. Has its facthood any reference to space-position?

In what we have called the aesthetic or imaginative perception of absence, the absence is taken to be where the thing absent is imagined to be. Now in imagining an object in a perceived position, the position is turned into an imagined character of the object. The position of the absence of the object is thus imagined though not imaginary. The position of the perceived body is also imagined and of both it may be said that they are not unperceived because imagined, being, in fact, perceived through the imagination. The difference is that the body is half-perceived by sense while the absence is perceived wholly through imagination. Absence has a factual position only as the felt body is undetached from the perceiving body. The position of absence as distinguished from the absence itself, is like the perceivable body half-perceived through the imagination: the locus is perceived by sense and it is also imagined as turned into a character of the imagined object. Perceived absence then is on a level with the felt body but its position is on the level of the perceived body. Such absence is undetached from its position as the felt body is undetached from the perceived body.

85. Absence that is known by conscious non-perception is not referred to objective space. It is not known as with a position though it would be going too far to say that it is known as positionless. It is felt even as the body is felt, the belief in it being a bodily feeling of not feeling the object. Yet as the felt body is not detached from the perceived body and appears spatial as the mystic interior, absence in conscious non-perception is referred to this interior. It is as though the absent object was in the felt body. Yet the felt body is half-distinguished from it, just as the perceived body is half-distinguished from the felt body. Absence is here not known as with position while the felt body is known as with an unknown position from which objective space-position is distinct. There is the further distinction that the presentness of the absence is asserted explicitly while bodily feeling is only the implicit feeling of presentness. It is the explicit presentness that makes it possible for absence to be known as objective and yet without position.

86. The image is known to be without position while absence in conscious non-perception is only not known with position. So, too, absence is known as present or *now*, while the image is not known as *now*. The image has no space-position and it cannot be asserted to have a time-position, which, however, is not denied. To imagine an object is not necessarily to know it as now absent. We may imagine it while we perceive it e.g., when the object is our body and

we may perceive it wholly through imagination as in what has been called aesthetic perception. But we imagine the object also when we know it to be absent. In such a case we imperfectly distinguish the object as *now* absent from the image of the object, which however is undissociated from the absent object and as such is not denied to be *now* but is not, therefore, asserted to be *now*.

87. The ordinary perception of object is said to involve imagination but the image here is only inferred and cannot appear to introspection. In a perception like that of one's own body, there is the direct consciousness of something in it as not sensed, from which the sensed portion of the body is distinguished but which itself is not distinguished from it. In what has been called aesthetic or imaginative perception, not only is the sense-perceived locus of its object distinguished from it: the object as imaginatively perceived is distinguished from itself as merely imagined though not conversely. In none of these cases is the image felt to be dissociated from the percept. In the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception, the image of the absent object is felt to be dissociated from the felt body but not from the present absence. What is known to be wholly distinct from the image at this stage is the object as present and not as absent. The knowledge of present absence is still a mode of bodily subjectivity; but in imagination as a free psychic fact, even the present absence is distinguished from the image; and so the image, though not explicitly dissociated from the presentness, is not known as with this character which is the last vestige of perceptible facthood. The image here appears with objective form but does not appear with objective position.

88. The relation of the image and of psychic fact generally to objective time has been the subject of controversy. There is the current banality that psychic facts are only in time while objective facts are in both space and time. We have pointed out on the one hand that absence that is known in conscious non-perception is not known to be in space though it is objective and that the image proper on the other is not known to be in time. We cannot assert nor can we deny that such objective absence is in space and that the image is in time. The image is assertable as not in space, neither in perceptible space nor in felt space. It has, indeed, spatiality as a character or form; and it is even possible to imagine an object on a perceived locus, where, however, the image is not in space but has space-position as an aesthetic expression. Thus there is a felt dissociation of the image from objective space and even from the felt

interior of the body. Since the absence known in conscious non-perception is not consciously dissociated from the felt body, it is only half-distinguished from the image, being not deniable as in space while the image is so deniable ; and thus the image is not felt dissociated from the present absence though it is potentially dissociated.

89. This potential dissociation of the image from the *now* is realised in 'thought'. In the examples of non-perception so far given it has been assumed that the object that is absent is imaged. But there may be cases where the absent object is only thought, as for example, when we say 'no man is present here' : man in general is here thought and not imaged. The vague image of an individual man may float up but the absence that is known is the absence not of this man in particular but of all men. The image here as symbolising the thought may be said to be consciously dissociated from the presentness of the absence. Thus though the image need not be denied as *now*, it may be denied. We cannot assert that the image of the object now absent is *now* and we can in higher stages e.g., in the stage of image with thought definitely deny it.

90. The lowest stage of psychic fact is represented by the image without thought, emerging in the conscious non-perception of the absent as such. Just as the perception of the object half-consciously implies the perception of the body, this the feeling of the body and this again the conscious non-perception of the absent, so this last implies the image of the absent from which the absent as such is imperfectly distinguished. Attention here is primarily directed to the objective absence but in distinguishing it we attend indirectly to the image of the object that is absent. As thus indirectly attended to, the image is not distinguished and appears without thought. There is no awareness yet of its being not objective : it appears as a ghostly object that does not consciously imply belief, much as the half-perceived body appears when an object is perceived to be *there*. The awareness of the image is still bound up with the perceiving attitude and is not introspective. The image is still consciously as though it were an object. It is like the illusion of the object persisting after correction, though it is only without belief and does not imply as in the case of illusion a conscious disbelief. It is only potentially psychical, being an object for possible introspection.

91. The distinguishing of the presentation of an object from the object is introspection which does not amount to the knowledge of the presentation as a given distinct. The distinguishing of the object

from its presentation is, however, a phase of object-knowledge. The presentation as thus distinguished from is an indefinite quasi-object. It is felt dissociated from the object as having no position in objective space and except in its lowest phase as image is felt also as not in time. In the case of the image, there is only no consciousness of its being an event in time : it is not felt to be not in time. Conscious non-perception of an object implies, indeed, the conscious image of the object but what is believed to be present fact is the *object* as absent, as distinct from the image which is neither believed nor disbelieved to exist at the moment. In the thought of an objective fact, however, the meaning which is the presentation is not only not referred to time : its existence in time is meaningless.

92. In conscious non-perception of an object, its image is not directly attended to and there is no introspective distinguishing of it from the object as absent. When it is introspectively attended to, it changes its character ; the image appears as imaging, as being formed though not as unformed, as functional without ceasing to be substantive. A presentation like meaning also appears functional under introspection but loses its substantive character. The completed meaning is turned into the meaning act and loses its ghostly objectivity. All psychic fact conceived in introspection to be outside introspection is the quasi-objective fact of presentation which, however—with the exception of the image—appears as a mere function or act under introspection. The ghostly psychic fact cannot accordingly be taken to be a mere illusion ; it is what introspection testifies to as existing consciously outside itself and the lowest form of it viz., the image is apprehended even in the objective attitude apart from the testimony of introspection. The view of psychic life as the self's transaction with quasi-objective presentation is suggested by the image. A presentation like meaning that wholly melts into function under introspection does not stand before the self as object for its attention.

93. The image appears under introspection as functional and substantive at the same time, as a form being formed. This forming or incomplete character of the image requires fuller consideration than it has received. There is a qualitative difference between the incompleteness of an image and the incompleteness of a perceived object, much like the difference between felt space and perceived space. The incompleteness of a percept is in reference to a fuller percept ; taken by itself, a percept is finished and definite and an indefinite and unfinished sense-appearance is not yet a percept. The sense-given cannot be incomplete in itself without being indefinite and without feel-

ing short of a percept. The image, however, is incomplete not merely in comparison with a percept but in itself ; it could not, in fact, be complete without being a percept. There cannot be a finished form that is not believed as the form of a perceived object. The imagined form is always being formed without, however, being indefinite like the sense-given content which is being formed into a percept. It is definite because the consciousness of the forming is at once the consciousness of the form to be completed. The forming and the form appear to be seen together, as they are actually seen together in what has been called aesthetic or imaginative perception. The image under introspection is, in fact, a standing process where the forming is not chronologically prior to the form and yet appears distinct from the form which is its interpretation. Under introspection accordingly the image appears as not in time while the image before introspection, as in the stage of conscious non-perception, is only not known to be in time. The consciousness of the finished form that interprets the forming is sometimes called *idea*. But the idea at this stage is not a separate presentation but only a fringe of the image. It is not dissociated from the image as forming, which, however, is distinguished from it. The idea as dissociated from the image would be the next psychic stage.

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHIC SUBJECTIVITY

THOUGHT

94. The image under introspection appears as a forming form in which the finished form is evident in the forming process as its interpreting idea. The idea as dissociated from the image is idea of the object as not imaged and sought to be imaged. The object here appears indefinite and the imagining or forming that is started by the conscious want of the image is the process of defining it. This process which may be called the materialising of the dissociated idea is intrinsically incomplete and is ever to be completed. The undissociated idea of the previous stage is the complete form that as much appears to be seen as the incomplete forming. The dissociated idea thus implies the imaging process and the conscious want of the image. The want is here only partial but there may be idea of something in the object that cannot be defined or concreted into image at all. Such idea is thought proper that is definite in itself and is not defined in meaning but at best fixed or detained in the mind by the images it may still call up. The images here have a consciously metaphorical or symbolising value for the idea.

95. Image or thought here is considered as presentation that embodies or at least does not exclude belief in the object. The mere image or the mere meaning, the object of which is disbelieved from the start is, as indicated before, no psychic fact at all. Now what in the object is believed specifically through imagination—viz., the form, though not posited in the space that is organic to the body, is still represented as spatial, appearing as though it were felt like the body. What is believed specifically through thought, however, does not thus appear to be intimately felt and is yet as definite as the imagined form. The dissociated idea lies midway between the definite form and the definite intelligible, being non-spatial in form but indefinite and only partially definable by an incomplete forming. It may be called pictorial thought to distinguish it from thought proper, the object of which is definitely presented as unpicturable meaning. Picturable metaphors and symbols may be used to fix the identity of such meaning and for purposes of easy communication but they do not help to define or elaborate it.

96. The image lacks space-position but still appears spatial in form and temporal as forming or becoming and as such implies a belief in its possible objectivity. Thought as the awareness of the unimaginability of its specific content is the awareness of its objectivity being impossible and thus involves a complete detachment from objectivity. Thought is still about the object but it is of something about the object that is definitely unobjective. In lower stages and even in the stage of body-feeling, something unobjective in the object is also presented but it is not known explicitly to be unobjective, not completely denied as objective. It is completely denied in thought and if it is still said to be something in the object, it is understood to be what *appeared* as objective, what the object was not distinguished from in the lower stages. The thinkable universal or relation, for example, was presented as objective in the lower stages and the object was never sufficiently distinguished from that presentation. Even in the stage of pictorial thought or the dissociated idea, the universal appeared as a quasi-spatial whole and relation as a quasi-temporal transition. In non-pictorial thought, this conceit of their quasi-objectivity is dropped, though the object continues to be referred to as what exists and is known without name and without relation. The universal and relation in the object are recognised, if not as thinking, as not distinguished from thinking, the object given as distinct being reduced to unrelated singulars or unique contents such as may be conceived to be 'purely perceived'. As thus referring to the object, meaning is still objective though explicitly through thinking, being a presentation and not a free subjectivity.

97. Non-pictorial thought which is definite independently of the image may be sought to be metaphorically or symbolically indicated by the image. Metaphor differs from symbol: the object that is thought is imagined as though it were the same as the metaphor but not as though it were the same as the symbol. Both are recognised to be other than the object thought; but while the metaphor is consciously employed as similar to the object, the symbol which is also remotely similar to the object in relational constitution is not employed as similar. The word is a symbol and not a metaphor for the object meant; the metaphor is only half-distinguished from the meaning while the symbol is fully distinguished. Thought in its higher grade is detained in the mind by the word and not by its figurative representation.

98. Thought as distinct from the forming image under introspection is a completed product and the thinking that does not

amount to a complete thought is a misnomer and should only be called a trying to think. This complete thought is about an object and the object thought is quite definite, whatever indefiniteness or incompleteness there may be in the symbolic imaging of it. Thought is complete as dissociated altogether from time, not merely from time-position from which the image (at least under introspection) is also dissociated but also from the forming or ideal timing that characterises the image. It is complete in the sense of being eternal; and spatial or temporal objectivity is distinguished from it. Still thought is about the object and as such should be called 'presentation'. Its content is such as is *necessarily* characterised as what the object is distinct from. Thought is thus a psychic fact, having a facthood apart from introspection. Despite its eternity, it would be incorrect to speak of it as a pure subjective activity. Much of the mysticism in Kantio-Hegelian philosophy has sprung from the confusion of thought with pure subjective activity, of reason with the spirit. Compared with the awareness of *I*, thought is objective and objective in its very dissociation from objectivity. It has still to be characterised in reference to the object as what the object is not.

99. That thought is a presentation comes out in the form of consciousness which we have called *trying to think*. Thought outside introspection is the accomplished meaning. The meaning stands in higher thought, at any rate, through the word. The word is quite distinct from the meaning but as *being used*, it is only half-distinguished from the meaning while the meaning is not dissociated at all from it within thought. The identity of the meaning with the word cannot be denied though it would be going too far to assert it. The identity is disturbed in the consciousness of missing the meaning of a word-combination of which the constituents have a meaning. The problem as to what a combination of significant words means, if it means anything, is an intelligible problem and so attained meaning is distinguished from possible meaning. Attained meaning has accordingly a kind of being outside subjective activity and is a presentation in this sense.

100. What, however, is this possible meaning, the missing of an actual meaning, the trying to think? The logical form of word-combination or syntactical connexion is a generality that has no actual meaning apart from the constituent words but cannot be denied to have a meaning when the word-combination has a meaning from which the meanings of the constituent words can be distinguished. The form of connexion here is not itself distinguished as an actual

meaning, being only distinguished from. As itself distinguished, it is possible meaning ; and in the problem of finding the meaning of a word-combination, the possible meaning is what symbolises the lack of actual meaning. Within thought, the image or the word furnishes the symbolism but here the form of thought itself constitutes the symbol for the felt problem. The feeling of the problem with the unrejected active faith in its solubility is the trying to think which is beyond thought or meaning, beyond all presentation.

CHAPTER VII

SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY

FEELING

101. Thought is still presented as meaning, as the unobjective something about the object, being characterisable only in reference to the object as what the object is not. The introspective awareness of meaning as distinct from the image is awareness of the explicitly unobjective. Feeling is also explicitly unobjective but it is not merely negative but positive as *subjective* fact without any reference to objective fact. The thought of object may accompany a feeling but it is recognised as only a symbolism for the feeling, as what no longer intends the object, being not consciousness of *object* as unknown but an avowedly over-definite representation of the merely unknown. The consciousness of the merely unknown as distinct from what is known as object that is also unknown is feeling. The consciousness may be called knowledge, such knowledge as has been sometimes supposed to constitute dreamless sleep. It is purely subjective in the sense that there is no conscious reference to object even in the way of dissociation from it though not yet in the sense that the meanability or thinkability of its specific content is denied. Feeling is as much undissociated from its content 'absence of knowledge' as conscious non-perception is undissociated from the objective absence that is its content. In the *trying* to think, as in feeling, thought is distinguished from the conscious absence of thought which itself is not distinguished from thought. While however in the trying, there is no belief in the unmeant as a distinct content, feeling involves such belief, much as perception involves belief in an object as distinct but not as distinct from perception.

102. To introspection, the content of thought appears distinct from thought though it does not appear to be *given* as distinct. Feeling, so far as we are aware of thought as only symbolising it, may be said to have a content, an unthought or unmeant content which, however, appears to introspection as only distinct in itself and not as distinct *from* feeling. While again in the case of thought or other psychic fact, introspection seeks to distinguish it from its content, it seeks to distinguish the unmeant content of feeling from the feeling

and not *reversely*, though the seeking to distinguish does not amount to the knowledge of distinction in any case. Because psychic fact is distinguished in introspection from its object, it is believed to exist also outside introspection. But as the feeling is not thus distinguished from its content, it cannot be believed to exist outside introspection as a merely conscious fact. Feeling is never outside introspection, just as perception is never within introspection.

103. Introspection into feeling, however, is an awareness of the feeling as apparently distinct from the awareness. Introspection into psychic fact is a distinguishing of the fact which appeared undistinguished from itself, consciousness being implicitly self-consciousness in this sense. Introspection into feeling, however, is an *identifying* of the feeling which appeared to be outside introspection as a psychic fact illusorily bound up with a presentation and implies the annulment of this illusion. Feeling is bound up with thought and imagination, being the awareness of their detachment as presentation from their objects, corresponding to the known distinction of the objects from their presentation. In introspection into psychic fact, the felt detachment is symbolised as a thinkable distinction of the psychic fact from its object, though its merely symbolic character is not appreciated as such. In introspection into feeling, the distinction of feeling from its presentative content is appreciated as definitely not known but only felt and symbolised. The content as presented is recognised to be not *its* content. To distinguish a feeling from the meant content is to view the content as a mere symbolism. When thought views the image as its symbol, the symbol still stands as presentation though it is not meant. But when along with feeling, there is the awareness of meaning as its symbol, the symbol is not only not felt: its object-reference lapses altogether. The meaning loses its actuality and turns into the form of a possible meaning. Possible meaning is no presentation, as the awareness '*as though* feeling meant something' is no belief in it as fact. There may be a faith that some meaning of feeling will emerge but the faith is not a belief in what is, at least, partly meant actually. It may imply a trying to think which is not so much a doing as a wishing, being but the free self-expressive play of the feeling. When a presentation is reduced to mere play, there is a make-believe and no belief. Not that the faith must be there but the belief in the object must lapse. Feeling as detached from meaning is awareness of the meaning as its symbolism and may in this sense be taken as implicitly introspective, being never a merely conscious fact outside introspection. Explicit introspection into feeling means only out-

growing the necessity of thus symbolising feeling by meaning and recognising that feeling does not mean anything but itself.

104. The place of willing may be indicated here as co-ordinate with feeling. If feeling represents the complete dissociation from objectivity, willing means the free identification with objectivity. Throughout we have been tracing the movement of dissociation, beginning with the dissociation of the perceived body from the object. To knowledge, the object is *there* and the body *here* is its presupposition ; and as knowledge deepens, there is a regress to prior presuppositions, the felt body etc., up to feeling or what we have called the knowledge of the merely unknown. Each presupposition persists undistinguished in a lower stage and hence feeling may be said to inform even the perceived object, though this is known only when feeling has been dissociated from thought. It is at this stage also that the identification in the lower stages is known to have been free in the sense of not being necessitated by the object. The playful self-expression of feeling in a meaning or thought as its symbol is the first conscious identification with a lower stage, self-objectification without the lapse of dissociation, the initial act of objective willing as distinct from spiritual willing. Willing starts as the aesthetic expression of feeling. The freedom from thought is as much a progress as a regress, as much a willing as a feeling. Regress and progress are two distinct movements in the lower stages, distinct because the object as known is there the starting point. With the cancellation of the objective attitude, there is the consciousness of being free, of being unrestricted by the object whether for withdrawal from it in feeling or for conquest over it in willing.

105. Knowing means freedom both from blindness and from error, escape from the confusion of the object with the subject and from the identification of the subject with the object. As we have shown at many points, the distinguishing of the object from its presentation implies a half-detachment of the presentation from the object when a consciousness emerges of something in the object that is unknown, the presentation being however not denied to be object. The consciousness of the unknown is at the stage we have reached understood as feeling inwardness ; and the consciousness of the presentation as a ghostly object, as what cannot be denied as object but cannot, therefore, be asserted as such is now interpreted as the objectifying or self-externalising function of the will. The so-called knowledge of the object thus appears to be a single function of inwardising and objectifying, of regress and progress, of feeling and

willing. The freedom or detachment implied in knowing means the outgrowing of the positive attitude of not knowing, of conscious entertainment of the unknown—which is feeling—and of *conscious* projection of objectivity—which is willing. Thus to the knowing attitude, feeling and willing appear as what are jointly outgrown and as what also symbolise the inwardness and reality of knowledge.

106. The positive consciousness of detachment from meaning which is the last residuum of the object is feeling. Feeling is the knowledge of the purely unknown as such, the unknown that is not even meant. It is only symbolised as knowledge of the unknown, though the unknown being unmeant, the preposition *of* has no meaning and is recognised as a mere exigency of language. There is no distinguishing of the knowledge from its content : the knowledge stands by itself and is the awareness of its content as no content, as unmeant. The next stage would be the awareness of the content as unmeanable. In feeling there is still the demand for a symbolical meaning to be denied, a will to expression, the awareness of the absence of actual meaning and the non-denial of a possible meaning. That will to expression is a trying to think and there may come after the trial the consciousness of a failure to think and the consequent abandonment of the trial. Such consciousness of failure may be regarded as feeling that has purged itself from the persisting will to objectification, as the awareness not merely of the unknown but of the contradictory or unmeanable, of what is not imaginary but is given as false. It is feeling in the sense that it *comes* : if trying to think is still an activity, the consciousness of inability to think is what is borne in upon us.

107. The consciousness of given falsity or objective illusion has to be distinguished from the consciousness of the imaginary. In the example of the illusory snake corrected into the perceived rope, the snake appears after correction to have been not merely a sport of the imagination like golden mountain but to have been believed as real. At the same time while the disbelief in golden mountain implies no uncertainty as to its being merely imagined, the present disbelief in the snake implies an uncertainty as to its having been perceived. What we are conscious of now is that it is *as though* it was perceived. So we say about a dreamed object—'it is as though it was seen'. The snake, we say now, was believed and not merely imagined but not known. What is now remembered as having been believed and appears as though it was known was not, therefore, merely imagined. Belief in an object ideated, as a psychic fact existing outside introspection, is presentation. The present awareness of an object as though

it was known might be called appearance of presentation. The appearance of presentation is a disbelieved possibility of object. It cannot, however, be taken as imaginary, for an imaginary thing does not appear presented (with belief) at all. The awareness of an imagined thing may not be a belief in the thing but is belief in the presentation. The awareness of an imaginary thing is disbelief in the thing and is no belief in the presentation. The awareness of a thing as illusory is not only disbelief in the thing but implies, at least, a positive doubt about its presentation. Disbelief in the imaginary thing may still be called knowledge, knowledge of the negation of all objective facthood. But disbelief in the illusory thing is not even knowledge of such negation, being the consciousness of an indetermination which is neither factual nor imaginary, neither presented with belief nor not presented at all. What being first presented with belief comes to be disbelieved cannot be asserted to be presented without belief: that it is presented cannot only be denied. Disbelief in the illusory object is not *knowledge* of its falsity but the awareness of what cannot be asserted or denied to be true. When this 'indescribable' content is altogether rejected, there is knowledge not of falsity but of the self.

108. The indescribable is unmeanable and so there may be a consciousness of the unmeanable and not merely of the unmeant in feeling. This consciousness cannot be said to be not feeling, though there is no longer the belief in the possibility of symbolising it by a meaning. Introspection into the first stage of the feeling process means, as has been shown, not a distinguishing of the feeling from thought—for feeling does not exist except in being thus distinguished—but an identification of it, the positive assertion of the feeling being itself only, of freedom from thought constituting the very being of feeling. Such freedom is a positive being because there is no rejection yet of *possible* thought or meaning. The awareness of the unmeanable then, as implying such rejection, is freedom from the being of feeling, though as the lapse of the trying to think *comes* as a result of such trying, it cannot be said to be not felt. Roughly then two stages of feeling can be distinguished—freedom from actual thought and freedom from possible thought, from the faith in a possible meaning, from the will to think. It is the persisting will to think that constitutes the being of feeling in the lower stage. Freedom from the will to think is thus feeling that has no being, possible feeling that yet is possible not to a will or trying but to feeling itself, being the feeling of self-negation as distinct from the lower feeling which is feeling of self-being.

109. The feeling of not having a feeling is not an uncommon experience. The awareness of wanting a feeling—whether sense-enjoyment, aesthetic satisfaction or spiritual serenity—is itself a feeling. All desire involves a present feeling of not having a feeling, an awareness of the ‘inferiority’ of the anticipatory pleasure to the actual feeling that is to come. It is not simply one feeling *due* to the want of another feeling but the feeling of the want of its own being or actuality. Nor is it yet the disinterested awareness of the want, a detachment from it such as introspection would imply. It can only be characterised as the *feeling* of a feeling, with which are bound up interesting spiritual attitudes like sentimentalism on the one hand which confuses the felt want with the actual feeling that is wanted and the experience of the want on the other as a pain that miraculously ends in a fulfilment.

110. This feeling of a feeling is not introspection but the stage prior to it, even as the trying to think is prior to feeling. It is the negative of which introspection is the positive equivalent—the self-negation of feeling or feeling detached from its being. Such detachment or self-negation is already the attitude of knowledge, knowledge of what is neither felt nor unfelt, of a negation that cannot be denied, of the indeterminate unmeanable or indescribable. Such knowledge may be regarded as introspection that yet has a being and is not denied to be the object of introspection. Introspection proper is not the object of further introspection.

111. The nature of this pre-introspective knowledge may be intelligible through the analysis of a puzzle about the unmeanable. *Unmeanable* is itself a significant word and so the unmeanable, it may be said, is meant. The puzzle suggests a two-fold function of the significant word. Speaking as to the speaker has to be distinguished from speaking as to the hearer ; and to the speaker himself, the word being spoken has a function different from the word as already spoken. What the speaker means as unmeanable after having tried to mean may be to the hearer what he does not even try to mean. Again, while in speaking of the unmeanable, as in any act of speaking, the speaker only means without contemplating the meaning as accomplished, the word as spoken appears either to his or to the hearer’s contemplation to have an accomplished meaning. If the speaker does not contemplate it, the hearer (or he himself later) may contemplate it ; and if the speaker contemplates, the hearer may not. There is thus a difference between the meaning being coined out or being understood and the meaning as accomplished and contemplated. We are

aware of the unmeanable in two stages, as the meant unmeanable and as the mere function of meaning or speaking. The knowledge implied in the former is of a contradiction while that implied in the latter is not *of* anything, being merely knowing. The feeling of feeling is the former kind of awareness while the latter is just introspection. Self-negation in feeling of feeling is still a felt being, existent knowledge rather than the function of knowing. Introspection is complete dissociation from felt being and is the pure knowing function.

CHAPTER VIII

SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.)

INTROSPECTION

112. Introspection into a subjective fact means a distinguishing of it. There is no direct introspective awareness of perceptual knowledge. In non-perceptual knowledge, object is already distinguished from presentation and the introspective awareness of such knowledge is the awareness of its distinction in itself with a feeling of its dissociation from the object. This feeling is symbolised as a thinkable distinction from the object by a reversal of the known distinction of the object from the presentation. Introspective distinguishing is only the knowledge of a subjective fact as distinct in itself, though in the case of subjective fact lower than feeling, it appears through such symbolised feeling of dissociation as the knowledge of the fact as distinct *from the object*. Feeling is nothing but this conscious dissociation, as is realised when presentation in the attenuated form of meaning is known to be distinct from feeling. Introspection into feeling from which meaning is known to be distinct—feeling which is nothing but the conscious dissociation from the object—is the awareness of feeling being distinct in itself only and does not involve the further symbolism of being distinct *from* anything. Thus while the introspective awareness of a psychic fact is the awareness of its distinction from object and, therefore, of its distinction in itself also as existing apart from introspection as presentation, the introspective awareness of a feeling proper is the knowledge of its distinction in itself only and is the recognition of the distinction as being entirely through introspection. Such recognition may be called an identification.

113. Introspection into feeling is the recognition of the distinct being of the feeling as entirely through the introspection. It is just the function of meaning the feeling, of distinguishing, referring to or speaking of the feeling. Meaning as a function as distinct from the meant is intelligible only after the self-negation of feeling, feeling of wanting a feeling, the detachment of feeling from its being or the awareness of the meant unmeanable. To mean not merely the conscious absence but the conscious impossibility of meaning is the pure function of subjectivity, the function of introspection that is not objec-

tive even in the form of the meant unmeanable. If the feeling of feeling is already a detachment from subjective being, it is as a contradiction, as a be-*ënt* want of feeling. Introspection is a subjectivity that is detached both from being and from negation, being positive as *freedom*. It is not simply like the meant unmeanable or the 'indescribable' what is neither be-*ënt* nor non-be-*ënt*, a negation that cannot be asserted or denied. It is the positive of which the negation is not even tried to be meant. The negation of the function of meaning is a gratuitous problem in meaning which there is no call to solve. Unlike the illusory object which is first presented and then reduced to the unmeanable, this negation is an imaginary problem in meaning which can, indeed, always be asked in logical sport but suggests no actual uncertainty about the introspective function. The imaginary problem is never ousted but never amounts to an uncertainty about any actual belief. Introspection is an actual believing which can only be sought to be impugned by the imaginary problem of conceiving its negation and is, therefore, never actually impugned. The content believed in introspection is, as will appear presently, capable of being impugned but not the believing itself. We speak only of introspective believing because a belief the object of which turns out false is no longer a belief in the object but is still a fact to introspective memory as the past believing in an unmeanable, as a contentless believing that is not other than the introspection.

114. The old argument against absolute scepticism that it is doubting on the strength of believing is untenable if it is intended to exclude doubt about the *object* of belief. The object of belief is always impugnable though the grounds of the doubt must be actual or believed to constitute a relevant doubt. The argument, however, is valid if it intends to say that believing cannot be doubted. It will be presently apparent that not object only but every subjective fact that is introspectively believed, even though it be meant as unmeanable, is capable of being doubted. Believing then would not be fact at all, being not even meant as unmeanable. Nor is it, therefore, an illusion, for an illusion about the subjective has a place, as will be shown, beyond the introspection that we are now considering.

115. Introspection is the function of believing or meaning which is not itself meant even as the unmeanable and is, therefore, not actually doubtable. It is just the first person I, the speaker who is not an object to introspection but is simply the function of speaking. Introspection is not believing *in* the I : it is the I, the believing that is not fact at all but is not, therefore, illusory. As not believing even in the

meant unmeanable, it is not believing in anything distinguished from it and so may be loosely expressed as believing in itself. The conscious inadequacy of the expression is itself evidence of the believing being not believing *in* anything.

116. Introspection as a conscious dissociation even from feeling that is distinct only through it is an annulment of the distinction—what we have called identification. Introspection into a psychic fact bound up with presentation reveals that its subjective facthood is nothing but the facthood of feeling. Such introspection appears to be a believing in a distinct because the distinctness of psychic fact is not immediately annulled by introspection, being reduced in the first instance to the distinctness of feeling. The direct unidentifiability of the psychic fact is what constitutes its apparently independent being ; and it is thus that the psychic fact is pronounced by introspection itself as having a ghostly existence outside introspection. That it is directly unidentifiable is due to the fact that it is never a complete detachment from the felt body and that accordingly psychic fact never appears to it as having only the facthood of feeling. But there is the conscious semi-detachment of feeling from the meanable psychic fact pointing to the possibility of complete detachment ; and there is the identifying introspection into feeling implying possible detachment from the being of feeling. This possible detachment from all distinct being is introspective awareness. Introspection is essentially the annulment of all distinct being, being self-identification or the conscious identity without being of the self.

117. The self is taken by Kant as the thinking function. The thinking function is thinking of a thought or accomplished meaning and Kant does not deny that the self as an Idea of the Reason is an accomplished meaning. There is, however, the awareness not only of trying to think without any accomplished meaning but also of the impossibility of meaning. We can mean the unmeanable and thus the speaking or meaning function is more fundamental than thinking. In calling introspection the self, we not only bespeak the detachment of the self from thinking and feeling but also take it to be a believing or self-identifying, the negation of which is not even a meant unmeanable and which, therefore, cannot be denied to be a self-knowing. The introspective self is self-knowing, not as having the self as the object of knowledge but as denying the distinct being of feeling, as identifying it without denying its being and as having itself no deniable being.

118. The self is the first person *I*. The *I* is not unmeanable nor is it meant—meant even as unmeanable. It is not unmeanable in the sense that it presents no problem in meaning at all and can be said to be neither meanable nor unmeanable. Meaning is the thinnest presentation of the object, as existing apart from introspection. *I* has no meaning in this sense : it has not even the meaning of being unmeant or unmeanable, which feeling in its two stages may be supposed to have. The word *I* is used by the speaker not for what is distinct but for what is only being distinguished by him ; and it is not understood by the hearer to *mean* a distinct content. No two persons would use the word *I* of the same thing ; but the speaker and the hearer must be agreed about a meaning. Yet if a person understand me when I call myself *I*, though he does not use the word himself about me, it is—it may be contended—because of the meaning of the word. But in that case it would be a kind of general term meaning any speaker, in which sense, however, it is not used, not being applied to more than one thing at a time. The term, in fact, is not singular in the sense that different people use it of the same thing and not general in the sense that it is *understood* by any of the different things at a time. If a person using the word *I* is understood as referring to himself by another, it is not because the latter means the speaker by the word and would use the word to refer to the speaker. Thus it may be said that a speaker calling himself *I* is understood through the word but not through the meaning of the word. The word here has a meaning function but not a meaning : it is the expression of introspection or what may be called the *I*-function.

119. Like the word *unmeanable*, the word *I* illustrates a use of language other than for purposes of thinking, the former being still the expression of an inability to think while the latter has not even this negative reference to thought. The meaning function of the word *I* is to the speaker his actual introspection but the understanding of the word by the hearer is indicative of a form of consciousness subtler than introspection. It is the awareness of how the speaker would introspect, awareness of a possible introspection.

CHAPTER IX.

SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY (Contd.)

BEYOND INTROSPECTION

120. The realisation of what a speaker means by the word *I* is the hearer's awareness of a possible introspection. Such awareness is as much knowledge as actual introspection. The speaker calls himself *I* and may be understood by the hearer as *you*. As thus understood, the introspective self is individual, not an individual being—for introspection is not a subjective *being* like feeling—but the function of addressing to another self. The speaker does not understand himself through the meaning of the word *I*: his introspection is through the word and not through its meaning and is less a self-knowing than a self-revealing, revealing to a possible understander of the word *I*. Yet as the addressing attitude is only implicit, it is to him accidental and posterior to his self-knowing. To the understanding self however, although he understands the speaker's self-knowing because he is himself self-knowing, his understanding of the other *I* is primary while his own self-knowing is accidental and secondary. The speaker knows himself in implicitly revealing to the hearer and the hearer knows the speaker in implicitly knowing himself. Neither self-knowing nor other-knowing is through thinking or the meaning of the word and both might be called 'intuition' in this negative sense. There are thus two cases—self-intuition with other-intuition implicit in it and other-intuition with self-intuition implicit in it. Both are actual knowledge implying the use other than the thinking use of a word like *I*, which is like a pointing gesture at once self-evidencing and self-evident. My self-consciousness is not the understanding of the meaning of the word *I*: the word only reveals it to another. His understanding of the word as referring to me is not the understanding of it in the sense he would use it himself. The word has no meaning either to him or to me and yet it stands like any other word for the same thing to both. This *standing for* is not only not meaning but not also mere symbolising. It is on the one hand revealing and on the other an accomplished revelation, at once self-evidencing and self-evident. The word may be said at once to symbolise and to be symbolised by my introspective self. The hearer takes it to symbolise myself but *I*, the speaker, symbolise it by myself or in a sense explained before, incarnate my-

self in it. The reference of the word *I* varies with the user of it: its meaning function is through his self-consciousness, is symbolised by his meaning function which is what he is primarily aware of, the symbol being better known than what is symbolised by it. Because the word *I* is at once the symbol and the symbolised, it cannot be said to have simply the symbolising function. It is this characteristic value of a word other than the meaning value or merely symbolising value that indicates a grade of self-consciousness higher than our actual introspection.

121. Actual introspection is implicitly social, being a speaking or addressing or self-evidencing to another possible introspection or self to which its conscious solitariness or self-identity is evident. The evidencing and the evidentness are actual to different selves, speaker or hearer. The evidentness as to the hearer is, however, only a possible evidentness to the speaker. Actual introspection is unrealised knowledge because it is actually only self-evidencing to another and not self-evident to itself. One's own self should be self-evident, should be intuited by oneself even as it is intuited by another. The introspection that is actually reached by the annulment of the alien character of feeling as subjective being is, as already shown, only a speaking, self-evidencing or self-revealing, a function in the Kantian sense though not thinking function, a kind of transcendental willing which is not known by the introspector but should be known as it is already known by another self. The self should be at once self-evidencing and self-evident but so far we have only the self as self-evidencing and evident to another.

122. The other self is to the self-evidencing self a possible introspector whose intuition of the latter again is a possible intuition to the latter. It is because the actual introspector is thus aware of the possible introspector that he can conceive a possible introspection of his own beyond his actual introspection; and it is only as he is thus aware of a possibly intuited subjectivity that he can understand the possibility of a subjective illusion. The awareness of these possibles in oneself—possible knowledge and possible illusion of subjectivity—indicates the necessity of a spiritual discipline of realisation, realisation of the knowledge of the self already implied by introspection.

123. Introspection into a possible or non-existent mental state is or involves understanding of a word meaning the mental state. To mean a mental state is not to think it: it is either to feel the want of it or to give it a distinction which it has not, which is like creating it. Where the mental state is not present, to mean it is to remember it,

to want it or to dreamily wish it. All these are forms of awareness of a possible mental state and may be regarded as a stage of introspection prior to the introspection into an actual mental state. If it is introspection, it cannot be said to be completely dissociated yet from subjective being and as such it is capable of being itself introspected into. There can be, for example, introspection into the conscious want of a feeling.

124. The want of a feeling is an actual feeling and introspection into it, as into any feeling, means its identification with the introspection. It does not, however, mean identification with itself of the feeling that is wanted. The introspector is not aware of such a feeling as his feeling: the possible feeling is an unappropriated feeling. The introspective awareness of an unappropriated subjective state is like the awareness of another self having it. To the introspector it is the awareness of what he himself *might* appropriate. There may be actual knowledge, as immediate as introspection and standing on a level with it, of another self and his subjective state. But as the introspector only imagines and does not know his own being, his awareness of his possible subjective state is not actual knowledge. Introspection into the awareness of a possible subjective state is thus possible or imaginary introspection. Such introspection is half-dissociated from the actually introspective self, half-dissociated in the sense that we only cannot deny it to be *our* introspection. It is, indeed, completely dissociated from the possible subjective state but not from the actual awareness of it. Complete dissociation from this actual awareness is reached when the content of it is a subjective state that is illusory and not merely absent or possible.

125. There are illusions about the subjective just as there are illusions about the objective. A subjective state appears illusory to later introspection into the subjective state that supersedes it through, it may be, the effervescence of interest or other subtle subjective cause. But a simple form of subjective illusion may be presented in connexion with an objective illusion. When the objective presentation with which a psychic fact is bound up turns out to be illusory, there is at least a partial reduction of the psychic fact to illusion. In the example of the correction of the presentation of snake into the presentation of *this* rope, the fear as of *that* snake—that individual fear—is, as pointed out before, also felt to be, if not illusory, at least incapable of being asserted as a past fact. We cannot say that we feared *that* snake if we now know that the snake never was. Some feeling bound up with the bodily reaction was, indeed, felt but *that* feeling of fear or fear

of *that* snake was never felt. The specific character of the feeling bound up with the past belief in the snake cannot be said to have existed. Introspection now not only does not identify *that* feeling with itself : it rejects it as what it cannot possibly appropriate. There is a doubt, if not a denial, of possible appropriation of it by any individual self, of its being knowable by any introspection and yet it is introspection itself that denies the possibility.

126. Introspection is the awareness of a subjective fact as owing its facthood to itself and is in this sense the identification or appropriation of it. Such subjective fact may be itself the awareness of the absence or possibility of another subjective fact and introspection into it is the awareness of this other fact as not actually appropriated but as possibly appropriated by another introspection. The subjective fact introspected into may be again the awareness of the impossibility of a subjective mode previously taken to be fact. Introspection here would be the awareness of this mode as beyond all possible introspective appropriation. One gets here the hint of an introspection that is not appropriative, of the appropriative function being accidental to the introspective self, of the distinctness or exclusiveness of *I* being an eliminable feature, of an intuitable self-identity that has not any subjective fact distinct from it to identify. Introspection that is not appropriation would be self-intuition, the *I* that is evident to itself and not merely to another, that does not like the individual *I* create a distinct subjective mode by distinguishing to resume it by identifying and proclaim this resumption again by speaking in the first person to another possible person. The possibility of such a silent self-enjoying *I* is intelligible only because we are aware of certain subjective modes previously appropriated as not only now unappropriated but as utterly unappropriable and as accordingly appearing only *as though* they were distinct. The absolute intuitable self is only understood if the non-being of distinction is understood. Objective illusion is still a meant unmeanable, meant and therefore distinguished. But subjective illusion is not even meant as unmeanable. Introspection too is an unmeant meaning function; it is not known as distinct nor is it primarily so much a distinguishing as an identifying so far as it is knowledge. It is, however, still a distinguishing in the act of self-revealing and therefore also a distinguishing from itself as possible. The awareness of subjective illusion goes beyond introspection, being the explicit awareness of illusorily distinguishing, of *creating* a distinction that is no fact at all. The non-being of distinction is finally understood here and hence too the conception of the absolute self.

CHAPTER X

THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM

127. The subject is understood as what intends by the word *I*. The subject that intends is other than the subject that understands, being self-evident as self-evidencing to another and not to itself. The intuited subject is not only revealed but revealing: it is directly known as self-expressing in the spoken word *I* without being meant by it. It does not, however, intuit itself, as the intuiting subject also does not reveal itself. There is no introspective awareness of being revealed or incarnated in the word *I*, of one's freedom to self-expression as itself an evident fact. There is at best an imaginative demand for such awareness, for the realisation of the felt identification with the word (or the object) as presupposing dissociation from it, for the transformation of the felt freedom into the intuition of freedom. It is in introspection that we are aware of this demand for the consummation of the freedom that is felt in every grade of subjectivity in respect of the object presented to it. The object appears alien to the subject up to the stage of thought. The feeling subject is free from the thought or meant content in so far as the latter is reduced to a symbolism. But it is still subject having being, subject that can still be object to introspection, being free but not freedom itself. The introspective subject is, indeed, free from this being or possible objectivity and is thus freedom itself but it is still a distinct individual though only unconsciously. It knows itself not as *itself* but as a distinct subject that is only possibly identical with itself. It is thus aware of a demand to know this subject as actually itself, to annul its possible distinction from itself and, therefore, also its actual distinctness through the word *I*. The demand is for the intuition of the subject as absolute freedom.

128. The introspective self is aware of itself as the psychic self and the bodily self. At all stages it knows itself as to be known. It knows the bodily self indeed as known not only as object but also as definitely separated from other objects. But it does not know it like other objects as having a space-position and is aware of the demand to realise its positionless objectivity. The psychic self is also known as identified with objectivity as pure form or pure meaning but it is only felt as dissociated from the perceived body; and in introspection we are aware of the demand to realise this felt dissociation in knowledge.

The introspective self is unaware of being objective to itself though it understands another self calling itself *I* and thus knows it as having objective distinctness, the distinctness of the word *I*. As, however, itself revealing through the word to another self, it is aware of itself as a possibly understood distinct entity. It knows itself not as known like the psychic or bodily self but as only to be known. As to be known, it is understood as what is only symbolised as distinct like the word *I* and what would lose its distinctness in being actually known. The subject is understood as freedom that is real and is characterisable by no objective category, not even by the category of distinctness. As we do not in introspection cease to be the bodily self which alone is actually evident to us, the subject that is absolutely unobjective or is freedom itself is to us only a possibility to be realised. The idea of realising the subject arises only because we are actually identified with the body while we are introspectively aware of ourselves as not objective and yet as definitely positive. Introspective awareness of oneself is awareness of the subject as not only not objective in the sense of being thought or meant but also as what cannot be said to have the being of feeling nor to be contradictory like the feeling of the want of a feeling nor even to be distinct like the subject to which it reveals itself. At the same time it is not awareness of a mere negation or of an indefinite. This definite positive cannot be said to be not known, though as actually undissociated from the object we cannot assert it to be known. We are only aware of not being dissociated, being dissociated to the extent implied by such awareness. Such implied dissociation is possible freedom that is to be realised as evident.

129. The consciousness of not being actually dissociated is present even in the stage of bodily subjectivity where alone actual dissociation is known in some measure and not merely felt as in higher stages. It is known, as has been pointed out, as the perceived separation in space of the body from the outside object, though there is a feeling still of one's body not being perceived in a space-position, all position being relative to it. In higher stages, there is no knowledge of freedom from the object but only a feeling of it, the feeling so far as it falls short of knowledge being the implicit awareness of not being actually free from the object. The higher the stage of subjectivity, the less is the freedom felt to be achieved though the more assured is the faith in its achievability. In the introspective stage, the feeling of achieved freedom lapses altogether, since it is here that the possibility of freedom is first definitely known. The faith in its achievability, however, is completely

assured in this stage and takes the form of a conscious spiritual demand for the intuition of freedom as evident.

130. Three broad stages of subjectivity have been exhibited—the bodily, the psychical and the spiritual. In the bodily stage, three substages have been discussed—the body as externally perceived, the body as internally perceived or felt, and the absence of object known as a present fact. As externally perceived, the bodily subject is the centre of the perceived world but is not itself perceived as in it. As felt, it is definitely known to be not in this world though it is not known as not the externally perceived body. The subject that imaginatively perceives the absence of an object is also like the felt body not consciously dissociated from the perceived body but the subject that knows absence through conscious non-perception is consciously dissociated from it. He feels himself unlike the felt body as definitely without reference to space-position and as only the time-position—present or *now*, as distinct from the image of the absent object, which also is without this reference but is not consciously felt as *now*.

131. The image of the object whose absence is known in conscious non-perception marks the transition to the psychic stage. It appears as the object that is absent and is not yet felt to be dissociated from it. The psychic stage begins when attention is shifted from the objective fact of absence to the image. As attended to, the image appears as imaging or the forming of a form, the process and the product being presented at once. The consciousness of the form as evident in the forming process and as a product that does not yet come in time *after* it is the idea as undissociated from the image. A later stage is the idea as dissociated from the image, or pictorial thought which wants to be imaged and is definite so far as it is imaged. Non-pictorial thought comes next, thought that is definite in itself and has properly no image though an image may serve as its metaphor or symbol. These grades of image and thought are the grades of presentation which is explicitly felt to be dissociated from the object. Such dissociated presentation is known in introspection to have no space-position and is at least not known to have time-position. The image still appears, however, as though it had spatial form and to be forming as though it were a temporal process. Some trace of this quasi-temporal process may persist in thought but thought as a non-pictorial meaning is felt to be free from it and to be eternally complete. Still such meaning appears as though it were object, being introspectively believed like other psychical facts to exist outside introspection. Its presentational character is explicitly indicated by the consciousness of

the absence of accomplished meaning in what we have called *trying* to think which may be taken as pointing to the positive freedom from objective meaning such as characterises the non-presentational or spiritual stage of subjectivity.

132. The positive freedom from objectivity appears in the first instance as feeling. Feeling still seems to mean something but the meaning here so far as it is formulated is avowedly a symbolism for it only. To introspection indeed, feeling appears to be object but not as what may exist outside introspection. Its alien character is to introspection only apparent, being distinct only through introspection and not capable of existing outside introspection except as illusorily bound up with a presentation. The feeling subject has a being to introspection so that it is free and is not freedom itself. The next stage is the feeling of wanting a feeling, which is, in fact, a felt contradiction or self-negation that still appears distinct from the introspection into it. The introspecting subject, however, is not introspected into and is self-revealing through the word *I*. It is aware of being revealed or evident not to itself but to the subject addressed and therefore of being *possibly* revealed to itself also. As thus only possibly evident to itself, it is unappropriated by itself while as introspecting, it is aware of addressing a subject and of being dissociated from it by the very fact of addressing. It thus feels being distinct but does not know itself as distinct. It is aware of the subject as possibly free from distinctness, as its very self but not as exclusively its own.

133. I am introspectively conscious of my body as subject but not as not mine or the appropriated. I am conscious of a psychic fact as not mine, as subject that is not, however, not *me* as the known. As, however, I speak of *I* in introspection, I intend what before I spoke was not *me* but not what was not a distinct *I*. There is no introspection into introspection but just as perception is known indirectly in introspection into some other subjective state like memory, so introspection is known indirectly in introspection into feeling. Feeling appears to introspection as subject that has no reference to object, as *I* but still as *I* distinct from *I*, as the be-ent *I* illusorily distinct from the introspective *I*. Introspection into the feeling *I* then is awareness of the introspecting *I* as not distinguished but as only distinguished *from*, as that from which being and non-being are both distinguished, as that which cannot be denied to be distinct in itself but of which such distinction is not known.

134. The apprehension of *I* as not even distinct in itself is indicated by the consciousness of subjective illusion, of a mode of sub-

jectivity that is not only unappropriated but unappropriable. There is occasion to correct the conceit not only of *my* body and of *me* as a presentation, not only of I as felt being but also of I as an actual distinct introspector. The introspecting self that I am indirectly aware of in introspection into feeling appears to be an actual self. In introspection into the feeling of wanting a feeling it turns out to be only a possible self that is still distinct as an introspector. But there may be the consciousness of a feeling being illusorily wanted: I may, for example, recognise not only that I am not religious but also that even my hankering after religion is not real but only a sentimental make-believe. Such recognition would be the awareness not only of an unappropriated but of an unappropriable religious aspiration, of the self that only appears as I aspiring and *is not it*, is not an actual introspector and not even a possible introspector.

135. I am never positively conscious of my present individuality, being conscious of it only as what is or can be outgrown, only as I feel freeing myself from it and am free to the extent implied by such feeling. I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can be free successively as body from the perceived object, as presentation from the body, as feeling from presentation and as introspective function from feeling. I am not introspectively aware of my actual introspective individuality but I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not actually introspect and may not even possibly introspect, that individual as it is as introspecting—individual or distinct freedom without being, it may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualised but not therefore indefinite—absolute freedom that is to be evident.

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

ANALYSIS

I. ORIENTATION TO KANT (1-5)

According to Kant, the self is not knowable but is thinkable; but according to the view presented here, the self is not thinkable, though not therefore utterly unknowable. Kant's 'Idea of Reason' is not 'thought' in the literal sense: it is only the verbal form of thought as a symbol of an unthinkable reality. The self is knowable without thinking and has to be so known. It may be a moral postulate but it is formulated for the contemplation of it as a truth to be known. This contemplation is the process of reaching the truth without thinking. What applies to the self applies *mutatis mutandis* to other metaphysical entities. Philosophy is then not only not actual knowledge: it is not even literal thought.

II. GRADES OF THEORETIC CONSCIOUSNESS (6-18)

(6) Philosophy presents beliefs that are speakable. To speak is to formulate a belief and it is the understanding of what can be spoken that constitutes the theoretic consciousness. (7) Such understanding may not be knowledge, but it involves belief in something as known or to be known. (8) All forms of theoretic consciousness as involving the understanding of a speakable are sometimes called 'thought'. Four grades of thought may be distinguished: (a) *empirical thought* which involves reference to an object perceived or imagined to be perceived; (b) *pure objective thought* which has reference to an object but not necessarily to a perceived object; (c) *spiritual thought* which has no reference to any object and is subjective; (d) *transcendental thought* which is neither objective nor subjective. The content of (a) is 'fact', of (b) the 'self-subsistent', of (c) 'reality' and of (d) 'truth'. Science deals with (a), the other three being the subject-matter of philosophy. (9) The grades of thought are really grades of speaking. Speakability is a contingent character of the content of scientific thought, but it is a necessary character of philosophic thought. (10) (b), (c) or (d) is not assertable as fact. Belief in it may indeed be expressed in the form of a judgment, but the form would be only symbolic. In a real judgment about a 'fact', the predicate amplifies or explicates the meaning of a subject that is already believed. But in the apparent judgment concerning the other three contents, the subject

is believed as a self-evident elaboration of the predicate that is already believed to be self-evident.

(11-15) Philosophy is such self-evident elaboration of the self-evident which is spoken but not spoken of. There are three forms of this self-evident according as it is spoken in the objective, the subjective and the transcendental attitudes. The objective self-evident is spoken as the apparent judgment "the relation of A and B is", where 'is' means an objective content that is self-subsistent and where the objective attitude is still retained. The subjective self-evident is spoken as "I am", where 'am' means something that is subjectively 'enjoyed'. Here the objective attitude is explicitly dropped and the content is only spoken *as though* it were objectively contemplated. In 'I am' the predicate is a symbol of a literally spoken subject. The transcendental self-evident is spoken as "the absolute self is". But unlike the above two cases of the self-evident it is not even literally spoken. Still it is not meaningless and it symbolises 'truth' i.e., what is believed and is not literally speakable.

(16-17) The self-subsistent entity meant by 'object is' demands to be known in absorbed contemplation or intuited as simply 'object'. The real 'I' demands to be known without the objective intuitive attitude i.e., in pure enjoyment. In these two cases there is no demand to know the content without the speaking attitude. Transcendental consciousness starts by regarding all speaking as only symbolising and is accordingly conceived as completed when this symbolising speech is dispensed with. (18) We have three grades of philosophy corresponding to the three attitudes, viz., philosophy of the object, philosophy of the subject and philosophy of truth.

III. SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS (19-24)

(19) Both science and the first grade of philosophy deal with the object. But object as discussed in philosophy is believed to be self-subsistent. (20) Science has no interest to formulate the concept of the self-subsistent object and it apparently believes that the object must be knowable or usable. To it the object is just what is known and though it may be unknown, there is no question of its being unknowable. (21) The implicit belief in the necessary knowability and usability of the object is, at least, questioned in philosophy. It is this spiritual attitude of science towards the object that suggests the need for a speculative theory of the object. The concept of the self-subsistent object is the first corrective that philosophy offers of the predatory outlook of the scientific intellect. (22) The problem of piecing together

the results of the sciences is wrongly taken to be a philosophical one: wrongly, because the expected synthesis can be accomplished only by the employment of the distinctive technique and methods of science. A world-view of this kind can at best be an aesthetic view. (23) The so-called philosophy of evolution as the significant story of cosmic evolution is neither science nor philosophy but only a piece of imaginative literature. (24) The so-called philosophy of science as the formulation of the postulates or the structural concepts of science ignores the impassable gulf between fact and the self-subsistent.

IV. PHILOSOPHY OF THE OBJECT (25-31)

(25) That object is called 'fact' in which the reference to the subject or the speaking function is not necessary. This fact is dealt with in science. The object that has necessary reference to the subject is called the self-subsistent and is dealt with in philosophy. (26) 'Objectivity' which is common to these two objects is itself no fact, being only the self-subsistent form that is elaborated in Logic. Logic is thus no science but only a branch of the philosophy of the object. The pure object of which Logic is the form is the metaphysical object. Logic and metaphysics are thus the two branches of the philosophy of the object. ((27) The concept of the object is first reached by contrast with the subject as the self-evident content of spiritual consciousness. Thus object is understood as self-subsistent before fact is understood as object. Logic in this sense presupposes metaphysics. (28) Metaphysics involves the objective attitude and is philosophy of the object. There is no metaphysic of the subject. The rationale of any division of metaphysical contents, e.g., into matter, life and mind is to be found in the introspected distinction within spiritual experience. (29) The characteristic abstractions of metaphysics are symbolic meanings which derive their whole value from spiritual experiences that they symbolise. Metaphysical beliefs are not reached by inference and metaphysical reasoning is only the systematic exposition of symbolic concepts. (30) The spoken fact and the spoken self-subsistent agree in having certain unavoidable speech-created forms. Logic presents a system of these unavoidable forms. And since Logic presupposes metaphysics which presents alternative theories, there may be alternative systems of Logic. Apparently, every metaphysical system has its distinctive Logic. (31) The contrast between Logic and Metaphysics suggests the distinction between the self-subsistent and the real.

V. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRIT (32-37)

(32) The suggested distinction between self-subsistence and reality is verified in the 'enjoying' consciousness of a content (viz., I) as symbolised by a 'contemplated' meaning (viz., 'am' in 'I am'). This 'enjoying' understanding is what should be meant by 'introspection'. Its content is not understood as fact nor even as the self-subsistent object. It is understood as what object is not, as the speaking subjectivity. (33) Introspection, in the proper sense of the term, is to speak in the first person—actually or ideally—with the consciousness of the 'I' as what the object is not. When such speaking involves the consciousness of *being* what is spoken, it may be called spiritual introspection. (34) In spiritual introspection, the subject 'I' is never enjoyed by itself. It is always enjoyed first (a) as unaccountably embodied, next (b) as having personal relation to other selves and lastly (c) as having identity with the over-personal self. The study of all contents enjoyed in explicit reference to the subject 'I' may be called the philosophy of the spirit. (35) In (a) the object is conceived not as self-subsistent but only as a shadow or symbol of the 'I'. In (b) 'I' and the other person are each not the other and each contradictorily the symbol of the other. In (c) there is the consciousness of the over-personal reality as symbolised by 'I': this conscious symbolising is consciously being nought and is the soul of religious experience. (36) Religious experience is consciousness of being and, as simple, it admits of no variation within itself. There is, however, an infinite plurality of unique religious experiences and the Hegelian notion of a single and exclusive gradation of religions is unacceptable. (37) The theoretic form of a religious system is a philosophy of religion. Every system of religious philosophy has its distinctive theory of the spirit, Metaphysic and Logic. All philosophy is systematic symbolism and symbolism necessarily admits of alternatives.

VI. PHILOSOPHY OF TRUTH (38-41)

(38) There is a theoretic consciousness of 'I am nought'. But the denial of the 'I' is possible because we already believe that the absolute is. Reality as apprehended in religion is expressed literally in so far as it is expressed as a self. The positive character of the Absolute, however, is expressible only by the negation of the 'I' and, as such, is not literally expressible at all. If then it is said that the Absolute *is*, the '*is*' means not reality but truth. (39) Truth is believed as independent of speaking, as self-revealing. As a positive to which even

the 'I' is nought in itself, it is nothing to be distinguished from and is, in this sense, absolute. It is, however, symbolically spoken, and as such it has to be believed as distinct. If, then, truth as absolute is distinguished, it can only be distinct from itself. There is, however, no necessity in this self-distinction. The absolute may be truth, or it may be freedom or it may be value. There is no sense in speaking of the absolute as the unity of truth, freedom and value. It is each of them. (40) This triple Absolute is the prototype of the three subjective functions—knowing, willing and feeling—which are elaborated not in the introspective but in the transcendental consciousness. (41) The theory of truth is the theory of the other two absolutes also, but it recognises the possibility of elaborating a primary theory of each of them in reference to the other absolutes.

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

1. An explication of the concept of philosophy appears to me more important than the discussion of any specific problem of philosophy. The possibility of philosophy as a body of knowledge distinct from science is nowadays called in question. I may indicate my general position by stating wherein I differ from the Kantian view of the subject.

I. ORIENTATION TO KANT

2. With regard to the knowability of the self as a metaphysical entity, Kant holds that the self is a necessity of thought and is the object of moral faith, but is not in itself knowable. My position is, on the one hand, that the self is unthinkable and on the other that while actually it is not known and is only an object of faith, though not necessarily only of moral faith, we have to admit the possibility of knowing it without *thinking*, there being a demand, alternative with other spiritual demands, to realise such knowledge. This is practically reopening the entire epistemological question of the meaning of thought and knowledge.

3. In taking the self to be unthinkable, I understand Kant's Idea of the Reason to be not only not knowledge, but to be not even thought in the literal sense. The so-called extension of thought beyond experience and the possibility of experience means to me only the use of the verbal form of thought as a symbol of an unthinkable reality, such symbolising use not being thinking. I go further and hold that a form of thought as understood by itself in logic and apart from its symbolising use is not literally thought. Some present-day positivists who deny not only metaphysical knowing, but also metaphysical thinking, would not go so far as to deny logic itself to be a body of thought. They rely, in fact, on logic which they take to be pure thinking, in order to deny metaphysical thinking. I take logic to be a philosophical and not a scientific subject: the logical forms are shadows of metaphysical symbolisms and are as such themselves to be understood as symbolisms.

4. On the negative side then I go much further than Kant. On the positive side, however, I would tone down his agnosticism. That the self is believed in and is yet actually unknown is itself to me ground for holding that it is knowable without thinking and has to be so known. The self or freedom is taken to be a moral postulate, but why

is a moral postulate formulated at all? Neither morality nor metaphysical theory gains anything by the formulation in theoretic form. A moral postulate is not simply an Idea of the Reason, nor is it a construct of the aesthetic imagination. It appears to me to be formulated for the contemplation of it not as a moral good or as an enjoyable value but as a truth to be known. Such contemplation cannot be a spiritual luxury or make-believe, but must have behind it the faith that it is just the process of reaching the truth without thinking. It is not indeed a duty to contemplate, but the contemplation being already there, it demands fulfilment in knowledge. The contemplation of the self as truth may start from consciousness other than the moral, nor need moral consciousness develop into it. A distinctively spiritual activity comes spontaneously and has no necessary origin. The contemplation of the self as truth demands fulfilment in knowledge only by one in whom this activity has already started. It is an absolute demand co-ordinate with the other absolute demands.

5. What applies to the self applies with necessary alterations to other metaphysical entities. Metaphysics, or more generally, philosophy including logic and epistemology, is not only not actual knowledge, but is not even literal thought; and yet its contents are contemplated as true in the faith that it is only by such contemplation that the Absolute can be known.

II. GRADES OF THEORETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

6. Whether philosophy is knowledge or embodies literal thinking may be open to dispute. But in any case it presents beliefs that are speakable or systematically communicable and is like science an expression of the theoretic consciousness. Theoretic consciousness at its minimum is the understanding of a speakable. What is spoken must be in the first instance believed. What is disbelieved must be, to start with, a believed content. The meaning of a sportive combination of words like the "hare's horn" or "square circle" is only not believed and cannot even be said to be disbelieved. Nor is such combination said to be spoken except as an example of what is not spoken. To speak is to formulate a belief. Even imperative or exclamatory speech expresses some kind of belief of the speaker, though the belief is not primarily intended to be communicated. A lie which is not believed by the speaker is not felt by him to be informatively spoken, being felt to be spoken only as incorporated in the implied prefix of all speech, viz., the imperative "believe me." It is believed content that is spoken

and it is the understanding of what can be spoken that constitutes the theoretic consciousness.

7. Such understanding may not be knowledge, but it involves belief in something as known or to be known. The belief may not be explicitly an awareness of the actual or possible knownness, but it can always be made explicit as such. The belief in knowledge may be implied in the explicit awareness of unknownness. The agnostic or the anti-rationalist or the absolute sceptic is primarily conscious of unknownness, but to be conscious of unknownness is to be conscious of knownness also. They may not be said to *know* the unknown as such but they *believe* it and impliedly believe also in something as known, even though it may be speakable only as unspeakable. They are said to present a philosophy so far as they express the theoretic consciousness which implies belief in something as known.

8. All forms of theoretic consciousness as involving the understanding of a speakable are sometimes called 'thought'. Of these, as will appear presently, only one form is literal thought, the others being symbolistic thought which should not be called 'thought' at all. Four forms or grades of thought may be distinguished. They may be roughly called empirical thought, pure objective thought, spiritual thought and transcendental thought. Empirical thought is the theoretic consciousness of a content involving reference to an object that is perceived or imagined to be perceived, such reference being part of the meaning of the content. There are contents that are objective but have no necessary reference to sense-perception and the consciousness of such contents may be called pure objective or contemplative thought. The content of spiritual thought is no object, nothing that is contemplated in the objective attitude, being subjective in the sense of being appreciated in a subjective or 'enjoying' attitude. Transcendental thought is the consciousness of a content that is neither objective nor subjective, the further characterisation of which will come later. The contents of the four grades of thought may be provisionally called fact, self-subsistence, reality and truth. Science deals with fact, the content of empirical thought. Philosophy deals with the last three, the contents of pure thought in the objective, subjective and transcendental attitudes.

9. All contents of the theoretic consciousness are speakable. The so-called grades of thought are really grades of speaking. Fact in science is spoken of as information and understood without reference to the spoken form. It is what need not be spoken to be believed. Speakability is a contingent character of the content of empirical thought, but it is a necessary character of the content of pure philo-

sophic thought. In philosophy, the content that is spoken is not intelligible except as spoken. Pure thought is not thought of a content distinguishable from it and is accordingly sometimes regarded as a fiction, philosophy being rejected as a disease of speech. Philosophical contents are, indeed, believed to be self-evident and the self-evident means what is independent of the spoken belief of an individual mind. This independence of speaking is, however, a part of their meaning. It is not part of the meaning of a scientific content which is understood without reference at all to be linguistic expression of it.

10. Now a believed content that has necessary reference to the speaking of it is not spoken of as information. Self-subsistence or enjoyed reality or truth is not assertable as fact. Belief in it may be expressed in the form of a judgment, but the form would be only artificial or symbolic. Fact is always expressible as a judgment of the form "A is thus related to B", this being the only judgment-form that is literally intelligible. A judgment of the form "X is", if it expresses belief in a fact of science, is only a periphrasis for a judgment of the above rational form. In "X is", if X stands for "A is related to B", the assertion means either only that A is related to B or that A that is thus related is related to something else. Fact is always a fact related to facts. If anywhere "X is" means something other than the relational assertion, it means that X is self-subsistent, real or true, which is only an apparent judgment. The subject is here understood as presupposing the predicate. The predicate does not, as in a judgment proper, amplify or explicate the meaning of a subject that is already believed. The subject is here believed as a self-evident elaboration of the predicate that is already believed to be self-evident.

11. Philosophy is such self-evident elaboration of the self-evident and is not a body of judgments. The self-evident is spoken, but is not spoken of. Of what is only spoken and contains a necessary reference to the speaking of it there are three forms according as it is spoken in the objective, the subjective or the transcendental attitude. The difference between the first two forms is the difference between the imports of the apparent judgments "The object (-in general) is" and "I am". In a judgment proper "A is thus related to B", if the word *is* by itself means anything, if in other words the assertion means any content more than "A related to B", the content as isolated would be objectivity. It may be expressed as an apparent judgment "the relation of A and B is". In a judgment proper, the word 'is' expresses only the objective attitude of the subject, but in this apparent judgment, 'is' means an objective content which is self-subsistent but not

fact. To express or formulate this content is still to retain the objective attitude. The attitude is explicitly dropped in saying "I am". The content here also is spoken and not spoken *of*, but it is explicitly understood as not objective and as only apparently objective or symbolised by objectivity. What the word 'am' means is not contemplated in the objective attitude but is subjectively enjoyed and only spoken *as though* it were objectively contemplated. If fact is spoken of and the self-subsistent object is only spoken—both being spoken as *meant*, reality is spoken not as meant but as only *symbolised*.

12. All the three are literally speakable. To say that the object is not the subject and that the latter is symbolised by the former is still to speak literally. The word that is used as symbol is not indeed literally understood, but what is symbolised by it (and that it is symbolised) is literally spoken. The subjective is a positive entity through which the objective is understood. The concept of the object is not reached through a generalisation of the objective facts of science. Were it not for the direct consciousness and speakability of the subject *I*, the concept of the object would never be precipitated. The first person *I* is the primary instance of a content that necessarily refers to the speaking of it. It is, in fact, the spoken that is understood as the same as the speaking function. In "I am" then, the predicate is a symbol of a literally spoken subject. What is taken as self-subsistent or real is literally spoken and understood. What, however, is taken as true is not literally understood.

13. How then is truth as beyond reality spoken? To answer the question, the connection between the notions of fact, self-subsistence and reality has to be further elucidated. The denial of each of these is possible. The judgment "A is thus related to B" may be denied in the form "that A is so related is not fact". "That A is so related" is no judgment, but what is nowadays called a 'proposition'. The enunciation and denial of it are possible because we have already a belief in the self-subsistent. If the proposition is understood as not fact, it is because we cannot deny its self-subsistence¹. So we may deny the self-subsistent in the form "object is not", meaning "What is other than the subjective is not a definite or self-identical content for contemplation"—a recognised philosophical view that is not *prima facie* meaningless. The denial is possible because we already believe in the

¹ The term 'self-subsistence' instead of 'subsistence' is used because we *mean* only in reference to a belief. The believed subsistent is the self-subsistent as meant. A meaning that is not a believed content of one grade is a believed content of a higher grade.

subjective as enjoyed reality. We may also deny reality in the form "I (as individual subject) am not". This, too, is *prima facie* intelligible and it represents a new grade of negation, for the individual subject is understood to be real as subject and not as object though it may be individual through some sort of identification with the object. Even as individual, the *I* is enjoyingly believed and the denial of such a content is possible because we have already the notion of truth beyond reality.

14. Taking a sentence of the form "X is", it is a judgment proper if 'X', 'is' and their combination (or the judgment-form) are each literally understood. Where X stands for the self-subsistent, both X and 'is' are literally understood but the combination is not, since X is intelligible only through 'is'. Where X stands for the (individual) self as enjoyed, it is literally understood, but the word 'is' is only an objective symbolism for enjoyed reality and the combination, therefore, is also symbolic. Where X stands for the negation of the (individual) self, it is not literally understood, because no positive is understood as equivalent to it. The self is unintelligible except as the subject *I* or as what the subject *I* is not. There is no consciousness of an absolute or transcendental self without reference to the subject *I*. If such a self is understood, it is only as the implication of the enjoyed *I* and never by itself. It is indeed positively believed, but there is no positive formulation of it independent of the notion of *I*. Thus here X is only symbolically understood and consequently the word 'is' and the judgment-form also are symbolically understood. "Object is" is no judgment, being tautologous as a judgment and "I am" is no judgment because 'am' is only symbolism, but both are literally spoken because the subject is literally understood as positive. But the sentence "the absolute self is" is not only no judgment but is not even literally spoken. Still, it is not meaningless and symbolises what is positively believed, viz., truth. What is believed and is not literally speakable (and is as such undeniable) is truth.

15. So there are the four grades of speakables. There is the primary distinction between what is only symbolically speakable and what is literally speakable. The literally speakable comprises what is spoken of as information and what is only spoken and not spoken of. Of these, what is only spoken is spoken either as symbolised or as meant. Truth is only symbolically spoken, reality is literally spoken as symbolised and the self-subsistent is literally spoken as meant. None of these are spoken of as information, while fact is spoken of as information. These correspond to what were roughly called empirical,

contemplative, enjoying and transcendental thought. It is only what is spoken of as information or fact that is or can be meant literally. In contemplative, enjoying and transcendental thought, the content is not spoken of but is only spoken. If it is put in the judgment-form "X is", the form is only symbolical. In the first two, X being literally understood, the content though not literally thought is still said to be literally spoken. In contemplative thought, the judgment-form is only symbolical; even in enjoying thought, the word 'is' is also used symbolically. In transcendental thought, X also being symbolical, "X is" is not only not literally thought but not also literally spoken.

16. A content that can be literally spoken of is the content of a judgment. The content of a judgment is information or fact that is intelligible without reference to the speaking of it. A content that is necessarily understood in reference to the speaking of it is in some respect, at least, symbolically understood and is not information, fact or content of judgment. Beliefs in science alone are formulable as judgments and literally thinkable. If a content is literally thinkable in a judgment, the belief in it as known is actual knowledge. If it is only symbolically thinkable, it is not said to be known but to be only believed as known.

17. Theoretic consciousness was said to be belief in a speakable content involving belief in a content as known. When the content is spoken symbolically, it may not be believed as known, but is at least understood as pointing to what is believed to be known. In science, the content is spoken literally, and is just the content that is believed to be known and is as such actually known. In philosophy, the content is spoken as at least partially symbolised. The self-subsistent content meant by "object is" where the judgment-form is symbolical and not actually known and demands to be known in absorbed contemplation (or intuited) as simply 'object'. The real *I* similarly demands to be known not only without the judgment-form, but also without the objective intuitive attitude, i.e., in pure enjoyment. Yet in all these cases something is literally spoken and there is no demand to know the content without the speaking attitude. The speaking function is the final form of individual subjectivity and even the pure form of spiritual thought implies it. Transcendental consciousness starts by regarding all speaking as only symbolising and is accordingly conceived as completed when this symbolising speech also is dispensed with. What transcendental consciousness amounts to and whether it remains consciousness at all when it frees itself from speech or individual subjectivity we do not know, for absolute or impersonal consciousness is

only conceivable in a negative way. All that can be said is that truth which consciousness starts by symbolising continues to be believed and becomes more and more self-evident as the symbolising accomplishes its purpose.

18. Theoretic consciousness is embodied in science and philosophy. Science alone speaks in genuine judgments, the content of which is fact intelligible without reference to speaking and is alone actually known and literally thought. Philosophy deals with contents that are not literally thinkable and are not actually known but are believed as demanding to be known without being thought. Such contents are understood as self-subsistent object, real subject and transcendental truth. We have accordingly three grades of philosophy which may be roughly called philosophy of the object, philosophy of the subject and philosophy of truth.

III. SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS

19. The philosophy of the object requires to be further distinguished from science. Both deal with the object understood as what is believed to be known in the objective attitude as distinct from the subjective, enjoying or spiritual attitude. The object in science, however, is understood as fact and not as self-subsistent. By 'fact' is meant what is perceivable or has necessary reference to the perceivable, is speakable in the form of a literal judgment and is believed without reference to the speaking of it. The self-subsistent is an object that has no necessary reference to the perceivable, is not literally expressible in a judgment and is believed only as it is spoken. A speakable is understood in necessary reference either to sense-perception or to the speaking of it. What is believed and understood in necessary reference to the speaking of it is, however, believed as self-evident or independent of the belief of any individual mind. As understood in the objective attitude, the self-evident is the self-subsistent. Fact in science is not believed as self-subsistent, as what would be even if no one believed it.

20. The self-subsistent object is a concept of philosophy, and it is not only not a concept of science but may be even denied by science. Science has no interest to formulate the concept of the self-subsistent object; and it apparently believes that the object *must* be knowable or usable. The self-subsistence of the object implies that the object *may be* in its very nature inaccessible to the mind. To contemplate the object as what would be if there were no subject to know it is to believe that it may be unknowable, that in any case it is not known as

of right. Science would not only take this suggestion to be gratuitous but would positively deny it. The notion that truth freely reveals itself and is in itself a mystery or even that it is its very nature to reveal itself would be scouted by science as obscurantist or anthropomorphic. To science, there is nothing in the object to make it known; it is just what is known and though it may be unknown, there is no question of its being unknowable.

21. The implicit belief of science then is that the object is knowable and usable *as of right*. This belief is at least questioned in philosophy to which it is an expression of solipsistic self-sufficiency on the part of the subject. In normal practical life, nature is not consciously exploited as a tool but is negotiated in the primitive spirit of sociableness. It is the arrogant exploiting attitude of science towards the object that provokes a self-healing reaction of the spirit in the form of philosophy or some cognate discipline. The spiritual demand is that nature should be contemplated and not merely used or manipulated. Science even as theory is evolved in a practical interest. What is more significant is that its very intellectual method is practical, being the use of actual or ideal *contrivances*. It is the wrong spiritual attitude of science towards the object rather than the so-called contradictions and problems left unsolved in scientific theory—as imagined by the philosopher but never felt by the scientist—that suggests the need for a speculative theory of the object. The concept of the self-subsistent object is the first corrective that philosophy offers of the predatory outlook of the scientific intellect. Realism is a philosophical faith among faiths: the creed of science, if formulated, would be a pragmatist form of solipsistic idealism.

22. The relation between science and the philosophy of the object may be brought out by a reference to certain problems which have been wrongly taken to be philosophical. There is the problem of piecing together the results of the sciences into a world-view. The synthesis wanted is sometimes imagined to be the generalisation of the primary laws of the sciences into more comprehensive laws. To suppose, however, that it can be accomplished by philosophy without the employment of the distinctive technique and methods of science would be nothing short of a presumptuous folly. If a law as distinct from a loose descriptive concept could be thus established, philosophy might well take in hand the entire work of science. All that can be achieved in this direction is an imaginative description of the world, which would be not only actual knowledge but not even a hypothesis that is intended to be turned into knowledge. Nor could it claim the

a priori certitude of a theory of logic or of metaphysics. Philosophical contents, if not known, are at least theoretically believed, but a world-view of this kind cannot even be claimed to be believed. It can be only an aesthetic view, having at best a suggestive value for science and an illustrative value for philosophy.

23. As an example of such speculation, I may refer to what is called evolutionary philosophy as distinct from the scientific account of evolution. Metaphysics may discuss the general concept of evolution which is but the concept of life and its materialistic, spiritualistic or other interpretations. For this, however, it does not require to piece together the results of science, all the data needed—matter, life and mind—being presented in the knowledge of oneself as in the body. The details and specific generalisations of science are utilised in the so-called philosophy of evolution not as evidence but as only illustrative material intended for visualising the metaphysical theory on the subject. The scientific account of evolution is knowledge or hypothesis, the metaphysic of life in relation to matter and mind is believed, if not known, but the so-called philosophy of evolution, so far as it is different from either, is only an organised presentation of the known or supposed facts of evolution *as though* they constituted the history of a single cosmic life. Cosmic life is not known as a fact, but may still be believed as self-subsisting. The single significant history of this life, however, as rounding off the jagged groupings of facts in science and bridging over the gaps left by it, is only imagined, and is understood to be neither self-evident nor verifiable. The significant story of cosmic evolution then is neither science nor philosophy but only a species of imaginative literature.

24. There is another problem, viz., the formulation of the postulates or structural concepts of science, which used to be regarded as a philosophical problem. Pure physics, for example, was taken by Kant as a branch of knowable metaphysic established by deduction from the *a priori* principles of synthetic knowledge. There is a similar confusion of thought at the present day in the romantic philosophy that has sprung up round the physico-mathematical theory of relativity, although here the confusion is of science with philosophy and not of philosophy with science as in the other case. In both, the impassable gulf between fact and the self-subsistent is ignored. The so-called axioms of science are but postulates, the formulation of which is the work of science itself. The postulates are hypothesis of a kind which are intended not for the anticipation of facts, but for the organisation of them into a system. They admit of rival hypotheses and may be

rejected though not as contradicted by fact, but only as clumsier and less expeditious to work with than the rival hypotheses. Again, there is no passage from a postulate of science to a concept of the object in itself. Whether the real world is four-dimensional or is intrinsically indeterminate in its behaviour can never be determined from the basic conceptual devices that happen to organise the facts of science at the present day. The postulates of science neither lead to nor are deducible from any metaphysical conception of the object.

IV. PHILOSOPHY OF THE OBJECT

25. What then has philosophy to say about the object? The objective attitude is understood only in contrast with the subjective or enjoying attitude. What is believed in the objective attitude, viz., the object, need not, however, be understood in reference to the subject. Where the reference to the subject is no part of the meaning of the object, the object is called fact and is dealt with in science. Philosophy deals with the object that is intelligible only in reference to the subject. By 'subject' is meant the individual subject or *I* which is understood in the theoretic consciousness as the speaking function that is symbolised by itself as spoken. The object that has necessary reference to the speaking of it is the self-subsistent object for philosophy.

26. Philosophy formulates and elaborates the concept of the self-subsistent object. What is common to such object and scientific fact is objectivity which is itself no fact, being only the circumstance of being understood in the objective attitude. This is just the form of the object, the self-subsistent form that is elaborated in Logic. It is indeed the form of spoken fact, but as it is the form of the self-subsistent object also, it cannot be said to have necessary reference to fact or the perceivable. Logic as the study of this form is thus no science, but a branch of the philosophy of the object. The form is itself a pure object and is also the form of pure object. The pure object of which Logic is the form or shadow is the metaphysical object. The two branches of the philosophy of the object then are Logic and Metaphysics.

27. Logical form or objectivity is not a concept reached by a comparison of the objects or facts of science. The concept of the object is reached in the first instance by contrast with the subject as the self-evident content of the spiritual consciousness. It is in the theoretic consciousness of the spiritual grade that one is first explicitly conscious of the object as such. In the consciousness of "I am", one appreciates the objective attitude of judgment as distinct from the enjoying attitude and understands it to be assumed only as a necessary make-believe.

The consciousness of the asserted being (*am*) or object as such here emerges as the consciousness of a necessary symbol of the subject *I*. That object is symbol of subject implies that object is not subject. The consciousness of negation as such, in fact, emerges only in this symbolising consciousness. One may be conscious of the object without being explicitly conscious of the subject, but object has no meaning except as the negation and the symbol of the subject. The symbolism here is necessary, and hence when the reference to the subject is only implicit, the object appears as the immediacy of the subject, as implicitly real. Thus object is understood as self-subsistent before fact is understood as object. Hence objectivity or the form of the object is intelligible in reference to the object that is taken to be implicitly real or what is called metaphysical object. Logic in this sense presupposes Metaphysics.

28. Metaphysics is philosophy of the object and involves theoretic consciousness in the objective attitude. There is properly speaking no metaphysic of the subject. What passes as such is either the metaphysic of the mind understood as a particular type of object or is no metaphysic but a self-symbolising form of spiritual activity. Metaphysics elaborates the concept of the object in reference to the subject. The rationale of any distinction of metaphysical contents is to be found in an introspectively appreciable distinction within spiritual experience. Even the crude division of the object into matter, life and mind is not intelligible as an inductive classification of fact. That these are *all that is* can at least never be known by induction. The notion of the objective universe is that of an infinite singular and not of a universal; and an *exhaustive* division of such a singular into items that are *all positive* can only be reached if the singular self-evidently unfolds itself in them, if, in other words, each item means every other item or means the entire system. Such a system is self-evident only as the symbol of an introspective or enjoyed content, as the symbolic analysis of the simple or unitary consciousness of oneself living in the body. The analysis is symbolic because the so-called constituents of the content—matter, life and mind—are intelligible not by themselves but only in reference to this consciousness. Their difference is such as is immediately felt and every apparently factual characterisation of them is understood in reference to this feeling.

29. No metaphysical concept is intelligible without reference to the subject or spirit which itself goes beyond metaphysics. The characteristic abstractions of metaphysics which are supposed on the one hand to be of an 'extra high grade' and on the other to be only diseases of speech are really symbolic meanings which derive their whole value

for belief from the spiritual experiences that they symbolise. There are no judgments, accordingly, in metaphysics and, paradoxical as it may sound, the metaphysical beliefs are not reached by inference. The elaborate parade of deductive proof in metaphysics is only a make-believe, unless proof is taken, as it is sometimes taken, as the exposition of an unperceived tautology. Metaphysical reasoning is only the *systematic exposition of symbolic concepts*, concepts that are implicitly taken as symbols of contents that are enjoyingly believed.

30. Fact and the self-subsistent are both literally spoken and in both the believed content is figured by being spoken. Fact is understood as independent of this figuration while the self-subsistent is presented as constituted by it. What is common to these spoken contents is this speech-created form. There are accidental forms of speech, but there are also certain structural forms that are unavoidable in the communication of belief and which are believed to belong to the understood content and not to the speech only. When a fact is spoken, there is a peculiar dualism in the understood content of the meant and the believed, the latter being meant as beyond meaning or as perceivable. When a self-subsistent is spoken, the dualism lapses, the meant and the believed being coincident. The unavoidable forms of speech are constitutive of the meaning. Logic presents a system of speech-created forms of meaning. There may be alternative systems, for logic presupposes metaphysics which presents alternative theories. The fundamental disputes in logic are unavowed metaphysical disputes. Apart from the question of accidental inconsistency within a logical system, whether one logical system is better than another is settled not by logic but by metaphysic. Metaphysical dispute, however, is not settled by logic, for apparently every metaphysical system has its distinctive logic.

31. The suspicion that the subject is not believed in the same sense as the metaphysical object does not arise within metaphysics. Metaphysics is unaware of the distinction between the self-subsistent and the real. There seems to be nothing wrong, for instance, in the characterisation of matter or mind as real. The distinction is suggested by a contrast of logic with metaphysics. The forms of meaning as discussed in logic are a kind of entity that must be said to be believed in, but it would be absurd to say that they are real. They are believed in as not real and yet not nothing, or in other words, as self-subsistent. If logical form or objectivity is self-subsistent, has the object of metaphysics any higher status? The distinction of abstract and concrete has meaning only within fact and hence the object cannot mean anything more than objectivity. The metaphysical object is defined, in contrast

with fact, as objectivity or self-subsistent meaning. Metaphysic defines itself in logic.

V. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRIT

32. The suggested distinction of self-subsistence and reality is explicitly verified in the spiritual or enjoying consciousness of objectivity as a symbol of the real subject. As already pointed out, in 'I am', *am* meaning self-subsistent being as understood in the objective attitude is the symbol of *I* as understood in the subjective attitude. Enjoying understanding of a content, in fact, is the consciousness of it as symbolised by an objectively contemplated meaning. Without such a symbolism, the subject would be enjoyed but not enjoyingly understood. It is not only understood like the self-subsistent in necessary reference to the speaking of it: it is understood further as symbolised by its spoken form. This enjoying understanding is what we mean or should mean by introspection. Introspection proper is a form of the theoretic consciousness that implies an abjuration of the objective attitude. Its content is not understood as objective fact nor even as self-subsistent object. The content is not the 'interior' of the body which is fact nor is the 'mental' which as unintelligible without reference to the speaking of it is a self-subsistent object. The content is *I* or implies *I*, and although it is spoken as though it were an object, it is understood as what object is not, as the speaking subjectivity.

33. To introspect is actually or ideally to speak in the first person. To speak in the first person may not be to explicitly conscious of the *I* as what the object is not. When it involves such consciousness, it amounts to introspection. Again, introspective speaking may or may not involve the explicit consciousness of *being* what is spoken. When it involves such consciousness, it may be called spiritual introspection. The consciousness of being what is spoken (*I*) is itself a new achievement of the subject, its realisation or deepening of being. All introspection involves such achievement: introspection cannot be like the knowledge of objective fact, which leaves the fact unaffected in being. But there is a form of introspection which *apparently* leaves the content thus unaffected, where really there is an alteration of subjective being which is enjoyed only in the non-theoretic way. This may be taken to be an implicit form of spiritual introspection. Sometimes there is a conscious suspension of theoretic consciousness about such alteration, a deliberate exclusion of it from introspection.

In such a case, introspection tends to degenerate into objective consciousness of the mind as distinct from the *I*—what is ordinarily called psychological introspection.

34. The subject *I* is never accepted by itself in spiritual introspection. Something else is always enjoyed along with the subject and enjoyed in reference to it. This may be of three grades. There is in the first place the explicit consciousness of the subject as *unaccountably* embodied, this being the same as the consciousness of the subject as what the object including the mind is not. Next there is the consciousness of personal relation to other selves. Lastly there is the consciousness of the over-personal self. The over-personal self is enjoyingly understood not only in reference to the subject *I* but as implying the specific experience of communion, the felt form of identity with the *I*. Such enjoying identity is what is called concrete identity or identity-in-difference, a relation that is unintelligible in the objective attitude. Identity in the philosophy of the object is conceived as abstract identity of the form '*A is A*' and there is no place for *relation* of identity in the sphere of fact. The consciousness of the over-personal self as thus one with the *I* is the religious form of the spiritual consciousness. The study of all contents enjoyed in explicit reference to the subject *I* may be called the philosophy of the spirit.

35. Spiritual consciousness is not mere consciousness of reality but is reality itself. Except in the specifically religious form of it, however, it involves some consciousness of reality as distinct from what may be called empty objectivity. In the enjoying consciousness of the self as embodied or symbolised by the object, the object is conceived not as self-subsistent, but only as a shadow or symbol of the *I*, the consciousness of the shadow as such being said to be empty. In the consciousness of personal relations—the moral consciousness, for example—*I* and the other person are each not the other, each the symbol of the other, there being an alternation of symbolisms. The other person is to me '*another I*' which taken literally is a contradiction through which alone, however, he is understood. Or *I* (first person) am aware of being '*this person*' (third person) to him, which too is symbolising by a contradiction. Each alternative is real in being but contradictory or empty in meaning or theory. The experience of religious communion or worship is the consciousness of the over-personal reality as symbolised by *I*. The conscious symbolising by *I* is a non-theoretic experience of self-abnegation: it is consciously *being* nought and not consciousness *of I* as nought. What emerges to theoretic religious consciousness is the over-personal reality alone. In this sense

the religious consciousness is said to outgrow all empty subjectivity and to be the enjoyed fulness of being.

36. Religious experience as consciousness of being is simple and admits of no variation within itself. There is, however, an infinite plurality of unique religious experiences. Their relation is determined by themselves and not by any external reflection. Each experience by its self-deepening gets opposed to or synthesised with other experiences. One experience may enjoy another as a stage outgrown or as in absolute conflict with it, where a third experience may emerge as adjusting them to one another. There is no possibility of systematising them by secular reason and so far as they systematise themselves, they present themselves in many alternative systems. Each experience, in fact, is a revelation and we believe in a system only so far as it is actually revealed. Extensive internally coherent systems with indefinite boundaries are actually revealed, though there is no *a priori* necessity of a system and still less of a system admitting of no alternative systems. The Hegelian notion of a single and exclusive gradation of religions would appear from this standpoint to be intrinsically irreligious.

37. The theoretic form of a religious system is a philosophy of religion, there being as many forms of this philosophy as there are religious systems. This form expresses itself in the lower grades of philosophy—in the theory of the sub-religious spirit, in the metaphysic of the object and even in logic. Every system of religious philosophy has its distinctive theory of the spirit, metaphysics and logic. The fundamental differences within logical theory are, as has been suggested, implicitly metaphysical, those in metaphysic are implicitly spiritual and those in the theory of the secular spirit are implicitly religious. Religions may indefinitely multiply and indefinitely get synthesised. So is there indefinite scope for differences and syntheses in philosophical theory in general. There is no question of philosophy progressing towards a single unanimously acceptable solution. All philosophy is systematic symbolism and symbolism necessarily admits of alternatives.

VI. PHILOSOPHY OF TRUTH

38. In religion, there can be no theoretic denial of the subject *I*. In worship, indeed, the subject abnegates itself but the abnegation is there an affair of enjoyed being and not of theory. There is, however, a theoretic consciousness of 'I am nought', of the possibility at any rate of the subject or the individual self being unreal. The denial of the *I* is possible because we already believe that the absolute is. The absolute is not the same as the over-personal reality that is enjoyed in

religion. It means what the subject *I* is not, but the reality of religious experience while it is enjoyed and symbolised by *I* does not mean such theoretic negation of *I*. What is called the absolute is a positively believed entity that is only negatively understood. It is an entity that cannot be understood as it is believed, and is speakable only by way of symbolism. Reality as apprehended in religion is, indeed, symbolised by *I*, but so far as it is expressed as a self, it is expressed literally. The positive character of the absolute, however, is expressible only by the negation of *I* (or more accurately by 'what-I am not') and as such is not literally expressible at all. If then we say that the absolute *is*, we mean by 'is' not reality but truth. Reality is enjoyed but truth is not. The consciousness of truth as what is believed in but not understood either in the objective or in the subjective attitude, as not literally speakable at all but speakable only in the purely symbolistic way, is extra-religious or transcendental consciousness.

39. What is believed in and understood as literally unspeakable may be said to be self-revealing. Reality is still literally speakable and may be taken to depend on the speaking for its revelation, though the speaking (which means the *I*) is not there empty subjectivity. Truth is believed or revealed *as* independent of it, as *self-revealing*, what is true being spoken as what the speaking *I* is not. At the same time, to be even symbolically spoken, it has to be believed as a distinct. As a positive to which even the *I* is but a symbol and, therefore, nought in itself, it has nothing to be distinguished from and is absolute. If, then, truth as absolute is distinguished, it can only be distinguished from itself. The self-distinction of the absolute cannot mean self-identity as it appears in the religious consciousness in which the identity-in-difference is conceived to be necessary. There is no necessity in this self-distinction. The absolute may be truth or it may be what truth is not or it may be their mere distinction without any unity in the background, which means their indeterminate togetherness which cannot be denied to be either of them. What truth is not and is yet positive is the absolute freedom beyond being (the absolute freedom of the will) and what is indeterminately either truth or freedom is absolute value. There is no sense in speaking of the absolute as the unity of truth, freedom and value. It is *each* of them, these being only *spoken* separately but not *meant* either as separate or as one. The theoretic consciousness of truth; then, is the consciousness of truth as distinct from itself as freedom and from this identity-less self-distinction or value. The absolute as transcending the enjoyed reality of religion is positive being

(truth) or positive non-being (freedom) or their positive indetermination (value). The absolute is conceived rigorously as truth in (Advaita) Vedānta. What is loosely called nihilist Buddhism apparently understands the absolute as freedom. The Hegelian absolute may be taken to represent the indetermination, miscalled *identity* of truth and freedom which is value. All these views belong to what may be called the transcendental grade of philosophy.

40. This triple absolute is apparently the prototype of the three subjective functions—knowing, willing and feeling. These functions are primarily the self-distinction of the transcendental consciousness. The distinction of the functions does not emerge in the spiritual consciousness. Spiritual consciousness is simple and integral in its very nature. The consciousness of *I* is not only not the consciousness of a complex unity of these functions, it is not even the consciousness of a unity revealing itself in each of them. It not only does not analyse itself: it supplies no motive for such analysis. The tripartite elaboration of consciousness is not introspective but transcendental. The absolutes reveal themselves and the *I* appears trinal only as their shadow or symbolism. As the absolutes are not related into a unity, neither can their subjective shadows be said to be related. The simple *I* has no enjoyed elements or aspects to be related. Nor are the so-called functions intelligible as pure acts or interests of the *I*. They cannot be defined in subjective terms nor can they be taken as unique subjective experiences, being not presented as distinct to introspection at all. Their whole meaning is derived from the self-revealed absolutes.

41. The theory of truth is the theory of the other two absolutes also. At the same time it recognises the possibility of elaborating a primary theory of each of them in reference to the other absolutes. We have shadows of these primary theories in the lower grades of philosophy. The theory of truth, for example, as conceived in its explicit transcendental form has its shadow in the theory of knowledge which belongs to the philosophy of the spirit and in the theory of objective categories which is somewhere intermediate between metaphysics and logic in the philosophy of the object.

THE CONCEPT OF THE ABSOLUTE AND ITS ALTERNATIVE FORMS

ANALYSIS

(1) Philosophy starts in reflection which is the awareness of a content *as to* a mode of consciousness. The nature of this relation of 'as to' has got to be analysed. (2) There can be no consciousness of a relation prior to reflection. Yet the relation between content and consciousness has to be understood in terms of the relation between two contents of consciousness. (3) It is sometimes held, on the contrary, that the relation between two contents of consciousness has to be understood in terms of the relation between consciousness and content, which is claimed to be one of identity-in-difference. That the relation under reference is actually what it is said to be has got to be examined. (4) To reflection, the relation of content and consciousness appears to be one of asserted implication. Now if A is asserted to imply B, a factual relation is always meant and this relation is one which obtains between a term which must be definite and independent of the relation and the implied term B. Unless such a definite independent term is found, the implication has to be taken as an indefinite formulation of a factual relation. In the case under reference, the independent term is not a definite nameable thing, and thus in the reflective stage, we have only an indefinite relation between content and consciousness. (5-8) This indefinite relation appears to reflection as at once distinction and non-distinction. But this non-distinction cannot be positively asserted as an identity. Neither can it be denied to be so. The relation, then, of content and consciousness appears to reflection as an indefinite distinction only and not as an indefinite identity. The demand is for this distinction to be defined and for a supra-reflective consciousness where this distinction can be visualised.

(9) The absolute has to be understood not as the identity but only as a completely definite distinction of content and consciousness. (10) Now, as consciousness is of three kinds—knowing, feeling and willing—the implicatory distinction is also threefold. The mode of resolution of these implicatory distinctions into corresponding non-implicatory distinctions will accordingly vary in these three spheres. Thus the absolute has to be formulated not as a unitary something but as an un-unifiable triplicity. (11) The variations of the implicatory distinction in these three spheres may be represented by three modes of distinction that are recognised to hold between known contents. The content may be spoken of (a) as unconstituted by consciousness, or

(b) as constituted by consciousness, or, again (c) as along with consciousness constituting some kind of unity. (12-16) The content of knowing, i.e., the object known is independent of and thus unconstituted by knowing. The content of willing, i.e., an act, an end or an empirical embodiment of the end is not independent of willing and is, in this sense, constituted by the willing. Reflective knowing, as also reflective willing, is the consciousness of the content as distinct from the consciousness. Reflective feeling, on the other hand, is the consciousness of the content as in unity with the feeling.

(17-19) The content of knowing is necessarily understood in reflection as what is perfectly distinct from knowing. The content implies such a reference to knowing and apparently means nothing without it. To say that the reference is necessary is not, however, to say that the content is a fact necessarily related to knowing. But the content is not also apprehended as only accidentally related to knowing. Reflection tells us nothing either way, and both the idealistic and realistic positions appear to be over-statements. (20) The realistic position that the known content may exist unknown cannot either be denied or asserted. The possibility, however, of such a content is understood in reference to what is taken as self-evidently known. The self-evident is that which reveals itself and which might not have been to the knower at all. (21) The realistic view of the independence of the known content can only be admitted in the sense of the content being in some respect self-evident.

(22) The self-evident is not 'necessary' in the sense of being that whose opposite is unintelligible. It is rather that in regard to which the problem of thinking the opposite is not entertained at all. To be conscious of a content as self-evident is to be conscious not of its negation being unmeanable but of the problem of meaning the negation not even arising. (23) The self-evident is that of which we cannot be conscious except as true. It cannot as a rule, be the content of a judgment in the true sense of the term. (24) That a conclusion follows from a premise or premises is the only content that can be claimed to be self-evidently known, but it is not, properly speaking, a judgment. (25-26) A disguised form of this inferential 'following' is found in 'to know A is to know B'. This content cannot, however, be said to be no judgment and yet we are not conscious here of the problem of meaning its negation. It is the primordial and the only self-evident judgment. (27) The copula of this judgment is not known like other copulas. It is understood as *spoken* but not as *spoken of*. The word 'is' in the judgment is known, no doubt, but is not under-

stood as known *content*. (28-29) It may, accordingly, be (loosely) called a known no-content. It is explicitly known as what known content is not. (30) This then is the element in 'all that is reflectively known that is known as what need not be known. It is the element that is free from the implicational relation of the content to the knowing of it. This is the absolute for knowing that demands to be freed from its immanence in the implicatory distinction of content and knowing.

(31) The implicative distinction is demanded to be resolved in willing also. The content of willing is something that is foreign to and is thus a limitation to itself. But in the reflective stage this limitation is not realised as a self-limitation or the free limitation of the will to realise itself. But reflection demands that the limitation should be realised as self-limitation in this sense. (32-34) The relation between two contents willed suggests the relation between the willed content and willing. Now, two contents are said to be willed at once when one of them is a means to the other. This relation of means and end has to be understood as the relation between the willed content and willing. It is difficult, however, to understand how one can be said to act in a particular way to act freely. Reflection indicates that it is to be understood by contrasting 'I will this act' with 'I will this act that I ought to will'. The contrast yields the implication that willing as represented by the former is itself a being that is to be superseded by willing as represented by the latter, and that we will an act in order to get rid of the being of the act. But reflection cannot understand this willing or freedom at its limit.

(35-39) In reflective feeling, there is the definite consciousness of an indefinite distinction of the content felt and the feeling of it. Reflection demands that this indefinite distinction be resolved into a definite self-subsistent unity, that is to say, a unity where the constituents are distinguishable from it. We try to understand this relation on the analogy of the relation between two contents which are felt together, as for example, in the feeling of a beautiful object. We do not completely succeed. The constituents (i.e., the felt content and the feeling) appear to be imperfectly distinct, and the unity here means an imperfect distinction of the constituents and not the self-subsistent unity that is demanded to be realised in reflection. Value as such unity is not thus realised as self-subsistent like the beautiful object. The felt content and the feeling-consciousness are not together distinguished from the value that is their unity. (40) Recapitulation of sections 22-40.

(41) In the case of knowing, a known content has to be under-

stood as what need not be the content of any knowing, that is to say, as utterly unrelated to knowing. In the case of willing, the reality of willing has to be understood as the negation of being or of an emergent distinct. In the case of feeling, the being of value has to be understood as a being from which known being is distinct: it is to entertain an indifference of being and non-being. All the three—unrelatedness, negation of the emergent and the indifference of being and non-being—imply unmeaning modes of negation to reflection. In all these cases, what demands to be understood cannot actually be understood, because such understanding would involve a species of negation that is unmeaning to reflection. To admit the absolute in any form is to admit a negation that is unintelligible to the logic of the understanding.

(42) The absolute may be defined from the standpoint of reflection as what is free from the implicational dualism of content and consciousness. There are three ways in which this freedom can be understood: (a) the content may be freed from its reference to consciousness and we have *truth*—the absolute for knowing; (b) consciousness may be freed from its content and we have *freedom* of the will—the absolute for willing; (c) the implicational relation of content and consciousness may be freed from their distinction as a unity and we have *value*—the absolute for feeling. (43) The absolute has thus to be formulated in a triple way. It is meaningless, however, to cognitively assert that there are three absolutes or one absolute, for the absolute is not *known* content and it is only about a known content that the question 'one or many' has any meaning. (44-45) Freedom may alternatively be called reality and, as it is not known, it is meaningless to call it truth. Truth is the self-evident and is known, though it is not a known content. What is known, however, may be either the self-evident in its purity or some relation of *given* contents with the form of self-evidence. The self-evident in its purity is truth and not reality: but a relation of given contents is not only said to be true but cannot also be said to be not real. The real then is not true, but the true may be real. (46) Similarly, truth is not value, but value is not un-true. The predicates 'valuable' and 'worthless' do not apply to truth. (47) The predicates 'real' and 'unreal' do not apply to value. But reality or freedom cannot be said not to be a value. (48) Thus it is meaningless to speak of truth as a value, of value as real and of reality as true; while value may be truth, reality value and truth reality. The absolute may be regarded in this sense as an alternation of truth, value and reality.

THE CONCEPT OF THE ABSOLUTE AND ITS ALTERNATIVE FORMS

1. Philosophy starts in reflective consciousness. Reflection is the awareness of a content *as to* a mode of consciousness. The phrase 'as to' means some relation and it is in reference to this relation that the concept of the absolute has to be understood. What is this relation?

2. We ordinarily understand a relation as between the contents of consciousness and we have here apparently to conceive some such relation as subsisting between content and consciousness. Of the two relations—between content and content, and between content and consciousness—the latter has to be understood in terms of the former. Not that we know relation in objective consciousness before we come to be reflectively conscious of a relation between content and consciousness. To be aware of a relation *as such* between two terms, of their relation as distinct from their whole having the form of being, is to be aware at the same time of the possibility of the terms being not related in that relation. Now unlike a term known to be existent, a relation known to subsist between two terms cannot be *imagined* to be absent. The possible absence of a known relation, in fact, can never be apprehended in merely objective consciousness. Hence we can know a relation *as such* of two contents only in reflection which is specifically the consciousness of a relation between content and consciousness. Yet although there can be no consciousness of a relation prior to reflection, the relation of contents may be said to be prior to the relation of content and consciousness in the sense that the former is intelligible by itself while the latter is intelligible only in terms of the former.

3. There are those who hold that because we are only reflectively conscious of relation, the relation between content and consciousness should be read into the relation of content and content and not vice versa. The relation of content and consciousness is to them a transparent identity-in-difference and all relation of contents is to be understood as the same relation in an implicit form. The difficulty is that the relation of content and consciousness is not explicitly or self-evidently appreciated as an identity-in-difference by reflection itself, being, in fact, claimed to be so appreciated only in a higher consciousness called absolute or speculative consciousness. The possibility, however, of this supra-reflective consciousness may be disputed and it is

necessary in the first instance to show if and how reflection itself points to it.

4. *Prima facie* to reflection, the relation of content and consciousness appears as an implicative distinction. We are reflectively aware of the content as distinct from and in necessary reference to consciousness and the reference is not merely verbal but is implicitly an assertion. In the case of an asserted implication between two terms, the fact asserted is a relation (or unity), the terms of which are not the terms asserted to be in implication. If A is asserted to imply B, a factual relation is meant but A is not understood as a term of the relation. A here stands for a fact which need not have the relation but is thought as having it, the fact being not altered by being so thought. This fact should be capable of being expressed by a term that does not refer to the relation and the relation should be taken as between this term and the implied term B. For every implying term, it is necessary to find such a non-implying term, if possible; and until and unless it is found, the implication has to be taken as an *indefinite* formulation of a factual relation (or unity). To reflective consciousness there is implication between the content and the consciousness of it and the implication points to a factual relation (or unity) of which one of them at least is not really a term. One of them at least stands for an unnamed something which need not be related to the other. Some factual relation then appears to be only *indefinitely* formulated as the implication of content and consciousness in the reflective stage.

5. Now if it can be shown within reflection that this indefinite relation cannot be denied to be a distinction and cannot be denied also to be an identity, a stage of consciousness in which distinction and identity of the same terms are positively known together may be taken to be demanded by reflection which cannot understand them together. That the content is somehow distinct from consciousness is obvious to reflection but identity is not so obvious. What immediately appears is an indefinite distinction between content and consciousness: the terms are undoubtedly distinct but they are not wholly distinguishable. Have we the right to interpret this vague indistinguishability as an identity?

6. The indefinite relation of content and consciousness appears to reflection at once as distinction and as not distinction but this non-distinction cannot be positively asserted as an identity. Things may come to be distinguished that were undistinguished but what are once distinguished cannot be later taken to be non-distinct without at least one of the terms being taken to be illusory. Hence to distinguish terms

imperfectly is to be able to assert their distinction but neither to assert nor to deny their identity.

7. But it may be contended that distinction and identity stand on the same footing in respect of undeniability: like distinction identity also once apprehended cannot be denied. That we distinguish what were undistinguished does not mean that we knew their *relation* of identity which is now denied. We reply that it is possible to deny the relation of identity even when it is explicitly apprehended. There is something peculiar about the relation of identity, as expressed in the dilemma: if its terms are not distinct, they are not related at all, and if they are distinct they are not identical. We cannot get rid of the dilemma and admit identity as a relation unless we hold that while the distinction of its terms is cognitively undenied, it is positively entertained only in non-cognitive consciousness. The fact A in the context M is said to be identical with A in the context N and A has the differential characters x and y in the contexts, which are presented and yet as neither factual nor non-factual. If the characters be facts, A cannot be identical in the two contexts and if they be no facts at all, there is no distinction of terms and, therefore, no relation. They have accordingly to be taken as not cognised characters but aesthetically apprehended expressions which do not preclude the cognised identity of A and yet are themselves cognitively undenied. To assert a relation is not to *assert* a distinction between its terms but only not to deny it. We may be affectively or conatively aware of a distinction where we do not intellectually disbelieve the distinction but do not also assert it. Identity then such as is knowable is a relation of terms, the distinction of which is undenied but unknown. Now what is unknown and yet speakable as felt *may* come to be known. If the differential characters x and y come to be known, the identity of A would be denied. Identity cannot accordingly be taken to be undeniable like distinction.

8. The indefinite relation then of content and consciousness should not be interpreted as indefinite identity. There is no demand, therefore, in reflection for a stage of conscious in which content and consciousness may be explicitly seen to be identical in difference. The only necessary demand in knowledge is that what appears as indefinite in an assignable respect should be definable in that respect. If further the indefiniteness is such as *necessarily* appears to a stage of consciousness, that stage is taken to demand a higher stage where the indefinite gets defined. To reflection, the relation of content and consciousness appears necessarily as an indefinite distinction only and not as an indefinite identity. The demand is for this distinction to be

defined and for a supra-reflective consciousness where this distinction can be visualised.

9. The concept of the absolute in any form is taken to belong to a supra-reflective consciousness. The possibility and nature of this consciousness have to be understood in reflection as a necessary problem. The conception of an explicit identity-in-difference of content and consciousness is not demanded in reflection. Reflection demands only a non-implicational distinction of them to define the necessarily implicational or indefinite distinction that is presented to it. The absolute accordingly has to be problematically understood within reflection as meaning not an identity but only a completely definite distinction of content and consciousness. It may be that the supra-reflective consciousness in which the reflective implication of content and consciousness is turned into a non-implicatory distinction is itself consciousness of identity in a symbolic or metaphorical sense. But in any case identity as a *logical relation* has to be definitely denied between content and consciousness before this mystic identity can be appreciated.

10. We are concerned for the present with the conception of the absolute such as is intelligible as a problem to reflection. We have to trace in detail how the indefinite distinction of content and consciousness can be defined, how their apparent identity can be denied, how, in fact, the implicatory distinction can be resolved into a non-implicatory distinction. We shall find presently that the implicatory distinction of content and consciousness varies according as the consciousness is knowing, feeling or willing. The implication is resolvable in different ways in these three spheres and the absolute is understood in the reflective stage in terms of the mode of resolution in each case. Knowing, feeling and willing will then each have its own formulation of the absolute—viz., truth, value and reality (or freedom) respectively, as will be justified later. In the reflective stage these absolutes or formulations of the absolute will be found to be un-unifiable and to be in a sort of alternation. Whether a mystical identity of the absolutes can be reached in the supra-reflective consciousness does not concern us. Our problem is to show how reflection demands a specific absolute in each case.

11. What is specifically apprehended in non-cognitive consciousness cannot be literally formulated in terms of knowledge. Philosophy which cognitively deals with the contents of all consciousness should claim to know *not* the non-cognitive contents themselves but only *that* they are non-cognitive, that we believe in contents which we do not know. It can, therefore, speak of these believed contents

only by a sort of intellectual symbolism *as though* they were known. To reflection, the implicative distinction of content and consciousness varies according as the consciousness is knowing, feeling or willing. The variations may be represented by three modes of distinction that we recognise as between known contents. If A is distinct from B, B may be simply an other, or it may be constitutive of A, or A and B may be both constitutive of C. So the content that is distinguished in reflection from consciousness may be spoken of as unconstituted by consciousness or as constituted by consciousness or as along with consciousness constituting some kind of unity. The first mode of distinction is the relation of content and consciousness in knowing and the last two will be found to appropriately symbolise the relation in willing and feeling respectively.

12. The content of a knowing act is unconstituted by the act. The *particular* act of knowing discovers and does not construct the object known, even if the object be admitted to be constructed by *some* knowing. Knowledge would appear to mean that the object known is in some sense independent of it though it may be a question whether what we ordinarily claim to know is properly said to be known and to be independent of the knowing. Where the object is coloured by the particularity of the act of knowing, it may be said to be only empirically known but it is still taken to be known so far as it is believed to be independent of it.

13. The content of willing may be said to be an act, an end, or the empirical embodiment of the end—the organisation of certain objective facts (including the means) by the end. None of these is a fact that can be said to be known in the willing, believed as independent of the willing in the sense the content of knowing is independent of knowing. Each is constituted by willing in the sense that apart from willing it is nothing at all. It cannot be said that it is a future fact that is *known* in the willing. Willing is, indeed, some form of consciousness of the future but the future here, unlike the future that is said to be known, is not a fact but a contingency, not what *will* be but what *would* be if it were willed, not as already determined but what is being determined by the willing and as therefore apart from the willing nothing at all. Yet the content of willing is distinct from willing, distinct as what is constituted is distinct from what constitutes it.

14. Reflective knowing is consciousness of the known object as distinct from the knowing. Reflective willing is consciousness of the act willed as being distinguished by the willing from itself. Neither is consciousness primarily of the distinction itself or the distinguishing.

Reflective feeling is primarily consciousness of the distinction (or the distinguishing) of content and consciousness. To be conscious of a content as felt is to be conscious of the content in unity with the feeling or of feeling unified with the content. The unity of two contents means—whatever else it means—an imperfect distinction between them ; and we have to understand the unity of content and consciousness on this analogy. The unity of which reflective feeling is conscious is the imperfect distinction between content and consciousness, taken itself as a content. To be conscious of a content as known or willed is not even to be implicitly conscious of a unity of content and consciousness. The known content appears to reflection as perfectly distinct from knowing and a unity of perfect distincts cannot be reflectively conceived to be knowable. The content of willing as constituted by the willing alone cannot be understood to constitute along with the willing any unity other than the content itself. It is only in reflective feeling that we are conscious of something, viz., value that is as much content as consciousness, that is not indeed *both* of them at once but what each of them is and is not alternately. The felt content is imperfectly distinguished from feeling but not constituted by it in the sense that apart from it, it is nothing at all. We do not, indeed, know but cannot deny that the value of an object is really in it.

15. Reflective consciousness is definite consciousness of something. The content of feeling of which we are reflectively conscious is not a definite content. What is perfectly distinct from another or constituted by another in the sense of being nothing without it is definite in itself. What, however, is imperfectly distinct from another and unconstituted by it is not definite in itself. Now an indefinite can only be referred to in connexion with a definite content. What we are definitely conscious of in reflective feeling is the imperfect distinction itself of content and consciousness, this indefinite *as such* being, in fact, their unity. The indefinite content of feeling can only be referred to as a factor of this unity.

16. The content of knowing then is perfectly distinct from knowing and is unconstituted by it. The content of willing is imperfectly distinct from willing though distinct in itself and is constituted by it. Content and consciousness make a unity in the case of feeling but not in the case of knowing and willing. There are thus three modes of distinction of content and consciousness of which we are reflectively conscious. Each of these is an implicative or indefinite distinction in some sense and the indefiniteness will be found to consist in the fact that a relation that is intelligible as between content and content is

only half intelligible when taken to be the relation between content and consciousness.

17. To begin with knowing. If the content of knowing be perfectly distinct from knowing, how can the distinction be implicative or indefinite at all? It is implicative in the sense that the content of knowing is *necessarily* understood in reflection as what is perfectly distinct from knowing. The content *implies* such a reference to knowing and apparently means nothing without it. When one content is asserted to imply another, a relation is asserted of which, as we said, the implying content is not really a *relatum* but some other content which need not have the relation and which as thought with the relation is the implying content. This irrelative content may not be actually formulated but we conceive it to be formulable. It is difficult to conceive, however, what the known content apart from the knowledge-relation can possibly mean, since it is before the mind only as known.

18. The consciousness of a content as known is not, indeed, the consciousness of it as a fact necessarily related to knowing but it is not also the positive consciousness of it as only accidentally related to knowing. Reflection, in fact, on knowing tells us nothing about whether the content known is or is not necessarily known. The known content *means* indeed what is perfectly distinct from knowing but this verbal reference to knowing need not mean a *necessary factual* relation. The perfect distinction, too, does not mean that the content stands for something that would be even if it were not known by any one. Both the idealistic and the realistic positions here appear to be over-statements. In one sense, however, the realistic position may be said to have an advantage, for although reflection does not testify that what is known need not be known, it does not deny it while the idealistic view that the content is constituted by the knowing of it appears to be plainly opposed to reflective testimony.

19. It may be, however, that if and when the realistic conception of the known content as what need not be known is realised, the idealistic notion of its being constituted by knowing will be found to have a meaning. Criticism of knowledge may show that all that is actually taken to be known in the reflective stage is in some respect constituted by the particular act of knowing and, therefore, is in that respect not properly known though its known character cannot be denied altogether. Meantime we may reject the ordinary idealistic argument that to be aware of knowing an object is to be aware of recognising it, aware therefore of the object as necessarily known. There is actually no consciousness of recognising the object in the

literal sense of remembering the past knowing of it. All that is actually meant is that to be aware of knowing an object is to be aware of knowing *truth*, knowing something—in other words—to be eternal or timeless. The object may be temporal but that it is in time is not itself a temporal fact. To know is to have a timeless truth revealed but this does not mean that it is timelessly *known* and so known *again* in the present act of knowing. There is apparently no ground to assume either a previous knowing or of a timeless, impersonal or universal knowing along with the present knowing to justify the use of the word 'recognition'.

20. The realistic position that the known content may exist unknown is not denied but cannot also be asserted in the reflective consciousness. It may be said, however, that it cannot be denied or asserted because only the proposition is meaningless. Can reflection understand it as a possibility? The possibility, we reply, is understood in reference to what we take to be *self-evidently* known. Certain known contents appear at least to be self-evident, not simply evident. So long as the evident is not contrasted with the self-evident, we say about it 'it is' and not 'it is *to me*'. When it is contrasted however, we say 'it is *to me*' (though not 'to me only'), while of the self-evident we say simply 'it is'. To say 'it is *to me*' is to suggest that it may not be; and to say—in denial of this possibility—that 'it is' is to imply that it might not have been to the knower at all, that it is eternally true, that it is truth literally revealing itself. If anything then is known to be self-evident, it is known as what need not be known.

21. That the known content may exist—or more accurately—may be true without being known is then intelligible as a problem to reflection. It is, therefore, deniable, and it is not denied (though not asserted) because some content claimed to be self-evident appears to be implied in all knowledge. What is taken to be known is thus implicitly believed to be self-evident and only in this sense to be what need not be known. The realistic view of the independence of the known content, of its knownness being accidental, can only be admitted in the sense of the content being in some respect self-evident or self-revealing. The realist's definition of knowledge has to be accepted; but the question against him would be if what is claimed to be known is really known, is independent of the particular act of knowing or knowing generally. It is not the question if what is taken to be true is true. Value, for example, may be claimed to be known but it may be legitimately asked if it is known at all, if it is not merely believed in a non-cognitive way. So one may ask if what is taken by

Kant to be only empirically known as involving construction of experiences is, as the realist will claim, really known, known as independent of the constructivity of the knowing act. The Kantian view may or may not be accepted but the question is certainly legitimate if what is claimed to be known is known in the realist's sense of the term. The realist apparently would not admit the necessity of testing whether what is supposed in the first instance to be known is really known.

22. The known content should be what need not be known but where is the content that is known as such? The self-evident, we take it, is what is known to be independent of knowing in the sense of being eternally true without requiring to be known; but is anything admitted to be self-evident in the reflective consciousness? No known content is absolutely indubitable and in any case there is no agreement as to what content is indubitable. But some content or other appears self-evident in the sense of there being an explicit consciousness of doubt about it being unintelligible. The unintelligibility of doubt about a content should be distinguished from what is called the inconceivability of the opposite. Inconceivability of the opposite is understood only by trying to conceive it and to try to conceive it is to entertain a problem in thinking or meaning, if not of knowing. But there are cases where the problem of thinking the opposite of the content known is not entertained and one is conscious of its not arising at all. To be conscious of a content as self-evident is to be conscious not of its negation being unmeanable but of the problem of meaning the negation not even arising. We are conscious of the self-evident in this sense though the negation of what appears as such may later come to be conceived through a new self-evident cognition or revelation.

23. What we reflectively speak of as true or false is a judgment. The self-evident is that of which we cannot be conscious except as true. Is there then any self-evident judgment? To form a judgment is apparently always to be conscious of the *problem* of meaning its negation. This applies even to what is taken as a necessary judgment. Its negation is found to be inconceivable only after it has been tried to be conceived, and it is so found because it is but the elaboration of a systemic concept which is really a *postulate* that is neither true nor false and may admit of rival postulates. It is a direction of imagination in which what tends to be imagined is eo ipso believed. The belief is here not properly cognitive but is what may be roughly called a feeling of cognition. It is the consciousness that something *must be* without the consciousness that it is: it is as though one

dimly felt what must be. The so-called necessary judgment is an analysis of the content of such felt cognition and is not properly knowledge.

24. What however is inferred, i.e., believed as what *must be* because something *is*, is believed also as what *is* and as such cannot be said to be merely felt as known. It is only the necessary that is not consciously inferred that should be so characterised. That a conclusion follows from a premise or premises is the only content that can be claimed in reflective consciousness as self-evidently known and not merely necessarily known i.e., felt to be known. Properly speaking, indeed, that a conclusion follows from a premise is not a judgment though expressed as such. The 'following' is not a relation of contents that is itself a content co-ordinate with them. Still as it is not an arbitrary subjective relating of contents, we cannot say it is not a *believed* relation though it is not content of consciousness.

25. A disguised form of this inferential 'following' we have in a judgment like 'A implies B' which may be paraphrased 'to know A is to know B'. What does the word 'is' here stand for? The two knowings stand for subjective acts but the connecting word 'is' does not mean another act co-ordinate with them. Nor does it mean a relation of the contents A and B that is a third content. It appears to be a relation not of the contents but of the cognitions in respect of their content, being itself however no subjective act of cognition. It cannot be said not to be known though it is not content of the knowing of which A and B are contents. Whether it is the content of the reflective consciousness is not known in the reflection itself and so *for the reflective consciousness* it means neither the consciousness nor the content of consciousness.

26. The self-evident is to reflection a relation that *is* without being the content of a knowing that is known. 'To know A is to know B' cannot be said to be no judgment and yet here we are not conscious of the problem of meaning its negation. It may well be that the assertion is a mistake but when it is made, it is made on the basis of an immediate unquestioning belief which is yet on the reflective level. The problem of meaning the negation of a perceived content does not arise during the perception because perception is not on the reflective level. But it, is only reflectively that we say 'to know A is to know B' and yet the knowledge here is immediate so that if later it turns out to be false, it is taken to be an illusion and not merely a thinking error. Since the knowledge is reflectively immediate, there is not only no conscious problem of meaning its

negation, there is the consciousness of such a problem not arising. It is only about what is known as the *content* of knowing that such a problem arises. So it is about judgment generally (which is on the reflective level) except what we take to be the primordial judgment viz., 'to know A is to know B'. It is primordial judgment because it is the basis of necessary judgments that are the bases of all other judgments. A necessary judgment is still known mediately through the baffled attempt to conceive the opposite. This also is based on a judgment like 'to know the inconceivability of the negation of a judgment is to know the judgment to be axiomatic'. A judgment of the form 'to know A is to know B' is self-evident judgment which is implied in all other judgments. That the terms of a judgment *have* a relation i.e., appear to be related to the relation only means that to know the terms is to know the relation—which is just a judgment of this form.

27. That the copula of this primordial self-evident judgment is not known as a content requires further explanation. The judgment is, indeed, knowledge and knowledge of the contents A and B as known, but so far as it is knowledge of the relation implied by the word 'is', it is not knowledge of it as a content that is known. In the case of a judgment like 'A is B', we understand the copula as a relation that is at least partially a content on a level with A and B. But in the judgment 'to know A is to know B' the 'is' is not on a level with the cognitions of A and B, far less with A and B. It is not known as known like the cognitions and their contents in the reflective consciousness. How then do we say that it is known? Because the sentence 'to know A is to know B' is significant and what it signifies cannot be disbelieved. The import of the sentence or of the word 'is' in it is, in fact, understood only when already spoken and not in the speaking of it. When even understood as already spoken, it is not retrospectively taken as the content of that speaking and *distinct from it*. It is understood, in fact, as *spoken* but not as *spoken of*. The word 'is' in the judgment is not understood as known *content*.

28. What is understood (without disbelief) only as already spoken and not in the speaking of it is understood as known but not as known content. By 'known content' is meant what is *knowable* as distinct from the knowing of it. It may not sometimes be so known in the knowing of it but it may be known later. The import of the word 'is' in the judgment 'to know A is to know B' is not so knowable at all and may accordingly be (loosely) called a known no-content. It may be suggested that the import of the word 'is' here,

therefore, is the knowing act itself (or I) that is known by first appearing as content and then getting denied. It does not, however, appear at all as content to be negated : it is only symbolically spoken of later as content in the full consciousness that it is only verbally distinguished from the problematic knowing of it. Meantime the knowing of A and B that appears to reflection is definitely distinguished from it. What then the judgment 'to know A is to know B' signifies is known but does not appear as content to be accepted or rejected. It appears neither as known knowing nor as the content of such knowing.

29. This judgment is the only self-evident entity of which reflection is aware and the copula in it is not only not known as content but is explicitly known as what known content—including the apparent reflective content 'known knowing'—is not. The known position from which all content is distinguished—as represented by the copula here—is implied in all reflective knowledge, in all judgment like 'A is B' where the 'is' means this over and above a relation that is a content.

30. To sum up. In reflection on a content as known, the content implies knowing and is indefinitely distinct from it in the sense that it *means* this reference to knowing (though it means perfect distinction from knowing), that it does not mean independence of this reference and is not known as what is accidentally known. Reflection demands that it should be so known. The content is known to be only accidentally known i.e., to be only accidentally a content, when it is self-evident. The only self-evident of which we are reflectively aware is a judgment of the form 'to know A is to know B' or what the word 'is' in it stands for, this being meant in all judgments or knowledge on the reflective level. This then is the element in all that is reflectively known that is known as what need not be known, the element that is free from the implicational relation of the content to the knowing of it, the element that reflection demands to be isolated but cannot itself isolate. This is the absolute for knowing that demands to be freed from its immanence in the implicational distinction of content and knowing.

31. So far about knowing. We may now rapidly indicate how the implicative relation of content and consciousness is demanded to be resolved in the case of willing and feeling. What implication of content and consciousness does reflective willing present? The willed content, as has been pointed out, is constituted by willing in the sense that apart from willing it is nothing at all. Yet the constituted content as definite in itself appears as a limitation to the constitutive willing :

willing appears to be necessarily the willing of what is foreign to itself. In the reflective stage the willed content is appreciated as real through the willing but yet as its limitation, not as its self-limitation. 'It is not apparent at this stage that the will limits itself to realise itself, freely commits itself to a being to annul it and become freer. Reflection demands that the limit that is necessarily constituted by willing should be realised as self-limitation in this sense. That is how the implication of content and consciousness is problematically understood to be resolvable in the sphere of willing.

32. To elaborate the problem. The relation of two contents willed at once may be taken to suggest the relation between willed content and willing. Two contents e.g., two acts are said to be willed at once when one of them is a means to the other. Two unrelated acts cannot be said to be willed at once and two acts that are jointly means to a third act cannot be *distinctly* willed in the willing of the third act. A conscious will-relation of two contents must be a relation of prior and posterior, the prior being that through which the other is possible. In the relation of means and end as *willed*, the end is the prior through the willing of which it is possible to will a content *as means*. Now this relation of means and end has to be understood as the relation of willed content to willing. A willed act has to be taken as a means to the willing of it though it is through the willing that the willed act is possible. It is difficult to understand, however, how the willing of an act is the end of the act willed, how in other words willing is realised by the putting forth of the act, how one can be said to act in a particular way in order to act freely.

33. That we objectively act to be subjectively free, that the good will and nothing but the good will is the value for which we will an act—the view, in fact, of Kant—may be called the idealistic view in this connexion. The realistic view here then would be that we act for an objective end and not for the subjective end of being free; and an extreme form of the view may be conceived that we objectively act in order that we may objectively act for evermore. In the case of knowing, we pointed out, the realistic view is *prima facie* more acceptable than the idealistic view. In the case of willing apparently, the idealistic view is acceptable in the first instance. The realistic view amounts to saying that there is no willed act that is good in itself and the view that we objectively act in order that we may objectively act is just its logical consequence and its *reductio ad absurdum*. The idealistic view is consonant with the nature of reflective willing—viz., that the prior is the end, but in the reflective stage it appears to

amount to the barren statement that it is good to will what it is good to will. The demand is to find a vital meaning for the statement, to understand how willing is a willing of itself.

34. Reflection indicates how it is to be understood. There is the difference between 'I will this act' and 'I will this act that I ought to will', when the former is not contrasted with the latter, the will-consciousness is expressible as an imperative 'let this act be done'. When, however, it is contrasted, it is expressed as mere information 'I am doing it' while the latter is properly expressed as an imperative 'let this be done' which implies 'I may not do it'. In contrast with it, the former appears as a statement of fact though by itself it appears as an imperative. The implication is that willing as represented by the former is itself a being that is to be superseded by willing as represented by the latter, that what is taken as free is implicitly not free, that therefore we will an act in order to get rid of the being of the act, get rid of the self-complacent will to continue in this being—what may be called the will to indolence. Reflection indicates the way but cannot understand willing or freedom at its limit.

35. In reflective feeling there is the definite consciousness of an indefinite distinction of the content felt and the feeling of it. The content felt is not definite in itself like the known or willed content and is understood in reference to this indefinite distinction definitely appearing to reflection *as though* it were a unity. We say 'as though', because the unity does not appear as a definite self-subsistent unity from which its constituents are distinguishable. The implication of content and consciousness would be resolved in the sphere of feeling, if a unity of this kind could be apprehended. In the feeling of two contents together, we can reflectively apprehend a self-subsistent unity. Reflection accordingly demands such a unity of felt content and feeling but cannot itself understand it.

36. To explain. In the apprehension of an object having spatial parts as beautiful, both the whole and the parts are felt but differently. The whole as a known content is distinct in itself and even if it be conceivably distinguished from the parts, the parts *as in the whole* cannot be distinguished from the whole and, therefore, can only be imperfectly distinguished from one another. The parts are, however, distinguished in the feeling way from the whole, being, in fact, felt as not felt in the way the whole is felt. The whole is felt to be beautiful but the parts are felt to be indifferent, felt to be 'only known', such feeling of their mere knownness being necessary for the appreciation of the beauty of the whole. To feel two contents at once then is to

feel their unity and to feel them otherwise than the unity. We try to understand the relation of the felt content and the feeling of it on this analogy. They appear imperfectly distinct and unity means to reflection an imperfect distinction of the constituents. But the unity does not appear to reflection self-subsistent in the sense of the constituents being distinguishable from it. Such a self-subsistent unity is, however, demanded.

37. As in the case of knowing and willing, so here one may imagine an alternation of realistic and idealistic or objectivistic and subjectivistic views. The unity of felt content and feeling may be understood as content that is indefinitely other than consciousness or as consciousness that is indefinitely other than the content. Value may be regarded as a kind of object though not as completely distinct from the consciousness of it as the known object or it may be taken to be an impersonalised feeling as somehow expressed in the object and thus objectified symbolically but not as a known character. Neither view appears to have any advantage over the other. Does reflection, however, indicate how consciously the alternation may be stopped and the unity come to be definite in itself?

38. Taking value, the unity of felt content and feeling, realistically as objective, we are reflectively aware of the value as referred to the known object that is distinguishable from it. We feel the object as known to be not the value, to be neutral, felt otherwise than the value. This is *feeling* the distinction of the object from the value of it and it is thus that the value tends to appear distinct in itself by having the object distinguished from it. So also if we take the value as an impersonalised feeling rather than as an objective character, in understanding it as expressed in the object we may feel the knowing of the object as somehow *inside* the impersonal feeling, involved in it without being confused with it, much as the image in a mirror shows the mirror to be unaffected by it. Thus we may be said to be aware of the felt object as well as of the individual feeling as distinct from their unity.

39. So far the relation of felt content and feeling appears to be similar to the relation of two contents of the same feeling. In both there seems to be a unity from which its constituents are felt to be distinct. There is, however, discrepancy in an important respect. In appreciating a beautiful object where we feel the object as a whole as well as the parts, the parts that appear neutral are *together* felt to be distinct from the whole that appears beautiful. The beautiful object as beautiful thus appears in *feeling* as a whole isolated not only from

amount to the barren statement that it is good to will what it is good to will. The demand is to find a vital meaning for the statement, to understand how willing is a willing of itself.

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act to be distinct from willing and yet to be nothing apart from it, or—to put it differently—for the act not to *be* and yet to be real as willing is to conceive the negation of an emergent distinct or the emergent distinction of a negation. To take the felt value also as a being from which known being is distinct is to be definitely conscious of an indefinite, to entertain without disbelief an *appearance* or an indifference of being and non-being. All the three—unrelatedness, negation of the emergent or the emergence of negation, and the indifference of being and non-being—imply unmeaning modes of negation to reflection; and yet the specifiable indefiniteness in the content of reflection demands to be defined precisely through such modes of negation. To admit the absolute in any form is to admit a negation that is unintelligible to the logic of the understanding.

42. The absolute may be generally defined from the standpoint of reflection as what is free from the implicational dualism of content and consciousness. There are three ways in which this freedom can be understood. The content may be freed from its reference to consciousness i.e., from its contenthood. Or consciousness may be freed from its reference to content, in which case it ceases to be conscious of anything beyond itself. Or the implicational relation itself may be freed from its terms as a definite self-subsistent unity. The known that is free from its contenthood is known as the content that need not be content, is the self-evident *is*, just what we call *truth*—the absolute for knowing. Consciousness that is free from its content (in the sense that it solely constitutes its content, makes the content a content, creates its distinction from itself) is *freedom* of the will—the absolute for willing. The implicational relation of content and consciousness that is freed from their distinction as a unity is *value* in itself—the absolute for feeling.

43. Truth, freedom and value then are absolutes for knowing, willing and feeling. It is impossible to avoid this triple formulation of the absolute though the notion that there are three absolutes would be just as illegitimate as the notion of there being only one absolute. The absolute is not a *known content*, about which alone the question 'one or many' has meaning. Truth is self-evident and is as such known but is no content; of value as the self-subsistent unity of content and consciousness, we cannot say either that it is not known or that it is like truth self-evident and, therefore, is no content; and there is no question even of knowing freedom, the belief in freedom being, as Kant pointed out, no intuition but willing itself. It is meaningless therefore to cognitively assert that there are three absolutes or one

absolute. The absolute has, however, to be formulated in this triple way. Each is absolute but what are here understood as *three* are only their verbal symbols, they themselves being understood together but not *as together*.

44. For freedom, an alternative name would be reality. The real is understood either as will or what is given to will. Will means free will or freedom which though not theoretically known is not disbelieved, the belief in willing being willing itself. The expression of willing is always an imperative 'let this be done', which means no known being and, if anything, means 'let this known situation here be negated, *used* as means, melted into the future'. Willing in this sense is the negation of being and is yet real, its reality consisting in the supersession of being. This comes out more explicitly in the consciousness of the imperative as the moral *ought*. *Ought* is real as the explicit rejection of the *is* or the actual that is known, explicit annulment of the known being of the presupposed 'natural willing'. Known being may be real but reality is understood in its purity as the conative rejection of known being; or more accurately, since everything has to be understood here in conative terms, as the freedom to withdraw or abstain from 'natural willing'. Natural willing, called 'natural' in reference to the *ought*, is in itself an imperative: the person who wills says to himself 'let this be done' and not 'I am doing it'. So any willing and specially the willing to abstain from willing is unknowable freedom or reality. What is given to the will is also said to be real because either it is consumed by the will as a means to itself as end or if it cannot be so consumed, it has to be taken as an opposed will. Freedom or reality may accordingly be taken as synonymous.

45. Freedom or reality then is not known or, in other words, it is meaningless to call it truth. The true is the self-evident, that of which we are conscious as known but not as known content. Freedom or willing is not known at all or if we are aware of knowing it, we are aware of its knownness as illusory. We are only aware in one grade of willing that a presupposed willing of another grade—natural willing, as we have called it—had an illusory being or appeared to be known. What is known, however, may be either the self-evident in its purity or some relation of *given* contents—meaning contents given *to the will*—with the form of self-evidence. Every judgment, as has been pointed out, involves a self-evident judgment of the form 'to know A is to know B'. The self-evident in its purity is eternal truth and not reality: but a relation of given contents is not only said to be true but cannot also be said to be not real.

46. The real then is not true but the true may be real. So speaking of truth and value, we may say that truth is not value but value is not untrue. Just as the predicates true and false do not apply at all to freedom or reality, so the predicates valuable or worthless do not apply to truth. Truth is not felt or if it is felt, it is felt as unfelt i.e., as no value. But the predicate false applies to value in so far as the falsity of a felt value is denied though its truth cannot therefore be asserted. A value like beauty is evident but not self-evident; it appears as a content to an appreciative consciousness and appears without being disbelieved as an illusion but not as what need not have reference to the consciousness. The self-evident is the true and the evident is true if it implies self-evidence and till the self-evidence becomes explicit, it cannot be said to be false.

47. Again in respect of reality and value it may be said that while the predicates real and unreal do not apply to value, reality or freedom cannot be said not to be a value. Value is a felt being and is neither given to willing nor is itself willed into existence though it may appear as the fulfilment of willing. It is in this respect similar to truth which may shine out in fulfilment of willing in the form of attention but is not brought into existence through its causality. Reality or freedom may, however, be felt and an act that is claimed to be willed is at least not morally indifferent if it is felt to have been genuinely willed. An act, in fact, that is felt to be morally indifferent is eo ipso felt to have been not free, not willing at all, the sole proof of freedom being in the retrospective moral valuation. To say that an act is free is to take it as not valueless though it may be going too far to assert that freedom is a value. Value is a felt *being* while freedom or willing is felt as the real *negation* of a known being and can at best be the felt being of a negation (of known being).

48. Thus it appears to be meaningless to speak of truth as a value, of value as real or of reality as true while we can significantly speak of value as not false, of reality as not valueless and of truth as not unreal, although we cannot positively assert value to be truth, reality to be value and truth to be reality. Each of them is absolute and they cannot be spoken of as one or many. In one direction their identity and difference are alike meaningless and in another direction their identity is intelligible though not assertable. Truth is unrelated to value, value to reality and reality to truth while value may be truth, reality value and truth reality. The absolute may be regarded in this sense as an *alternation* of truth, value and reality.

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

ANALYSIS

(1-2) The doctrine of truth and error stands on a different level of self-consciousness from that occupied by Logic or Epistemology. The level is indicated by the contrast between falsity which is the content of rejection and negation which is the content of disbelief. Disbelief is a kind of knowledge and negation is said to be *known* in the sense that truth may be asserted of it. But rejection is not knowledge and falsity cannot be said to be known, though it is something of which we have some kind of awareness. The consciously unknown or the unknowable, the false, the abstractly possible, the impossible or the unnameable and what is only willed or felt—these are only ‘half-thoughts’ and not accomplished meanings. These should be the subject-matter of a new philosophical discipline and not of Logic or Epistemology which is concerned with complete thoughts or accomplished meanings. The doctrine of truth and error would really belong to this new discipline. (3) Epistemology as the study of the knowing function is based on a kind of introspection which is neither logical mediation nor mere internal perception. It is a self-evident transition in self-consciousness, and is exemplified by Kant’s transcendental method. (4) Since the time of Kant there have been rival epistemologies each with its assurance of finality. It is only a doctrine of truth and error that can possibly adjudicate between them. This doctrine must, therefore, be based on a still deeper assurance of finality. And the possible falsehood of a theory based on epistemological introspection suggests that the concept of falsity belongs neither to Logic nor to Epistemology as they are commonly understood. (5-7) Kant gives a hint of a transcendental Psychology behind the general theory of knowledge. The systematic doctrine of truth and error would be the same as or a part of transcendental Psychology and it must itself be a body of knowledge.

(8) Knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other. Knowledge is what alone is true and truth is what alone is known. It is only metaphorically that we speak of the truth of a feeling or willing. (9) An object may be known without being known explicitly to be true. But knowing is never known except as implied in the assertion of the truth about its content. This, however, may be disputed and a perception may be held to be known in memory without any question arising as to the truth of the memory.

(10) There are reasons, however, to hold that the past perception is not known by any method by which an object is known. (11) There is occasion to know a past cognition only if its content is challenged or confirmed. (12) Neither is there any perception of knowing at the time of knowing. In perception, a content is never distinguished from it, so that it is not possible to know whether they are synchronous or not. The question, therefore, about the temporal relation of cognition and its perception does not arise at all.

(13) Cognition is not thus known by psychological introspection conceived either as perception or as memory. It is known by epistemological introspection such as is involved in the explicit awareness of truth. (14-15) Though there is this kind of introspective knowledge of knowing, there is no such knowledge of feeling or willing. There may, however, be a belief in the latter along with and implied in the knowledge of knowing. (16-18) Three consequences follow from the above: (a) there is no such thing as false knowledge; (b) there is no knowledge of objects as merely distinct but not otherwise related to one another: that is to say, the known content must be explicitly coherent and not merely co-existent with other known contents; (c) interpretations of knowing in terms of non-cognitive modes are unacceptable.

(19-22) The view that truth is predicated of the subsistent 'proposition' and that it is a relation between knowledge and its object cannot be accepted. The so-called 'proposition' or the merely meant is an illegitimate abstraction and no predicate may be asserted of it. It is, again, a misleading use of the term 'relation' to speak of the knowledge of an object as in relation or as the relation to the object. The reference of knowing to its object is no relation at all. For, there cannot be any relation without mutual distinction. And in the present case, though knowing is known as distinct from its object, the object is not known as distinct from knowing. The so-called distinction of the object from knowing is only unrelatedness. (23) Though this one-sided distinction is not, properly speaking, a relation, yet it has to be necessarily symbolised as a relation. (24) To knowledge, the object is only evident and not related to it though symbolised as such. To willing and feeling, however, this symbolism is real and unrelatedness is a believed quasi-relation.

(25) It has been said before that knowing is known only when confirmed by other cognitions and as so confirmed. But this entails the paradox that the confirming relation constitutes knowing and yet falls beyond it. (26) Confirmation is not a character either of the

cognition or of its object. It is not felt as a character of the complete cognition that is confirmed. The object, again, is unrelated to the object of the confirming cognition. (27) The confirmation of which we are aware in the awareness of a cognition implies a conscious distinction of it from the confirming cognition but not the distinction of the latter from the former. Though it is not a known relation, it has to be symbolised as a relation. And what is symbolised is a metapsychical or spiritual process. (28) There is symbolising in another direction. Confirmation in the epistemic sphere is a spiritual overtone of cognition as a psychic fact. It is itself a metaphor for a mode of cognitive realisation.

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

I. PLACE OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRUTH AND ERROR

1. The present-day doctrine of truth and error may be regarded as a part of Logic or Epistemology but it is to be recognised as standing on a level of self-consciousness different from that on which these subjects, as ordinarily conceived, appear to stand. The level is indicated by the contrast between the concept of falsity and the concept of negation. There are two grades of negation from both of which falsity has to be distinguished. When we disbelieve a content, we may only exclude it from a particular context while believing it to exist in another context. Such exclusion may be regarded as negation of the first grade. In the second grade, there is exclusion from a context without inclusion in another, disbelief without a positive complementary belief. It is what is sometimes called pure negation, the content negated being only known to be non-existent. Negation in both the grades is said to be known in the sense that truth may be asserted of it. Disbelief here amounts to a kind of knowledge which, however, is not the case when we reject a content as false. (The false is not simply the non-existent but the non-existent *as appearing existent*, to reject which is not logically to deny). We cannot say that we know the falsity, for then falsity would be regarded as a truth. We should only say that we are aware of the falsity: we only disbelieve the content without knowing its non-existence. The non-existence of the possible, as in the second grade of negation, is a tautology but the non-existence of the false is meaningless.

2. Objective Logic recognises only the first grade of negation. It takes note of existents only, disbelieving them only in the sense of believing them as outside or distinct from the context in question and knows nothing of pure non-existence, far less of falsity. Pure non-existence is admissible as a known content only in epistemology and in such logic as is undistinguished from it. The believed and the disbelieved are taken here as two classes of known content and what is common to them is the *possible* which is a *quasi-objective* or 'sub-sistent' content from the epistemic stand-point. But epistemology confines or should confine itself to the known, the possible being known in the disbelief in its existence as a complete meaning. It should have nothing to do with what is only a problem in meaning

as distinct from an accomplished meaning, with the consciously unknown or the unknowable, and with the false. We have no knowledge of the absence of knownness ; we speak of it and are aware of it variously in respect of the abstractly possible, of the impossible or the unnameable, or of what is only willed or felt but such awareness is not knowledge. Half-thoughts like these should find place in a new philosophical subject though they are as a matter of fact admitted in epistemology or logic. The doctrine of truth and error would really belong to this subject.

3. Epistemology is founded on a species of introspection different from what is called psychological introspection. The latter, if it knows knowing at all, knows it as indistinguishable in quality from mere believing. A qualitative distinction between knowing and believing is, however, known, being just what is called the logical character which is apprehended by a new quality of introspection. It is a confusion to speak of the function of knowing or the logical character being known by a logical procedure again. Kantian criticism is sometimes distinguished as logical from the criticism of Locke which is taken to be psychological. But the particular logical method by which Kant obtained his transcendental constants has never been identified or named in logic. There is, indeed, a quasi-logical transition from the logical forms to the apriori functions but it is not transition from one objective content to another as one would expect in logic. The transcendental method is a self-evident transition, a process in self-consciousness and not in consciousness and, as such, should be taken as a kind of introspection which is neither logical mediation nor mere internal perception. To be necessarily implied or presupposed by the logical content is no logical relation at all nor is it a name for the mere psychological mode of knowing the content.

4. Epistemological introspection knows only this presupposition, the functional character that distinguishes the known content from the merely believed content. It claims a special quality of certitude, deeper than that claimed by mere objective or logical cognition, cognition through what Kant would call the uncritical employment of reason. Kant, in fact, hoped that critical reflection, as he understood it, would establish a final science of knowledge above the reach of philosophical controversy. The hope has not been realised and rival epistemologies have been put forward since his time, each claiming the same degree of certainty as that set up by him. The conflict of these assured theories of knowledge has brought to the fore

the importance of a doctrine of truth and error competent to adjudicate between them and, therefore, based on a still deeper assurance of finality. The possible falsity of a theory based on epistemological introspection suggests the unique character of the general concept of falsity which, as we have indicated, belongs neither to logic nor to epistemology, as these subjects are ordinarily conceived.

5. The assurance of critical reflection does not in itself constitute the subjective criterion for distinguishing truth from error and cannot be the level of self-consciousness from which one can sit in judgment on an epistemology. A criticism of epistemology is demanded to-day, of the very subject that emerged as the criticism of the logical or dogmatic procedure of reason. The doctrine of truth and error, if it could be systematised according to a principle, would furnish such a criticism of criticism. The two degrees of criticism are not distinguished and there is so far no principle on which we may decide between rival epistemologies. In the Kantian critiques, there is the hint of a transcendental Psychology behind the general theory of knowledge, with an occasional recognition of the necessity of distinguishing between them. Kant speaks, for example, of error being due to the 'subjective use' of reason as distinct from its intrinsically logical function and of certain principles being real to reason as employed in an extra-theoretic 'interest'. His theory of knowledge is properly concerned with the general logical function which is common to true knowing and error. His references to reason as a subjective faculty capable of perverse or extralogical use are accordingly to be looked upon as mere obiter dicta within his epistemology and as really belonging to transcendental Psychology which was always assumed but never sufficiently distinguished by him.

6. The systematic doctrine of truth and error would be the same as or a part of this transcendental Psychology. To empirical psychology, the logical function going astray and yielding a false *content* conveys no meaning at all. Logic can recognise error only as a blind fact and epistemology should regard it as a miracle: the question of explaining its possibility does not arise at all in these subjects. Yet a theory of truth and error is ordinarily claimed to be established by a conscious or self-conscious logical method and there is no recognition so far of any mystery of cognitive level about it. One tendency, however, is noticeable in theories thus established—viz., to slur over the absolute distinction that is recognised in commonsense between truth and error. The suggestion is put forward in different forms that error

is a partial truth, truth within a limited context; and it is sometimes proposed in a manner to drop the conception of truth itself, a content being taken to be true only in the sense that it is known or 'asserted'. Such flagrant opposition to commonsense requires to be justified by something more than the consideration that it is conceivable and logically irrefutable. It is necessary to show on the one hand that a doctrine of this kind is itself knowledge and not a mere hypothesis and on the other that a theory admitting the absolute distinction of truth and error cannot be maintained.

7. Here we have the hint of a principle or criterion for deciding between rival theories of knowledge. *An epistemology must itself be a body of knowledge*; there is no room for a hypothesis or a mere conceivability in this region where finality is claimed for every assertion. With regard, for example, to a voluntarist theory of knowledge, the preliminary question must be asked in what sense, if at all, willing is *known*, if psychological introspection yields *knowledge* of it, and whether some spiritual consciousness of the practical kind amounts to the knowledge of the impossibility of pure knowing. There is the connected negative demand that *theoretic* reasons have to be adduced for the rejection of a theory that keeps within the commonsense distinction of truth and error. Such a theory, in fact, has a prior claim to consideration, even if these theories can interpret knowing all the way without stumbling. The interpretation of the cognitive by the non-cognitive—by willing or feeling or any superior spiritual process—is *prima facie* suspect and can be accepted only if a purely cognitive interpretation is shown to be impossible.

II. MUTUAL IMPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

8. Two propositions may be stated about knowledge—that knowing is known only as implied in the explicit awareness of truth and that truth is asserted only of a content that is known. Knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other, the former as what alone is true and the latter as what alone is known. It is only metaphorically that we speak of the truth of a feeling or willing; and values in the non-cognitive sphere are what we only believe but do not know. We may examine in this connexion two positions that appear to be fundamentally opposed to our view, viz., that knowing is known by psychological introspection and that truth is a relation, not to a known, but to a suggested possible content, an idea or mere meaning.

(i) KNOWING IS NOT KNOWN BY PSYCHOLOGICAL INTROSPECTION

9. We may know an object without knowing it explicitly to be true but do we ever know the psychic fact of knowing except as implied in the assertion of truth about its content? It may be contended that knowing is known by memory or internal perception, like any other psychic fact. The past perception of an object, for example, may be taken to be remembered in the remembering of the object without any conscious reference to the truth of it. When we remember an objective event, we do not at once reproduce every detail of it and need not know that it was perceived. But just as omitted objective details are gradually reinstated, so also, it may be said, does the subjective fact of perception come to be known in the course of the mere fulfilment of the memory without any question arising as to the truth of the memory. Is such a contention tenable?

10. There is in the first place the obvious difficulty that the past perception was not perceived in the past and so cannot be said to be now remembered, unless we admit either that all perception is implicitly perception of perception or that we can remember without having perceived. Nor can the past perception be said to be now internally or introspectively perceived, for the object of perception is ordinarily understood to be synchronous with the perception. There cannot be also any question of inferring the past perception from the remembered object of it, for that presupposes, what we never had previously, knowledge of other objects and their cognition as together. To know the cognition of object is not to know the cognition and the object to be together.

11. The past perception is, indeed, known but it is not known by memory, perception or inference,—by any method, in fact, by which an object is known. There is occasion to know the past psychic fact if the object or content of it is challenged or confirmed. If any grounds now present themselves for doubting the reality of the past objective event, the doubt is laid by the assurance that we actually perceived it. Or, again, if any facts or inferences now yield an explicit confirmation of the reality of the event, the sense of confirmation implies the awareness of the past perception of the event. We cannot imagine any other occasion for such awareness. Not that we can say why the awareness of the past cognition emerges. We know only that this awareness is at the same time awareness of the confirmation or the rejected doubt that is involved in the explicit assertion of the objective content as true. Properly speaking, the knowledge of cognition does not emerge

in time as the cognition itself emerges and so does not demand explanation. We start with this knowledge which is the same as the knowledge of the truth of the objective content. The time-position of the content determines, not the time position but only a differential quality of its cognition,—a quality, however, which does not appear to affect the knowledge of the cognition at all.

12. There is apparently then no memory of a cognition in the mere interest in fact, as distinct from interest in the truth of the fact. Is there an introspective perception of knowing at the time of the knowing? The question is really illegitimate; for, as just shown, there is no possibility of knowing the synchronousness of a content and the perception of it. A content and its perception are never known independently to be taken as together or successive: the content is never distinguished from its perception, though the perception distinguishes, manifests or reveals the content. If this holds good when the content is objective, it holds good with greater reason when the content is cognition itself. The cognition as we have said has no time-position but only a quality due to the position of its objective content; and the knowledge of the cognition has not even this quality, so that there is no question at all of the cognition and the knowledge of it being temporarily related. We conclude then that neither a past nor a present cognition can be said to be known as such for the purposes of psychology.

13. Cognition is, indeed, known but not by the so-called psychological introspection, conceived either as perception or memory. It is known by what we have called epistemological introspection such as is involved in the explicit awareness of truth. All that psychology claims to know about cognition, it gets either through this unconfessed epistemological reflection or through a blend of imagination and verbal interpretation which yields only the appearance of knowledge. This blend is what passes by the name of psychological introspection which can never know a psychic process as a fact as distinct from fancy or mere meaning. Belief in psychic reality emerges only as the implication of belief in a spiritual value like truth or beauty or obligatoriness.

14. The object of cognition is distinguished by the cognition though it is not known as distinct from it. In the awareness of the cognition, the cognition is distinguished from its object which then as not appearing distinct from it becomes indefinite. In the awareness of a feeling or willing, however, the psychic fact is not distinguished from the object, the object being only distinguished from it. The psychic fact and its object are in neither case presented as mutually dis-

tinct : the cognitive fact is only distinguished and the non-cognitive fact is only distinguished from. This is apparent from the nature of the value in apprehension of which the awareness of the psychic fact is implied. Truth does not appear as a *character* of the object while beauty or sacredness appears as such. Hence in the awareness of truth, the object is indefinite and its cognition definite while the consciousness of beauty etc., implies the reverse—viz., the object as definite and the corresponding psychic fact as indefinite. The awareness of the fact of cognition accordingly itself amounts to a cognition, while that of the non-cognitive psychic fact is nothing more than a belief. There is no introspective belief in the reality of the mental except as the implication of belief in value, and there is introspective knowledge, as distinct from belief, of knowing only, not of feeling or willing.

15. There may, however, be a belief in willing or feeling along with and implied in the knowledge of knowing. In the knowledge of knowing, the object of the knowing is cognitively indefinite but that does not prevent it from being definitely real to a non-cognitive interest. Such indefiniteness of the object does not prejudice the completeness of the cognition of it, though the feeling or willing that it implies points to a new conception about cognition—viz., the necessity of subjectively realising it. The non-cognitive value of the object known—e.g., its beauty or sacredness—demands to be realised as the truth-value (if that can be called value at all) of the cognition, though the truth which has already presented itself does not suffer because it is not yet realised. Again, just as there is the demand to realise other values as truth, so there may be demand in the non-cognitive interest to realise truth as other value, realise it, as we say, in life. Thus something can be done through feeling or willing to secure the subjective maturation of knowing, as these too may be matured by a discipline of knowing.

16. We have so far tried to establish that psychological introspection is not knowledge of psychic fact, that psychic facthood emerges only as the implication of belief in value, and that knowing alone among psychic facts, as implied in the belief in truth, can be said to be known. Certain consequences follow. There is, in the first place, no such thing as false knowledge. If knowing could be known as an indifferent psychic fact, both truth and falsity would be predicable of it. But if knowing is known only as the implicate of the awareness of truth, to know an object is to know it as in some sense implicitly true. Truth cannot be taken simply as additional confirmation of what already is known indifferently, though the explicit knowledge of truth itself testifies to a prior knowing of the object without this conscious asser-

tion of truth. Not that the truth of this mere object-knowledge can be said to be now *recognised*: the loose use of the term 'recognition' is responsible for a good deal of epistemological superstition. Knowledge is implicit knowledge of truth only in the sense that the explicit knowledge of truth is the knowledge of a knowing that was not known. It does not mean that truth as a character or content of the knowing was somehow hidden in it. We can only say that the knowing, when it was not known, could not be false, as then it would be no knowing at all. An object to be known need not be known explicitly to be true; but if it now appears to be not true, it is never said to have been known but taken at best to have been believed.

17. Another consequence of the view that knowing is only know in the knowledge of truth is that there is no knowledge of objects as merely distinct but not otherwise related to one another. To be known, an object must not only be distinct but consciously confirmed by the contents of other cognitions. The known content must be explicitly coherent and not merely co-existent with other known contents. The coherence emerges not only within the content of a particular cognition but also between it and the contents of cognitions that fall beyond it. The content as a whole of a given cognition, without losing completeness or self-sufficiency, is felt to be confirmed by the contents of other cognitions that retain their distinction from it and do not get fused. The coherent plurality within the content may be taken as representing a fusion of cognitions, although the coherence does not appear as conscious confirmation but not, therefore, also as a mere relation of co-existent elements in a whole.

18. A third consequence of our view about the knowing of knowing is that interpretations of knowing in terms of feeling or willing are excluded as not themselves amounting to knowledge. If the awareness of willing, for example, is not knowledge but at best a belief, a voluntarist interpretation of knowledge has to be regarded, not as a scientific or factual theory, but as a prescription to imagine or believe the fact of knowing in a particular way for some practical end or purpose. It is a contradiction, in fact, to claim a voluntarist epistemology to be true, though it may be practically useful or even obligatory as an imperative to the imagination. If cognition is only a means to activity, the knowledge that it is so cannot again be a means to further activity without leading to an infinite regress. The awareness that a belief works and is, therefore, cognition does not itself appear again as an *efficient* belief.

(ii) TRUTH IS NOT RELATION TO A MERE MEANING

19. We have examined the proposition that knowing is only known as the implication of the awareness of truth. There is next the converse proposition that truth is asserted only of knowing. The affirmation of truth in respect of a feeling or willing is, as we have said, only a rhetorical expression of its non-cognitive value. Within knowing, however, truth is sometimes taken to be asserted, not of the known content, but of the merely suggested content, of what has been proposed to be called 'proposition' as distinct from judgment. We have said that the awareness of the truth of a content is knowledge of the content as *known*, not merely suggested. The content is known as known for the first time in such awareness; and to say that it is true is to say that it is known as known. In the view just suggested, however, the assertion of the truth of a content means only the assertion that it is known, not that it is known to be or to have been known. The subject of the assertion 'it is known' is taken to stand only for a meant or 'subsistent' content as distinct from a known or existent content. The predicate *known*—or what is its equivalent, *true*—is understood to be external to it, to be however, not *in relation* to it, but the relation itself, being thus at once term and relation, constituting what is described as a 'flavour' of the content.

20. Our objection to such a view is two-fold. On the one hand the merely meant or subsistent content—the *possible*, as it may be called—is an illegitimate abstraction of which no predicate may be asserted, and on the other, the knowledge or assertion of a content cannot be understood as a relation, far less as *in relation* to it. The first objection comes out definitely if we consider an existential judgment of the negative form 'A is not'. As we have already indicated, the disbelief in A here may be knowledge but need not imply belief in A as having being in some context. Properly speaking, therefore, such knowledge cannot be called a judgment at all. A is here known as the possible only through the apparent predicate *non-existence*, it being a mere tautology to say that the possible is not actual. The possible has no positive being except as implied by verbal fixation. 'A is not existent' is only an illegitimate extension of the form of a negative judgment like 'A is not B' which implies the existence of A. It should accordingly be recognised as a mere trickery of language: there is no belief in A here, the disbelief being the whole of the knowledge.

21. Our second objection is that it is a misleading use of the word 'relation' to speak of the knowledge or assertion of an object

as in relation or as the relation to the object. The realist, we hold, is right when he takes knowledge as external to or distinct from the object: knownness cannot be understood as an attribute or character of the object. When we are aware of the knowledge of an object, we distinguish the knowledge from the object though the distinguishing does not amount to the knowledge of a factual distinction. It appears to be wholly wrong, however, to speak of the object as distinct from the knowing of it. We are not aware of the distinction from knowing as an objective fact. Nor is the knowing of the object the *distinguishing* of the object *from itself*. The object known is simply distinguished: it is not related at all to its knowing in the way of identity or distinction. If the act of knowing or distinguishing be knowledge of the distinction of the object from itself, that *itself* would be a term known as distinct from itself and so on indefinitely. We have, therefore, to recognise that the reference of knowing to its object is no distinction or relation at all, that though we are aware of the knowing of the object as distinct from the object, the so-called distinction of the object from knowing is only unrelatedness of which we are aware but not cognitively.

22. To explain the concept of unrelatedness. When two contents are known together, they need not be known *as* together. They may not only be known as unrelated in space, time or nature: they may not even be known as barely distinct from one another. To know *two* contents, it is only necessary to know that one is distinct from the other but not that the other is distinct from it. When two contents A and B are thus known, A being distinct from B, B is known, not as distinct from nor therefore identical with A, but as unrelated to A. In fact, even when we know them as mutually distinct, the two distinctions are not known as making up one distinction. They alternate and the alternation appears, not as distinction between A and B, but as their unity or whole in space, time or nature. They are then not only known together but also *as* together, though the distinction of A from B and that of B from A do not cease to be themselves distinct. Hence it follows that to know one content as distinct from another is *in no case* to know the other as distinct from it but only to know it as *unrelated*, though the two distinctions may sometimes be known together. It is thus intelligible how while knowing is known as distinct from its object, the object is known, not as distinct from, but as unrelated to the knowing.

23. When, therefore, in the view under discussion it is held that knowledge is the relation to the object, what is really meant is that

knowledge is distinct from its object but not reversely. Our contention is that such onesided distinction is not relation at all. There is no relation without *mutual* distinction which implies some form of objective togetherness. Knowing and its object are not objectively together and, therefore, even the known distinction of knowing from its object, which we admit, is not relation. Yet such onesided distinction has to be necessarily symbolised as a relation. We have to speak of two things—knowing and object, though we know they are not objectively two, not known as two. The awareness of the distinction as onesided is the awareness of the evidentness, manifestation or *prakāśa* of the object, which is no relation but is only symbolised by it. The evidentness of the known content is a category utterly distinct from relation, to recognise which is to appreciate the differential character of knowing.

24. We have said that the object is known, not as distinct from or identical with its knowing, but as unrelated to it. Properly, however, we should say that it is known simply as evident and that it is *not* known as related to knowing. There is no knowledge of the circumstance of unrelatedness but only an extra-cognitive awareness of it. As already pointed out, it is only in the awareness of willing or feeling, as distinct from that of knowing, that the object referred to is distinguished from the psychic fact. This distinguishing is not the knowledge of distinction or relation but only a direction or phase of willing or feeling. The object is not known as related to knowing but is willed as an end to be realised or felt as a value that is being realised. There is, therefore, no conflict between the deliverances of cognitive and non-cognitive consciousness; what we are *not* aware of cognitively we are aware of *non-cognitively*. The distinction between these deliverances is sometimes overlooked; and we have realistic and idealistic theories of knowledge asserting the object to be distinct from or identical with the knowing of it. The former take the willed distinction and the latter the felt identity-in-difference as though it were the known distinction of the object from or the known identity of the object with the knowing of it. To knowledge, the object is only evident and not related to it though symbolised as such. To willing or feeling this symbolism is real and unrelatedness is a believed quasi-relation which is by confusion taken to be a known relation.

III. NATURE OF LOGICAL CONFIRMATION

25. Truth, we have said, is asserted of the known content. The assertion amounts to saying that the content is known as known,

Knownness or truth is external to it in the sense that knowing is distinguished from its object. Knownness is no character of the object, being but the fact of knowing, the knowing that reveals the object as evident, as distinct but not distinct from itself. This knowing is also known, known only when confirmed by other cognitions and as so confirmed. The confirmation is not known as a relation within the content of the knowing, for then there would be no break between the content of one knowing and that of another. We have as a matter of fact many cognitions and a cognition does not, consciously at any rate, refer to the entire universe. The elimination of the distinction between cognitions or—what is the same thing—the conscious presentation of truth as single may be a spiritual ideal but we have no right to assume it in the characterisation of an actual cognition. Since a cognition, however, is not known except when confirmed, there emerges the paradox of the confirming relation constituting it and yet falling beyond it. A cognition, as we have seen, must be complete but it is never known except as confirmed by other cognitions.

26. Not that confirmation is known as a character of the cognition, or of its object. The object is unrelated to the object of the confirming cognition and the so-called systemic relation is only an imaginary objectification of the subjective circumstance of confirmation. Nor is the subjective circumstance felt as a character of the complete cognition that is confirmed. There are cases, indeed, where the confirming cognitions get telescoped into the confirmed cognition; but there the latter gives place to a new cognition of which the content is a synthesis of the contents of previous cognitions and presents the confirming relation as some immediate relation of coherence like that between the substantive and the adjective. The cognition, however, that is said to be confirmed by others without prejudice to its completeness does not get modified in the confirmation; it only gets to be known through it. There may be a strengthening of belief but that is only a psychological circumstance. Logically then, confirmation is not a known character either of the cognition or of the object of it.

27. The confirmation of which we are aware in the awareness of a cognition implies a conscious distinction of it from the confirming cognitions but not the distinction of the latter from the former. It is accordingly no known relation of the cognitions, though as the one-sided distinction is there, it has to be symbolised as a relation. What is symbolised here is a metapsychic or spiritual process which though not itself a cognition is not indifferent to cognition. The given cognition is known only in the assertion of truth in respect of it, truth that

is manifested in conscious confirmation symbolised as a relation. It is this pseudo-relation that has been elaborated into the objective symbolism of a system of relations, the system that is said to constitute the known object and which may be regarded as a shadow of truth, an imaginary projection of the knowing of knowing or self-consciousness. It is important to recognise that system is but a symbolism.

28. There is symbolising in another direction. Confirmation in the subjective or epistemic sphere is no psychic character or relation but a non-cognitive or spiritual overtone of cognition as a psychic fact. It is itself a metaphor or symbolism : the strengthening or maturation of knowledge is but a figure of speech for a mode of cognitive realisation. The process may be otherwise symbolised as the shining out of thought, with the attenuation of error, as a mirror that catches the reflection of truth. Truth cannot be characterised; it has only to be symbolised by the evident content of a cognition, appearing within its magic interior. The interior or reference of a cognition is the conscious gap or discontinuity between the cognition and its object, the sphere of what may be called problematic thought—comprising incomplete but completing meanings, the consciously unknown, the contradictory, and this circumstances of confirmation—all centering round the evident content that is known. Truth is known as this evident content but not reversely : the particular known content is not known as the truth but is only demanded to be so known, by the process of confirmation and the consequent or independent process of the dissipation of error inherent in it.

FACT AND THOUGHT OF FACT

ANALYSIS

(1-2) 'Fact' means that which is believed. It may be the existent, or the non-existence of a possible existent, or, again, that which is neither existent nor non-existent e.g., the moral 'ought' or freedom. (3) The possible existent or that about which there can be an *actual* question of existence is a fact that is said to be 'thought'. That which does not imply the question of existence cannot properly be said to be 'thought'. (4-5) This may be disputed and the 'subsistent' may be cited as an instance of a thought-content which does not necessarily involve the question of existence. The contention, however, is inadmissible. The 'subsistent' is, no doubt, a meaning or thought-content, but there appears to be no escape from the view that the subsistent also *means* the possible existent. A content abstracted from its possible existence is not a thought-content but only a significant speakable. (6) A speakable content that is not thinkable may or may not be a fact. The false or the unreal is a significant unthinkable that is not a fact, for the assertion of falsity implies *pure* disbelief. (7) The purely disbelieved content has no reference to existence. There is no actual question about its existence : we may have at best a possible question. (8-10) The 'false' is sometimes distinguished from the 'unreal', the former being taken to be asserted of a proposition and the latter of a thing. The distinction is not tenable in the case of the 'illusory'. The illusory snake e.g., can be spoken of indifferently as false or unreal. The term 'unreal', however, is apparently wider than the term 'false'. An unreal content is properly said to be false if it was believed and hence could be the subject of an actual question.

(11) Belief in some fact is implied in all negative assertion. To say that a content is non-existent implies belief in some actual existent; to say that it is false implies belief in some possible existent; to take it as imaginary or contradictory requires no belief in a possible existent but only, in fact, about which there is no actual question of existence. (12) Though falsity implies belief in a possible existent, the thing believed in is only *some* possible existent which is not anything determinate. As an indeterminate entity, it is the unthinkable. (13-14) A speakable content is either fact or no-fact. Fact is either thinkable or unthinkable. The unthinkable fact is either assertable or unassertable. Just as the thinkable fact is the possible existent as determinate, the un-

thinkable assertable is the possible existent as indeterminate. The indeterminate possible existent is believed to be other than the believing, i.e., to be something that is objective. What is believed without being objective, viz., concrete subjectivity would be the unthinkable, unassertable fact. (15) The indeterminate fact that is said to be possibly existent is the objective or the assertable in general. It is possible to ask if objectivity is fact or no-fact. The question would be an actual one representing a spiritual uncertainty. (16) A subjective or spiritual fact is, like bare objectivity, a fact beyond the question of existence. But while there cannot be any actual question about the latter, about the former there cannot be even a possible question. The suggestion that objectivity is unreal is not meaningless. It is not worthless either, for there is a spiritual feeling of the symbolistic character of the object and of the vanity of the object-interest as independent of the spiritual interest. (17) A question about the facthood of the spiritual is meaningless. (18) No question arises about the facthood of the spiritual itself unless it is artificially objectified by language or otherwise. To realise that it is an unmeanable content would be to reject the question itself as illusory and not to obtain an answer to the question. (19) Doubt about an object implies the belief in *some* object or in bare objectivity. The apparent doubt about a subjective fact implies certainty about the fact itself and uncertainty about its symbolic characterisation by an objective category. (20) The bare object or objectivity cannot be disbelieved but there may be a spiritual doubt about its being other than the spiritual, for the object may be conceived as only the self-symbolising function of the spirit. The suggestion has value for the spiritual consciousness but it is not assertable in the secular consciousness.

FACT AND THOUGHT OF FACT

1. Fact means what is believed : what a person believes is a fact to him. The characterisation of fact as what stands in a constant system of relations or as what is given and not constructed by the mind or as what conditions and constitutes successful willing is no definition, as it itself assumes some fact. Fact does not admit of an impersonal definition.

2. Fact need not be the existent. The non-existence of that about which there can be an actual question of existence is also a fact that one believes and asks others to believe. A content about which there is no such question is, if believed, a fact and, if not believed, is no fact. There may be believed contents like the moral 'ought' or freedom which are facts that are neither existent nor non-existent. What is taken as false or unreal is no fact and one cannot speak of its non-existence also as fact, there being, as will appear presently, no question of its existence.

3. The existence or non-existence of a content about which there can be an actual question of existence is a fact that is 'thought'. Other facts are not properly said to be thought and the consciousness of a content as false or unreal is not a thinking consciousness. That about which the question of existence is asked is the possible existent. What is thought is either the possible existent or the existence or the non-existence of the possible existent. Nothing is properly said to be thought which does not imply the question of existence.

4. This restriction of the use of the word 'thought' requires justification. In the question 'does A exist or not', A does not mean an existent; it is a thought-content that is sometimes said to be subsistent. Must such a thought-content be understood as a possible existent? Is anything sought to be known about it except whether it exists or not? One may, it may be said, seek to analyse it to find out if it is compatible with another thought-content. Are such problems answered by thinking without reference to existence and non-existence? The answer in any case, it may be contended, is self-evident, however it is reached. But it is not self-evident like an axiom, being no judgment if a judgment is understood to imply a reference to the fact of existence or non-existence. Is the explication of a meaning or its compatibility or otherwise with another meaning a thought-content at all? Is the awareness specially of contradiction properly called thinking?

A contradictory thought is no thought, being only a loose expression for a combination of words meaning contents in contradiction with one another : the contradiction itself is no meaning. A synthesis of two meanings may, indeed, be a meaning but the so-called relation of compatibility is no meaning. It is only a symbolic expression for the problematic synthesising process which, if called thinking at all, is thinking without any thought-content of which we are actually conscious. So, too, when a given meaning is known to be equivalent to the synthesis of two meanings, the equivalence is a symbolic expression for an equating process which is at best a thinking without an actual thought-content.

5. What then is sought to be known about a thought-content or objective meaning without reference to its existence or non-existence is not itself an objective meaning. If anything is objectively known about the subsistent as other than a possible existent, it is its distinctness. If the reference of the distinct subsistent to existence be not necessary, how is the relation understood at all? In 'A has or has not existence', is the relation of *having* itself a subsistent or existent? If it is subsistent, how does it again get related to existence and if it is existent, how does A which means only a distinct get related to it? It will not do to say that the reference of the subsistent to existence is no objective content at all, for then the judgment 'A exists or does not exist' would have no objective meaning. There appears to be no escape from the view that the subsistent *means* the possible existent. A content abstracted from its possible existence is not even subsistent. Not that a content as thus abstracted is an unmeaning phrase : it is only not subsistent, not a meaning or thought-content, though it is still a significant speakable. Even a contradiction which is no thought is a significant speakable.

6. A speakable content that is not thinkable as having no reference to existence may or may not be fact. The false or unreal is a significant unthinkable that is no fact. It is unthinkable as implying the absence or withdrawal of the question of existence and is thus distinct from non-existence, to assert which of a content is still to entertain the question of its existence. What is said to be false is a speakable content that is sometimes wrongly taken to be a proposition understood as the thought-content that is asserted or denied in a judgment. A negative judgment is the denial of a proposition or of a possible existent but the awareness of a content as false is not a negative judgment. To take something to be false is to reject or negate it without being aware of the negation as a thought-content. The

negative judgment also implies rejection or disbelief but the disbelief there is always a qualified belief. If the judgment 'A is not B' be a denial of the proposition 'A being B', it is also an affirmation of the proposition 'A being not B'. Even in the limiting case of the negative judgment—the negative existential judgment 'A is not', the disbelief in the existence of A is a positive belief in the non-existence of A, non-existence being understood as a factual determination of the possible existent A. But the assertion of falsity implies *pure* disbelief that is not equivalent to any belief. The content that is disbelieved here is not even understood as a possible existent and is accordingly no thought-content. If it is still called a proposition, we have to distinguish it as a merely speakable proposition from the thinkable proposition that is affirmed or denied in a judgment.

7. But has not the purely disbelieved content, it will be asked, a reference to existence? If the golden mountain or the hare's horn is disbelieved, do we not take these to be thinkable and as possibly existent? The question is if the person who disbelieves such a content takes it to be a possible existent during the disbelief. In forming a negative judgment like 'A is not', one entertains the question of A's existence, the content of the undecided question being just the proposition. But in stating the hare's horn as an example of the false or unreal, we do not have an undecided question of its existence in our mind. We do not actually ask if it exists: we can only imagine ourselves asking it. If then a purely disbelieved content admits of a question about its existence, the question is not actual to the disbeliever, being only a *possible* question. The content of an actual question being the possible existent, the content of a possible question would be the possibility of a possible, an entity that we need not regard as unmeaning but which is not the same as the thought-content called proposition that is asserted or denied in a judgment. If the content that we take to be false or unreal has a reference to existence at all, it is this possible or imaginary reference. Such reference we may deny only to a contradiction like square circle; a question is not even imagined about the contradictory. Not that it is absolutely unimaginable, for the contradictory is not meaningless like the word 'abracadabra'. We can ask about two thoughts if they are compatible and hence a possible question of existence about the possibly compatible—the doubly possible question, as we may call it—is not altogether excluded. If the content of a possible and a doubly possible question were to be called proposition, it would be only a speakable that is not thinkable, a significant entity that is yet no meaning.

8. What is rejected as false then is a speakable but not thinkable proposition. Must it be even a speakable proposition? The terms 'false' and 'unreal' are sometimes distinguished, the former being taken to be asserted of a proposition and the latter of a thing about which there is only a possible question of existence. Is the distinction tenable in the case of the perceptually false or the illusory? A perceptual judgment like 'this stick exists'—expressed, it may be, in the interjectional form 'this stick'—may be said to be the affirmation of the proposition 'this stick existing' or 'the existence of this stick'. A proposition of this kind is, indeed, a useless paraphrase of the word 'this' but it is not meaningless. When a stick is mistaken for a snake and the mistake corrected, the correction is properly expressed not as 'this is not a snake' but as 'this snake is not a snake'. It is not the thinking denial of a proposition, for the proposition 'this snake being snake' cannot be denied. It is no judgment but is only the symbolisation in the form of a judgment of the peculiar experience of perceptual annulment, of the visible reduction of the percept to unreality. Correction is the correction of a falsity and so it is the thing snake as apparently perceived and no proposition that is taken to be false. The snake can be here spoken of indifferently as false or unreal.

9. What is false then need not be a proposition. Where it is a proposition, it is speakable but not thinkable and is equivalent to a content about which there is no actual but only a possible question of existence. Such a content is said to be unreal and so, the false—whether perceptual or non-perceptual—may also be called unreal. The term 'unreal', however, is apparently wider than the term 'false'. A content that is said to be unreal may or may not have been previously believed and the question of its existence may or may not have been raised. All that is necessary is that it should be disbelieved and that there should not be an actual question of its existence during the disbelief. If the question was previously raised about it, it is now wholly dropped, and if it was previously believed, the belief is now wholly or partially withdrawn. About the unreal in the form of the contradictory, no question of existence could have arisen and it could not have been believed. What is called 'imaginary' may or may not have been believed and made the subject of a question but in any case the belief and the question are now wholly withdrawn. An unreal content is properly said to be false if it was believed and hence could be the subject of an actual question, the question being now wholly and the belief only partially withdrawn. What does the partial withdrawal of belief mean?

10. The possible existent is fact that is indeterminately known as either a determinate existent or a determinate non-existence. We speak of the falsity of what was previously believed to be a possible existent. Existence or non-existence is itself a determination of fact but each again has its particular determination : we speak of the previously believed existence or non-existence of *A* as false. The falsity would imply disbelief in *this* existence or non-existence but not in *some* possible existence as a determination of fact. When *A* is taken to be false, the non-existence of *A* may also be false but *some* possible existent must be believed. One may, for example, dream of the room in which he actually is and on waking take the dream to be false without believing in the non-existence of the room. So, too, the falsity of the belief in the non-existence of *A* need not imply belief in the existence of *A*, though in neither case is the belief in the possible existence of *something* rejected. This is the sense in which belief is to be understood as *partially* withdrawn in an assertion of falsity.

11. Belief in some fact is implied in all negative assertion—the assertion of non-existence of falsity or of other forms of unreality. To say that a content is non-existent is to continue to believe in some actual existent. To say that it is false is still to believe in some fact as possibly existent. To take it to be imaginary or contradictory requires no belief in a possible existent but only in fact, about which there is no actual question of existence. The assertion of falsity presupposes the belief that reality or fact can be existent fact or the fact of non-existence. The belief is not denied or rejected in the assertion of a content as contradictory or imaginary but it is irrelevant to such assertion of unreality.

12. The notion of the possible existent may appear to present a confusion. A fact is taken to be 'thought' if there is an actual question of existence about it or, in other words, if it is a possible existent. The consciousness of falsity, however, has been said to imply a belief, that is not questioned, in some possible existent. Falsity is not a thought-content and the possible existent that is presupposed by falsity is also presumably not a thought-content and yet thought-content is defined as the possibly existent. There is no confusion if we remember that what falsity presupposes is *some* possible existent, only an indeterminate assertable, an unquestioned and, therefore, unthinkable fact; and that thinkable fact as a determination of this indeterminate is the subject of a question of existence. The determinate assertable is thinkable fact, the indeterminate assertable is unthinkable fact and there may be unthinkable fact that is not assertable at all.

13. A speakable content then is either fact or no-fact. The false, the imaginary and the contradictory are forms of unreality or no-fact. Fact is either thinkable or unthinkable and unthinkable fact may or may not be assertable. Thinkable fact is the possible existent as determinate and the unthinkable assertable is the possible existent as indeterminate. Is there any unthinkable fact that is not assertable and if so, is it co-ordinate with the unthinkable fact that is assertable?

14. The false or the unreal as such is an unassertable content that is not fact. It is unassertable in the sense that it is purely disbelieved. The believed content may be distinguished from the believing but the disbelieved content is not distinguishable from the disbelieving. As thus indistinguishable, the disbelieved content is not asserted and so if there be a believed content that is not other than the believing of it, it would be said to be unassertable fact. A fact that is not yet known to be existent fact or the fact of non-existence but is known as not other than these alternatives—the indeterminate possible existent—is believed to be other than the believing, to be presented or objective in this sense. Unassertable fact then would be what is believed without being presented or objective. Not that it would be only the believing : it would be believed as not distinct from the believing, believed to be the subjective that is not merely consciousness of fact but is itself the fact of which it is conscious. Concrete subjectivity, as we may call it—the spiritual in our ordinary parlance—is thus the fact that is not only unthinkable but unassertable.

15. Unthinkable fact—whether assertable or unassertable—is fact about which there is no actual question of existence. About the assertable unthinkable there may be a *possible* question, just as there may be possible question about the false or imaginary. The indeterminate fact that is said to be possibly existent is the objective or the assertable *in general* about which there is no question of existence because the question presupposes it. But it is possible to ask about it—what idealism actually asks—if objectivity or distinction from the subjective or spiritual is fact or no-fact, real or unreal. It would be an actual question not of existence but of facthood or reality, representing a spiritual as distinct from logical doubt. Spiritually actual, it can be admitted in logic only as a *possible* question of existence. The idealist's doubt about the object is properly not about its existence, not whether it is an existent among existents. Since the object *means* the possible existent, the existent or non-existence, the doubt is whether the existent is existent and non-existence non-existence. It is

an unintelligible question which is none-the-less real, being, in fact, a spiritual uncertainty symbolised by the logical form of a question.

16. The possibility of existence and non-existence or bare objectivity is a fact beyond the question of existence. Subjective or spiritual fact is also beyond the question but the difference is that a question about the former is not meaningless, while it is meaningless about the latter. No question is actually entertained about the former, while about the latter there cannot be even a possible question. The possible question entertainable about bare objectivity is, as already said, whether the existent is existent and non-existence non-existence. It is the question whether existence and non-existence are not both unreal. If the possible means *either* existent or non-existent, what is neither existent nor non-existent would be the impossible. It may be a contradiction to speak of a content as both existent and non-existent but to say that it is neither is only to imply that it is not thinkingly known, that it is impossible to thought but not that it must be unreal. The impossible may be fact, though this 'may be' is a motiveless possibility to logic, a possibility that cannot be thought but cannot also be rejected by thought. Hence it is not meaningless to suggest that objectivity—meaning both existence and non-existence—is unreal, though in the absence of a positive spiritual feeling or experience of such unreality, the suggestion would be worthless. It is not worthless because there is a spiritual feeling of the symbolistic character of the object or of its unsubstantiality in itself or of both, of the vanity of the object-interest as independent of the spiritual interest—the heart of religion and the perennial spring of all idealism.

17. Thus the facthood of objectivity though unquestioned in logic is questionable from the spiritual standpoint, the question being not meaningless but motiveless for logic, no actual intellectual question. A question about the facthood of the spiritual, however, is meaningless. We may contrast three forms of certainty—the necessity of an axiom, the unquestioned character of the object in general and the self-evidence of the spiritual. All the three are logically undeniable. The axiom, however, admits of an actual question; there is only a possible question about the object in general; while a question is altogether meaningless in respect of the spiritual. An axiom is at once a law and an intuitable form of a particular organisation of thinkable facts. The law is necessarily true for the organisation but it does not exclude the possibility of an alternative organisation of the facts under a different axiom. Objectivity again, as presupposed by the logical question, is not itself questioned in logic; but while

logic does not entertain, it does not exclude a doubt other than the intellectual, which is symbolised by a logical question. That doubting cannot be doubted is true not of the logical but of the spiritual doubt. Spiritual uncertainty is itself a certainty and if objectivity is spiritually felt to be suspect, it is as much unreal as real. The object is never felt to be more than suspect, to be altogether unreal, though one may feel the want and the desirability of such feeling.

18. No question arises about the facthood of the spiritual itself unless it is artificially objectified by language or otherwise. The question about the reality of the self arises when the self is represented—it may be, through a word like 'I'—as a meant thing among things. To realise that it is an unmeanable or unthinkable content would be to reject the question itself as illusory and not to obtain an answer to the question. So if an alleged spiritual value of a thinkable object is pronounced unreal, it means either that it is not a spiritual value or that the value is not embodied or incarnated in the object but not that the spiritual value that it is alleged to be is itself illusory. So a doubt about the facthood of what is called a subjective state is an uncertainty about the naming of the subjective fact or about its being a fact in the mind of the doubter as appropriated by him or even about its being subjective at all, but not about there being the subjective state.

19. Doubt about an object need not imply the belief that the object exists at any time but only implies the belief that there is *some* object, belief in bare objectivity which is not questioned within logic, though a question about it is not meaningless. What appears as a doubt about a subjective fact implies certainty about the fact and uncertainty only about its symbolic characterisation by an objective category. Uncertainty about the spiritual is a spiritual certainty about its persisting objective aspect being merely symbolic or superinduced and is, in fact, the beginning of the correction or elimination of the aspect. The spirit is born in the uncertainty about the facthood of objectivity and it realises itself on the one hand by freeing itself from or correcting away the objectivity that sticks to it and on the other by consciously symbolising or contemplating itself as object to consolidate its freedom.

20. While the bare object is an unquestioned fact, it is not co-ordinate with self-evidencing spiritual fact. Objectivity cannot be disbelieved but there may be spiritual doubt about its being other than the spiritual. As the spirit realises itself by symbolising itself as object, the object may be only the self-symbolising function of the

spirit. The suggestion has value for the spiritual consciousness but is not assertable in the secular or logical consciousness, being only not denied in it. So long as the dualism of the spiritual and the secular consciousness remains, we have to regard the object as an unquestioned fact and the subject as an unquestionable fact without being able to assert their unity or duality.

CORRECTION OF ERROR AS A LOGICAL PROCESS

ANALYSIS

(1-3) The correction of an error, e.g., of taking a rope for a snake cannot be adequately expressed by the single sentence 'this that I believed as this snake is not snake'. It has to be expressed in the two sentences '*this* was taken as *this* snake' and 'what *this* was taken to be was no fact'. There is no unitary 'logical form' to express correction. It is an epistemic function without any unitary logical content. (4) There is an extreme view that the corrected consciousness was no belief and no consciousness of any unity like 'this snake'. The position cannot be accepted. (5-6) There may, again, be the suggestion that the corrective consciousness is no disbelief of the form 'this was not snake' and no awareness of 'this snake' as having been false when it was believed. But this appears to be an extreme statement that is not warranted by introspection. The testimony of introspection is not, however, clear as to whether the disbelief is in the form 'this was not snake' or 'this is not snake'.

(7-11) It may be contended further that the content 'this snake' as false to my present belief does not contradict 'this snake' as true to my previous belief and that the former may even be said to be a 'transformation' of the latter. But this alleged transformation or ideal inclusion is inclusion only in a constructive sense and, even as such, cannot be demonstrated. Secondly, it is hardly intelligible at the stage of disbelief to describe the content of the previous belief as a 'this'. Thirdly, the previous belief stood only on the conscious level, while the present disbelief stands on the self-conscious level. But the conception of falsity—and, therefore, of truth as well—does not emerge on the level of the merely objective consciousness. It is thus meaningless to speak of '*this* snake'—as to the previous belief—as true or false. The suggestion, therefore, that a belief that is false in conscious reference to another belief may be still true in itself has to be rejected as futile.

(12) Falsity has no reference to the time-position of a cognition at all. What is taken as false cannot be specified in purely objective terms, and the expressions considered in sec. 1-2 are all a mixture of subjective and objective terms. (13-14) What is false is a meaning to self-consciousness and is *this* fact to the corresponding consciousness. As meaning, it cannot be spoken of as *this*, though it cannot be indicated except in reference to *this* fact. A false content is a mean-

ing with a necessary reference to the thisness of fact. There may be the realistic view, however, that 'meaning' or 'content' is but the fact that is meant and what is false is not content of a belief but the belief itself. The belief is false not in respect of *its* content—for it has no content—but in respect of the content that is now thought to describe the particularising character of the belief. (15) Now this thought-content is not a true description of the belief but is only a constructive or symbolic description. The meaning of 'correction', accordingly, changes in this view : it is not a disbelieving in a previously believed *content*, but only disbelieving that the previous belief had a content at all. (16-17) The realistic view thus admits a contentless belief and is perilously near to the idealistic view that the object is nothing but belief with its subjectivity heterised. In the former, however, the contentless belief was only a believing and no presentation; in the latter, it is a presentation. The idealistic view is to be preferred to the realistic view.

(18) Taking the disbelief implied in correction to be adequately expressed in the form 'this snake is not', the '*this*' in it would not mean a perceived substrate of the snake-character. *This*, here, is not even a believed substrate but only an imagined specification of the imagined snake. (19) *This* in 'this snake' stands for no fact at all. The disbelief is absolute and is not capable of being expressed as a negative judgment. (20) It cannot, again, be said that what *this* was believed to be was not presented, nor that it was presented as *this*. I cannot now describe in objective terms what I then believed, nor can I say that there was only the subjective fact of contentless belief. I believed in a content that was neither fact nor absolute nought.

CORRECTION OF ERROR AS A LOGICAL PROCESS

1. I am said to correct an error of mine when I disbelieve in what I am aware I believed. The correction of the error of taking a rope for a snake may be expressed as two processes. I am now aware that I believed this object before me to be *this snake* and I now believe that this was not a snake. Is the singleness of the corrective process expressed adequately by the complex sentence, 'this that I believed as *this snake* is not snake'? The clause 'that I believed, etc.' only gives subsidiary information though the corrective function is directed primarily towards what is meant by the clause, towards what *this* was taken to be and not towards *this*. Again, what is now taken to be no snake is a content that *was* believed to be fact and is not now believed. It is not believed as a past fact, nor can it here be said to be merely suggested to me as a possible fact about which there may be a genuine question whether it exists. The subject of a negative judgment is what is believed or suggested as a fact in the judgment. The complex statement above is no negative judgment and does not adequately express correction.

2. The predicate of the complex sentence '(this...) *is not snake*' is also open to objection. The disbelief implied in correction is primarily disbelief not in a certain naming of a previously believed content (that it is *snake*) but in its facthood. I now know that what *this* was taken to be was no fact. Correction has to be expressed in the two sentences, '*this* was taken as *this snake*' and 'what *this* was taken to be was no fact'; and these cannot be combined in one sentence.

3. Not only is correction not expressible as a negative judgment: there is no unitary logical form to express it. By 'logical form' is here meant a form in which there is reference only to the content of a believing or thinking and not to the believing or thinking itself. Correction cannot be formulated in language without reference to the subjective fact of a past believing. It is an epistemological function that has no unitary logical content corresponding to it.

4. Correction has been so far described in terms of two subjective processes—a previous belief and a present disbelief referring to it. Are the processes rightly designated 'belief' and 'disbelief'? Was the previous consciousness a belief, the content of which could be called '*this snake*'? There is the extreme view that it was no belief, no consciousness at all of the unity '*this snake*'. There was belief

in *this* and belief in snake and these beliefs that were together were simply not distinguished. Or it may be allowed that the facts *this* and snake were the contents of a single belief but they were not distinguished. Or this view may go with the admission of some consciousness of the unity 'this snake' other than belief—suggestion or thought or speaking consciousness. There is no error according to these views and, therefore, also no correction. What is called error is only not distinguishing, the privation of the knowledge of distinction; and correction is nothing but the knowledge of the distinction that was previously unappreciated. Such a position can hardly be refuted except by an appeal to the testimony of consciousness. The appeal is not indeed decisive, for the testimony is indefinite. We are not clear at the time of correction whether the previous consciousness was of a definite unity but in any case we can say that it was not consciousness of an indefinite content, consciousness of this and snake as utterly unrelated. What was not appreciated as indefinite may yet have been indefinite but there is at least a presumption in favour of its having been a definite unity.

5. Admitting then that there was a belief in the unity 'this snake', we ask if there is now a disbelief in it. That there is no longer a belief in 'this snake' is not disputed but it may not mean that there is now a disbelief in the form 'this is not a snake' or 'this snake is not a fact.' Even if such a disbelief be admitted, it may not mean disbelief in *this* having been a snake when it was believed as such. These may appear to be unreal objections but they gain plausibility when developed. The present consciousness, it may be said, is primarily a belief in *this* being a rope. It refers indeed to the previous belief in 'this snake' but the reference is only a belief in a positive distinction between *this* and snake which ousts the previous belief psychologically but does not amount to a disbelief in it. I may now say 'this is not snake' but the word 'not' here only means a distinction and does not imply a rejection. Negation in the objective content means nothing but distinction and even if there be a subjective feeling of rejecting or disbelieving as distinct from distinguishing, it has no content other than distinction. Even if 'this is not snake' means the non-existence of snake here and not simply its distinction from *this*, non-existence being as much an objective fact as distinction, it is the content of a belief and not of the alleged process of rejection or disbelief. Again, admitting that the disbelief has for its content the *falsity* of the previous belief, this falsity, it may be said, is only an additional character, the knowledge of which means the psychological cessation of the

previous belief but does not affect its truth. There is no contradiction in speaking of the content 'this snake' as both true and false, true in itself when the belief was there and false now in relation to the content now believed, viz., 'this being rope'.

6. The suggestion throughout is that there is no disbelief in the form 'this was not snake', no awareness of the content 'this snake' as having been false when it was believed. That there is now only belief and no disbelief appears, however, to be an extreme statement that is not warranted by introspection. I am aware of having a disbelief, and also a belief not only in 'this rope' but also in the non-existence of snake here though hardly in the distinction of *this* from snake. The testimony of introspection is not, however, clear as to whether the disbelief is in the form 'this *was* not snake.' If it be suggested that the disbelief is only in the form 'this *is* not snake', the suggestion does not appear to be definitely opposed to my introspection. Not that the snake has now only ceased to exist and that it was when believed. Introspection apparently does not say anything about my present belief being in a snake having existed when it was believed.

7. But, it may be said, the truth or falsity of a believed content does not mean its existence or non-existence in time. Disbelief in its existence now may be regarded as *belief* in its falsity as an additional character. The content 'this snake as false now' does not contradict the content 'this snake as true then' and may even be said to contain it ideally, to affirm it as not negated but positively transformed. The notion of ideal retention or transformation is difficult to understand in the case specially of perceptual error. But then perception as knowledge would be taken in this view to be an implicit judgment. How is the content of the judgment 'this is snake' contained in that of the judgment 'this is rope'? A judgment cannot be taken by itself: it has to be taken as implicitly cohering in the inferential way with other judgments. A judgment is to be understood as an epistemological condensation of a system of judgments and perception that is knowledge is a further integration of such a judgment into psychological immediacy. The percepts 'this snake' and 'this rope' are each an integration of a system of believed contents and one may be said to contain the other in the sense that the system integrated in the one is inclusive of the system integrated in the other. The relation of inclusion between the percepts is not indeed perceived and hence it may be called an ideal inclusion which appears to perception as the magic relation of transformation.

8. The strictly logical assertion in this view is that the content 'this snake' as false to my present belief does not contradict 'this snake' as true to my previous belief. The rest of the view is couched in imaginative language and whether it can be fully presented in literal logical terms is disputable. The metaphors mainly employed are the *implicit* working of one cognition in another and the content of one cognition being present in *ideality* or transformed in the content of another. Implicit working of inference in judgment and of judgment in perception means in strict logic that the included cognition is cognition of a content other than the content of the inclusive cognition, which yet is no new fact. When again the content A is said to be reduced to ideality or transformed in another content X, nothing more is meant than that the cognition of X is the cognition of A in relation to B and that the cognition of this relation is implicitly contained in the cognition of A in the sense explained that it is cognition of no fact other than A. Whatever else appears to be meant by these notions is purely subjective and is only figuratively represented in objective language.

9. When then the belief in 'this rope' is said to contain the belief in 'this snake' as transformed, what is literally meant is that the belief now is in the content 'this snake' in relation to new contents, the relation being no new fact. The perceived *this* taken with certain relations to outside facts makes a system which is constructively the same fact as 'this snake'. (Again, *this* taken with the relations to these and other outside facts makes a fuller system which is the same fact as 'this rope'.) The facts and relations contained in each system, however, can never be fully specified and it would, therefore, appear to be impossible to show that one system is included in the other. Even if this objection is waived, it is hardly justifiable to deny that the percepts integrating the systems are incompatible on the ground that one system includes the other. The percepts 'this rope' and 'this snake' are wholly incompatible characterisations of the given *this*, one of which can be said to ideally include, define or transform the other only in a remotely constructive sense.

10. The belief in 'this rope' is a disbelief in 'the snake' now, but does it mean that 'this snake' was false when it was believed? It all depends on what is meant by the content of a belief or disbelief. Is believing a content the same as believing a fact? If a content is believed, it is believed as fact. If later it is disbelieved, taken to be false, it is no longer believed as fact. The disbelief is a conscious reference to the previous belief, to the previous apprehension of the

content as fact. Can the content be *now* spoken of as 'this snake'? I can say now that what I believed and could have then spoken of as 'this snake' is false but can I say 'this snake' is false? Can what is known as false be spoken of as *this*? Does not *this* at once mean *this fact* in time? If a content does not mean a fact in time, can we apply the word 'this' to it?

11. The content of the consciousness 'this fact' can be called 'this meaning', if introspection into the consciousness of a fact as *this* is admitted to be itself the consciousness of the fact as a meaning. If what is now disbelieved be said to be 'this snake', 'this snake' is a meaning and not a fact to the disbelief, though the same expression stands for a fact to the previous belief. The present disbelief refers to the previous belief and is on a self-conscious level relatively to it which stood only on the conscious level. What then is false to self-consciousness need not be false to consciousness. Properly speaking, however, the concept of falsity does not emerge on the level of merely objective consciousness. We can speak of the content of consciousness as fact or no-fact, existent or non-existent but not as true or false. It is meaningless to speak of '*this snake*'—as to the previous belief—as true or false. The suggestion running through the views just examined that a belief that is false in relation and conscious reference to another belief may be still true in itself has, therefore, to be rejected as futile.

12. What was taken as 'this snake' cannot be said to have been false. What is now taken as false cannot also be expressed as 'this snake'. Falsity, in fact, has no reference to the time-position of a cognition at all. What is taken as false cannot be specified in objective terms. If the disbelief is expressed in the form 'this that was believed and could be spoken of as *this snake* was not a snake', the subject is a mixture of subjective and objective terms. If the disbelief be formulated—preferably for reasons explained—in two sentences 'what this was believed to be is no fact' and 'this was believed (or more accurately, could be spoken of with belief) as *this snake*', both the sentences are a mixture of subjective and objective terms. The difficulty, it would appear, is not merely verbal.

13. What is false is a meaning to 'self-consciousness' and is at the same time *this fact* to the corresponding consciousness. As meaning, it cannot be spoken of as *this*, though it cannot be indicated except by a reference to *this fact*. A false content is a meaning with a necessary or constitutive reference to the *this-ness* of fact. It may, however, be held that meaning or content is but the fact that is meant.

The content of a belief that is not fact but mere meaning is a chimera. Meaning as distinct from fact meant is but the subjective function of thinking. 'It may be symbolically or figuratively spoken of as though it were objective but it is not objective at all. What is false then is not the content of a belief but the belief itself. There was the belief formulated by the phrase 'this snake' which, however, was not belief *in the content* 'this snake'. It was belief *in this* and belief *in snake* but not belief *in the unity* 'this snake'. Yet it cannot be said that the two beliefs were simply not distinguished—a view already examined. They were positively combined into a single belief which had, however, no content. It was not belief *in* 'this snake' and can only be figuratively spoken of as such. Correction indeed is disbelief but the content of the disbelief is the negation 'this is not snake' which, however, is not the whole content of the corrective consciousness. What is false or is corrected is not the judgment 'this is snake': it is the previous belief which was not a judgment or inference but a perception. But as there was no fact corresponding to the phrase 'this snake', the perception was only a perceiving and not the cognition of a content or fact which are the same.

14. Can belief as a mere subjective fact be said to be false? It can be said to be false only in respect of its reference, of what it says, unless the falsity of a belief means nothing but its ineffectiveness in a will-context. Falsity may be ascertained partially by a reference to the will-context but it does not *mean* ineffectiveness. Apparently then this view has to admit a content that is spoken of, thought or suggested without belief. What is false is belief in respect of this thought-content. There was a belief combining the beliefs in *this* and *snake*, which had no content, no fact corresponding to it. But the belief is now interpreted by a word-conditioned thought of which 'this snake' or 'this being snake' is the content. This thought is formulated at the time of disbelief and is taken to be the description of the belief. The belief then is false not in respect of *its* content—for it has no content—but in respect of the content that is now thought to describe the particularising character of the belief.

15. But is this thought-content a true description of the belief or is it only a constructive or symbolic description? It is the latter, though as no belief is claimed for it, there is no question of truth or error. The meaning of correction accordingly changes in this view: it is not disbelieving in a previously believed *content* but only disbelieving that the previous belief had a content at all. This is expressed by the negative judgment 'this is not snake' which, however, does

not presuppose the suggestion that the belief had 'this snake' for its content. The negative judgment is ordinarily taken to presuppose an affirmative judgment or a question which suggests a possible fact. Here, however, the judgment 'this is not snake' would be taken to presuppose a belief that has no content and is only characterised by the thought 'this being snake' at the time of the judgment. The belief is false in respect of what is now constructively taken to be its content.

16. The admission in this realistic view of a contentless belief would bring it perilously near an idealistic view according to which object is nothing but belief with its subjectivity alienated or heterised. There was, according to both, no belief *in* 'this snake' but only belief *of this form*, belief as factitiously characterisable by the present thought of 'this snake.' In the realistic view, however, the contentless belief was only a believing and no presentation; while in the particular idealistic view, it is a presentation. A further difference is that the belief that is corrected is in the realistic view contentless so far as 'this snake' is not a unitary believed content, though it is still belief *in* the contents *this* and snake; while in the idealistic view, the belief *of the form* 'this snake' is not only not belief in the unity but not also in *snake*.

17. The idealistic view here appears to have an advantage over the realistic view, for it is difficult to understand a unitary belief which is only partly determined or characterised by its content. Now that we have the thought of the unity 'this snake' or 'this being snake' which is disbelieved, the thought that symbolises the subjective unity of the belief, can we say that the predicate or determinant *snake* in it means the fact snake as remembered to be elsewhere? Is it believed at all within this thought? As the thought of 'this snake' now rises with disbelief, it implies an empty contingency like 'if this could be snake, as it cannot be'. The emergence of the idea of snake may be through memory but does the idea continue to be believed memory-content within such a contingent thought? Apparently it continues only as *meaning* and for the belief now characterised by the thought of 'this snake', 'snake' is as little a believed content as the unity 'this snake', being only the *mode* of the belief—the believing or the presentation.

18. To the idealistic view, the previous belief is no belief *in* snake but is still belief *in this* as a presentation, though not as objective fact. 'This snake' was a presentation and since *this* as believed now is objective fact (or heterised presentation), the word *this* appears to be a specification both of the objectified and of the unobjectified presentation. Taking the disbelief implied in correction to be

adequately expressed in the form 'this snake is not' rather than in the form 'this is not snake', would *this* in it mean a perceived content, the perceived substrate of the snake-character? If neither 'this snake' nor 'snake' be a believed content for the previous belief, can *this* be regarded as a substrate at all? When I imagine a lion on a perceived object like the wall before me, the whole content 'lion on the wall' being imaginary, the term 'wall' in the whole means not the locus as perceived but the imagined character of location of the imagined lion. So here *this* is not a believed substrate but only an imagined specification of the imagined snake. The previous belief in the mode 'this snake' has thus no content at all or has for its content something that is no fact at all but absolute nought.

19. The illusion 'this snake' is then a presentation in which there is no belief in *this* or snake or their unity as fact. The word 'this' is here not only not the specification of an objective fact but not also of the presentation as a subjective fact. *This* in 'this snake' which is disbelieved stands for no fact at all. The disbelief is absolute and is not capable of being expressed as a negative judgment. If it is at all expressed as a negative statement, its form would be 'this snake is not' which would not be a negative existential judgment like 'ghosts do not exist' in so far as the subject 'this snake' is not even the suggestion of a possible fact. It is not even the psychic fact of presentation, being only the appearance of presentation, if such a phrase could be allowed. At the time of disbelief, we feel it is only *as though* 'this snake' was presented.

20. All this follows from the meaning of *this* in the disbelieved unity 'this snake': every part of an imaginary content is imaginary. The objection to this view is that 'this snake' was believed and was not merely imagined like the lion on the wall. I disbelieve it now not in the form 'this snake is not' but in form 'what I believed this to be is not', where the word *this* stands for a fact that is now believed. But then I believed *this* to be 'this snake' in which phrase or thought the word 'this' means what is like *snake* no fact. Yet the two *this*'s mean the same perceived content. I cannot say then that what *this* was believed to be was not presented nor that it was presented as *this*. Now that I disbelieve, I cannot assert that I perceived *this* snake nor can I deny that I perceived something as *this*, as an individual fact before me. I cannot now describe in objective terms what I then believed, nor can I say that there was only the subjective fact of contentless belief. I believed in a content which was not fact nor absolute nought.

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ANALYSIS

(1-2) The consciousness of the false and the consciousness of the subjective imply one another. A. *The consciousness of the false is the consciousness of the subjective.* The consciousness of the false is the consciousness of a content that is not speakable except as the content of a belief. (3) The false is what is corrected and disbelieved. 'Disbelief' is a positive mode of consciousness and is not merely the privation of belief. (4-6) The content said to be disbelieved cannot be expressed except as what was believed. The content of belief is formulated loosely as 'this is A', artificially as 'this being A' and naturally as 'this as A'. The content of the corresponding disbelief cannot, however, be expressed in this form. It can only be described problematically as '*What was believed*'. (7) Disbelief of correction has thus to be taken as a form of reflective consciousness. It is not, however, a cognitive belief in the prior belief: it is only a consciousness of it in necessary reference to itself. (8) It is not cognitive belief, for a cognitive consciousness is the consciousness of something which is speakable without reference to the consciousness.

(9-16) B. *The consciousness of the subjective is the consciousness of the false.* That is to say, (i) the consciousness of a belief implies disbelief in its content; (ii) all consciousness of the subjective implies consciousness of a belief. (i) The consciousness of belief is the consciousness of having the belief *as past* for present rejection or re-affirmation. The consciousness of a past belief is either belief or disbelief in its content and never a mere non-committal consciousness of the content as merely subsistent. The consciousness of the subjective is not a substantive conscious state like the consciousness of the object. To be conscious of a belief, in the way of rejection or re-affirmation, is in all cases to be conscious of a dissociation of the content of the belief from fact. This dissociation even in the case of re-affirmation implies that re-affirmation is really the rejection of disbelief. In all cases then in which we are explicitly conscious of a past belief, we have a disbelief in the content of that belief. To be conscious of the subjective fact of belief is thus to be conscious of its content as false.

(17) (ii) All consciousness of the subjective is consciousness of a belief. There is no consciousness of a subjectivity that is not consciousness of a content referred to fact. What we are reflectively

aware of is the consciousness of a content as what is or may be believed. (18-20) Introspection is only distinguishing a mode of consciousness from its content. It cannot literally be said to be the consciousness of a subjective content, for that would lead to a vicious regress. Introspection is itself a subjectivity and we speak of it with belief without having any consciousness of it. Much of what we call 'introspection' appears to be only a naming of a subjectivity. (21) We have no consciousness of a subjectivity that is not the consciousness of a content referred to fact. Thus to be conscious of the subjective is to be conscious of a belief.

THE FALSE AND THE SUBJECTIVE

1. The thesis elaborated in the present paper is that the consciousness of the false and the consciousness of the subjective imply one another. It may be analysed into two propositions (A) that the consciousness of the false is consciousness of the subjective and (B) that the consciousness of the subjective is consciousness of the false. The first denies that the false is but the objective fact of non-existence and the second denies that the subjective can be known without belief or disbelief in its content—which is apparently the theory behind what is called psychological introspection. The further implications of the thesis would be that the object is through the self-alienation of the subject and that the subject is not known except by a denial of the object. These implications are not discussed in this paper.

A. CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE FALSE IS CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SUBJECTIVE

2. The proposition may be thus developed:

The consciousness of the false is consciousness of a content that is not speakable except as the content of a belief which, again, is not speakable except as that the content of which is false.

3. The false is what is corrected or disbelieved. Properly, 'disbelief' should mean correction or rejection of what was believed, though the word is sometimes used loosely to mean rejection of what is suggested or the mere absence of belief in the imaginary or the contradictory. To be conscious of a content as imaginary or contradictory is to have no belief in it. Disbelief is a positive mode of consciousness and is not merely the privation of belief. The so-called disbelief in a suggestion is really a belief. A content is suggested as what either is or is not and never, as will appear, without all reference to fact; and the rejection of it means that the negative alternative is accepted or believed. We take disbelief then in the sense of correction which we hold is incapable of being regarded as equivalent to a *belief* in negation.

4. Correction of error means disbelief not merely in what was believed but in what we are explicitly conscious of having believed. The content said to be disbelieved cannot, in fact, be expressed except as what was believed. What is it that we are said to disbelieve? If we start with the belief 'this is A'—all belief in the last resort is in a

this or given reality—and then correct it, what is it that we take to be false? What we disbelieve may be taken to be what we believed. In the belief or judgment 'this is A', how should the content believed be formulated? Is the correct formulation of it 'this *is* A' or 'this *being* A' or 'this *as* A'? If we accept the first two formulations, there is no difficulty in accepting them also as the formulations of what we disbelieve. If, however, the believed content be taken to be 'this *as* A', what we disbelieve cannot be said to be also 'this *as* A', for the word 'this', when used as the principal word in a verbal combination, can mean only what is believed and never what is disbelieved.

5. We contend that the first two formulations of the content of belief are inadmissible. The judgment-form 'this is A' in which the principal word is the copula stands neither for the fact believed nor for the believing act but for an undifferentiated or confused unity of the two. There is nothing in believed fact or in the believing act—each taken singly—answering to the distinction between 'this A' and 'this is A', i.e., to the copula, the meaning of which nevertheless has to be understood in reference to the fact and the act. The content of belief cannot, therefore, be formulated as 'this *is* A'. Nor should it be expressed as 'this *being* A'—what is nowadays called *proposition* as distinct from judgment. In 'this being A', the principal word is *being* which means here a relation, in a wide sense of the term, between *this* and A. What is believed, however, is not the relation but the concrete fact this as related to A. It is briefly expressed as 'this *as* A' in which the principal word is *this* standing for the substantive fact. It is this fact as characterised by A and not the characterising relation that is properly said to be believed.

6. The content of belief is formulated loosely as 'this is A' and artificially as 'this being A', the natural expression of it being 'this as A'. The content of the corresponding disbelief—meaning *what* is disbelieved—cannot be expressed in this form. It cannot, in fact, be expressed in any form except problematically as '*what* was believed', the *what* being unspecifiable at the time of the disbelief in purely objective terms. We cannot then even say that *what* was believed is 'this as A', for the word 'this' would mean content of a *present* belief.

7. Disbelief or correction then as necessarily involving the consciousness of something subjective, viz., the previous belief has to be taken as a form of reflective consciousness. To be conscious of the

* In more complex cases the content may have to be expressed as 'this A as related to B'.

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2. The proposition may be thus developed:

The consciousness of the false is consciousness of a content that is not speakable except as the content of a belief which, again, is not speakable except as that the content of which is false.

3. The false is what is corrected or disbelieved. Properly, 'disbelief' should mean correction or rejection of what was believed, though the word is sometimes used loosely to mean rejection of what is suggested or the mere absence of belief in the imaginary or the contradictory. To be conscious of a content as imaginary or contradictory is to have no belief in it. Disbelief is a positive mode of consciousness and is not merely the privation of belief. The so-called disbelief in a suggestion is really a belief. A content is suggested as what either is or is not and never, as will appear, without all reference to fact; and the rejection of it means that the negative alternative is accepted or believed. We take disbelief then in the sense of correction which we hold is incapable of being regarded as equivalent to a *belief* in negation.

4. Correction of error means disbelief not merely in what was believed but in what we are explicitly conscious of having believed. The content said to be disbelieved cannot, in fact, be expressed except as what was believed. What is it that we are said to disbelieve? If we start with the belief 'this is A'—all belief in the last resort is in a

past belief is either belief or disbelief in its content and never a non-committal consciousness of the content as merely subsistent. We may be conscious of the content of a past belief without being conscious of the belief itself. Such consciousness need not be actual belief or disbelief: it may be only an idea or suggestion.^a If however we are conscious of the belief as a subjective fact, our consciousness of its content is always a judgment that it is or is not a fact.

12. Strictly speaking, the consciousness of a past belief, as of any subjective fact, is not memory but whether it is called memory or not, it differs from the memory of an objective fact in an important respect. To be conscious of a subjective state is to *be* in a subjective state referring to the content of the primary state, of which the consciousness of the primary state is a transitive fringe or function. The consciousness of the subjective is not like the consciousness of an object, a substantive conscious state subsisting by itself.

13. To be conscious of a subjective fact like belief is to have a present dealing with the content of the belief in the way of rejection or re-affirmation. Either way, it implies *having* the belief. How can we be said to have the belief when it is rejected? When we disbelieve the content of a belief, we understand the content, as already explained, not by itself but *as* what we believed. We are thus conscious of the belief as past but as the belief is now understood *only* as rejected, we may say that to reject it is to *have* it now in the mind *as past*. 'As past' means 'as rejected': the consciousness of the pastness of the belief is but the consciousness of the belief being rejected.

14. To reject a belief is to have the belief as rejected. It is to be aware of a dissociation of the content of the belief from fact. Again, to re-affirm a belief is not only to continue believing in its content but to be conscious that the content might not be fact. It also implies the dissociation of the content from facthood. To be conscious of a belief then is in all cases to be conscious of such a dissociation. When the belief of which we are conscious is the belief of another mind expressed through speech, we are conscious of the content of the belief being dissociated from our own belief in the very act of understanding the speech. To understand a person's assertion may be primarily to believe the content asserted but it is also *from the very start* to be aware that the content might not be fact.^b When however we are conscious of our own belief, we are conscious

^a The consciousness of a content without all reference to fact is not even an idea which has a problematic reference to fact.

^b The content, however, is not here dissociated from the asserting act.

of the dissociation of the content from fact *only through positive disbelief*.

15. We are explicitly conscious of a subjective fact like belief when we distinguish its content from it and we distinguish it only as we disbelieve it. The dissociation of the content of a belief from its facthood in the re-affirmation of the belief implies that re-affirmation is really the rejection of disbelief. To know a belief to be true is to reject a disbelief in its content that is already emergent. Just as the rejection of a belief implies having the belief as past, so the rejection of a disbelief means having the disbelief as past. To be conscious of a past belief as true is also to have consciousness of its being false. In all cases then in which we are explicitly conscious of a past belief, we have a disbelief in the content of it.

16. It may be said that to be conscious that the content of a belief might not be fact, it is not necessary that it should be disbelieved. It may be simply doubted or there may be only a question in the mind, a desire for information as to whether the content is existent or non-existent. But a question of this kind does not imply consciousness of the *belief*: it implies only the consciousness of its content as possibly existent or possibly non-existent and does not accordingly involve a dissociation of the content from *fact*. Existence and non-existence both come under believed content or fact. Doubt indeed—as distinct from such question—involves a dissociation of the content from fact, being the consciousness of the content as either fact or no fact (where ‘no fact’ means ‘not even the fact of non-existence’). It is the consciousness of an alternation not of two beliefs but of belief and disbelief, of a belief as past and the disbelief in its content, both being present in the mind. Doubt cannot indeed be said to be *both* belief and disbelief but it cannot be *denied* to be either. Where then the content of a belief is doubted, it cannot be said to be not disbelieved.

We may accordingly hold that we are conscious of a belief as past only when we have a disbelief in its content. To be conscious of the subjective fact of belief is to be conscious of its content as false.

17. (ii) We now come to the other proposition that all consciousness of the subjective is consciousness of a belief. It may be thus paraphrased:

There is no consciousness of a subjectivity that is not consciousness of a content referred to fact.

What is not the consciousness of a content is not the content of introspection, though it may be subjective fact. Again, there may be

the consciousness of a content without any reference to fact and this also cannot be said to be the content of introspection. What we are reflectively conscious of is the consciousness of an actual or possible fact, of a content as what is or may be believed. The consciousness of a content as what may be believed is still an actual consciousness of belief.

18. Some explanations are necessary. Introspection should be taken as at once *meaning* the distinguishing of a mode of consciousness from its content. To be conscious of a mode of consciousness is to be conscious also of the content of the mode; and to be conscious of the mode and the content together is to distinguish them. Not that it can be said to be the consciousness of their distinction *as a content*; the distinction cannot be regarded as an actual content that is either objective or subjective. The distinguishing here is not the consciousness of distinction and the consciousness of the subjective is but the distinguishing of the subjective from its content. Introspection accordingly cannot be literally said to be the consciousness of the subjective content, though the form of expression is unavoidable. If it were the consciousness of a content, there would be introspective consciousness of introspection and therefore introspective consciousness of this consciousness and so on ad infinitum.

19. The subjective is not definable as the content of introspection. Introspection is itself a subjectivity and we speak of it with belief, though we have no consciousness of it. A subjectivity, then, of which we are not conscious may not be denied and may be significantly spoken of. One example of it is the so-called consciousness of a content without a believing or disbelieving reference to fact. To be conscious of a content without reference to fact is to be conscious of it *as* without reference, as with the referring consciousness suspended. The so-called consciousness of the bare content is the suspending act which is the consciousness of the referring consciousness and not of the content only. If to introspect be to distinguish consciousness from its content, a content without reference to fact being incapable of being distinguished from, there can be no introspection into the consciousness of such a content. The consciousness of a content without intentional reference is a non-relational *acquaintance* with the content.

20. To the definition of introspection as the distinguishing of a subjectivity from its content, it may be objected that it would exclude introspection into perception and into all consciousness on the perceptual level. The very character of perceptual consciousness is that it is not immediately distinguishable from the object perceived and yet we

seem to be obviously aware of such consciousness as when we say 'I see the table.' Nor does this awareness of perceiving the table imply any disbelief in the table, as would be demanded by our theory. Such awareness of perception, however, is not introspection but only a significant speaking of it. Just as there is no introspection into introspection though we may speak of introspection, so the fact that we speak of seeing the table does not imply that we are introspectively conscious of the seeing. We have no direct enjoying consciousness of the seeing operation—as distinct from the organic-muscular experience of using our eyes—being performed by us. Much of what we call introspection appears to be only a speaking or naming of a subjectivity. All introspection may imply a naming of the subjective but all naming of it is not introspection.

21. We have no consciousness then of a subjectivity that is not consciousness of a content with intentional reference. Intentional reference is a believing or disbelieving reference and disbelieving reference involves a believing reference. Thus if we are conscious of the subjective, we are conscious of a belief.

22. The consciousness of a belief has been shown to involve disbelief in its content. As to be conscious of any subjective fact is to be conscious of a belief, all reflective consciousness may be said to involve disbelief in the content of the corresponding unreflective consciousness. Thus the consciousness of the false is the consciousness of the subjective and vice versa. We are necessarily aware of the false and the subjective together.

SOME ASPECTS OF NEGATION

ANALYSIS*

(1-5) The problem is to formulate the logic of the view that truth is manifold. There are many radically different types of logic based on incommensurable views of negation. What *is not*, viz., the illusion may be regarded (1) as having some kind of abstract being or (2) as contradiction itself. Illusion may be (i) a being only to be denied, (ii) a being as positive as fact but different from it and positively related to it, (iii) identical with fact, relation being but identity, or (iv) no being at all but negation transcending all being.

(6-10) These four views indicate four distinct attitudes towards truth, four stages of attention. The positive direction of attention is alone emphasised in the first three views. Pragmatism which recognises the fourth view in one form does not yet suggest a definite discipline of attention in the negative direction. This negative attention is very like introspection, being the consciousness of the absence of object and as such implying cognition of the object as well. The faculty is explicitly recognised in the fourth view of negation which accordingly brings out the need of an intensive discipline of it.

(11-15) The analysis of the meaning of '*not illusory*', of negation of negation shows the concrete shapes which the above four views assume. In (i), '*not illusory*' means '*not merely subjective*', and all relation being illusory or merely subjective, there arises the notion of the self-identical reals. Self-identity or self-conservation as a function, and what is opposed to it, viz., the thinking function of the subjective ideas are only grades of illusion, each of which is indifferently one or manifold. In (ii), '*not illusory*' is what is different from the positively subjective and coordinate with it, viz., the objective. Each side of the difference is a relation of terms, subjective relation is distinct from objective relation, and while there is one object-system, there are many idea-systems connected with many substrata. In (iii), the truth that is '*not illusory*' is the necessary identity of the subjective and objective, of the known and the unknown. In (iv), this necessary identity is not positive at all. To say that the limiting unknown is *necessary* is not to know the unknown. Nor will it do to make any positive use of it as a transcendent negation, to take it, e.g., either as positively conditioning the known or as negative matter in relation to (Platonic) Ideas. '*Not illusory*' in this view can only mean the unknown of which we are aware through the absence of positive knowledge. The

principle is uncertainty itself, the uncertain alternation between the unknown and this awareness of the unknown.

(16-18) The feeling of this alternation is a religion in three forms: (i) an absolute dissatisfaction with the definite dualism of truth and untruth, (ii) an absolute condemnation of the attitude in which any religion is taken to be false, and (iii) a faith that all religions are not only true but identical. These are bound up with the views (i) that the negation of negation is negation, (ii) that the negation of absolute negation is the absolute truth of all affirmations, and (iii) that absolute negation and absolute affirmation are mutual negation in identity. Such is the absolute, as distinct from the subjectivistic, interpretation of the view that truth is manifold.

SOME ASPECTS OF NEGATION

1. The aim of this paper is to bring out the fact that there are certain ultimate modes of logical thought embodying types of negation which are really incommensurable and that all philosophical dispute resolves itself in the final analysis into a conflict between such types. Every system of philosophical thought or religion has its own logic and is bound up with one or other of the fundamental views of negation. Each furnishes its distinctive criticism and orientation of the others: it is impossible to refer them all to a single court of trial and probably the only demand should be that a philosophy or religion and its distinctive logic justify each other. Not that, however, subjectivism or scepticism is the necessary consequence: all the types may be true and truth itself may be manifold. It is necessary to formulate, if possible, the logic of this view of the manifoldness of truth.

2. Negation is intelligible as illusion. When an object is known to be illusory, what kind of being or non-being do we attribute to it? We answer the question too easily when we say that it has a subjective being but no objective being. The antithesis between subjective and objective has only been reached very gradually in the history of thought and there is every reason to regard it as contingent. There is a too facile falling back upon psychology as a secure anchorage, although it should be an open question whether psychical fact is fact at all.

3. To say 'this object is not existent' is to imply either that *this* is no object but something else is, or that this object is no object. In the former case, 'this' is something which can be spoken of without being object; it has a being which is not objective being, and so negation means only a *difference* between this peculiar being and objective being. This peculiar being need not at once be spoken of as subjective being: that would be to identify without sufficient proof yet a mental state with the content of it i.e., with what it refers to. Such an abstract being would be the starting point of a view which interprets negation as mere difference: concrete being would be only a determination of it—determination in a sense which will appear presently. In the latter case where the illusory object is regarded as an object which is no object, negation does not mean mere difference: contradiction itself which is no abstract being is the starting point. We begin then by distinguishing these two starting points—abstract

being and contradiction and these we expect to indicate a deep line of cleavage throughout philosophy.

4. 'The different shades of views in the first type of thought require to be developed in order to be brought into definite relation to the second type.

(i) Negation emerges only when an illusion has been corrected, when, for example, we say 'A is real, *not* X'. Has X here anything to do to determine or define A? It may be held that A is here by its own right and that it owes nothing to X which is simply to be rejected or outgrown. 'A' which is wholly given is not X: it gains or loses nothing by rejecting X. There is no relation between A and X to define A: truth is never determined by relation, truth *is not* relation, i.e., all relation is illusory. Negation is always difference in this type of thought; all relation implies difference, and the primal relation is the difference between fact and illusion. Hence the relation between two facts A and B is itself no fact: each of them is a fact by its own right and each rejects the other as illusion. Positive relation between A and B is only this mutual rejection *by* two given beings: what *are* only rejected are not related at all, are neither identical nor different, and so the region of negation is the region of the indefinite.

(ii) If, however, A and B are negations of each other and yet facts, it may be said that an illusion X, by the correction of which A is posited, is only the name of *another fact*; only, this is not X, this is A. Something else is X, X is not nothing, and the illusion is only in the inherence of X in *this*. The illusion is not in the 'that' or in the 'what' of the given content but in their particular relation: a judgment alone can be false, not any term of the judgment, nor the bare relation apart from the terms. The false judgment however has a definite form, as definite as the corresponding true judgment; and the relation between these judgments is expressed in the definite negative judgment. 'This is X' is the false judgment corresponding to 'this is A', the true judgment; and their relation is 'this is not X'. In fact the primal judgment is simply the opposition between two terms like 'this A' and 'this X' expressed as 'this A is not this X', through which there emerge the affirmative judgments 'this is A' and 'this is X' and the concepts of truth and falsity as applied to them. The simple negation appears as a difference between two terms but is really an opposition between two judgments and in fact the judgments are judgments because of this simple negation. All relation is at bottom this simple negation or difference, the opposition of truth and falsity is the opposition of a true and false relation, and so relation is not necessarily

an illusion as in the previous view. Truth, however, in this view is the *relation* of two beings as set against some other relation: not the abstract beings but these as related constitute the true starting point. This relation is never without the terms, nor the terms without the relation; and yet neither side is *constituted* by the other. This relation which keeps up the difference of the terms and is itself different from them is *inherence*. So we have as facts not only particular given beings but also particular relations of these beings, illusions being included in such particular relations. In this view then, illusions are particular and definite relations: the relations of terms, which are facts are not constituted by these illusions and so terms too are not constituted by their relation.

(iii) It may be asked however, if terms and their relation are inseparable, if in the primal negative judgment, 'this A is not thisX', the illusion is inseparable from the fact, and if both the illusion and the fact are particular and definite, by what criterion are illusion and fact distinguished at all? In the view just considered, each negation is at once the distinction; but then as there is no *universal* negation, so there can be no universal fact-character also. This means that fact and illusion are not distinguishable by any general character at all. A particular fact is *not* the corresponding illusion and it is *not* also another fact: there is nothing to distinguish these two negations. So the conclusion should be that a particular fact and the corresponding illusion are *identical* and that the positive relation of inherence, therefore, is reducible to this identity of position and negation.

Particularity in the first two views as above considered is ultimately *given*. In the present view however, the particularity of a position is constituted by that of its negation and vice versa. Each position is different from an infinity of other positions and is thus constituted by an infinity of differences, by infinite negation. Each negation too would thus be the negation of infinite position i.e., a negation identical with infinite position. There would thus emerge the conception of the identity-in-difference of the finite and the infinite, and of infinite negation and infinite position. Every term, however, is not only constituted by its negation of other terms but it is also, as explained in the previous view, through such negation turned into a judgment, relation, or negation opposed to i.e., negating other judgments, relations or negations. A whirl of negation then alone remains but it is still regarded as the positive.

(iv) There is nothing however to distinguish such a positive from negation. Here then we definitely leave behind abstract being

which was our first starting point and start with contradiction itself or transcendent negation as our first principle. We may next take being as only *'posited'* by this negation. The uniqueness of particularity is then not removed and need not also be removed. It is not taken indeed as ultimately *given*: it is held as *free* determination by this negation but yet as inexplicable or unpredictable. From the vortex of negation *any* particular may spring and so particulars have only to be accepted as they come and related into a world, positive for all particular purposes but with an absolute inexplicability as the ground of it all. We have accordingly equal right to take particular being as *superseded* by this inexplicability or retracted into this whirl of negation.

5. Being then is progressively reduced to negation in these four views. In view (i), the particular simple beings are ultimately given and are not in any way determined by negation or the indefinite. In view (ii), both the beings and their negations are given as particular and so all relations are also given as facts. In view (iii), particularity is not given but posited or constituted by definite absolute negation. This however does not abolish their dualism: their identity and their difference remain as inexplicabilities, though not as given beings. In view (iv) finally, being is abolished and absolute negation alone remains, not only as inexplicably definite but also as inexplicably self-related or self-negating i.e., as a free function or activity.

6. The true value of these views of negation appears in the concrete types of philosophy and religion in which they take shape. They indicate certain distinctive temperaments or attitudes towards truth, certain familiar modes of handling a given content. One's first impulse is to attend to what is confusedly given, to break up its continuity, to single out its elements, to analyse. It is the attitude of positive attention to the elements and although it means the withdrawal of the mind from the given confused content, this negative direction of attention is not itself attended to. The given confused aspect also is not attended to, it is simply forgotten or left behind. The next stage is that in which the given aspect is remembered along with the elements analysed out, is distinguished from them and is recognised to contain them. The elements are separated and also related. The given complex and the relation of the elements alternate in the mind, though the alternation itself is not attended to. In the next stage again, the given complex is taken as identical with the related elements and so the elements themselves are felt to be identical. When thus however alternation is stopped and difference superseded by positive attention

to this identity, the identity has lost the placid being of the given: it is felt to be an inexplicability, a dream, a being that is negation through and through—a perfect revel of negation. Positive attention denies itself utterly and the denial itself is known, not by positive attention to it but by attention directed to the positive object alone. Positive attention is recognised as a withdrawal from its own withdrawing activity; in other words, negative attention is known by negative attention to it.

7. In all accounts of attention, the positive direction is alone emphasised: it alone is taken to be under control and capable of being cultured. To try to know or to do something is to positively attend: and even to try to forget it or avoid is to attend to something else. And yet in all knowing and in all doing, one has a consciousness of the problem before the effort to solve it, a very peculiar kind of consciousness rousing and regulating the effort, containing in fact both the solution and the effort already within it. It is the 'aching void' of James, of which all determinate knowledge and action are the materialisation. This materialisation is ordinarily left to chance and it is never suggested that negative attention which is the very heart of all mental process can be controlled or cultured by any intensive discipline.

8. The modern pragmatist resolution of truth into will means a recognition in one form of this fourth type of negation. The will that constructs all truth and therefore denies the right of all absolute truth is nothing but this creative negation. Not that pragmatism has suggested any system of discipline for this truth-constructing will: it has not yet told us *how* to construct any particular truth. In this respect it is on a par with absolutism which pronounces reason to be creative of truth but cannot present any method of obtaining a particular truth other than the method of experience. So too the neo-Hegelian formula of self-realisation furnishes no ethical discipline other than that presented by positive morality. When Hegel and others sought to *deduce* physics or history, they recognised the legitimacy of this demand for a method other than experience for obtaining particular truths, though they did not satisfy the demand. This method cannot be other than a discipline of negative attention, the process of accentuating the 'aching void', the deliberate endeavour to see what we *want* to see i.e., to know the want itself or the particular ignorance.

9. We know the absence of an object, say of a book on the table by a faculty which is neither perception nor inference. It is not perception, for the absence gives no sensation; and it cannot be inference, for inference must be based on perception. The faculty

however being there, it may be helped out by the perception or inference. It is nearest to psychological introspection, though it knows objective non-existence and not subjective existence merely. The non-existence of a book on the table is an objective fact known by negative attention, defined by relation to the facts obtained by positive attention. Through this negative attention then, we also know a particular negation or absence of knowledge, know the want of a solution and therefore the solution itself. Negative introspective attention accordingly is the faculty that requires to be controlled.

10. The first type of negation which we have considered implies no recognition of the necessity for this control. It leaves the discovery of truth entirely to chance. It suggests nothing but the anxiety to escape the given. It is a mode of self-will in the intellectual region: let only attention assert itself and some truth will come. Still the escape here is nothing but negative attention which however does not know itself. The will is unregenerate here, uncontrolled, capricious: it wants to possess or to rest in the positive, wants anyhow to discharge itself only. In the second type, there is already some sort of recognition of negative attention. There is the positive eagerness still to catch the truth but there is no satisfaction or rest in what is caught and hence there is the positive anxiety to return to the given. The consciousness of the possession of a truth is accompanied by a haunting sense of the truth left behind and so each truth is alternately possessed and left behind. Nothing is rejected, everything is only distinguished, and all judgments are taken to be true but different. This haunting sense of the truth left behind, this positive attention to difference is negative attention itself turned inside out. The unregenerate assertive tendency is still regnant but it is the *negation* that is asserted as a positive difference. The difference is however not taken as constitutive of the position, as it is taken in the third view. This would be the next stage then where positive attention and negative attention are employed as one process, where what is known and what is unknown are viewed as in one necessary system of truth which however is still only positive. This truth in which the will finds rest—for it is still anxious for rest—is not dull being but a free play, a moving identity. So the dream of the construction of truth arises here: truth appears at least as a play of reason, as a music which the mind follows and feels it can reproduce but cannot reproduce. The will cannot construct a particular truth, for it has not faith enough in its omnipotence, though there is an irresistible feeling of omniscience i.e., of truth being absolutely transparent. Hence arise on the one hand the absurdities of

Natur-philosophie and the indolent acquiescence on the other in all given reality as rational. The newness or uniqueness of intuition remains over after all dialectic which proves at best that intuition must be unique. The experience of quality is still utterly unpredictable and religion mocks all attempts to trace its evolution. Faith lours ahead as a dark cloud that refuses to be transparent to reason. The free and undoubting play of reason, the facile dream of the transparency of truth gives place to the absolute abruptness of quality and the deathlike seriousness of faith. Negative attention refuses to be positive: it denies its assertive tendency utterly. All truth is retracted into this self-denying negative attention and what remains over is but the demand for its intensive discipline.

11. We began with a discussion of illusion as a clue to the ascertainment of the several types of negation. To bring out their nature in more concrete terms, it is necessary to consider the illusion of an illusion. It involves a double correction or negation. Something is believed to be real, it is next taken to be illusory, and then again on closer observation it may be pronounced to be *not* illusory. The question is what 'not illusory' means. In the first view, illusion which is the name of the utterly indefinite gets some kind of definition in this connexion. Negation being negated becomes definite though not positive, being set against a positive. This definite negation or 'definite indefinite' is the subjective, the *merely* subjective, which the corresponding positive is *not*. The subjective not only does not constitute the positive, it does not determine it in any way. It means a double triumph for the positive alone: it is not merely by its own right, it asserts this right explicitly. So to say 'this object is not illusory' is to say that this object is not *merely* subjective but is self-identical. There emerges then against the notion of the subjective the notion of the self-existent simple which explicitly rejects all relation and all complexity and is the self-conserving real or monad. So then a double series comes out, the series of the reals as rejecting the subjective series, real atomism *versus* psychical atomism. The self-conserving function of the real is only the function of rejection, for which the real is neither the better nor the worse and so it is nothing real by itself. Yet here it gets a pseudo-objective character: it is the activity or energy of the real. On the other side the subjective is rejected i.e., the definiteness of the idea is proved to be nothing and this predicament of being rejected, like the function of rejecting, gets a pseudo-definiteness as the conscious activity of the idea. This conscious activity of the idea would be called 'thought', being more unreal than the idea and yet on that very ac-

count nearer the positive as the cognition of truth. In this negative or illusory region lies the concept of identity-in-difference. The reals are distinct as rejecting all relation and each idea is distinct as being rejected by a distinct real. But the energies of the reals, which are essentially illusory, have not the distinctness of the reals and hence would arise the notion of one energy or self-activity turning up many different energies. This objective self-activity again would be taken as negating a corresponding subjective self-activity, viz., a self-conscious self determining all cognitions of truth. Such then would be the illusory emanations of negation, the implications of the illusion of illusion in the first view.

12. In the second view, negation being negated becomes not only definite but also positive. Only, this positive would be of a different order from the positive of which it is the negation. This positive being of illusion is our ordinary subjective idea which is not to be disparaged as the merely subjective i.e., as nothing at all. Here too this idea does not constitute the object: each of them is self-identical by being distinguished from the other. We have nothing but particular negations in this view and the relations among these negations are of a different order from the relations among the positions. Not-A and not-B are like A and B distinct but not-A rejects A in a way different from that in which A rejects not-A. The idea is conscious of not being object but the object distinguishes itself from the idea by not being conscious. Hence arises the circumstance that an object is definitely related to other *objects* only. In the subjective region, two ideas are not the same though they know, i.e., consciously distinguish themselves from, the same object and so the definite objective relations need not be reflected in correspondingly definite relations of ideas. The ideas may have orders of their own which do not reflect the objective order at all: hence the distinction between true and false cognition. False cognitions would be relations of ideas without the definiteness of the relations of things. Hence while we have the notion of a single system of objects, we cannot speak of the system of ideas as single, which as distinct from the single object-system must be regarded as *many* systems, many minds each definitely related to other minds but indefinitely within itself and to the object-system. Yet the indefinite as such has no place in this view: definite cognitions and indefinite cognitions are alike definite as ideas, definitely connected with the selves as unconscious substrata.

13. In the third view, the illusion of an illusion is not only definite and positive subjective being but as the original illusion which

was pronounced subjective is turned objective, the given is taken to be the identity of the subjective and objective. The distinctness of a particular given position and the corresponding negation vanishes altogether: what is now taken as objective may appear to be subjective and this subjective again may turn out to be objective and so on indefinitely. It may be said that the objective at which we stop at any stage is only *possibly* subjective and has not yet been actually corrected. But every stage is believed to be contingent because there is no ground to believe that it is final. One may be uncertain whether it will turn out to be illusory but uncertainty or indefiniteness has no place either in this view or in the previous view. The uncertainty itself is here a definite negation of knowledge: the stopping at any object is a definite illusion or definite subjective being which is identical with the corresponding reality of absolute knowledge. Limit itself is posited by reason. All truth is hypothesis and all hypothesis is true: the particular truth which is not yet turned into hypothesis is only a hypothesis in relation to the absolute truth. Thus there emerges the identity-indifference of the given truth and its explanation. The given by itself is abstract thing-in-itself and the explanation by itself is abstract reason. Each is the negation of the other and their synthesis is the concrete positive, the absolute Idea.

14. In the fourth view, this synthesis of mutual negation is not positive at all. The manner in which the present actual stage of knowledge is resolved into a contingency in the previous view may not be accepted as satisfactory. The difference between the problematic and the assertory statements—that the present object *may* be illusory and that it *is* illusory—may be felt to be an absolute difference; and to cover the defect by saying that all particularity *must be* resolvable into universality may sound very much like a bravado. That uncertainty whether or not what is now believed to be real will turn out to be illusory either appears not to affect the belief at all or if it does, it points to a feeling of certitude about the unknowable which is stronger than all knowledge. To say that the feeling is itself the highest knowledge, that this uncertainty is what is *reasonably* to be expected will not remove the uncertainty itself. The uncertainty in fact deepens: it is uncertain whether we should begin philosophy with the *assurance* that uncertainty is necessary or with the *uncertainty* itself.

15. This deeper uncertainty about the starting point of philosophy should, for all we know, be itself the starting point; but meanwhile there may be attempts at compromise. The assurance of reason may be accepted along with the inexpressible negation of it. The posi-

tive may be taken along with the negative but as transcending it. On the one hand, Ideas of Platonic type may be believed to transcend a negative matter and yet to work with it, or on the other the unknowable or unknowables may be regarded as transcending all knowables and yet as positively conditioning them. In either case a positive use is made of negation: it is either the matter that is formed or the real cause, never a bare nothing. There are those who object to all such positive use of negation, although they do not bring out the real implication of their objection viz., that a negative use is to be made of negation. In the fourth view of negation then, what is 'not illusory' is the unknown of which we are aware by the absence of positive knowledge. Here the principle is uncertainty itself, the uncertain alternation between the unknown and this awareness of the unknown.

16. It is this alternation which takes the form of the uncertainty whether philosophy is to start with the faith that all our finality or positiveness, all unique quality, all our present truth in fact is explicable or necessarily to be expected in respect of us as merely finite beings—with this very halting and withal very assured form of omniscience, or with these inexplicabilities themselves. Neither the given nor the explanation, no positive in fact is the beginning or the process or the goal of philosophy. The identity of the given and the explanation, or of the objective and subjective is the last thinkable positive which alternates with negation. This identity (or reason) is a process and as such is itself a negation opposed to a transcendent negation. This latter negation may be indifferently called subjective will (or interest) constructing all truth, or vital impulse moulding a matter known only as its negation, or absolute will determining at once reason and Ideas. It is not the merely subjective of view (i), nor the subjective co-ordinate with the objective of view (ii), nor the absolute reason of view (iii). The negative use of this transcendent negation is religion which is the negation of philosophy and therefore also the true philosophy.

17. Here also in the final stage, the first three views of negation may alternate. The first type would be the religion of *nirvāṇa*, consisting in an absolute dissatisfaction with the definite dualism of truth and untruth. The negation of negation is itself negation, the dualism of true and false is itself false. The second type would be the religion of absolute toleration, which is a dissatisfaction with all negation, an absolute condemnation of the attitude in which any religion is declared to be false. The negation of any religion is absolute negation and the negation of this absolute negation gives the absolute

truth of all particular affirmations, all particular religions. The third type would present the faith in all religious being not only true but identical. The absolute negation and the particular absolute affirmations are mutual negations in identity. This identity and this mutual negation are then the terminal points of all philosophy. Either side is beyond the dualism of definite truth and untruth.

18. Such is the logic of the manifoldness of truth. The pragmatist interpretation of this manifoldness makes philosophy subjectivistic and logic temperamental. We have endeavoured here to give an absolute, instead of a subjectivistic, interpretation.

PLACE OF THE INDEFINITE IN LOGIC

ANALYSIS*

(i) Logic which ordinarily deals with the definite refers to the indefinite (i) as only subjective, (ii) as an epistemological element of the definite, or (iii) as the dialective function of negation constructive of the definite. Should not logic find place for the absolute indefinite, in view especially of the metaphysic of the irrational?

(2-5) Logic as dealing with the form of all thought-content should consider primarily if there is any form which is not matter i.e., which is prior to all determinate doctrine and controversy, scientific and metaphysical. Epistemology, as it is, presupposes determinate principles supposed to be above criticism and hence it lapses into metaphysics. Logic should criticise the basis of this science and start with an absolutely abstract first principle which can be neither a self-evident axiom nor a contingent law, viz., with the bare dualism of the definite and the indefinite, to deny which is to admit it. All dualisms except this admit of a third something beyond. If stated as a law at all, the principle would be 'the definite is not and is the indefinite', i.e., the line between the definite and the indefinite is itself indefinable.

(5-7) It is different from the dialectic principle of the identity of being and non-being which lays more stress on identity than on difference. Against dialectic, it urges that there is an alternative—unreason—beyond the identity of being and non-being which is reason; against conceptualist logic, that there is the indeterminate beyond determinate affirmation and negation; and against empirical logic, that the positive object of experience is a determination carved out of the indeterminate. It not only thus extends but modifies the logic of the definite: it brings out the indefinite given character of determinate experience, of relation (including contradiction), and of systemic or necessary unity quite as much as it emphasises their character as determinate negations of the indefinite.

(8-10) Logic starts neither with pure being and non-being nor with determinate being and non-being but with '*this* determinate', where determinateness or 'this-ness' is being or negation or their identity and the 'this' a transcendental indefinite. This indefinite is determined into the relation in a judgment—identity and difference; and so of affirmation and negation, neither is prior to the other. The necessity in reasoning, again, is in reference to this indefinite, whether taken as a given system of position as in empirical logic, as a given system of

analytic relations as in conceptualist logic, or as a given self-creating system of functions as in dialectic.

(11-16) Dialectic only shows that a given category *was* necessary: it does not create it and yet *somehow* such prophecy after the event is synthetic knowledge. As, however, the inferential expectation of material truth is only probable, the ideal form of inference has to be distinguished from the material process. To conceptualist logic, this form of analytic necessity is *given* and is *somehow* applied to the matter of experience. To empirical logic, the material process—from particulars to particulars—which is really indefinite is *somehow* definite. Kant shows that the forms of conceptualist logic are not merely given but are synthetic necessities, they being necessarily applicable to experience which, however, in its particularity is unanticipable. So Spencer shows against empirical logic that inference is not only a psychological transition but implies a consciousness of necessity or justification and that the given definite experience is but the unknowable breaking forth into the relation of difference. Both bring out the transcendental indefinite but both take it uncritically to be *real*. But the indefinite is really a third category, beyond reality and negation, and thus not a transcendental implicate only but a content of positive logic. It may be called unknowable negation or reality and so metaphysically we may deny the knowable world, not only in absolute intuition but in logical thought and admit at the same time determinate noumena or phenomena or both as real specifications of the indefinite. We may make a metaphysical use of the indefinite in either way; and in reference to this indefinite, the distinction between necessity and fact, negation and position itself becomes indefinite.

(17) Two applications : (i) *all and some*. In 'all A', the denotation determined by the definite connotation is definite as denying the indeterminate differences of the particulars which are still implied; and 'some A' means not only this indefinite but also a definite, suggesting that the connotation of A is indefinitely modified by a determinative *x*. So sub-alternation may or may not be opposition.

(18-26) (ii) *Negative conditional propositions*. In logic of the definite, conditionals are admitted only as intending a definite element *explicitly against* a mass of indefinite implication; and negation (i.e., indefinite negation) of this definite element is supposed only to yield abortive propositions. Yet such negation may be practically useful and so the negative hypothetical should be a definite form in logic. The indefinite disjunctive 'A is either B or not-B', where not-B stands for a definite or an indefinite positive or for nothing at all, is really

negative in relation to the definite 'A is either B or C' and is in fact the very form of ultimate alternation between knowledge and ignorance, between the definite and the indefinite.

PLACE OF THE INDEFINITE IN LOGIC

1. The purpose of this paper is to examine what modifications of logical doctrine would be necessitated by the admission of the indefinite in logic, side by side with definite position and definite negation. In logic which ordinarily deals with the definite content of thought only, the indefinite is considered in at least three ways. It may be regarded explicitly as extralogical, as only something subjective or psychological which it is the purpose of the science to outgrow or supersede. Sometimes it is treated as provisionally definite; both the uncertain and certain relation of the knowing faculty to the object is taken to yield definite forms of positive logic, the indefinite in fact being admitted as only an epistemological element of the definite content of logic.* In dialectic, it is taken as definite function of truth itself, as the *function* of negation which is neither a mere epistemological element nor a static truth by itself but still a constructive factor of definite truth only. Our inquiry is whether and how logic should find place for the absolute indefinite as distinct from the indefinite that is only constitutive of the definite and our *prima facie* justification for the inquiry is that there is such a thing as a metaphysic of absolute doubt—at least a philosophy of the irrational—and that logic as the prolegomena to all science and metaphysics should not commit itself to the particular metaphysical faith in the finality of a definite system of truth. The indefinite has found in fact a place in metaphysics in many forms. To mention only a few at random, there is the 'negative' matter of Plato, the *māyā* of the Vedāntists, and the *śūnyam* or 'void' of the Buddhists. There is the notion of objective chance in Aristotle and of the inexplicable change of direction of the atoms of Lucretius. There is the conception of the indeterminate will, specially in the extreme form of unmotivated or irrational activity, as presented by a Duns Scotus, a Schopenhauer, or a Bergson and there is finally the Unknowable whether of Kant or of Spencer. These notions are at present homeless in logic; there is no category to express them and disputes arise in connexion with them in metaphysic which properly should have arisen in logic itself.

2. It is necessary to begin by clearly defining the scope of logic as conceived here. Whatever may have been the origin of the science, in its present state it can hardly be treated except mainly as a positive

* See ref. to Venn § 19.

science distinct alike from psychology and the objective sciences and concerned with the most abstract principles, not only of all science, but of all philosophy. It deals with the object or content of all knowledge claimed as such and in this sense is an objective science, though the object here means all thinkables, subjective, objective, and absolute. It considers only the form of the object, not the matter and so its primary problem should be whether there is any form which is not matter, which is not determinate, which is undeniably presupposed in all determinate concrete thought, accepted or disputed, which in fact—paradoxical as it may sound—is not affected even by the uncertainty of this problem. It is not the primary purpose of logic to develop this form, if it can be discovered, into the ground-principles or categories of the several concrete departments of thought. That would be committing oneself to a particular system of metaphysic; and logic, as prior to all metaphysic, can only indicate these by way of bringing out all that it does not deal with. For purposes of logic, in other words, it should be assumed that all intuitions that are claimed as such and all sciences and philosophies *may* be true; it must be universal in the sense not only of presenting the form common to all that is claimed as knowledge but also as presenting the form of all doubt and dispute.

3. This view of logic is forced upon us by the circumstance that it has to take account not only of the positive sciences but also of metaphysics. Metaphysics in re-opening the fundamental questions assumed to be settled in the sciences presents many alternative solutions of which it is not for logic to accept or reject any on the ground of commonsense, for the whole purpose of the science is to replace the rough and ready rule of the thumb. A similar problem gave rise to epistemology as a prolegomena to all branches of knowledge claimed as such but there is this difference from logic as we conceive it here that it itself represents a body of knowledge that is determinate or uncriticised, resting as it does either on the authority of introspection or on that of traditional logic for the solution of the critical problem without a prior criticism of these authorities themselves. This prior criticism, if undertaken, would yield us logic proper, with its absolutely abstract or fundamental character. If epistemology has not been able so far to maintain its role of a prolegomena and has come to be a mere chapter in some metaphysical system, dialectical or other, it is because it has not stripped itself, to start with, of all determinate presuppositions, because in fact it has not been fundamental enough. That the transcendental logic of Kant, for example,

led to the positive dialectic logic of Hegel only shows that the antithesis between the transcendental and positive is not absolute in the sphere of the determinate. In both, the abstractions with which logic is taken to be conversant are taken to be constructive functions: they are viewed as at once analytic and synthetic. In Kant, the analytic moment indeed remains transcendental in view of a consciousness of a limit to reason, of an indefinite thing-in-itself; but this consciousness of the indefinite is not taken seriously to affect the epistemology itself. The definite unity of the self and its synthetic specification into a definite system of categories are obviously suggested by the presuppositions of a particular system of metaphysic, viz., the developmental, and the indefinite itself is taken to be *real* without criticism. Logic in our present conception, however, in endeavouring to supply the abstract form of epistemological knowledge itself would stand on a height of abstraction where the distinction of the transcendental and the positive is obliterated. The synthetic developmental principle has no necessary place in it any more than the principle of determinate identity, for it has no right to build on a determinate metaphysical presupposition: the principle of logic should be absolutely abstract.

4. Can we have such a science at all? If we demand a criticism of epistemology, should we not demand a criticism of the criticism and so on ad infinitum? Epistemology starts with a principle that it believes to be self-evident or necessary. If however, a real doubt is cast on the principle, if the basis of intuition or axiom in general is challenged as it has been challenged, logic as such has no right to enter into the dispute and to take sides; and so on in criticising epistemology, it cannot stand on any so-called necessary or self-evident principle. To start with a determinate contingent principle would be equally absurd and so it can only stand on an indeterminate principle which can indifferently be called necessary or contingent. This principle can be no other than the bare dualism of the definite and indefinite, in which neither has even the specific implication of reality or unreality. A further criticism of this dualism is unintelligible, for the negation of the principle is nothing other than the principle itself.

5. To explicate this principle. The most abstract and comprehensive dualism that can be conceived is that between the definite and the indefinite. It is possible to show in the case of any other dualism that can be proposed that there is a *third* something beyond it. Even in the case of being and non-being, one can cite an indefinite

that is neither, call it the unknowable or freedom or whatever else. It is not necessary to present the dualism of definite and indefinite in the form of a judgment as a law of thought, for the law-form is only a form among forms: the judgment is not the necessary logical unit in such logic as is conceived here. But if a law-form is demanded for this principle—the word ‘principle’ is sufficiently general in philosophical usage, it may be presented in the paradoxical form—the indefinite is not and is indefinite at once. It is similar to the dialectical principle of the identity of being and not-being but there is the difference that in the latter, more stress is laid in the last resort on the identity than on the difference between the opposed terms: the synthesis of position and negation is uncritically taken to be only positive, and the final synthesis viz., the absolute is taken as a positive system of truth. In the principle we have presented, equal stress is laid on the identity and difference of the opposed terms; what it amounts to is that the line between the definite and the indefinite is itself indefinite that the minimum of difference from the indefinite that constitutes the abstract definite is a vanishing quantity.

6. The difference from the dialectical principle can be stated in another way. The ground principle of logic has been formulated in at least three ways—in the form of system or reason, in the form of relation or judgment, and in the form of an irrelative term, intuition or experience. The identity of being and non-being points to the conception of system as the ruling conception of dialectic. In conceptualist or intuitionist logic, the fundamental principle is best conceived as a relation between positive terms i.e., as an ordinary judgment like ‘this being is not another being’. In empirical logic, an experience is the test of its own truth and so the basal principle may be formulated as ‘this determinate being (Mill) or this determinate becoming (Bain) which is not non-being.’ In the principle proposed for the logic of the indefinite, no preference is implied for any of these three forms. It is best put as a mere dualism or opposition, definite *and* indefinite, the ‘and’ expressing apparently the very form of illogicality or the despair of knowledge. It really however expresses the inadequacy of the three forms aforesaid. As against the form of reason, the dialectical principle, it indicates an alternative—unreason—beyond reason: position and negation are not necessarily the moments of the positive absolute. As against the form of judgment, the conceptualist principle as we may call it, it suggests that beyond determinate affirmation and negation, there is the indeterminate (though it may be practically useful) form of doubt or

ignorance. As against the form of the irrelative determinate term—we call it the experimental principle provisionally—it points out that the positive object of experience is always a determination carved out of the indeterminate. It suggests, in fact, that the indefinite has to be recognised as standing outside the term, the judgment, and the inference, that one should go beyond ordinary logic which simply turns its back on the outlying indefinite and looks to the definite as the sole content of thought.

7. Such recognition of the indefinite implies not only an extension of logical doctrine: it involves also a material modification of the logic of the definite. With regard to the term, for example, the determinate object of experience, our principle shows that the boundaries that demarcate it from the surrounding indefinite are themselves indefinite or indefinable, that the particularity of 'this determinate' is something unique which can neither be taken as a separate definite category nor as a necessary determination of the universal and accordingly the 'this' may be indifferently taken as either being (Mill) or as transition (Bain).^a With regard to the judgment-form, it is pointed out that definite relation, affirmative and negative, is itself indefinite, that if relation is given fact, the 'givenness' is an indeterminate which can be regarded either as an abrupt positive or as a negation of the indefinite and that the negation of the indefinite is indifferently affirmative or negative i.e., the distinction between affirmative and negative is indefinable or in other words, contradiction is just as conceivable as otherwise.^b With regard to the form of reasoning, our principle would indicate that system or necessary relation is as much a given fact as a negation of negation and that this negation

^a Within empiricism in fact is reproduced the opposition between the conceptualistic and dialectic views of the *principium individuationis*. To conceptualist logic, individuality as such is properly a unique category of thought, a simple ultimate thought, and there is sometimes a tendency to abolish it altogether. To dialectic, it is a construction through thought as a function. (i) In the empiricism of Mill, corresponding to the simple thought of 'this', appears 'this' individual experience, this given simple being. (ii) In Bain however, experience is taken to be a transition; properly no term is given but only a passage, a differentiation between terms. Individuality is only an arbitrary point in this transitional process; it is a conflux of relations or generalities. Existence is admitted as a separate category, distinct from co-existence, sequence, and resemblance by Mill but not by Bain. These conflicting views only show that the unit-term or the individual is at once definite and indefinite, the latter aspect being systematically ignored in ordinary logic.

^b Here within conceptualism is reproduced the opposition between empirical and dialectical views of *relation*. To empiricism, relation is a given experience; the elementary relations of likeness and difference are taken as ultimate feelings. To dialectic, it is the *function* of negation, the negation of immediacy, the self-distinction of the given. The conceptualist view splits up into at least two types: (i) relation is an ultimate given thought and here the ultimate difference between empiricism and intuitionism is a vanishing one. All relation in fact is positive;

of negation may be taken as equivalent to position or negation indifferently.*

8. With the Hegelians then, we admit the identity of being and non-being or necessity but hold that this necessity is itself a contingent fact. So the contradiction between being and non-being is to us as much an object of thought as their non-contradiction; a contradictory judgment is neither inadmissible nor is merely a moment in the necessity of dialectical identity. So, too, the determinate *this* has not simply being and negation in its constitution but also the indefinite or the Unknowable.

9. The indeterminate being or non-being with which Hegel starts is not the same as our indefinite. In the term, 'this determinate', 'this' is something unique to which neither the terms, 'being' or non-being can be applied, though 'thisness' or determinate being may be taken as an identity of being and non-being. As constitutive of 'thisness' then, the indeterminate being or non-being of Hegel is still definite in our sense: 'this' as transcending 'thisness' is unanalysable, indefinable, or indefinite. 'This determinate' may thus be analysed into the three principles—the indefinite, being, and non-being. In reference to the criticism of the Hegelian position that logic should start with determinate being rather than with pure being, we hold that the indefinite, being, and non-being can all be taken as the starting point indifferently, these being all implied in 'this determinate'.

10. With reference to the judgment, our contention is that it is equally true to say that the terms are or are not constituted by their relation, that in it a given matter of fact, a 'this' which is neither definite being nor definite non-being is determined into a relation of

negation itself is but positive difference. (ii) Positive relation and negative relation are co-ordinate: absence or void is a category side by side with existence. The given positive stands over against its definite negation: the primary difference is not difference between two positives but between position and negation, this negation being thus a sort of being or position. Thus the distinction between affirmation and negation becomes indefinable. Negation is not being and yet a sort of being. These conflicting views show again that what is taken to be definite relation in ordinary logic is really indefinite.

* The opposition between empiricism and conceptualism has to be traced as affecting the integrity of the dialectic view of *system* or necessary relation. To empiricism, system is no given being: the past does not *exist* in the present and yet the present is what it is *because* of the past. The ground of present knowledge is always non-existent. To conceptualism, the relation of ground and consequent is an eternally existent thought. The dialectic movement presents both these tendencies without reconciling them. As the ground of itself (*natura naturans*), it is a transition, negation of negation, freedom—no existent being. As the consequence of itself (*natura naturata*), it is the *existent* absolute, the *truth* that is thought through and through. This alternation of the dynamic and static aspects in dialectic points to the fact that system or reason is indefinite in its very constitution.

terms, that the relation is at once identity and difference in reference to this indefinite, and that apart from this indefinite, it is just as true to say that there is as that there is not necessary mutual implication between identity and difference, that the affirmative relation is and that it is not prior to the negative.* As to reasoning, the necessity implied in the 'therefore' is taken by Hegel as the self-creating dialectic of truth itself, as the position created by the negation of negation. In empirical logic, it is taken to be the position contingently reached through other positions, as a particular reached through particulars; and in conceptualist logic, it is the mere explication of a position by negation, as a rendering of a universal premise analytically definite by an individualising minor premise. We, however, hold that the new something reached in the conclusion is really a definition of the indefinite matter to which reasoning has reference and that the necessity is but a contingent fact in this reference.

11. Hegelian Logic does not admit the indefinite but holds instead that dialectic necessity is creative. Its strength lies however only in *seeing* that a real category of given experience *was* necessary, not really in yielding any new category or creating it. Hence where it has sought to create, critics have only seen a dismal failure or found that it was a sort of prophesying after the event. This inability to create is, in fact, the implicit admission of the indefinite. What the critics do not bring out however is that this retrospective prophecy, this *seeing* that a stage which has emerged *was* necessary is a true seeing: they have yet to explain why the dialectic exposition which is not at least explicitly analytic *fits* the category deduced, how an apparent continuity between an old and a new category is at all established by the mere process of negation of negation. It is a form of the old question how what is anticipated by inference comes to be verified by experience and to call it a mere accident or to understand

* The judgment 'A is B' has been understood in at least three ways: (i) A does not exist when A B exists. (ii) A exists when A B exists, (iii) A exists *because* A B does not exist but is a function—the empirical, conceptualist, and dialectic views respectively in typical form. Taking ii, A is in the limit the unique 'this', transcending the determination A B. As indeterminate, it is as much definite being as negation and thus (i) is justified along with (ii). So in (iii), A B, the function or negation, is i.e. constitutes A, the existent. Thus A or 'this' is negation, being, and their identity in i, ii, iii respectively: it is in (i) the not-given (not-now-given), in (ii) the given and in (iii) the existent through not being given. A B then is (i) not A, (ii) is not A and yet in A, and (iii) is A by being not A; in other words, the negative relation is *after* the affirmative, *co-ordinate with* the affirmative and *before* the affirmative in the three views.—All these variations of view point to the circumstance that relation is at once definite and indefinite: the admission of the indefinite justifies and falsifies all these views.

a preestablished harmony is simply to give up the problem of explanation.

12.' At the same time it is true that such anticipations of inference are not sometimes verified, that only probable truths are reached actually by inference and hence the justification for taking the inferential form as only an ideal and for distinguishing it from the material process of inference itself. This amounts on the one hand to the admission of the analytic necessity within this ideal form as itself *given* and as *somehow* applicable to the indefinite matter of experience and on the other to the view that the synthetic material process is a definite necessity inexplicably emerging out of the indefinite. In conceptualist logic, the definite analytic necessity within the syllogism is understood as the given or intuited ideal and error or uncertainty is taken as only the accident of application. In empirical logic where the ideal is nothing and the material process is all, it only amounts to saying that *somehow* as a matter of fact we pass from particulars to other particulars which are sometimes verified.

13. As against conceptualist logic, Kant holds that the forms of positive logic are not merely given but are synthetic apriori necessities at bottom, that their applicability to experience is not accidental but necessary, that however although matter in general is necessarily demanded by form, *what* specifically the matter will be is unknowable. The Kantian view thus brings out the latent implication of the indefinite in the intuited character and applicability of the forms admitted in conceptualist logic. As against empirical logic, Spencer points out that unless logic is to lapse into psychology, the ideal form has to be taken as necessarily presupposed in the material process, that inference is inference only as implying the consciousness of justification or necessary ground, that this necessary ground or axiom is not only the consolidation of contingent experiences but has the implication of the inconceivability of the opposite and that experience taken as the *given* definite in empirical logic is really the indefinite breaking forth into the relation of difference.

14. Both Kant and Spencer thus bring out the transcendent character of the indefinite but both uncritically take this indefinite to be the unknowable *reality*. Against this however we hold that the indefinite may as well be called the unknowable negation, that in fact it is a third category side by side with position and negation, that it is as much immanent in the definite as transcendent, and that therefore it is not simply the transcendental implicate of definite logic but the content of positive logic itself.

15. Our logic thus finds categories for widely different metaphysical notions of reality, for the notion of the knowable world as unreal in the last resort as well as for the notion of it as a real evolute in all different senses in which it has been taken. Logic as here conceived renders intelligible the denial of the unique positive reality of the given, not only in the sense in which Hegel understands it who admits the reality and takes it to be constructed by negation, but also in the absolute sense. The assertion of the ultimate falsity of the world—falsity not only to absolute intuition but to logical thought itself—is thus conceivable. In positive logic itself, not only is position to be conceived as negation of negation as it is conceived in dialectic: it is to be admitted also that negation of negation may be indefinite negation. At the same time we recognise that the indefinite may be regarded as real and as embodied in the definite axioms and experiences that we start with as positively *given*. We admit the truth both of conceptualist and empirical logic or—what is the same thing—we can conceive the metaphysical view that determinate noumena or phenomena or both side by side constitute the knowable world. There is nothing finally to prevent us from conceiving that this immanent being is to the transcendent real indefinite a real mode, effect, or objectification, that the definite is a real specification of the indefinite. We thus frankly make a positive use, logical and metaphysical, of the indefinite, unlike Kant and Spencer who while deprecating such positive use of the indefinite view it implicitly as the *real*. Conflicting epistemological notions are also thus logically conceivable: both necessity and fact can be understood alike as an emanation and evolute of the indefinite, and each may be regarded as the other—i.e., necessity may be taken as an inexplicable fact, as the positive stress of the indefinite real and given fact may be viewed as implying negation of an indefinite negation.

16. The general implications of our principle—the indefinite and definite are and are not one—have been brought out as demarcating the logic of the indefinite from other types of logic. The bearing of it on some details taken at random may be discussed by way of further elucidation.

17. *Conception of 'all' and 'some'*. Logic as dealing with the most abstract content of thought, definite and indefinite, has no direct interest in developing the determinate categories of the several departments of knowledge. If it refers to quantity then, even in the vague form of 'all' and 'some', it is only by way of bringing out what it does not deal with. The primary question is whether it starts

with the determinate or the indeterminate and our answer is that the starting point is 'this determinate', where 'this' is the unique indefinite. The difference of the definite and indefinite being itself indefinable, the difference of the determinates from one another is also indeterminate in the last resort. From the side of the definite as fixed by language, we deny this indeterminate difference which we are conscious of, by using the word 'all': the connotation is primarily meant as definite, in view however of the indeterminate differences of the particulars constituting the denotation. The word 'some' on the contrary primarily means this indeterminate difference in view of the definite connotation. The secondary accompaniment in each case is affected by the primary intention. We have said that the definite and the indefinite are not only different but identical and so the indefinite denotation of 'all A'—indefinite as fixed by connotation and not by enumeration—is itself a definite function or form in logic: and the definite connotation of 'some A'—viz., the connotation of A—is itself rendered indefinite, 'some A' being equivalent to 'all A x ' where x is an indefinite determination of A. In so far then as we say that the definite is *not* the indefinite, subalternation may be regarded as an opposition and not so in so far as we admit their identity: the truth of 'all' both denies and admits the truth of 'some'." This only means that quantity-difference which is the object or content of thought and not merely psychological is itself indefinite and that these contradictory views about 'all' and 'some' may be both true. Logic should consider this fact of alternation only: it should not be its business to develop the quantitative doctrine itself into some sort of logical algebra or geometry. Nor is it its business to settle the psychological or metaphysical question of the concept, although in thus defining its own business, it would indirectly indicate the germs of the concrete solutions of the question that have been presented.

* There are the two ordinary views: (i) 'some' means *not* 'all'; (ii) some does not deny 'all'—i.e. (i) some is a definite negation of 'all', (ii) 'some' is indefinite. In both views, 'some' is taken as both definite and indefinite in a sense e.g. in (i) though it means 'not all', it is indefinite which individuals and how many are meant.—Still it is held that this indefiniteness is only subjective: to logic, it means the definite 'not all', definite because 'not all A' means 'all A x '—i.e. the connotation of A as qualified by an unknown but real adjective x . In (ii), though 'some' is indefinite as not denying 'all', it means definitely at least one individual having the connotation of the class: the indefinite is thus provisionally treated as definite in logic. The second view does not assume what the first does that 'some A' is necessarily equivalent to *another* universal, viz., A x ; and the first does not assume what the second does that any individual A is definitely known to have the predicate B in the judgment 'some A is B'. The first would assert 'some A is B' on the two definite grounds (1) that at least one individual A has been found to be *not* B and (2) that therefore the real connection of B is not with A but with A x . The second would assert it on the ground (1) that at least one A is B and (2) that other A's are either B or not B.

18. *Negative conditional propositions.* Can conditional propositions be negative? (1) There are the opposite views about the hypothetical proposition—(a) As distinct from the categorical, its sole function is to express the logical or objective dependence of one relation on another. Non-dependence is no objective relation at all and requires no logical form to express it. The consciousness of it is purely privative: that I cannot connect a consequent with an antecedent is a mere subjective incapacity. There is therefore no negative hypothetical. (b) It may be contended however that in any case the negative categorical is allowed in this view (we need not discuss the extreme view according to which no negative relation is admitted in logic) i.e., the negative relation is admitted as objective, though with the implied assumption that it is equivalent to a definite affirmative which may not be known yet. As a logical form then, the negative categorical is admissible where subjectively there is the ignorance of its affirmative equivalent. Now there should be a difference between the dependence of an affirmative consequent and that of a negative consequent on a given antecedent. The quality of the dependence itself varies with the quality of the consequent and hence a negative hypothetical should be admitted if a negative categorical is admitted. To be negative the hypothetical need not express non-dependence but only dependence of a negation.

19. The dispute here really turns on whether the quality of the dependence is affected by the quality of the consequent. Where we do not know yet what affirmation is equivalent to the negative consequent, should we say that the hypothetical proposition itself is negative? Should we express the state of knowledge there by a hypothetical form at all? We take the example—‘if the keys cannot be found in this room after so much search, they are not here’. I do not know *where* the keys are then and still it may be useful to

The first emphasises the defect of connotation (A should be determined into Ax), i.e. the indefiniteness of the connotation which is taken to be definite in ‘all A ’ and the second emphasises the indefiniteness of the denotation in ‘some A ’ which is already indefinite in ‘all A ’, though the point is provisionally ignored there. ‘All A ’ in fact is both definite and indefinite, definite in connotation and indefinite in denotation. ‘Some A ’, as indefinite in connotation ($A \rightarrow Ax$) is a negation of ‘all A ’; but ‘some A ’, as indefinite in denotation, is no negation of ‘all A ’, the indefinite being indefinitely related to the indefinite.—The recognition of the indefinite as a logical and not merely a subjective, element brings out the truth of both the views of ‘some’ and ‘all’. The logic of the indefinite thus not only makes conflicting logical doctrines intelligible: it points out the essential indeterminateness of the concept, and the really extralogical character of quantity—showing that logic is here uselessly racked with disputes about what as outside its scope must be disputed and indicating that the doctrine of quantity is capable of being developed, not only from the side of the determinate but also from that of the indeterminate.

express the circumstance in the negative hypothetical form: I need not waste time searching for it in this room for the reason stated. But it is urged in the first view that what is expressed in this proposition is only something subjective: there is no objective connexion between the antecedent and the consequent, the absence of the keys here being not conditioned by the fruitless search. But this only means that the keys have not been removed from the room in consequence of the fruitless search. The absence of the keys need not however mean this positive removal and may yet be a useful truth that is inferred from i.e., is conditioned by the fruitless search as its reason or ground. It is not the content of mere ignorance. Mere ignorance, it may be said, need not be expressed in logic: what is called the privative judgment in logic is *useless*. The proposition about the keys is useful and yet is not the expression of an objective dependence of a positive fact. Should this intermediate state of consciousness between mere ignorance and positive objective knowledge be expressed in logic? Venn has pointed out the fallacy of over-objectification in logic: to him, logic deals with the *passage* from the subjective to the objective. We hold that logic as dealing with object in the abstract sense of content of thought can never *over-objectify* and that the real truth of Venn's view is that logic deals with the passage from the indefinite to the definite in the object. The useful knowledge about the keys which is not yet positive objective knowledge has a content or object distinct alike from the absolutely indefinite and useless content of ignorance and from the definite object of the positive knowledge of the whereabouts of the keys: it is at once indefinite and definite and as such should have a logical expression. The logic of the indefinite would therefore admit the negative hypothetical and point out that its logical status is indefinite—somewhere intermediate between the forms of positive knowledge and absolute ignorance, and a stage removed in point of definiteness from the negative categorical judgment. The negative categorical is already the explicit objective embodiment of partial ignorance: it assigns a provisional being to negation in relation to a position. In an affirmative hypothetical also, the *contingent* being of the relation in the consequent is such an explicit objective embodiment of partial ignorance: the assertory being of the categorical relation is modified by a negation into a possibility. The negative hypothetical then is an objective embodiment of a double ignorance or negation but is still in view of a position and therefore useful.

20. It may be noted in passing that the issues here are similar to those which arise in the Vedāntic discussion of the illusion of illu-

sion.* An illusion being positively *given* has an 'indescribable being' according to Vedānta, even when it is corrected. Has the illusion of illusion such a being also? A compromise between plain yes and no is given by some Vedāntists viz., that the illusion of illusion is *given* in a way different from i.e., more indefinitely than illusion itself. A similar difficulty may be pressed against Bradley's view of the negative judgment. It presupposes, he says, not a full-formed affirmative judgment but only a question. What is the nature of the question? He himself takes it to be *only psychological*, an ideal suggestion, a floating idea. Bosanquet however would take it as a logical content, a rudimentary disjunction. Sigwart would call it a rudimentary positive judgment—i.e., a merely *given* relation. They all admit that a full affirmative judgment need not be presupposed by the negative and yet *what* precisely do they contend about? It is really somewhere intermediate between the *content* of thought and the mere psychological *fact* of thought. This transitional something between the definitely psychological and the definitely logical can only be taken cognisance of in such logic as has been conceived in this paper.

21. (2) As to the disjunctive proposition, the ordinary view is that it cannot be negative in the disjunctive form. The definite element in 'A is either B or C' is that A is in B and C taken together and sometimes the definite side is pushed further to imply the mutual exclusion of B and C. There is indefiniteness then at least as to *which* of the two, B and C, is predicated of A: the disjunctive is so far an explicit embodiment of partial ignorance. It would be held then that 'A is either not B or not C' is not the logical denial of 'A is either B or C', for if the ignorance-element in both is considered, there is no denial, an indefinite being only *indefinitely* related to an indefinite, and if the knowledge-element in both is considered, B plus C is either the same as or a part of not-B plus not-C. In reference to the knowledge-element however, we intend to point out as in the case of sub-alternation that if the connotative side as distinct from the denotative side of B and C is considered, there is an intelligible sense in which B plus C may be taken as the negative of not-B plus not-C.

22. Those who hold that 'A is either B or C' do not deny that A may be both really point to this connotative side: the precise relation between the denotations of B and C may remain indefinite according to them when the disjunctive is asserted. From this stand-

* Something is believed to be real it is next taken to be illusory, and then again on closer observation it may be pronounced *not* illusory. What does 'not illusory' mean?

point then 'either not B or not C' would be doubly indeterminate. In 'A is either B or C', it is only affirmed that the connotations of B and C are compatible with that of A. This compatibility is a definite logical content but the mutual relation of B and C understood connotatively is indefinite; the mutual relation of not-B and not-C then would be doubly indefinite. The problem is to find out the value of this double indefiniteness.

23. We may distinguish our position here from at least four positions that may be conceivably advanced. (1) It may be held that the negation of the indefinite 'either B or C' in the form 'either not-B or not-C' has nothing definite in it and is absolutely useless. (2) There is just the opposite view that 'either not-B or not-C' is the same as 'either B or C', B and C being already exclusive. (3) Or it may be held that the mutual exclusion of B and C is indefinite in 'either B or C', and that 'either not-B or not-C' makes this definite, that it amounts to a more definite affirmation and is therefore no *negation* at all; it is *extra* affirmation, an *added* truth *side by side* with the definite truth of 'either B or C'. Or (4) it may be urged that this extra affirmation is a *development* of 'either B or C' rather than an accretion, that it is undoubtedly a negation but amounting to an affirmation. 'Either not-B or not-C' is taken as (1) no logical form at all or (2) as identical with 'either B or C' or (3) as different from it but not a denial of it or (4) as a denial of it that amounts to a definite affirmation which is at once same and different. Our position however is that 'either not-B or not-C' is the form of the *indefinite denial* of 'either B or C'. It is denial of the definite element in it—viz., the compatibility of B and of C with A: that the compatibility itself is partial or indefinite, is *not* definite is pointed out by 'A is either not B or not C'. As the denial of what is believed to be a definite element in 'A is either B or C', it is itself *believed* in and is not dumb ignorance: it has a useful content which yet is not positive, not the same as the given affirmative nor something co-ordinate with it, nor a negation amounting to a definite positive.

24. That 'A is either not B or not C' is the negation of 'A is either B or C' may be shown in another way. The ordinary form given of its negation is 'A is neither B nor C'. This however states more than the mere negation which should be simply 'A *may* be neither'. If not-B and not-C are understood as the negation of the connotative side of B and C, 'A is either not-B or not-C' is equivalent to 'A is either B or C or neither', which means precisely that A may be neither.

25. In speaking of a logical form being useful, we have assumed only for the sake of the argument that the merely privative judgment, the expression of mere ignorance is useless. It is necessary now to point out that the word 'useful' is itself a question-begging term: it dogmatically assumes that the knowing self ought to move towards more and more determinate truth. This assumption itself may be questioned and the logical impulse may be taken to be satisfied in the correction of the given error of determinateness, not in the attainment of new determinations, in getting rid of the limitation of the definite and not in securing increase of definiteness, in the direction of the indefinite and not in that of the definite,—freedom or the absolute state being reached either way. In this 'undefining' process, as we may call it, it is not even necessary that empirical truth should be held fast provisionally. All doubt, including what is taken to be the most irresponsible form of it—viz., absolute scepticism, would be *useful* in this connexion, though there might be grades of usefulness here also. Logic, conceived to deal with the bare dualism of the definite and indefinite can make room for either kind of usefulness or truth.

26. This may be presented in terms of the disjunctive proposition. The proposition 'A is either B or C or neither' may be taken as equivalent to 'A is either B or not-B', the bare form of the Excluded Middle. Now this form may be taken (1) as absolutely useless, a joke, the mere form of ignorance; (2) as the limiting form of disjunction, and therefore a particular case of disjunction, giving us the form of truth i.e., of the universe as constructed by thought out of the unique given; (3) as the form of the determinate—determinate position and negation as co-ordinate—present in all particular disjunctions; or (4) as the abstract form of truth *developed* in all concrete disjunctions, in all grades of determinate knowledge. Not-B in these views is (1) nothing logical at all, (2) logical only in relation to the unique but definite 'givenness' of B, (3) a positive logical content side by side with B and (4) the logical implication of B, as B is of not-B. In conformity to what we have said above, we hold that not-B is something logical, though not definite: it is the logical useful indefinite. 'A is either B or not-B' is a logical negative of 'A is either B or C'; utterly indeterminate in contrast with it but determinate as expressing the fundamental logical principle of the disjunction of the definite and indefinite, the form of the knowable-unknowable, the form of mystery rather than of absolute truth, the limiting mystery of all philosophy.

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ANALYSIS

(1) An attempt is made here to establish a definition of 'relation' in objective terms on the assumption that 'relation' of objects is not a mere mode of knowing them but is as definite and objective as the terms themselves. (2) Two terms A and B may be presented together to thought (a) either as mere distincts or (b) one may be thought as distinct from the other. (b) again has two varieties: the distinction may be thought (i) either in both 'directions' or (ii) only in one direction. (3) On the alternative *a*, distinction is not thought at all and the thought of the 'and' cannot be said to be definite like that of A and B. On the alternative *b* (i), we get either the reinstatement of *a* and so of the indefiniteness of *and* or the indefiniteness of A and B which, however, would be contrary to the starting assumptions. (4) The alternatives *a* & *b* (i) thus getting eliminated, it is only *b* (ii) that remains over to be examined. In 'A distinct from B', there is no confusion between the thinking of B and the distinguishing of A. The distinction of A is together—not with the thinking of B but—only with B. Thus 'A distinct from B' represents a distinct act of thinking. (5) Is it also definite as a content? Now, B here may be said to be *given* as distinct or the intrinsically distinct and A is only distinct *from* or the extrinsically distinct content. The togetherness of the extrinsically distinct and the intrinsically distinct is more definite than the togetherness of two mere distincts, for the concepts 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' distinction serve to fix the relative positions of A and B.

(6-7) Relation has sometimes been taken to be definite but holding between terms one of which is indefinite. But the indefinite is what we are barely acquainted with and cannot be described and used as a term. (8) Mere *togetherness* of two distincts has sometimes been taken to be a relation. But this 'togetherness'—A and B—is not distinctly thought. (9) There is, again, the infinite regress if 'A and B' is taken as a single definite thought. This regress can be avoided on the theory of 'pure togetherness'. (10) But 'pure togetherness' as what is common to the definite whole and the definite disjunction of A and B amounts to 'either both or not both A and B' which is nothing but an indefinite alternation and is no definite relation at all. (11) Not 'pure togetherness' but togetherness in a unity may be taken to be the relation of A and B. This unity may be (i) a disjunction or (ii) a whole. (12-13) (i) Now, disjunction of A and B, even

if it be taken to be a definite unity, is a standing cycle $A B A$. But this cycle is hardly a relation being just an indetermination of term and relation. (14-15) (ii) Neither can the relation of A and B be taken to be a static whole of the two. That would be only to invite an indefinite regress. (16) The notion that elements are related by the fact of their being in a whole may be replaced by the theory that relation is always between element and whole. The whole may be a substance (or unity of attributes) or it may be a unity of such substances. The two relations are incommensurable and appear to be only nominally described as the *same* relation of element and whole. (19) The difference may be expressed by saying that though attribute is spoken of as *in* a substance and part as *in* a whole, in the former what is *in* is dependent and in the latter it is independent. (20) We have thus to avoid the concept of 'whole' in trying to characterise 'relation' in general.

(21-23) 'Relation' is to be understood in terms of 'dependent' and 'independent' which are intelligible as characters of terms without reference to relation. A term is said to be a 'dependent' when it is not only intrinsically distinct but *necessarily* so. It is said to be an 'independent' when it is thinkable as object apart from a given dependent. When then a dependent is thought as an object along with and distinct from an independent, the former is said to be objectively related to the latter. (24) This definition avoids the petitio of using the concept of relation. The use of the term 'along with' is harmless, for it is understood as not objective but only as a character of subjectivity. The definition amounts to saying that if we think in a certain way, we think of *objective* relation. (25) It is to be noted that relation like distinction is irreversible. Mutual relation is not objective relation: mutual contact is only an attribute. (26-29) Elaboration of the distinction between attribute and relation. (30) Objective relation implies a reference to thinking on the one hand and to the objective *fundamentum* on the other. The reference to thinking must not be more than the bare thinking together of objects. The objective *fundamentum*, again, must not be the mere distinctness of each object.

THE DEFINITION OF 'RELATION' AS A CATEGORY OF EXISTENCE

1. The paper starts with the postulate that objects exist as distinct from the knowing of them and that knowing itself exists as an object for a further act of knowing. It assumes that objects including knowing may both be related and unrelated and that relation of objects is not a mere mode of knowing them but is as objective as the terms. The question has arisen whether such relation is definitely intelligible and can be defined in objective terms that do not presuppose the concept of relation so as to be distinguished from other categories of existence. It is the purpose of the present paper to establish such a definition by a criticism of certain conceptions of relation that claim to keep within the above assumptions.

2. Relation involves at least two distinct terms. Assuming that the terms stand for contents that are definite and objective, our first question is if two such distinct terms can be said to be the object of a single thought unconfused with other thoughts. Now two terms A and B may be presented together to thought as mere distincts, or one may be thought as distinct *from* the other. Again, the distinction of A and B may be thought in both directions at once—A distinct from B, and B distinct from A; or it may be thought only in one direction. In what sense, if at all, is the content 'two terms as distinct' said to be definitely thought?

3. If A and B are mere distincts and *distinction* is not thought at all, the thought of the 'and' cannot be said to be definite like that of A and B. Each of the two terms can by the hypothesis be separately thought, but 'A and B' is not thought separately from the thought of each (4, foot-note). 'And' here means no whole, distinction, or relation but simply 'togetherness', the claim of which to the status of relation will be refuted presently (8-10). Neither is *mutual* distinction of A and B capable of being definitely thought. We can conceive 'A distinct from B' and 'B distinct from A' to be different thoughts, but are these two directions together present to a single distinguishable thought? If they are, as together, fused into the mere distinction *between* A and B, such distinction is nothing more than A and B as distincts together (13). If they are not so fused, we have the indefiniteness of the mere 'and' or togetherness of the two distinctions. If finally, mutual distinction alone is taken to be definitely thought,

each direction of distinguishing being an indefinite abstraction mixed up with the other, the terms A, B would be themselves indefinite, contrary to our original assumptions. The consequences of dropping the assumption will be considered later (12).

4. Is then the content 'two terms as distinct' definitely thought only as a single direction of distinction, say as 'A distinct from B'? Whatever B may be distinguished from, the distinguishing of A from it is a single act of thinking. The distinguishing of B from something else, if presupposed, is presupposed as a separate act. But since B is thought in the distinguishing of A, is not there confusion, it may be asked, between the thinking of B and the distinguishing of A? That depends on the value of B when *not* thought as distinct from something else. B then is still a distinct, and presupposes the distinguishing of it as an act that is finished and no longer there. There are, in fact, two modes of thinking a content. The content may be thought to be distinct from the thinking of it *as continuing* or from the thinker of it *as ended*. In the latter case, it is still together with another thinking, the content of which is distinct from it. In the present instance, B—a distinct presupposing a past act of distinguishing—is together with the thinking of A, A being distinct from it. The distinguishing of A is together—*not* with the *thinking* of B—but only with B, is in fact the thinking of B as an *implication*. But what is B as an implication as distinct from B thought on its own account? A content *as other than itself* is not indeed definite as content but can yet be said to be definitely *thought*. B as implied in the distinguishing of A is here definitely thought as other than itself—viz., as the B that was distinguished in a previous act.*

5. We conclude then that 'A distinct from B' represents a single distinct act of thought. Is it also definite as a content? The distinguishing of B from something else in a previous act has bequeathed only the *term* B to the present act of distinguishing A: B in the present act is distinct only from the indefinite and is as such nothing but the distinct B. But the present act has to do with two distinct terms, A and B, B being its implication and A the direct content. B here may be said to be *given* as distinct and A is only distinct *from* it. They may be designated intrinsically distinct and extrinsically distinct contents respectively for this particular act of thought. Now the

* The distinguishing of B and the distinguishing of A are here two separate thoughts in spite of B being the implication of the latter. This cannot be said of the thought of 'A and B' and the thought A (or of B) in 3, for A there is not the mere implication of the former but is thought on its own account while the former is there.

togetherness of the extrinsically distinct and the intrinsically distinct is at least more definite than the togetherness of two mere distincts. Anything that is spoken of is by the very fact a definite; even the indefinite is definite in this sense. Mere 'A and B' is also so far definite, but the extra definition through the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic distinction consists in the fixing of what we may call the relative positions of A and B. Not that complete definition of the content is yet attained, for we can still speak of 'A distinct from B' and B, where the 'and' points to the uncertainty whether the distinction is objective or merely a distinguishing. The extent of definiteness attained may be brought out by a criticism of certain current views of relation.

6. Relation has sometimes been taken to be definite without both the terms being definite. One term may be indefinite, the other term being definite either only as distinguished from it or as with an intrinsic or given distinction. In the former case, the definite term is said to be the same as or to be constituted by the relation. In the latter case, the relation is additional to it, being like a line or an interval extending away from it. Either way, it is taken to be definite as a function.

7. But should the indefinite be regarded as a *term* of a definite relation? Something may indeed be definitely thought *as* indefinite, but there 'indefinite' is only a term in a factitious sense. It is in fact a problem: a whole may be presented to thought through language where the elements and even the abstract form of the whole are definite, but the form *as applied* to the elements is not yet capable of being thought and is only sought to be thought. If the particular combination of definite thoughts at all yields a definite content which is not known, that content is the indefinite formulated in advance as a term. In any other sense, the indefinite is what we are barely acquainted with and cannot be described, far less used as a term. The factitiously or problematically definite term 'indefinite'—in a proposition like 'this is indefinite'—cannot be said to be either denied or affirmed as a character or *predicate* of *this*; and there is no question of its being used as the *subject* of an assertion. We can indeed have a negative assertion like 'this is not indefinite'; but it only amounts to the thought of the definite term 'this', the negation or distinction being here no relation but only the subjective act of distinguishing viewed as finished.

8. We may conclude then, what we assumed at the beginning, that relation must be between two definite terms. Is the mere

togetherness of two distincts a relation, as it has been taken by a school of writers at the present day? We have already seen that mere togetherness—A and B—is not even distinctly thought. Can it be then a definite content? But it may be said that a content may be definite, even if it has to be fixed by more than one definite thought.* So without raising the psychological issue of the thinking here being single or manifold, we may consider the strictly logical aspect of the content 'A and B'.

9. If the content 'A and B' be distinct from A and from B, it is yet together with them. If it be called C, then C is C and A and B, for 'and' is here the symbol of togetherness. But C and A and B may be taken as D—distinct from and together with each of the terms and so on indefinitely. Can this indefinite process be avoided? Togetherness of A and B, it may be answered, is just what is common to 'A and B' as a definite whole and 'A or B' as a definite disjunction; in both cases we have A, B as purely together. In both, however, C together with A and with B is but C, *not* a further content D; and thus the indefinite process is avoided.

10. But is there anything common to the whole and the disjunction of A and B? Is pure togetherness in fact a legitimate abstraction? Whole and disjunction agree in the circumstance of involving two terms but this circumstance can as little be regarded as a common object of thought as table can be said to be common to the maker of it and the price of it. If there be anything common, it would be either of them *minus* its speciality. The speciality of the definite whole of A and B—what it is as distinct from their disjunction—is that it is *both* A and B. So the speciality of the definite disjunction of A and B is *not both* A and B. Pure togetherness of A and B then would mean abstraction from *both* and *not both* at once, which would leave nothing behind. We can only abstract from one at a time and then togetherness amounts to 'either both or not both', which as a disjunction without a standing universe is but an indetermination or indefinite alternation of one and many and is therefore no definite relation.

11. Shall we then reject pure togetherness and take togetherness in a unity—as whole or disjunction—to be the relation of A and B? The mutual distinction of two terms of which neither is intrinsically distinct is regarded in an influential school of thought as the primordial

* When a content is made definite by two thoughts, there is a single thought of the two thoughts as finished, the contents of which make a single implication for it (4). This implication of the single thought is here a construction (27) by the thought. If togetherness be such a construction (say, an abstraction from the thoughts of whole and disjunction—9), it must be still shown to be definite as a construction.

relation through which the terms become definite, the relation itself getting defined again through the terms. The view takes two forms according as the relation is admitted to be definite prior to the definition of the terms or is regarded as definite only after the definition. In the former, mutual distinction is definite as disjunction of alternating and therefore indefinite terms. In the latter, such disjunction is rejected as merely subjective, relation being definite only as the whole of the terms as elements.

12. To begin with disjunction. Disjunction of A and B, it may be said, is a definite unity, being the standing cycle ABA which means that A is definite as distinct from B which again is definite as distinct from A. Is this cycle a relation? If ABA is definite when A as well as B is indefinite, then, as a relation, it is indistinguishable from a term; and each term too, so far as it is defined by the relation, is indistinguishable from the relation. In other words, the cycle is but an indetermination of term and relation. If A and B as defined are thought along with the defining cycle, the alternation ceases and the cycle becomes indistinguishable from a static whole. But why should A and B, as alternating, be taken to be indefinite? Could we not take disjunction as the alternation of definites? Why should alternation cease when the terms are definite and taken along with the cyclical unity?

13. The reply is that the *alternation* of definites cannot be taken along with their unity. Each of the two thoughts—of alternation and of unity—presupposes the other as a finished act and, therefore, the content of it as only an implication. As we said in 3, the implication is definitely thought as other than itself, though 'other than itself' is but an indefinite content. It is, at best, the problematic 'definite indefinite' of 7. The alternation of definites, so far as it is a definite content, means either nothing more than the togetherness of mere distincts, or if it means more, it means the precipitation of the abstract content—extrinsic distinction—as an attribute of each of the distincts. That each distinct has a distinction may be regarded as a relation, but it does not mean a relation *of* the distincts. The extrinsic distinction of the one may be correlative with that of the other; but, as will appear later (27), this does not oblige us to admit that the terms are related.

14. Is then the relation of A and B a static whole of the two? Here, by the hypothesis, A, B, and their whole C are all definite. Wherein is C different from A, B that it should be called 'relation', while the other two are called 'terms'? It is no use saying that A, B may be separately definite, but not C; for C also, with A, B yet

unanalysed, may be definite. We are besides concerned here with A, B as definite *in* C and not with the previous history of the situation. In the given situation, A and B are by hypothesis mutually distinct, but are C and A (or B) mutually distinct? To understand the mutual distinction of A and B, we have recourse to their whole C, and if C and A (or B) are also distinct from one another, should we have a further whole and so on *ad infinitum*?

15. There appear to be two alternative ways of avoiding the difficulty. Either C is only a distinct and is not distinct *from* A or *from* B, or C and A (or B) make a whole which is C itself. The first alternative amounts to saying that the togetherness of C with A or B is no distinct thought at all and that C is but a third term and is no relation between A and B. The second alternative admits that C and each element are mutually distinct but holds that C is not only a term of the distinction, but also the whole comprising itself and what is distinct from it. The contradiction in the last phrase is sought to be avoided by saying that it only verbally analyses the meaning of 'whole' which as perfectly simple cannot be really analysed. But the verbal analysis does not appear to be arbitrary. A whole may be thought with its elements unanalysed and indefinite, or with its elements definitely emergent. The difference of the latter from the former is not merely subjective. Analysis or emergent difference of elements is a character of the latter content and is not simply analysing or distinguishing thought. The whole *of* distinct elements is, in fact, no mere third term like the whole with elements unanalysed. As a relation it must mean a cyclical triplicity of relations. If C is but the equivalent of the mutual distinction of A and B, the equivalent of the distinction between C and A should be taken as B and *not* as C and that between C and B as A. But is this triplicity of relations a definite content? As before, we argue that either the relations are each indefinite, their whole being alone immediately definite or the relations are all definite, the *and* joining them standing for indefinite togetherness.

16. But why not drop, it may be suggested, the notion that elements are related by the fact of their being in a whole? In the first alternative above, the whole is an unrelated term and has no extrinsic distinction from the elements. In the second alternative the whole is both intrinsically and extrinsically distinct. Why may not there be a third alternative viz., that the whole has only extrinsic distinction? When A and B are each intrinsically distinct, their whole C is not intrinsically distinct but only distinct *from* them. Relation

then would still involve the whole and the only relation, it would be said, is between an element and a whole, though the whole is not the relation between the elements. The indefinite triplicity of relations then would define itself out as two relations between C and A and between C and B, A and B, being *unrelated*. Where A and B are related, one being an element of the other, C would not be the whole of A and B only but of a third element as well, say, X. If A be an element of B, C—if distinct from B—would be the whole of B and X. In the sense in which we use the word 'whole'—viz., as the static equivalent of the mutual distinction of the elements, the whole of A, B, X is not also the whole of A, B. So where C and A, C and B, and A and B are all mutually distinct, they do not make up a cyclical system; for if C and A make B, and C and B make A, as understood in 15, A and B do not make C but only some unanalysed element of B.

17. In this third alternative then, where relation is understood as between element and whole, *not* between elements in a whole, the whole as the equivalent of mutual distinction is but a term and a further mutual distinction between this and the elements is a meaningless supererogation. But the relation of element and whole appears to cover at least two incommensurable relations. The whole may be a unity of attributes, a substance or it may be a unity of such unities or substances—e.g., a spatial whole of parts. Whether the substance is simply the whole of its attributes or an underlying something, it is still a unity of the attributes in some sense. Now, the addition of a new attribute to a substance does not disturb its identity while the addition of a new part or extra bit to a spatial whole makes a new whole. So the two relations—that of an attribute to a substance and that of a part to a whole appear to be only nominally described as the *same* relation—viz., of element and whole.

18. This difference may be sought to be whittled away by saying that extensity is but a character of every quality and that substance is only a synthesis of the extensities of many qualities. But that substance is not disturbed in its identity by the addition of a new quality should imply that the extensity-synthesis here differs from that in the addition of a new part to a whole. The difference would be some qualitative equivalent of the difference between spatial superposition and side-by-side arrangement. The term 'extensity-synthesis' implies in the two cases no *common* logical content that is distinguishable; it means either the one or the other. The difference,

therefore, between the two forms of the relation would still stand out as absolute.

19.* We may express this difference by saying that though we speak of attribute in a substance and part *in* a whole, in the former what is *in* is dependent and in the latter independent. An attribute is never thought except in a substance but what is conceived as a part in a given whole need not be so conceived elsewhere. A space, it may said, is always part of a larger space but the spatial thing need not be part of a bigger spatial thing. In this sense, then, attribute is always dependent whereas part may be independent. But why should the substance be taken to be independent? It is independent in the sense that without the particular attribute given as dependent, it would still mean something. But how if the particular attribute be what is called an essential attribute? Without an essential attribute, substance would not indeed *be* anything actual, but would still *mean* either the underlying unity, the hidden something, or if that be not admitted, the persistent extensity-measure of the given substance from which the abstraction is made. The spatial whole however, unlike substance, is dependent on a part, since without that part it would not mean the same whole.

20. It appears then that to characterise relation in general, we have to avoid the concept of 'whole' altogether. It was shown in 5 that relation of A to B, whatever else it means, implies that A is distinct *from* B *given* as distinct but not vice-versa; or, in other words, for the single thought of A, B, they have fixed relative positions as extrinsically and intrinsically distinct respectively. The view that the sole relation is that of an element to a whole has to be rejected, because the relative position of the terms varies in the two cases of the whole—viz., as substance and as spatial whole. Incidentally the criticism of the view has suggested that in both the cases the relation is properly of a dependent to an independent. Dependent and independent, however, while satisfying the condition of fixed relative position appear to go further, and there is the *prima facie* doubt if they make up the content of a single thought.

21. Do the extrinsically distinct and the intrinsically distinct together make up a unitary objective content? We said in 5 that the fixing of the relative position of A and B does not secure complete definition of the content. We have still *two* positions; we can still speak of 'A distinct from B' and B. Relative position here is the content of a single thought but is not yet more than an abstraction to characterise the particular thought. It is not objectively unitary in the

sense in which A or B has been assumed to be at the outset. The distinction of A from B need not be objective, because A and B are each separately objective. When we say 'whiteness is distinct from the Soul', we mean that the *thought* of whiteness only is distinct from the thought of the soul, though each of the terms, taken separately, is objective. The question therefore arises: under what circumstances if at all, the relative position of A and B may be regarded as objective relation. In other words, is the content of the thought of relative position distinguishable from the particular thought?

22. That depends on whether the position or extrinsic distinction of A can be thought apart from the position or intrinsic distinction of B, or what is the same thing—apart from the thought of the abstraction, *relative* position. Can A be known to have *necessary* extrinsic distinction, i.e., to be *always* together with and distinct from something else which may not be B? Now whether there are any terms that are thinkable as only intrinsically distinct or absolute; never extrinsically distinct, may be disputed. But there are at least some terms, viz., those which stand for attributes and wholes that must have an extrinsic distinction. When A is always thought as together with some other term (not necessarily B) which is however thinkable apart from A (though, it may be, still together with a third term), A is said to have necessary extrinsic distinction without specific reference to B. Now if such a term A is thought together with B in any particular case where B need not be thought together with A, their relative position is said to be distinguished from the particular thought of it, or in other words, said to be objective.

23. We are now in a position to understand relation of a dependent to an independent as a definite and objectively unitary content. Dependent and independent are intelligible as characters of terms without reference to relation. A term is said to be a dependent when it is not only extrinsically distinct but *necessarily* so. It is said to be independent when it is thinkable as object apart from a given dependent.* This reference to a given dependent is no dependence, but only the thought of the absence of dependence. When then a dependent is thought as an object along with and distinct from an independent, the former is said to be objectively related to the latter.

24. In thus defining relation, we have avoided the *petitio* of

* When A as object is thought as distinct from B as object, if B is also distinguished from A, it only means another co-existing thought of the *thought* of B as distinct from the *thought* of A (21). B as *object* is then thinkable however *apart* from A i.e., not as distinct from or together with A but as by itself or as the content of a past or finished act of thinking of, say 'B distinct from X'.

using the concept of relation. The terms we have used in the definition are distinct objects together, one of them always distinct as together with some other which is either distinct by itself or as together with something else. *Distinct* is here the character of a term, and the only relational word used—viz., 'together' is understood here as thinking together, as not objective but only as a character of subjectivity. We begin in fact with a confusion of subjectivity and objectivity, of thinking with the object of it. Our definition is only an attempt to distinguish the object from the thinking and practically amounts to saying that if we think in a certain way, we think of *objective* relation. The reference to this thinking together is indeed necessary to the thought of the objective but it does not on that account prejudice the independence of objectivity. The thinking together of two contents we take to be a unique experience which we somehow symbolically describe by an objective term. Whatever account may be given of this symbolism, it does not affect objective logic.

25. We note also—as about distinction, so about relation—that objectively it is irreversible. If A is related to B, B cannot be said to be related to A: mutual relation is not objective relation. When, for example, A and B are said to be in mutual contact, contact is no relation but an attribute that is related to both of them. Why it is ordinarily called 'relation' will be explained below (26-27). But why offer violence to ordinary usage, it may be asked. The reply is that the categories of attribute and relation have to be distinguished. An attribute, whatever else it means, is understood as that which has necessary extrinsic distinction. Relation, we have seen, is the togetherness of an object with necessary extrinsic distinction with another object that in reference to it is intrinsically distinct. Relation cannot be said to have a further necessary extrinsic distinction, for then relation would be a term and there would be a demand for a further relation between relation and its terms and so on ad infinitum. If what can be regarded, like contact, as having a necessary extrinsic distinction be called a relation, there would be nothing to differentiate the category of attribute.

26. That an attribute like contact is plausibly called relation is due to the circumstance that two relations having such an attribute as a common term sometimes yield an inference involving the other two terms. It happens in fact that certain characters of an object can be inferred from the characters of an object in contact with it. But this inferability need not mean an objective relation between the two objects. In some cases, indeed, inference is possible through an objective relation, as for example, when an attribute or spatial whole is given,

we infer a substance or spatial parts. There are other cases where if we infer a predicate about B from a predicate of A, it is because the predicates are the same attribute or substance, there being no reason to suppose that it does not persist. An attribute of a part may ordinarily be inferred to be an attribute of a whole constituted by it; and given a concomitance of attributes we can under certain circumstances infer a single substance underlying them. In such a case the given objects are not related; they are either each related to a third object or have a third object related to each of them. There is a more complex case—covering most of our really productive inferences—where what is inferred about B is either directly or remotely correlative with, but not the same as, the given circumstance about A from which it is inferred. This case demands special investigation.

27. If the given circumstance be X and the inferred circumstance, Y, X is either directly correlative with Y or there are intermediate circumstances M...P such that X and M,...P and Y are correlative terms. Correlatives need not always be in a pair: sometimes more than two terms may be directly correlative with one another. The principle, however, is that inference is possible through groups of correlative terms. Does the admission of correlative terms imply the admission of correlation as an objective relation? How else, it may be asked, could we have objective correlations? Object is indeed distinct from the thought of it but such thought also is an object to the further thought of it. The cause of an object other than thought may be other than thought, or it may be in some cases a thought regarded as an object. In the latter case, the object is said to be a construction of thought, meaning by it nothing mystical but only the objective *effect* of thought which is itself an object to some other thought. Now correlative terms stand for such an objective effect, for the joint effects of the same causal thought. The effects are objective though they have no objective relation to one another. Though each is objective, two correlatives are not together as objective: the *thoughts* of two correlatives can alone be said to be together. The cause of an object need not be a part or element of it and there is no objection to starting with effects as data of inference, whatever their causal history might be. We can then start with correlative objects as our data without admitting any objective relation between them. That they have the same thought as their cause does not mean that they are objectively related.

28. The inferibility of Y from X then does not necessarily mean that X is related to Y. The contact of A and B is no relation because contact is capable of being regarded as an attribute. It is

ordinarily called a relation, because A and B in contact have correlative positions X and Y which are indeed objective but are only unrelated effects of the same mental cause. To speak of a relation between A and B when they have a common circumstance or correlative circumstances is to confuse a mere subjective attempt to relate or infer with a unitary objective relation. A and B are here objectively unrelated, there being relation only between each of them and the common circumstance or the correlative circumstances.

29. Although such a complex situation is no single object, there may be a single thought of it, and this thought may have a special working value. It sometimes happens that the form of the thought enables us to infer a new truth with other given terms. Taking for example the symbolism $A\ X\text{---}\ Y\ B$, where there is a relation between A and X and also between B and Y, X and Y being correlative terms, we find that by arranging given terms A, X, Y in that form, B which is not given can be imagined and is sometimes verified as a fact. In such a case Y may on subsequent verification be found to have the same relation to B, as Y has to B. Sometimes, especially in complex cases, this subsequent verification is not forthcoming: the symbolism anticipates B without bringing to light its objective relation. The symbolism stands for a mode of imagining and thus a subjective activity discovers, by a leap as it were, a new truth the objective relation of which to the data may yet be unknown. There is ground indeed for regarding this mode of imagining as more than mere subjective play, if it happens to uniformly hit a new truth. It cannot be by a mere accident that the symbolism happens to be so systematically useful. But the mystery is not removed by taking the symbolism to be a single objective relation. The commonsense description which we find verified in simple cases of inference—viz., unrelated terms related each to each with correlative terms, the complex being nothing objective but only a unitary act of thinking—should not be rejected in complex cases merely because the constituent details of the situation cannot be completely exhibited. Still less is there excuse for rejecting it in favour of the conception of relation as a living *objective function*, which as altering the fundamental meaning of objectivity cannot at least claim to be justified on ordinary objective grounds. To exclude this conception from objective logic is not to deny the subjective mystery of the inferring imagination.

30. Objective relation, as we have defined it, implies a reference to thinking on the one hand and to an objective *fundamentum* on the other. The reference to thinking must not be to more than the

bare thinking together of objects. Many apparent relations alleged to be objective will accordingly have to be ruled out as involving a reference to a more complex subjectivity. Again, the objective *fundamentum* must not be the mere distinctness of each object, for then we would only have unrelated objects. Nor are objects necessarily related when they have a common circumstance or correlative circumstances. Nor are correlative terms themselves objectively related, for though they have an objective ground, there is a necessary reference to a single thought as the cause of them, a reference therefore to much more than the terms, but in the *objective* not like that of correlatives in a complex *thought*. The objectivity is secured only where the complementariness is in a single direction, or in other words, where the thought of relation has an unshiftable starting point in a term having necessary extrinsic distinction. The thought of such complementary objects is alone the thought of objective relation. There are other more complex unitary thoughts of an objective manifold which are useful for inferring objective truth, but it is only in a figurative sense that they are called 'thoughts' of 'objective relation'.

OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PERCEPT AND IMAGE

ANALYSIS

(1) Percept is a spatial object as perceived and the image is the spatial object as cognised but as unperceived. An attempt is made here to translate the subjective terms 'perceived' and 'unperceived' into objective terms. (2) A spatial object is sometimes perceived with its outside indefinite and so un-perceived, e.g., an emerging flame. (3-4) An object is perceived as existent when it is perceived as defining an outside. Two cases: (a) where the object emerges in time but not in space, e.g., a scar coming to be perceived on a man's face; (b) where the object is perceived to cease in space, e.g., a fire perceived to go out. (5) In (a) the object is not perceived to *happen*. It is known only to *exist*. It is known to emerge in time only and not in space. Its outside or spatial negative is perceived as definite, though not as emergent either in time or in space. It is perceived only as constituting the existence of the object. (6) In (b) the fire is noticed to exist in being seen to go out. The spatial negative of the fire (to wit, the field) is perceived to emerge in time only. This emergence of the field is the perceived existence of the fire in space. (7) The spatial negative of a perceived object is the *whole* of space in which the object is distinguished. The limit of the bounded space is not set by the *object* occupying it but by the *sensed matter* that fills space and is not itself spatial. Space that is outside the limit has nothing spatial outside it and is as such the whole of space. (8) The perception of the object as existent or emergent in time only is the consciousness of the percept which is not anything other than the perceived object. Percept is a *mental* object not in the sense of being a datum for introspection but in the sense that it is an external object as perceived *explicitly* to be existent. (9) Two kinds of percept—the non-cessant and the non-emergent. (10) To know perceived space as non-emergent is to know it as having been and to know it as non-cessant is to know it as continuing to be. There is thus knowledge of persistence either in the form of *having been* or in the form of *continuing to be*. (11-12) This knowledge of persistence is not, however, perceptual.

(13) To know a perceived object as persistent is to be aware of an image which, like the percept, has two varieties—the non-emergent and the non-cessant. (14) The image is nothing other than the perceived object as persistent. (15) The objective equivalent of the *unperceived* character of the object is its non-existence in time.

OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PERCEPT' AND IMAGE

1. To be conscious of a spatial object as perceived is to be conscious of a percept and to be conscious of it as unperceived is to be conscious of an image. 'Perceived' and 'unperceived' are subjective terms and the problem is to translate them, if possible, into objective terms.

2. To perceive is to perceive a spatial object with a spatial outside or the spatial outside of a spatial object. It is to be conscious of a definite shape and of an outside that may or may not be defined. When we perceive an object emerging in space e.g., a flame emerging as a match is struck, the outside of the object as emerging does not appear with a definite boundary. As it is only a definite shape that can be said to be perceived, the outside of the flame is not perceived but is only the content of an indefinite sensational awareness. The emerging flame is perceived with an outside that is not perceived.

3. When an object and its outside are perceived together, the former defines the latter but not vice versa. The object is definite in itself while the outside is definite through it. The definite object is perceived as existent, its definite outside being its perceived existence. But the outside may not itself be perceived as existent, though it is perceived as definite. An object emerging in space like the flame is also perceived as only definite and not as existent. But the flame is perceived as definite in itself while the perceived outside is definite through the object of which it is outside.

4. An object is perceived as existent when it is perceived as defining an outside. There are apparently two cases where an object is perceived as defining its outside. The first is the case where the object emerges in time but not in space and the second is where the object is perceived to cease in space. A scar comes to be perceived on a man's face as he draws near. The scar here begins to appear at a certain moment but does not then begin to exist. It does not like the flame appear or emerge in space but emerges in time only. There is explicit perception of the scar as *there*, as existent: to come to be perceived without being perceived to happen is to be perceived as existent. Again a fire is perceived to go out, the going out or cessation being, unlike the emergence of the scar, a perceived happening in space. The fire need not have been explicitly perceived as

existent before its cessation is perceived. Its existence, however, is perceived as involved in the perception of its cessation. The fire may be for the first time perceived to exist in being perceived to cease. To see it ceasing is not to cease to see it but to notice its existence.

5. In the first case, the scar is seen to exist in the face but not to emerge *in* it. To emerge in space is to happen and the scar is not perceived to happen. Its outside or what may be called its spatial negative is perceived as definite but not as emergent in space or in time. To know that the scar *emerges* in time only and *not in space* is to know that it *exists* in space. But its spatial negative as being not known to emerge at all is not known as either existent or non-existent. It is perceived only as constituting the existence of the scar. Existence to perception is spatial existence and the spatial negative of the perceived object here is its perceived existence.

6. In the second case, the fire is noticed to exist in being seen to go out. To see the fire ceasing is to see it as existent against its outside or spatial negative perceived *not* as not emerging at all like the outside of the scar, but as emerging in time only like the scar itself. To see the fire going out is to see the field in which it exists getting defined without happening, such definition being emergence in time only. The emergence of the field in time only is the perceived existence of the fire in space or—what is the same thing—the emergent non-existence of the fire in time. The scar, as emerging against a field that emerges neither in space nor in time, is perceived as existing both in space and in time. The fire as ceasing is perceived, against a field that emerges only in time, as existing in space only.

7. The spatial negative of a perceived object is the *whole* of space in which the object is distinguished. The object indeed occupies some space but the outside or the negative of this space has not this space outside it. The limit of the bounded space is not set by the object occupying it, for then there would be a circle, since to occupy space is to have *so much* space constitutive of it. The limit is set by the sensed matter that fills space and is not itself spatial. Space that is outside the limit has then nothing spatial outside it and is as such the whole space that might be filled. The existence of an object to perception is space defined as outside the object but not having the object as its outside. Space is defined as outside the object when either the object emerges in time only or ceases in space.

8. The object is perceived to exist when it emerges in time only or when its spatial negative emerges in time only. The perception

of the object as thus existent is the consciousness of the percept. The percept is not other than the perceived object, not a ghostly or diaphanous object—as it is sometimes conceived to be—apprehended in psychological introspection. There is no introspective awareness of the percept, although it has to be taken as a 'mental' object. The mental object is nothing but the external object as perceived explicitly to be existent. The object is said to be *perceived* as existent when existence is seen in the object without being reflectively known as seen. Its emergence in time only or its cessation in space is its existence unreflectively seen as an objective predicament of the object. The external object in this objective predicament is the percept.

9. Such is the objective interpretation of the percept. Corresponding to the two kinds of perceived existence viz., that of the scar in both space and time and that of the fire in space only, there are two kinds of percepts. The scar is perceived as beginning to appear but not as disappearing while the fire is perceived as disappearing but not as beginning to appear. The percept scar is non-cessant while the percept fire is non-emergent. The scar must indeed disappear to the observer as the scarred face recedes from him but the beginning of the disappearance is never perceived. The fire again begins to be perceived in the perception of its cessation but this beginning is not itself perceived. Unlike the scar, the fire is perceived to exist only and not to emerge at all.

10. The spatial negative of an object perceived as existent in space is perceived as not existent in space. As pointed out, the outside of a perceived object has not the object outside it; and it is the outside of an object that constitutes its perceived existence. The outside of an object then is perceived along with the perception of the object but not as with the object as its outside i.e., not as existent in space. It is perceived as space itself and this perceived space differs according as the object, perceived as existent i.e., as in space, emerges in time only or ceases in space or, in other words, according as the percept is non-cessant or non-emergent. Space as the outside of the scar is known as non-emergent against the scar as emergent in time only and space as the outside of the fire is known as non-cessant against the fire perceived as cessant i.e., existent in space only. To know perceived space as non-emergent is to know it as *having been* and to know it as non-cessant is to know it as *continuing to be*. In the perception of space then as the outside of an object perceived

as *existent*, there is the knowledge of persistence either in the form of *having been* or in the form of *continuing to be*.

11. The perceived outside of an object is presented as a definite extending away into the indefinite. What is known to persist is the definite—e.g., the face on which the scar emerges or the glowing ember that may be taken as perceived to survive the fire. When the scar is perceived as *existent*, the face is known as having existed and when the fire is perceived as *existent*, the ember is known as *continuing to exist*. The face and the ember are both known to persist but while the former is known as *non-emergent*, the latter is known as *non-cessant*. Both are perceived as the definite outside of a perceived object but is the knowledge of their persistence in the two forms to be called perception?

12. The outside of an object is known as what the object is not, not as what is not the object. The face and the ember are known as what the scar and the fire are spatially and temporally demarcated from. The perceived content that is known as persistent is as much a percept as the perceived content that is known as *existent*. The distinction of the scar from the face or of the fire from the ember is perceived, for there is a single perception of an object as in its field or outside. The distinction of the face from the scar or of the ember from the fire is really the distinction of the *percept* of the outside from the *percept* of the object of which it is outside. The distinction of the former percept viz., percept of the persistent from the latter percept viz., that of the *existent* is however no percept, being known as definite but neither as *existent* nor as persistent. A persistent is known as persistent when what is known as *existent* is distinguished from it or—what is the same thing—when the percept of the persistent is distinguished from the percept of the *existent*. There is thus no *perception* of a content as persistent.

13. To know a perceived object as persistent and not as *existent* is to be incipiently aware of an image. The persistent is not *non-existent*, but to be known as persistent is not to be known as *existent*. A perceived content may be known as persistent or *existent* but while to know it as *existent* is to be aware of a percept, to know it as persistent is to be aware of an image. Just as corresponding to the perceived object as emerging in time only and ceasing in space, there are the *non-cessant* and *non-emergent* percepts, so corresponding to the knowledge of the perceived object persisting as what *has existed* and as what *continues to exist*, we have respectively *non-emergent* and *non-cessant* images.

14. The image here is still, like the percept, nothing other than a perceived object. The percept is the perceived object as existent and the image is the same as persistent. The persistent perceived object is the outside of the existent perceived object, which however as persistent is not perceived though immediately known. As thus immediately known as persistent, it is the incipient image. The awareness of such image is the knowledge of an object as what the existent is not though not yet as what is not existent. The knowledge of an object as non-existent is the awareness of an image proper, where the object is no longer a perceived object.

15. For the interpretation of the image proper, the objective equivalent of the *unperceived* character of the object has to be found. The scar, we said, disappears as the face recedes from the observer though the disappearing is not perceived. The face still perceived is immediately known to be different without the belief in its identity being disturbed. The difference is known to be the scar itself as non-existent in time only, which is known as much in the unreflective objective attitude as the scar emerging in time only. Again, varying the example of fire, we may imagine seeing black charred wood instead of the glowing ember directly as the fire goes out. Here, too, there is the undisturbed belief in the identity of the charred wood with the ember in the fire but a *discontinuity* is immediately known without being perceived of the wood from the fire such as is not known when the glowing ember is seen to *survive* the fire. It is known in the objective attitude as an emergence not, like that of the surviving ember, in time only but also in space. The emergence of the charred appearance is known as the non-existence of the fire not only in space but also in time, the fire being here not what is ceasing but what has ceased. Thus the objective equivalent of the unperceived character of the scar and the fire is their non-existence in time as contrasted with the persistence of the face in the case of the former and with that of the ember (that glowed in the fire) in the form of charred wood in the case of the latter.

REALITY OF THE FUTURE

ANALYSIS

(1) The object of this paper is to discuss whether the reality of the future expected on a known ground can be said to be an object of 'knowledge'. (2) That which is believed on a known ground and is not directly known may comprise two cases: (a) 'if A, then B'; (b) 'since this A, therefore B will be'. (3-4) (a) may be admitted to be *known*, (b) is claimed to be a case of inferential knowledge, but what we really may claim to know is that B *can* be. That B *will* be is only a matter of non-cognitive expectation. (5) The future as real is thus a real contingency or an indeterminate potentiality. (6) But objective indetermination has no accomplished being and we cannot claim to *know* it. (7-8) Belief in the future is expectation either as initial willing or as faith. The future is real but as what might not be and what is being brought into existence or being revealed.

(9) The ordinary view that the past, the present and the future are facts of the same status seems to be an oversimplification. The time-positions differ in factual status and are not *mutually* distinct. The past is distinguished by itself, the present is distinguished only from the past and the future is distinguished only from the present. (10-11) The past may be remembered without being known to be remembered and as such it is known as *that* existent and thus as fact. The belief in the *that* is direct and does not involve a consciousness of its present non-existence. The past is in this sense distinguished by itself. The present may not be distinguished at all and may only be felt and not known. When it is at all distinguished as *this*, it is only known as beginning to be. It may not, again, be so known. But in either case the past is an accomplished fact. The present is only half-known and is known simply as *not* the past. (12) The present is known only as beginning and not as ending. It is not distinguished from the future, though what is now believed to be the future is distinguished from the present. This distinguishing is not, however, knowledge. The future is a fact to faith which the present only symbolises. (13) The future then, if distinguished at all, is distinguished from the present and taken either as being actualised or as being looked for. (14) The process of actualisation is an imaginary movement from the present towards the future: the other process is an imaginary defining out of the future towards the

present. Neither process reaches its end. The apparent knowledge in the former case takes the form of inference and in the latter case the form of justification of inference. (15) The consciously willed future is not really inferred. What is really inferred from the present is the potential future. The interpretation of this potentiality as a fact is *not inference but ungrounded expectation*. (16) The future that is real to faith can be justified by the present only in the sense that faith is extra-logically confirmed by an inference from the present. It is not logically justified as is a conclusion by its premise in retrospective explication. (17-22) The future is real to us in two ways—to will and to faith. Elaboration of this distinction.

REALITY OF THE FUTURE

1. The future, if expected without a ground, cannot be said to be known as real. If expected on a known ground, it is believed to be real. Is this belief knowledge?

2. What is believed on a known ground may be also directly knowable or it may be intrinsically unintuitable. The latter comprises two cases—(a) a conditional relation—‘if A, then B’; and (b) ‘since this A, therefore B will be’.

3. The conditional relation may be admitted to be known, though the point is open to dispute. From the joint perception of A and B in the past, we may claim to infer ‘if A, then B’ where the dependence is independent of the time-position of A and is timeless in this sense.

4. On the ground of this timeless relation and of the perception of A as present, we are said to *infer* that B will be. Really, however, we infer at least that B *can* be and only expect non-cognitively that B *will* be. We infer that B will be, *if* there is nothing to counteract it and we never *know* that there is nothing. That there will be no counteraction is but a faith. What we may claim to know or infer is that B can be, that there is a tendency for B to be.

5. The future then, so far as it is real to us now, is not what actually will be but only can be. It may not be actual at all and yet it is believed to be real. It is the real contingent, real in the sense in which a possibility which is willed or, if not willed, can be willed is real. The future or the anāgata as real is taken by Patañjali to be avyapadeśya just in this sense. With this we may connect the present day notions of reality in the making and of the intrinsic unpredictability of the future. The mechanical conception of the real being determinate and of the future being what must be, the present being what it is has considerably lost its hold on the modern mind. The principle of objective indetermination or real contingency is now-a-days presented with assurance in many forms.

6. Our question is if this principle can be said to be *known*. What is known is the complete or accomplished being, the pariniṣṭhita or bhutartha. The unaccomplished in the sense of what is real without being actual cannot be said to be known. It may be that in God’s consciousness, the real future is accomplished or determinate: it is the old conception of God knowing our free action beforehand.

It may be also that we can rise by yoga to some kind of transcendental intuition of the future as future. As it is however, the future as real is only an indeterminate potentiality to us: we cannot claim to know it.

7. We may now state our position briefly. Belief in the future is not knowledge but expectation. Expectation is either initial willing or faith. Will and faith are antithetical attitudes, their dualism being ever sought to be overcome but never actually overcome.

8. The future is not eternally existent or necessary. It is real but as what might not be. The contingency itself is real, being believed and not merely imagined. The future is what is inexplicably being determinate as being and as meaning: it is either being brought into existence or being signified or revealed. Here, too, is a dualism that is only being overcome.

9. The past, the present and the future are ordinarily taken to be all facts of the same status, disposed in an imaginary time-line and mutually distinct like facts in different space-positions. It is an illusory simplification of a complex situation. The time-positions differ in factual status and are not *mutually* distinct. The past is distinguished by itself, the present if distinguished is distinguished only from the past and the future is distinguished only from the present.

10. To explain. The past fact may be now remembered without being known to be remembered and hence may be said to be believed as a distinct fact without being distinguished from the present. When the past is known to be remembered, it is not distinguished by itself but *from* the present. As so distinguished, however, it is the non-existent which is no fact at all, its non-existence being a fact that is present. Fact or what is believed is either an existent or the non-existence of an existent: the non-existent is only imagined and is not fact. The past that is merely remembered without self-consciousness is known as *that* existent and thus as fact. The belief in the *that* is direct and does not involve a consciousness of its present non-existence. The past is in this sense distinguished by itself. The present, however, if believed without reference to the past is not distinguished at all, is felt but not known. *That* or the past, though psychologically prior is logically posterior to *this* or the present. *That* means *not-this* but *this* does not mean though it is *not-that*. The present may not be distinguished at all but only felt. But if after the past is known, there be any occasion to distinguish the present as *this*, it is known only negatively as *not* the past, as *beginning* to be.

11. There are cases in which no break appears between the

past and the present, and the present is not known as beginning. But the past here is just as complete or accomplished a fact as the past from which the present is marked off, the only difference being that in the latter case, the present non-existence of the past is *also* known. The past is the type of the existent: the existent is the accomplished. The present is only half-known, known simply as *not* the past but not as existing by itself, as beginning but not as ending. Where the past does not consciously cease, it is not incomplete as fact like the present. It is at once complete and continuing, unlike the present existent which is only continuing. There is no incompatibility between *complete* and continuing. The past is not distinguished *from* the present, the latter being only distinct from the former. Hence the past does not lose its pastness or accomplished character, if it is also present. The past can be present though the present cannot be past.

12. The present is known only as beginning, not as ending. So the present as fact is not distinguished from the future. What is now believed as future is however distinguished from the present. Is such distinguishing knowledge? If the present is not known to end, the break between it and the future cannot mean a *known* distinction. The future cannot begin as the present begins. If it is believed at all to begin, it can begin either in the present without being present or actual or begin absolutely without any adjacent past. In either case, its distinction from the present amounts only to unrelatedness. If the future now begins without actually being, it means that its existence is being brought about, that it is now willed. Known relation implies an existent continuity but the will-continuity of the present and the future is nothing that exists now. If, again, the future is believed to begin absolutely, there is no continuity at all—known or willed—with the present. There is awareness of the present, not as the *past* of this future, but as its *symbol*, the signifying function of which is no factual relation. The future is here a fact to faith which the present only symbolises, which is helped somehow to get defined as a meaning by the present.

13. The future then if distinguished at all and not merely implicitly expected is distinguished from the present and taken either as being brought about or as being looked for—the content of will or faith. As explicit, either content takes the appearance—but only the appearance—of the known fact. The future as beginning to become without actually existing is symbolised as a potential existent actualising itself; and the future as absolutely beginning which is only

timelessly set against the believed contingency of its non-emergence tends to be pictured as having this contingency temporally before it, as heading backwards in time towards its actual present non-existence, as presupposing the present. The symbolisation in either case means an imaginary transformation of the discontinuity between the present and the future into a continuous process.

14. The process of actualisation is an imaginary movement from the present towards the future but never reaching the future. The other process is an imaginary defining out of the future towards the present, a magic development of the future as a meaning and may be called the process of idealisation. Neither process reaches its end because the farther it goes, the more does the interval become indefinite: we become only less and less aware of the gap and do not see it getting filled up. The apparent knowledge in the former case tends to take the form of inference and in the latter case the form of justification of inference, of the explication of presupposition.

15. The consciously willed future appears to be inferred from the present but is not really inferred because what is inferred is necessary i.e., is not temporally related to the data at all. What is inferred from the present is at best that something *tends* to be, can happen, will happen if there be no counter-acting circumstance. The interpretation of this potential future as factually future is not inference but only ungrounded expectation.

16. Again, the future that is real to faith may appear to be justified by the present, as a fact already known is retrospectively justified—or explained—by the explication of its reason. Such retrospective explication is already a strange process within logic. But there is difference between the justification of a known conclusion by its premise *within* an inference and the justification of a fact that is expected *by* an inference. The future as a fact to faith is justified by the present only in the sense that the faith is non-inferentially or extra-logically confirmed or strengthened by an inference from the present. This subjective (not merely psychological) confirmation of faith by an inference outside it is ordinarily confused with the inverse justification of a conclusion by its premise within an inference.

17. The future is real to us in two ways—to will and to faith. Reality to the will-consciousness is a current conception, some going so far as to say—what we may deny—that even the past and the present are real as somehow ideally willed. The future alone, we hold, requires this pragmatic interpretation. But the future may be real not to any ideal willing but to faith which is utterly distinct from

it. A voluntarist will ordinarily reduce faith to ideal willing. What I believe will *come*, I either actually will, or imagine I can will, or imagine as willed by some other will I imagine myself energising. If faith be an ideal willing, it would be this imaginary willing of another's willing. Whether this reduction is correct or not, reduction in the opposite direction is also equally conceivable. My consciousness of willing may be sought with equal justice to be resolved into the faith that my will is *coming*. If I can imagine another's willing as being brought about by my willing, I can also look for my willing to come with absolute spontaneity. As a matter of fact, neither of these reductions is really accomplished or believed: we only *aspire* to believe either way.

18. We may start from actual willing—say, willing to move a limb—and trace the steps by which we extend it ideally and aspire even to incorporate faith in willing. We may start also from implicit faith in the free rationality of persons and trace how the faith is extended downwards, how faith in the behaviour of the object is justified by this faith and how my own willing comes to be imagined in faith as the last link of this object-behaviour.

19. When I will to move a limb, I implicitly expect this movement will be brought about. The movement need not even emerge in a conscious anticipative idea. Where I will to bring about an extra-organic change through my limb-movement and cannot at once bring it about, I have an anticipative idea of the object, though I may not be conscious of the movement that is a means. Where again an objective change is willed through another objective change brought about by my movement, I have a conscious idea of the objective means which however is undistinguished from my initial willing. I have a sort of feeling of 'double touch' with the objective end. This is the sense in which I go on ideally extending my will. Mechanical causality is thus imagined as an extension of my bodily willing.

20. A difficulty emerges when the objective means appears unpredictable in its behaviour, cannot be believed as simply transferring its motion to the object in which the end-change is to be brought about. The feeling of this discontinuity affects the belief in the future which thus appears only probable. Still the will asserts itself in imagining a continuity: we believe there must be continuity though we do not visualise it. There are cases however where this general belief in necessary continuity is pulled up—e.g., where the means is a living thing or a person, where the unpredictability of its

behaviour is felt to be due not to my subjective uncertainty but to its objective uncertainty. We need not ask why this belief in objective indetermination comes, but it is a fact that we sometimes cannot *believe* even generally that there *must be* some continuity of motion between the means and the end. Here we only *imagine* with a definite abandonment of the will-claim to bring about the end of right.

21. This is just where the attitude of faith should come in, so far as I still believe that the end will come though the behaviour of the means is intrinsically unpredictable. Not that the will-attitude always gives place to the faith: it may persist as a satanic or āsurika will-aspiration. I may choose to exploit the living or free object as a means, though I feel I have no right to use it as means. I do not identify my will with it as I do with a dead objective means. I seek not only to take advantage of its behaviour so far as it is mechanised: I employ it much as I make an evil spirit by incantations do my bidding. It is like hypnotising the means: I command, for example, a person to act and make his own will lapse. It is through such a hypnotising will that one feels making history—the culmination of the āsurika ambition.

22. Thus we may trace the ideal extension of willing including the stage in which faith itself which ought to mean surrender of will is incorporated in aspiration with willing. We do not trace here the other process of the ideal extension of faith and its aspirational incorporation of willing.

THE CONCEPT OF VALUE

ANALYSIS

(1) We speak of the value either of a known object or of a willed content. (2) A known object is valued in the form of a judgment—'The object has this value', (3-4) Here the object is known and the value is felt. The judgment apparently means that there is a single consciousness of the object and the value. The knowing and the feeling do not, however, make up one consciousness. They are the objects of a single reflective consciousness. In spite of the judgment-form, this consciousness is not reflective knowing. It is primarily reflective feeling. Value cannot be said to be reflectively known though the object to which it is referred may be said to be reflectively felt. (5) Valuation implies a feeling-consciousness both of the felt content as such and of the known content as such. 'The known content does not cease to be known by being reflectively felt and the felt content, though not known, is endowed with a kind of objectivity by reflection. Both being objective, they can be spoken of as though they were related in a judgment. (6) The felt content is objectivised in reflective feeling in a peculiar manner. The content of a reflective feeling as the feeling of the impersonal feeling of the same content is definitely objectivised through the mediation of the impersonal feeling. (7) Though the felt content is thus objectivised, it is not turned into a known object. Though value is referred to a known object, it is not known as a *character* of the object. (8) To speak of the relation of the known content and its value would be really to *speak* the reflective feeling and not to *speak of* it. When we speak of a value in an object then, we only indirectly express as information what we should only speak exclamatorily.

(9) That the known object is in a manner 'subjectivised' is not so obvious as that the felt content is objectivised. We may feel that something is *only known* in the sense that we feel it as unfelt or neutral. In valuation, we are feelingly aware of the known object as unfelt even when the object is being felt. (10-11) It is possible for the *same* content to appear *at once as felt and unfelt*, in the valuating reflective feeling. The known object is not felt as one with the value, though the value is felt as one with the object. The known or unfelt character is not the felt value though the latter has the former involved in it. Value is thus referred to the object which is understood as not really *having* it and may in this sense be called a *floating* or *free*

adjective of the object. (12-13) Strictly speaking, however, value cannot be taken as an adjective of the object like red, green etc. In 'red flower', though the substantive is one with the adjective, the adjective is not one with the substantive. In an object that is felt to have value, the value is not felt as other than the object, but the latter is felt as other than the value. (14) Value, however, appears to be necessarily referred to the object and to be subordinated to the object. But this notion of subordination can be got rid of and it can be shown that value is independent of valuation. (15) Value is not appreciated as such until the object to which it is referred is felt as known. When the known object is so felt, it is felt to be subordinate to the value. (16) It is not enough to understand that value is felt to be objective but not known as such. We have to appreciate that value is absolute and that the speakability of value as information is a necessary illusion. (17-19) There are cases of feeling a possible feeling and feeling the want of a feeling. They indicate the possibility of the feeling of an actual feeling. Valuation as reflective feeling is of an imperfectly distinct content, viz., the possibly felt and the felt unfelt. We have also a feeling of feeling in which there is not even this imperfect distinguishing. The value of an object gets freed as a substantive from the object of which it appears as an adjective and acquires the status of an absolute only in this feeling beyond reflective feeling. (20) The expression of this absolute feeling is not only no information, it is not even a speakable valuation. The term 'value' should properly be confined to this absolute; value is nothing if not absolute.

(21) The valuation of a willed content is not, like the valuation of a known content, a pure feeling but is a feeling with willing somehow involved in it. Moral valuation is to *feel* the sacredness of the 'ought'. It is properly expressed as an exclamation of the 'practical feeling' of respect for the 'ought'. (22) Aesthetic valuation is the type of valuation. (23) To be valued, what is valued should be a finished content. Willing, then, as simply the process as distinct from willing as completed is no content of consciousness and the rightness of willing as a process is no value at all. (24) The moral valuation of an object as clean or sacred occurs when the purity or holiness of an *impersonal* will is felt to be embodied in the object. (25) A willed act is the content of willing only and is distinct from the willing through the willing itself. It has an embodiment which is no content at all apart from the willing. (26-27) The judgment on an embodied willing is aesthetic relatively to the judgment on ideal

willing which determines it, though the value depends on or involves the moral value of the ideal willing. (28) Valuation ranges from the pure aesthetic valuation of an object to the moral valuation of an act. All valuation is expressed in an informative sentence, though as feeling it should be primarily expressed as an exclamation. (29) Valuation—whether aesthetic or moral—is no judgment. Aesthetic valuation is not judgment because the subject here is subordinate to the predicate. Moral valuation is not judgment because it is not even literal information. (30-33) Analysis of the form of the moral judgment that is furthest removed from the aesthetic judgment. (34) Valuation in its different forms may be conceived to be a process, intermediate between knowing and willing.

THE CONCEPT OF VALUE

1. We speak of the value either of a known content or of a willed content. Value is itself a felt content and so the value of a felt content is but a higher grade of the value of a known or willed content.

I. VALUE OF A KNOWN OBJECT

2. A known object is valued in the form of a judgment—'The object has this value.' The difficulty about the judgment is that the object is known and the value is felt and there can apparently be no relation between the incommensurable contents. One may evade the difficulty by saying that value is only symbolically spoken of as content, the real judgment here being 'we thus feel the object.' But this form also is not easy to understand. What does 'feel' as a transitive verb mean in reference to the object? It cannot mean simply 'we thus feel *when* we know the object'; and even if it does, there is the further difficulty how one speaks of 'we' having the feeling in respect of the object. Probably it is one and the same circumstance that is expressed by 'feeling the object' and 'we thus feeling about the object'; and to speak of value as a content is apparently to symbolise the same mystery. It is as well therefore that we accepted the judgment-form—'The object has this value' and tried to find out its implications.

3. How is any relation spoken of between the known object and the felt value? The relation may be only symbolical but it is not obviously unintelligible. What is at least meant literally is that there is a single consciousness of the two terms—the object and the value. We cannot say, however, that the knowing and the feeling make up one consciousness. We are aware of what is known as completely distinct from the knowing and of what is felt as only imperfectly distinct from the feeling. We cannot speak of the object as content of the single consciousness for then it would be at once known and felt, at once completely and incompletely distinct from the consciousness.

4. The knowing and the feeling cannot make up one consciousness but it may be that there is a single reflective consciousness of both. Is such consciousness the consciousness of the content of the

knowing and the feeling making some sort of unity? It depends on what is meant by reflective consciousness. There are apparently two kinds of reflection on a conscious process: it is either the distinguishing of the conscious process from the content or the distinguishing of the content from the process. The former is what is usually called psychological introspection in which attention is withdrawn from the content of the conscious process and fixed on the process itself which is thereby sterilised and turned into a ghostly temporal event. In the latter, it is the content of the conscious process that is attended to as in the unreflective stage, though it is defined by being distinguished from the conscious process which we thus do not distinguish but only distinguish from. The reflective consciousness of knowing and feeling that we postulate to understand the so-called value-judgment is reflection in the latter sense. It is consciousness not directly of the knowing of the object and the feeling of the value but of the object and the value as known and felt respectively. Reflection in this sense is consciousness of the conscious process not as an event but as a function implied in the content. It is not necessarily cognitive: reflection on the knowing or feeling or willing of a content may be but need not be the reflective knowing or reflective feeling or reflective willing of the content respectively. To understand the so-called value-judgment then, the object and the value should be taken as the contents of a reflective consciousness of knowing and feeling. Is this consciousness, reflective knowing or reflective feeling? The judgment-form would suggest that it is reflective knowing but we contend that the form is here only artificial, if not symbolic and that the so-called value-judgment is primarily reflective feeling. Value is here spoken of *as though* it were known but the object is not here spoken of *as though* it were felt. The known object in fact is actually felt in the reflective feeling. Its knownness is felt: there is a feeling of the object as in space and time being *merely known* in the sense of being *unfelt* or indifferent. In the reflective stage we may feel that something is only known but we do not know that something is only felt. To know is to know a definite content but to know that a content is only felt would be to be aware of it as indefinite. In other words, value cannot be said to be reflectively known though, like value, the object to which it is referred may be said to be reflectively felt.

5. The so-called value-judgment then is not reflective knowing but reflective feeling. The judgment-form or the form of knowing here is only an indirect if not symbolic expression of the reflective

feeling of valuation. Valuation implies a feeling-consciousness both of the felt content as such and of the known content as such. The known content does not cease to be known by being reflectively felt and the felt content, as will be shown presently, though not known, is endowed with a kind of objectivity by reflection. Both being objective in a sense to the same reflective feeling, they can be spoken of as though they were related in a judgment.

6. How is the felt content objectivised in reflective feeling? When I am conscious of my own past feeling or of another's feeling, the consciousness is a feeling and not a spectator's consciousness, though the feeling of which I am conscious is in some sense alien to me. The content of this alienated feeling is not however consciously distinguished from it in my reflective feeling of it. Now when I say that a person feels in a certain way towards an object, I say it on some evidence over and above the mere evidence of my feeling. But sometimes I am aware without any such evidence that one *must* or *should* feel in the way I feel. When I take something to be beautiful, for example, I feel implicitly that any one will find it so, as I believe when I take it to be of the colour red. I do not say that it is red to *me* but only that it *is* red; and so I say it *is* beautiful. If asked how I know it is beautiful to others, I would say it *must* or *should* be so and if it is falsified, as it well may be, I would doubt as I would doubt my senses. I am, in fact, here implicitly aware in my feeling towards the object that it is not my feeling only, that the object would be so felt by any one, or—what is the same thing—that the felt content is somehow *in* the object. To believe unquestioningly without evidence that *we* feel in a certain way in respect of an object and to believe that the felt content is in the object are one and the same belief, neither being prior to the other. Here then the feeling that I reflectively feel is not taken as any one's feeling in particular: it is unappropriated or impersonalised rather than universalised. The content of it also is consciously distinguished from it and taken to be on a level with the object to which it is referred. Thus the content of a reflective feeling as the feeling of the impersonal feeling of the same content is definitely objectivised through the mediation of the impersonal feeling.

7. The felt content is thus objectivised but it is not therefore turned into a known object. Value is objective and is somehow referred to a known object but it is not known as a *character* of the object. The word 'objective' here is wider than the word 'known.' Whatever can be spoken of as information may be said to be objective.

Now the objective may be either capable of being spoken of without reference to the consciousness of it or not so capable. It is only in the former case that it is said to be known. Value which is objective to reflective feeling is not speakable without reference to the feeling. It is unintelligible without reference to the impersonal feeling which is not speakable without reference to the reflective feeling. Value accordingly is not said to be a known content.

8. We can speak of the known content and this value together as both objective to the reflective feeling. To speak of their relation would be really to *speak* the reflective feeling and not to *speak of* it. In exclaiming, we speak our feeling and not speak of it; and when we command, we speak and do not speak of the command. What we thus speak may be, however, spoken of in a symbolical or periphrastic way. When we speak our feeling in the way of exclamation, we may also artificially speak of it or express it as information in the form 'this is my feeling about the object' or 'the object has this value'. When we speak of a value in an object then, we only indirectly express as information what we should speak exclamatorily in a form like 'how fine is this object'. Why do we thus express ourselves? It is to mark the objectivity of the feeling-content induced by the impersonalisation of the feeling, to indicate in fact that it is not arbitrarily that we thus value the object.

9. That the knownness of the object is felt in reflective feeling, that the known object is thus in a manner 'subjectivised' is not however so obvious as that the felt content is objectivised. As pointed out, we may feel that something is *only known* in the sense that we feel it as unfelt, neutral or indifferent. To the extent a known object appears flat and uninteresting is it felt as merely known. We speak of truth as beyond our likes and dislikes: the feeling of the truth of a content is the feeling of its being independent of our feeling (and of being no value at all). To be aware of a content being known is not necessarily to be aware of the content as unfelt but to be feelingly aware of the known as such is to be aware of it as unfelt. In valuation, we are feelingly aware of the known object as unfelt even when the object is being felt.

10. How is it possible, it may be asked, for the content to appear *at once as felt and unfelt*, as interesting and as neutral in the valuating reflective feeling? We may put it in some such formula: the known object is not felt as one with the value, though the value is felt as one with the object. In feeling at least if not in knowing, if a content A is one with a content B, B need not be one with A.

Something, for example, may be felt to be pleasurable and painful at once: one may enjoy a tragedy with a breaking heart and one may grieve over the loss of one's beloved in the enjoying reminiscence of the love. The pleasure and the pain are not really mixed here, the feeling being either pleasure or pain, *one* of them with the other somehow *within* its content and not side by side with it. The enjoyment of the tragedy is undistinguished from the pain that is felt, the pain itself being enjoyed; but the pain is distinguished from the enjoyment in the sense that it does not detract from the enjoyment. So in the other case, the pain through the pleasure and not vice versa. Likewise we say about the valued object that its neutral or unfelt character is distinguished from its felt character or value which however is not distinguished from it. The known or unfelt character is not the felt value though the latter has the former involved in it. Value is thus referred to the object which is understood as not really *having* it and may in this sense be called a *floating or free* adjective of the object.

11. Unless the known object is appreciated as unfelt at the time we feel towards it, the felt content cannot be called value. The value of a known object is a content felt to be one with the object which is however felt as other than the content. The oneness of the content with the object or the objectivity of value is through its being felt as the content of an impersonalised feeling in respect of the object. The object is felt as other than the content through its being felt as unfelt. The reflective feeling of the value as felt and the object as known is the feeling of the objectivity of value and of the unfelt character of the object.

12. We have spoken of the value as a free adjective of the object. But is value an adjective at all? We say about a red flower that the flower is red flower but the red colour is not the flower, implying in this sense that the substantive is one with the adjective which however is distinct from it. Here however we have said that the value is not felt as other than the known object but the known object is felt as other than the value. So properly speaking, value is no adjective of the object.

13. We may elaborate the argument. A substantive need not be distinguished from its adjective to be known as a distinct. But an adjective to be known as a distinct must be distinguished from or in the substantive. When an adjective has been distinguished in a substantive, the substantive is not distinguished from the adjective at

least in the sense of being taken to be *without it*. But when value is distinguished in object, the object is distinguished from it in the sense that it is felt to be intrinsically without value, felt, as unfelt or merely known. Value accordingly cannot be taken as an adjective of the object.

14. Apparently however we are still unable to deny that value is in some sense subordinate to the object, that while the object does not imply value, value has necessarily to be referred to the object. We have to get rid of this notion of subordination, of this necessary reference of value to the object. Value as such is not understood unless we clear our mind entirely of intellectualist prejudice. We speak of value indeed in connexion with the valuation of a known content, which though a feeling is necessarily symbolised as a judgment. But a critical examination of valuation shows not only that it is no judgment (amounting to knowledge) but also that value should be independent of valuation.

15. Value-judgment, we have seen, is primarily an exclamation somehow toned down into information. Exclamatory speech is like an impersonal proposition: the predicate is all and the subject seems to be nowhere. A person exclaims 'grand' and so he can say 'lightning' or 'rains'. There is a difference however, for when the exclamation 'grand' is completed into a sentence, we should say 'how grand is this scene' and not 'this scene is grand,' the predicate still retaining the principal position. This indicates the relation between object and its value: the known content is here subordinate to the felt content. 'How grand is this scene' means that grandeur—the value—is expressed or embodied in the scene. In the Platonic way we may say, the scene partakes of grandeur as the individual partakes of the Idea. Expression appears to be the least mystical description of the relation: value is expressed in the object as a feeling is expressed in the face. Both the terms here—object and value—are here substantive and both are interesting though we are interested in the object because of the feeling or value embodied in it and not in the latter because of the former. It may be, the object *as expressive* is as interesting as the value expressed but the object *as merely known* is in any case subordinate in the so-called value-judgment to the value expressed in it. Value, we said, is not appreciated as such till the object to which it is referred is felt as known or unfelt or neutral. When the known object is so felt, it is felt to be subordinate to the value, being so felt because of the value. The neutral character of the object is, as we pointed out, within the content of the feeling that is felt.

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then is consciousness of the value of the value, feeling of reflectively feeling the value.

20. Such is the feeling of an actual feeling to which the feeling of a possible (impersonal) feeling and the feeling of the unfelt (merely known) alike point. It is a stage of feeling beyond reflective feeling, an absolute or transcendental feeling, the expression of which is not only no information but not even a speakable valuation. It is a pure exclamation in which we do not speak *of* anything or rather in which we symbolically speak of the *unspeakable* as such. It is the expression of what is undeniable yet unintelligible, of the absolutely unique or new, or of the absolutely contingent—what is *believed* as might-not-have-been while it is there or as might-have-been while it is not, what is perpetually being lost or wanted when attained and being attained when it is lost or wanted. What is spoken but not spoken of in the pure exclamation may as much be called value of value as feeling of (actual) feeling, being in fact a form of the absolute. The term value should properly be confined to this absolute; value is nothing if not absolute. Loosely however we speak of absolute value and relative value, the former as the value of the latter.

II. VALUE OF A WILLED ACT

21. Valuation of a willed content is not like the valuation of a known content a pure feeling but feeling with willing somehow involved in it. Both the valuations are expressed as information but while the latter is properly expressed as an exclamation, the natural formulation of the former is an exclamation that is at the same time an imperative. To say that an act willed is good is a periphrasis for 'how good is this act' which again means 'how we *should* all act thus'. To say simply 'we should act thus' is no valuation or exclamation, being only an imperative. But to say '*how* we should act thus' is to wonder at this universal or impersonal obligatoriness, to *feel* the sacredness of the *ought*. Moral valuation is thus properly expressed as an exclamation of the 'practical feeling' of respect for the *ought*.

22. Aesthetic valuation is the type of valuation. Moral valuation is valuation as approximating to aesthetic valuation, there being intermediate valuations. There is the feeling, for example, of an object being clean or sacred, which may be called moral or spiritual valuation of the known object. Again, we feel admiration for a willed act as noble or magnificent, this being a sort of aesthetic valuation of the *look* of the act. Moral valuation proper would be the valuation

of the act—not as it looks but as the inner willing that is finished—as good or evil. This again may be distinguished from the consciousness of right or wrong willing in the willing itself, which is not the valuation of the willing as finished and therefore not valuation at all.

23. For valuation it is apparently necessary that what is valued should be a content having the form of being. It may be a known object that is definitely distinct from the consciousness of it or it may be indefinitely distinct from it in different degrees, the minimum distinction being that of the willing as completed from the willing as process. Willing as simply the process without the form of being is no content of consciousness and cannot be valued. The rightness of willing in process as distinct from the goodness of willing as completed is not felt and is like truth no value at all.

24. To begin with the valuation of an object as clean or sacred. Cleanness is a simpler value than sacredness. Dirt may be matter in the wrong place but the wrongness is what is felt as such in a specific feeling and does not admit of objective definition. So the clean is what appears as such to a specific organic feeling which has a close affinity with the feeling of moral goodness. Cleanliness is next to godliness and the feeling of having sinned is the feeling of being polluted. The clean suggests purity as the beautiful suggests joy. The sacred object has a further mystic significance: it is not merely clean in itself—what one dares not pollute—but what will clean the soul by its touch or presentation. Cleanness or sacredness of an object then is the purity or holiness of an *impersonal* will felt to be embodied in the object just in the sense in which the beauty of an object may be taken to be an impersonal joy embodied in it. This valuation then is an aesthetic feeling of a moral or religious value, of a will-value or a soul-value.

25. A willed act is the content of willing only and is distinct from the willing through the willing itself, having indeed an empirical embodiment which however apart from the willing is not even a known content. By 'embodiment' is here meant not an already distinct empirical 'body' into which the will somehow enters but what is made distinct by the willing alone. Taking for example the act at the lowest level—viz., the bodily act as willed, the embodiment of the willing is not some objective attitude of the physical body but some internal motor experience which cannot be described even as a given internal sensation. It is doubtful whether the motor experience—experience of moving a limb or even of having it moved—should be called muscular *sensation*. There is no consciousness of its being *given* to

willing i.e., of being other than willing when we are conscious of the willing. This applies even to the consciousness or having one's limb moved, for it is only imperfectly distinguished from the experience of moving and is only appreciated as a partial privation of the latter experience. This motor experience is apparently nothing but bodily willing that one is conscious of in reflective willing. Tactual and other sensations bound up with motor experience are adjectival to it in the content of reflective willing and cannot be regarded as independent facts that are only mixed up with it. A similar consideration will apply to willing at higher stages of consciousness. The embodiment then of a willing is no content at all apart from the willing.

26. There is a distinction between the embodied willing at any stage and the next higher willing that constitutes it. Each may be morally judged but the judgment on the embodied willing will be more of an aesthetic valuation than the judgment on the higher willing. Mere bodily act e.g., an acrobatic feat is almost like an object and is valued almost wholly in the aesthetic way. Yet the fact that it is willed makes some difference. It is not merely the outward look of the act that is judged; the look as expressing the success of the willing is judged, its value being the efficiency of the psychic effort put forth. To say that the acrobatic feat is splendid is to say that the will is wonderfully efficient though the will is judged because of its triumphant expression in the body. So at a higher stage we speak of a splendid act of bravery, the psychic act being here judged more or less aesthetically, though its value consists in the measure of freedom of the willing behind it which however would not be judged as splendid but for its expression in the psychic act. Everywhere then the judgment on an embodied willing is aesthetic relatively to the judgment on the ideal willing that determines it though the value depends on or involves the moral value of the ideal willing.

27. When we speak of a splendid act of bravery, we judge the *look* of the act to have the aesthetic quality of splendour. What does *look* mean here? It is the empirical being of the free willing, meaning not only the bare being of the willing as a finished process but also an entire objective situation as conatively incorporated in it. The look of the act is judged aesthetically according to the moral value of the willing behind it. This willing too is judged as good or evil only as it is taken to have some kind of being. It has to be understood at least as *this* act in order to be valued even morally.

28. Valuation then ranges from the pure aesthetic valuation of an object to the moral valuation of an act considered simply as the

finished being of free willing without any further empirical determination. All valuation is expressed in the form of an informatory sentence, though as feeling it should be primarily expressed as an exclamation. The informatory expression of aesthetic valuation, though not primary, cannot be said to be merely symbolical. Beauty has an objective though not known being, the objectivity being mediated through an impersonal feeling. Moral valuation is not only not judgment; its expression as information is symbolical and not literal. Moral value is indeed objective in the sense of being mediated through an impersonal willing; goodness, as will appear presently, consists in being eternally or impersonally willed. But it is not objective being but objective negation or freedom that is eternally willed. Negation is information when the subject of which a predicate is denied is not itself denied at least as a possible existent. But when it is so denied, there is nothing about which the information is given and the expression of it as information is only symbolic. Now to say that an act is free—and that is, as will be explained, what is meant by saying that it is morally good—is to deny the being, the bare temporal being or other empirical being of the act. In the sphere of knowing, the subject of an apparent judgment which is denied absolutely in the judgment is just the unreal in some form. In the sphere of willing, the act of which the being is taken to be nought by being felt to be free is understood to be *real* beyond all being or empiricity. The statement therefore that the act is free is no information and is only symbolically expressed as information.

29. Valuation, whether aesthetic or moral, is no judgment. Aesthetic valuation is not judgment because the subject here viz., the object valued, is subordinate to the predicate 'beauty' which appears at best as a floating character and is really no adjective but a substantive that is *expressed* in the substantive subject. Moral valuation is not judgment because it is not even literal information.

30. Moral valuation of the form that is furthest from aesthetic valuation is that in which the subject is an act of willing considered as a being in the sense simply of being finished or of having a bare position in time. The value of it viz., goodness, we have suggested, means only felt freedom. This requires explanation. It is clinched best on the negative side: to say that an act of willing is evil is to imply that it was not willing at all, that there was an illusion of willing. An illusion of a particular subjectivity means no denial of subjectivity itself but only of its particularity or specification. The specification or naming of a subjectivity is however vital to introspection: one is

said to be introspectively aware only of a subjectivity that is named or specified at least as different from named forms. Now we are said to have an illusion of willing when we somehow will but do not will the particular content that we claim to will. We may think we are running of our own accord when we are being mainly dragged along a slope or that we are speaking to a person for his good when we are really speaking to him in anger or that we are acting on principle when really some unavowed selfish motive is operative. What does such an illusion imply?

31. The consciousness of not having willed a content is always consciousness of having positively willed not to will it and not simply of having willed some other content. In the moral valuation of an act of choice, we consider not simply the content that we have not chosen but also the fact of having positively rejected or willed not to will it. So generally we cannot be conscious explicitly of the *subjective fact* of not having willed a content unless we are conscious of having rejected it. Unless we are so conscious, we should only say that *another* content was willed but not that there was *no willing* of this content. The fact of willing or no-willing is not known but is only conatively believed. So the correction of the illusion of an act of willing means awareness of having willed not to will it. But then it may be said we are not actually conscious in the valuation of an act as evil of having willed not to will the act. There is however an unspecified consciousness, in all retrospective consciousness of an act as evil, of having willed not to will in the form of willing to remain what one is, the will to spiritual indolence. That is the general willing of omission that is bound up with all consciousness of willing—even of good willing: it is the consciousness of not having sufficiently exercised one's freedom. The consciousness of freedom in fact is belief in it as not completed, as having no *being*.

32. Moral self-approbation is not complacency but the consciousness of having exercised our freedom which could have been however further exercised. To exercise our freedom is always to work against the radical evil in us of the will merely to be or the will to indolence, against the downward current—what has been called *pāpavahā nādi*—which however is still will or freedom and not nature, the freedom to be not free, freedom to suicide. Moral self-condemnation is the feeling of not having exercised our freedom against this will to be, of not having shaken off the will to indolence, of having willed to drift or not to will, of having only had an illusion of willing otherwise. All consciousness then of *having willed wrongly*—as distinct

from that of the willing in operation—is consciousness of having had an illusion of willing. The consciousness of wrong willing in the willing itself is however not being aware of the willing as illusory. In fact it is to be more explicitly aware of it as willing, aware of *individual* freedom, than in the case of right willing. To the retrospective valuating feeling however, what was believed as a specific wrong willing was not that specific willing but only the radical will to indolence. What we are conscious of as right willing in the willing itself appears to the valuating feeling as a finished act that is good. It is the valuating feeling that on the one hand turns the process of willing into a finished act with bare position in time and distinguishes its freedom on the other as its constitutive reality. To say that an act is good is to say that it was free; that it was genuinely willed. Moral value is the *reality* of the act willed and does not even appear as its *character*. While the subject of the so-called moral judgment gets bare objectivity through it, the predicate viz., good is not objectified into a being at all, being only freedom that is felt as negation of the objectivity of the subject and yet as its constitutive reality. We have pointed out that it is not for the same reason that aesthetic valuation and moral valuation are denied to be judgments.

33. We have discussed the form of the moral judgment that is furthest removed from the aesthetic judgment. Still it is valuation so far as it is aesthetic, so far in fact as free willing is aesthetically represented as an act with the form of being. The aesthetic character is more prominent in the valuation of an empirically embodied willing as noble or magnificent and still more so in the valuation of an object as clean or sacred. In the aesthetic judgment proper, the joy that is embodied as beauty in the object completely loses its naked subjectivity. We have here in fact the least mystical and the most self-forgetful mode of embodiment of subjectivity. In the judgment of an object as sacred, the spiritual value retains a raw subjective character though mystically referred as a character to the object. In the judgment of empirically embodied act of willing as noble or splendid, not only the value but also the substrate of it has an element of subjectivity. In moral judgment proper, the substrate of value has only bare being as its objectivity and the value itself is felt as freedom or subjectivity and not objective *being* at all.

34. Valuation means aesthetic valuation which though not judgment may still be regarded as information and as such the least removed from logical judgment which is no valuation. On the other side, the consciousness of willing being right or wrong *in the willing*

itself is no valuation and the moral valuation of a finished willing as good may be taken to be just on this side of purely subjective willing. Valuation then in its different forms may be conceived to be a process intermediate between knowing and willing.

STUDIES IN KANT

CHAPTER I

IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

1. Kant's critical philosophy is a form of transcendental philosophy, and is avowedly only the first sketch or 'architectonic plan' of it. The 'transcendental' may be taken provisionally to mean what we are certain about as not objective. By 'object' is meant a content that is other than the consciousness of it. The transcendental then would be a content that is not distinct from the consciousness of it. One may be conscious of a content as simply distinct or as distinct from the consciousness of it or as not distinct from the consciousness of it. Instances of the last would be negation as the content of disbelief and the self as the content of self-consciousness, variously called consciousness, pure being, pure act or freedom. To Kant, the transcendental is the self as conscious act or freedom. He does not conceive it as quiescent consciousness or undifferented being like the Vedāntist, and he vigorously denies intuition of the self. The self is to him an active consciousness or conscious act, whether as knowing or as willing. The primitive act is not unconscious, as it is conceived by Fichte, but conscious freedom in willing and conscious apperception in knowing. The thinking act in knowing is to him not only conscious in reflection but conscious also as constructive of the object. He does not also admit a primitive act in the Fichtean fashion as the common prius of knowing and willing. Knowing and willing are to him entirely different acts, and although each implies thinking, it implies it in different ways, and in any case thinking is not to him an act that is fact by itself prior to knowing and willing. Willing as free is the realising of thinking, practical assertion of reason; while knowing or the theoretic assertion of reason is thinking not as realising itself but as dealing with reality as given in intuition. Willing is real as realising, while knowing is only true and not real by itself, being real or existent only so far as its thinking form is realised in willing. Knowing is not willing but fits in with willing, being dependent on willing for its existence and not for its truth. Speculative thoughts which as lacking intuition do not amount to knowledge may indeed be turned into certainties in being realised in willing but certainty is not truth. ('Primacy of practical reason in its union with speculative reason') One of these thoughts, however, is the thought of the self itself, which is

turned in moral willing not merely into certainty or faith but into knowledge. The self then would appear to be at once reality and truth. Still it is neither as real nor as true that the self is taken as formative of the object known. It is formative only as the thinking form or the purely logical unity of the object. All the transcendental constants of knowledge are the possibility of object and this possibility is only the form of truth and not a truth that is known. This form of truth is indeed real as the thinking act involved in willing, but it is not therefore as real or realising or willing that it is said to determine the object that is known. Thus Kant's theory of knowledge is neither voluntarism nor intuitionism of the Vedāntic type. To the former, willing or realising which may be called the reality of the subject is constitutive of the object known, and to the latter, it is the self as truth that is so constitutive. To Kant, the subject as constitutive of the object known is only the form of truth and is conceived neither as an existent nor as a truth.

2. Transcendental or critical reflection may be supposed to arise through the necessity of adjusting two different kinds of certitude—practical and theoretic. We have in moral willing a certitude about the reality of the self, and we have in our theoretic consciousness a certitude about the existence of the object. The former is faith, the self as freedom being one of the postulates of moral consciousness. There is a difference, however, between freedom and the other two postulates, freedom being an *immediate* implicate of the consciousness of the moral law. The belief in freedom accordingly is called cognition^a and not merely faith, cognition of the practical and not of the theoretical kind. Knowledge then to Kant need not be theoretical knowledge and need not imply intuition: it is only theoretical or objective knowledge that has intuition as a necessary factor. Both practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge imply thinking, the former being thinking *in* categories and the latter thinking *under* the categories^b. In neither form is belief induced through thinking. In theoretic knowledge of the object belief comes through the intuition or the sense-givenness or blind pressure of the thing-in-itself, the matter that is brought *under* the categories. In practical knowledge of the self, there is the thinking of the self as cause, as *in* the category of causality, but the belief in the self is through the willing or the realising of the thought. Willing is free as *thinking* of itself as cause

^a Critique of Practical Reason p. 200 (Tr. Abbott).

^b Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Maxmüller) p. 324, and Critique of Practical Reason (Abbott), p. 233.

and realising the thinking. Free willing is known as *real in the willing* itself, not in introspection; known therefore not as an object but only as not empty concept, as form to which 'object belongs', though *what* the object is is not *understood*. In theoretic knowledge of the object too, there is the thinking of the object as causally constituted and related, which is taken to be fact because the thought is found to apply to sense-experience. There is the common thought of causality and the practical cognition is of the self as not object. The cognition of the self as free in moral willing has reference to sensibility as what "affects but does not determine" the will and also as that on which a rational system is to be imposed. Free will is determined by reason in conscious rejection of sensibility; and to realise the rational idea or the idea of the good is to have faith in the sensible world being changed in response to it. To will or freely cause is in fact to think and expect a causal change in the world, and the expectation is at least partially fulfilled. Thus there is a fitting of free causality with objective causality, a meeting of practical cognition of the self and theoretic cognition of the object in the thought of causality. It is difficult however to understand how a change in the object is caused at once by another object and by the self, and thus arises the necessity of adjusting the two kinds of cognition. The adjustment is effected by the view—to be explained presently—of the known object as only phenomenal. To critical reflection that is roused by the meeting of practical cognition with theoretical, the object becomes suspect in its determination or form, though—as given—its reality in point of matter is undeniable. This brings in the problem of transcendental analysis of the object into matter and form, matter that is undeniably given and form that is indistinguishable from the self.

3. That critical reflection is roused through the practical consciousness may not be readily admitted. It is ordinarily assumed that the critique of knowledge is an independent enquiry and that it refers to willing only at the end when it takes the Ideas of the Reason to derive their reality from the moral consciousness. Many passages in the Practical critique however, and especially the elaborate discussions of the relation of freedom and necessity suggest that the relation between the theoretic and the practical reason is much more intimate. The entire conception of apriori thinking as a factor of knowledge appears to be connected with the moral apprehension of free causality. All the transcendental constants of knowledge are comprised in the category of causality. The last category—necessity—is

but causality on a reflective level, and necessity not only comprises all the other categories but is also an anticipation of the forms of sense—time and space. Now this causality in the known object is intelligible only in reference to free causality as practically cognised. That the object or knowledge of the object is constituted by the self-functions would not be an assertory proposition at all, unless the functions were believed to be real and not mere logical entities. If, as Kant says, the self is not theoretically known as real, the entire conclusion of the theoretic critique that the self constructs the known object would be but a metaphor of speech and no assertion meant for acceptance.

4. In fact, the very problem of the first critique—how knowledge and object of knowledge are possible—would be gratuitous and almost meaningless unless the object were already suspect in the light of a certitude higher than that about the object, and that certitude can only be a spiritual certitude which in Kant amounts to the certitude of the moral consciousness. The idea of the phenomenality of the object must have already been suggested from the practical side to start the enquiry—if certain contents that are claimed to be known as objects are really so known and if what is known as object is known as noumenal. The standard of reality can only be suggested by the apprehension of the self in the subjective or spiritual attitude. It might be supposed that the distinction of phenomenon and noumenon is suggested by our objective apprehension of appearance and illusion. But that only implies a distinction within the object between the mental and the external, the mere appearance of the external object being somehow conditioned by the mental object. The suspicion that the mental object is itself phenomenal would never emerge so long as one knows in the objective attitude. By far the most important pronouncement of Kant is that about the transcendental ideality of time or the mental world, implying a distinction between self and mind. It is doubtful whether this is really proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic alone without the assumption of or faith in a real self that is utterly unobjective.

5. That brings up the question: in what sense is the object taken to be phenomenal? Phenomenon has to be understood from the standpoints of all the three critiques, from the practical, theoretic and aesthetic points of view. In the first critique, the objective is taken as phenomenal because its forms, space and time, are taken to be not objects, not given in experience but *a priori* as supplied by the self. They are taken to be, if not the self, at least indistinguishable from

the self. Causality including other relations constitutive of the object is understood as the thinking or apperceiving *act* of the self, but the forms of time and space are taken as the receptivity of the self and not its act. As constitutive of the object, the self is logical form. This form is real as the implicate of the act of freedom and is itself accordingly called the act of thinking, apperceiving or understanding. The knowing self being thus an act, what is its receptivity? If the act has to be understood to be real as free will, the facthood of the receptivity—of time and space—has to be understood also from the practical standpoint. Moral willing involves the certitude that free causality is being realised in the sensible world. The certitude has two forms—that free causality is being realised in internal sense as a temporal or mental series and in external sense as causality in the spatio-temporal world. The first certitude is that free choice will be expressed as sensible *life* i.e., a necessary chain of mental appearances* and the second is fulfilled in its objective as an objective rational system or nature^b. The former is time and the latter space (-time) to practical consciousness. Thus we may understand time and space or the pure receptivities as the expectations involved in the act of freedom, as not acts of the self but as their fulfilment in knowable objectivity. Willing involves thinking of itself as 'successful' or objectively realised, realised as time and space, as mind and the world. If freedom could be known in intellectual intuition, as it is not known, it would be known to put forth time and space. As a matter of fact we only know freedom practically and know time and space practically as what *must be* and not as what *is*. Freedom is known in moral willing as *not* the object, not in time and space. To know the real self to be *not* in time and space and to know time and space to be not fact but only necessary is to know the object as less real than the self. Thus we practically know the object to be an emanation of the self as freedom.

6. From the practical standpoint then, the object is phenomenon in the sense of being an emanation of the self. The temporal world or the mind is not theoretically known as distinct from the self which however is practically known to transcend it. Thus the mind is known to be a phenomenon of the self. But the spatio-temporal world is theoretically known as distinct from the self as thinking and is not merely mental or mere idea of the self. How it can be an emanation of the self and yet not an idea is not theoretically understood and

* CPrR—pp. 192-3.

^b Ibid.—p. 161.

hence it is taken to imply an unthinkable given element and to be indistinguishable from an unthinkable but believed—i.e., an unknowable reality or thing-in-itself. Yet it does not itself appear indefinite: it appears as definitely known. This definite appearance has to feeling or imagination an intrinsic value and is thus appreciated to be self-subsistent. The object thus appears as a contradiction—an emanation of the self and yet not mere idea, unthinkably real and yet having the definiteness of the idea; and the contradiction is resolved in aesthetic consciousness into a self-subsistent value. Though practically indistinguishable from the self as real and theoretically indistinguishable from an unknown reality, the object is not known as real nor therefore known as unreal, being aesthetically apprehended as a self-subsistent emanation from reality. Mind however,—the merely temporal object is not apprehended in aesthetic consciousness.

7. In transcendental reflection then the free self alone is known to be real and the object is known to be phenomenal. This may be regarded as the simple teaching of Kant's transcendental philosophy.

CHAPTER II

MIND AS PHENOMENON

8. Mental facts unlike external facts which are spatio-temporal are in time only. What is in time is change. A change in the external world is perceived or understood as a persisting spatial object in change. Mental fact has to be taken as a change but it cannot be objectively known to be in a persistent. The persistent can be either a spatial object or the self. The mind is not spatial and the self is not objectively known. A change in a spatial object is as real as the object, the reality of the object being primarily known through the matter of sensation being given to space. About mental fact as change then, which is not objectively known to be in a persistent, the question arises for the first time how it is fact, though that it is fact of some kind cannot be doubted. The question whether the spatial object is real or phenomenal does not arise in the first instance. It arises only after the mental fact is known to be phenomenal. Hence though in the order of exposition in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the phenomenality of space is presented before that of time, in the order of truth the former is dependent on the latter.

9. The question, in what sense the mental is to be regarded as fact is suggested by its contrast, as explained, with external fact. As a change for which no persistent is known and yet of which the fact-hood is undeniable, the mental appears as a problem. The solution that it is a phenomenal fact and that it is a phenomenon of the self could not have been reached on objective grounds. It is, as was suggested in the previous chapter, because we practically know the self as free causality with a negative and positive reference to a life of sense, know that the self is free only as refusing to be determined by the temporal and yet as having its causality realised in the temporal that the mental which is the purely temporal is understood as the phenomenon of the free or the noumenal self. The proof of the phenomenality of time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* on the ground of time being an *apriori* notion must be taken as already assuming the reality of the free self, all *apriori* theoretic function being understood as emanating from free causality.

10. If the *apriority* of space and time proved the phenomenality of the external and mental object, why should the former

be taken as phenomenon of an unknowable reality and the latter as phenomenon of the self as real? Both the objects are presented: we do not know object except as affecting us, though we may conceive an infinite spirit knowing (and creating) object entirely by thinking. Now the mental object unlike the external object is not presented through sensation: it is the self that affects itself in its form of receptivity called time.* Why the self has the forms of receptivity is to our theoretic knowledge an ultimate fact and no necessity. The question how the self 'affects the mind' cannot be answered; we are only assured that it does. Apparently this is not theoretic assurance.

11. That we are affected in our external sense may be admitted to be theoretically known in our internal sense. But that we are affected in our internal sense cannot be said to be known in the internal sense again. We can only be apperceivingly aware or aware in the subjective attitude that we do not know the self as object, i.e., as mind by mere apperception. Such subjective awareness of our inner sensibility in the negative way is apparently involved in the practical cognition of ourselves as free cause.

12. There is a good deal of obscurity in Kant's conception of the internal sense, and the exposition of it presented here is to a certain extent tentative. The external sense is said to be affected by the object, the form of the sense being space and the matter the sensations. If the object affects, it is not as spatial but as given, i.e., as the unknown reality phenomenised in space. The internal sense is also affected by its object, viz., a mental object, not by the object so far as it is temporal (for time is the form of the sense) but by the real self phenomenised in time as mental. The mental object has a form and a matter, the form being time, the form of the internal sense or the internal sense itself, but what is the matter? 'The representations of the external senses'—the percepts as we may call them, rather than the perceived things—are the matter of the internal sense.^b In the case of the external object, the matter (i.e., sensation) is only understood in reference to the form (i.e., space) as what fills space, although space is not understood in reference to the matter, being imaginable as empty. Sensation *means* what is involved in space, this involution of content being apprehended in the internal

* 'If the faculty of self-consciousness is to seek for i.e., to apprehend what lies in the mind, it must affect the mind and can thus only produce an intuition of itself.—Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Max Müller)—p. 733.

^b Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Max Müller)—p. 732.

sense. In the case of the internal or mental object, the matter—spatial percept—is similarly understood only as the filling of 'time, as involved in time. How is this involution apprehended? Not by the internal sense but by apperception. The reference of the image to the percept may be taken as the type of involution here. This reference is not itself presented: there is awareness of it only in the subjective attitude, in the form of 'I refer'. This awareness or apperception is only self-feeling, not knowledge of the self.^a The matter of the internal sense is thus the spatial percept as floated in time, as involved in time, as referred to in an image. The mental object is the image which is not so much in time as time itself, time figured as variously as the image varies. So the external object is not so much in space as a determination of space. The varying determinations of space or space-figures are through timing, through the imagination of possible motion in space. Similarly the varying time-figures—each image being a time-figure—are through the working of apperception or understanding in time, of the self or the mind,^b this working being called the transcendental synthesis of the imagination or figurative synthesis.

13. The mental is thus understood by Kant to be time as figured by the self and as involving or engulfing percepts, to be image constructed by the self in time (as pure intuition) and referring to spatial percepts. We have spoken of the work of the self on the internal sense in connection with knowing. We may now generalise it and understand the work of the self on the internal sense as willing or feeling also after the analogy of the schematic imagination in knowledge. The internal sense as thus figured is the empirical mind. The images belong to the internal sense, while the feelings of pleasure and pain and the will do not belong to it except as bound up with the images and as thus representing the work of the self on time. The mind then will mean the images as figured—cognitively, conatively and affectively—by the self. A mental fact is thus an image as formed out of time by the self and as informed by the self. An image, we said, is not so much in time as time itself as figured, so that that mental facts are in a series is only a verbal proposition while that external facts are in time is a synthetic proposition. If mental facts being in time be taken as implied by the very concept of the mental,

^a Prolegomena (Tr. Mahaffy & Bernard)—p. 97, ft.n.

^b Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Max Müller)—p. 758-9—where the internal sense is distinguished from the faculty of apperception, the mind from the self.

^c Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Max Müller)—p. 732.

Kant's view even of the (empirical) mind would be very different from the Humian view of the mind as a mere series of mental states. To Kant, mind would be time itself as a unity, as a permanent or duration, not mere succession, and so in sundry passages he speaks of mind and its modifications. Only this permanent mind cannot be pictured: it is on the one hand presented with the self-feeling and on the other symbolised by the spatial world (as gathered up in body—a point which Kant did not bring out), time being symbolised by space. The symbolism is necessary and adequate because the body felt as referring to (or in specific response to) the external world is the content of the mind as self-feeling.

14. The time-relation of mental facts (images) though not a succession within a spatial permanent and therefore not a causal succession is yet an objective fact and not a merely imagined content or image. The paradox requires to be explained. Empirical Psychology is taken by Kant as a descriptive but not an explanatory science. 'It' (Empirical Psychology) 'can never . . . be anything more than a historical and as such, as far as possible, systematic natural doctrine of the internal sense i.e., a natural description of the soul but not a science of the soul . . .'.^a It cannot be a science because, as pointed out in this connection, 'mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense'. These may no doubt be represented in time symbolised as a line, but the inapplicability of mathematics means really inapplicability of causality which is known only in the *spatio-temporal* world. The applicability of mathematics makes science proper only because such applicability means precision of causal explanation.

15. This is brought out in another way. The object of the internal sense, unlike that of the external sense, has no 'quantity as substance' 'consisting of parts outside one another'. Not that it has no intensive quantity or degree but its 'increase or decrease is possible, notwithstanding the principle of the permanence of substance'. The intensity of an external object increases or decreases, only when *substantial* units are added to it or taken away from it. But when a mental state decreases in intensity, we do not know of its losing any parts or substantial units so that a total annihilation of a conscious fact unlike that of a material fact is intelligible. This is practically saying that the law of conservation of matter or energy is inapplicable to the mind; and it amounts to the statement that the category of causality is inapplicable to mental phenomena.

^a *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (Tr. Belfort Bax)—p. 141.

16. Succession, says Kant in connection with the second Analogy of experience, is objective only as causal. Now if, as shown, the succession of mental states is not causal, must it be taken as only subjective? Must we say only that we are aware of one mental state after we are aware of another and *not* that one mental state *is* after the other? No: the succession of mental states is to Kant as much a fact as the succession of external events, the same time being the form of the mental object and of the external or spatio-temporal object bound in causality. How is this possible? We may imagine—for I am not aware of any actual passage of Kant in support—that it is because each mental state is, as pointed out, necessarily and adequately symbolisable by an external situation (as gathered up into a felt bodily state), is non-distinct from it (though it is distinct from the mental state). The time-relation of two mental states is then the time-relation of the external situations with which they are bound up, and it is only thus that it is objective fact without being causal.

17. It may be asked: if there is no causal relation among mental facts, why does Kant hold in connection with freedom and necessity that the self as noumenal is free and as phenomenal i.e., as mental is causally determined? The answer is that causality within mental phenomena is not theoretically or objectively knowable, being only a practical expectation. Moral or free willing involves the belief that it is being realised in the empirical world—mental and spatial. The belief is only partially realised theoretically: we may see the effect in the objective without being able to see the *modus operandi*, to understand how the effect so far as it is seen is brought about, how e.g., an inclination is weakened and rendered impotent on the occasion of moral willing by the free act or by some mental antecedent, though neither alternative is excluded, and an adjustment of the two causalities is conceivable. The belief in the operation of causality within the mind is only practical, being bound up with the practical belief in or knowledge of free causality.

18. The external world as phenomenal is felt, heuristically imagined or reflectively judged to be self-subsistent. The mental world cannot be similarly imagined to be self-subsistent. It may be suggested that the self-feeling in the mind can be *symbolised* by the external world imagined to be teleological i.e., to be a self-subsistent mind (not self). The mental world would then only be symbolised, not judged, as self-subsistent phenomenon.

CHAPTER III

SENSE AND SENSATION

19. Kant speaks of 'sense' not only in connection with knowing but also in connection with willing and feeling. Inclination, for example, and pleasure and pain are taken as belonging to sense, though they are not like sensation matter of knowledge. Sense generally is thus understood in a spiritual or transcendental reference rather than in a psychological or physiological connection. 'Sense' is taken by Kant as a mode of the faculty of representation. It is defined as 'the faculty of receiving representations according to the manner in which we are affected by objects'. The primary dualism apparently is of the thinking act and the faculty of representation, sense being the latter with the further attribute of being 'affected'.

20. The self is, to Kant, essentially the conscious thinking act which has three incommensurable 'interests' or directions—theoretic practical and aesthetic. We have representation in each of these directions of thinking. Representation is received in knowing, put forth in willing and entertained in feeling. In none of these is representation a mere floating image, the self having certitude of some kind about its content. Representation is apparently nothing to Kant apart from the thinking act, though distinct from it; and the thinking act means to him a necessary act or an act with immanent certitude about its content. Pure thought, to him, has no content distinct from it: the so-called logical entity is either not purely logical or is no content of thinking but the thinking act itself. The first content of thinking is representation.

21. To confine to representation as the content of *cognitive* thinking. Here the representation is received or is given. As given it is intuition and the receiving of it is intuiting. There is no reflective consciousness of intuiting as distinct from the intuited and so somehow representation is at once the object and has the object given to it. Thinking, however, is reflectively distinguished from representation, though in knowing it is not distinguished from the representing. Thinking as undistinguished from representing is Kant's pure productive imagination. Representation as distinguished from thinking in reflective knowledge is the image, not floating image but image of the believed or existent object which is not other than the object.

It is at once imaging and image of the existent and comprises memory, apprehension (internal perception of external perception) and perception (external perception of external object). The faculty may be called reproductive imagination and its function is to Kant as much apriori as the productive function, being an anticipation of the given.

22. Representation in knowing is then imagination of the existent and the faculty may be taken as the mind itself as distinct from the self. Thinking as undistinguished from representing—pure productive imagination is as much the self as the mind. How in it the self retains the thinking activity and how the mind as image of the existent is distinct from the self and is given to it is what we do not know. To Kant, the self is somehow the mind and the mind is somehow not the self—a mystery that can be only exhibited in transcendental reflection but cannot be understood. It is probably the same mystery as the practical self being somehow at once free and not-free, free as good willing and unfree as the 'intelligible character' behind wrong willing, free as act and unfree as being.

23. The mind as the faculty of representation is sensibility when the representation emerges through the self being affected by the object. A 'pure' mind is conceivable in which the image of the existent emerges to the self without an affection of the self; but as a matter of fact an image of the existent arises in us human beings through affection or in other words, we have sense-intuition only. How are we conscious of the affection? We are conscious not merely of receiving i.e., not thinking but also of the thinking act being arrested, of a positive limitation of thinking or, more accurately, of productive imagining. We may conceive a clairvoyance of the object, a veridical image of the existent floating up before the mind as a spontaneous fulfilment and not as a limitation of our productive imagining. Actually, however, we receive such an image as a limitation i.e., through an affection. The veridical image comes in memory, apprehension and perception as a check to our free imagination.

24. Sensation is to transcendental reflection the conscious limit to free imagination. It is defined by Kant as 'the effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it'. If the image of the existent emerges—as it always does as a matter of fact—through an affection of the self i.e., as a limitation of the free imagining act, it is a sensible or empirical representation. To be aware of a limitation of free imagining 'is to be aware of something positive and not of a mere privation, aware of

something other than the free act—viz., a given object—as positively limiting the act and as thus conditioning the emergence of the conscious representation of the object. This conditioning is understood as the causality of the object towards the mind. The representation—call it the percept here—is an event that emerges in the mind as the object is given. The percept is not other than the perceived object and cannot be said to be the effect of the object. It is in fact the mental object or event as reflecting the external object or as one with it. But the emergence of the event is not an event or representation. Not the event but the conscious emergence of it is the effect of the object and this emergence, as meaning a conscious arrest or limitation of the free imagining act, is sensation.

25. Sensation is not a representation but the emergence of it (as percept) on the one hand and the arrest of free imagining on the other. The causality of the object in respect of sensation is a conditioning, though it does not mean temporal succession. The causality of the phenomenal object in respect of the sensation which is not an object at all is not phenomenal or temporal causality. It is like the causality of the self in respect of a phenomenal event or the problematic conditioning of a phenomenal causal sequence by a noumenal ground. The emergence of a percept as mental event is not itself an event, nor is it a mere abstraction, being a state or affection of the self that is timelessly or transcendently real, as real as the free imagining act of which it is limitation.

26. It may be asked how the object which to Kant is only a phenomenon constructed by the self can be said to cause the affection of the self called the sensation. The objection implies a misconception about the status of the phenomenal object. Representation received or given is intuition and it is empirical intuition as received or given through sensation. 'The undefined object of . . . an empirical intuition is called phenomenon'. Now, consciousness of sensation as an affection of the self is consciousness of a positive something that affects i.e., of a given that is transcendently real. The phenomenal object is this given real as represented in the mind. The representation or percept or perceived object is not a mere idea other than this given real or thing-in-itself. The mental view of the thing-in-itself is the thing-in-itself as viewed. Not *falsely* viewed, for there is question of falsity only where the truth is knowable. The consciousness of the thing-in-itself is indeed a certitude involved in the certitude of the self being affected, but it is certitude only about the affecting positive *somewhat* and is not knowledge. It is certitude

involved in phenomenal knowledge and running beyond it. The certitude is not falsified in phenomenal knowledge, for it is reached only in the latter and never in isolation from it. We may say that the phenomenal object is the thing-in-itself as symbolised and given only in the symbolism. Thus to say that the phenomenal object causes the affection of the self is to say that the thing-in-itself causes it.

27. The sensation is not a mental event in time. Nor is it a quality of the spatial object. 'Colours' says Kant, 'are not qualities of a body, though inherent in its intuition . . . but are modifications only of the sense of sight as . . . affected by light'. In 'the table is red', the table as perceived is so much occupied space and this space is not red, even as the image of red is not red. The so-called quality of the phenomenal object is to transcendental reflection only the *filling or content* of the space *occupied* by the object.

28. Apparently to Kant, the relation of thing and quality has no application to objective existence. Thing is understood as a *simple* existent unity with a manifold of qualities and not as a *whole* of the qualities. How a simple can have a manifold in it is objectively unintelligible and is understood only in the case of the self as the subject of conscious states. Taking 'quality' in the proper sense as what the thing is and what yet is not the thing, we understand (though we do not know) the relation of thing and quality literally only in the case of the subject; and in the case of the object, we should take it merely *as though* it subsisted in it. The object or—what is the same thing—the space that is the object or is occupied by it has the apparent quality as its *content* or filling—as matter *within* it much in the sense in which the mirror has the image within it—and not as its real determination which quality proper should be.

29. The sensation then is neither mental object nor external object (as it would be, if it were quality) but what is mystically 'involved' in the external object or occupied space. Not that it is unreal like the image 'involved' in the mirror, but it is real not as object but as an affection of the subject and is known as such in the emergence of the percept as a mental event. The *content* of the external object, the *emergence* of the (percept as) mental object and the *affection* of the subject are one and the same real fact, viz., sensation. The content of the external object is (the degree of) its affecting causality; the consciousness of the affection of the self is the consciousness of the affecting causality of the object; and it is in the reflective consciousness of affection that the external object is known as the emergent mental object—the percept.

30. The external object is 'involved' in the percept as sensation is involved in the external object or occupied space. The external object is analysed into space as the form and sensation as the matter given by the thing-in-itself. The corresponding internal object—the percept—is similarly analysed into time as the form and the spatial matter which is paradoxically taken by Kant to be given by the self. The material for the internal sense to him is the external object which fills time as its content as sensation fills space as its content. The percept occupies time (i.e., emerges in time) as the perceived object occupies space; and the perceived object is the matter or content of the percept, internal sense or time as the sensation is of the perceived object.

31. How to understand however that the spatial object is matter given to internal sense *by the self*, as the sensation is matter given to external sense by the thing-in-itself? The affection of the self as internal sense is the spatial object and the cause of the affection is taken to be the self. It is only as the spatial object is reflectively known by the self that the mental object —percept—emerges in the mind. To reflectively know the object is to judge the object, to categorise it, or in other words to know it as externally and internally related. It is only of the explicitly related object that we have a conscious mental representation. The percept emerges to consciousness as mental (and not merely as the perceived object) only in the context of a judgment where one is aware of the relation in the object as undistinguished from the relating activity of the subject. The mental as mental emerges only as the matter of a judgment. The relation explicitly constituting the matter is known here to be given to the self (as internal sense) not from without but by the self as judging or relating. Precisely then in the sense in which the thing-in-itself is the excitant of the external sense is the self the excitant of the internal sense.

32. Sense to Kant is an apriori or transcendental receptivity, being the self itself (which is essentially active) as *somehow* passive. The forms of sense are just this apriori sense or receptivity. Sensations are the affections of the sense by the thing-in-itself. Sense as the transcendental ground or potentiality of sensations is called the apriori form of the sensations.

CHAPTER IV

SPACE, TIME, AND CAUSALITY

33. The analysis of known object into matter and form emerges in the transcendental consciousness only : matter and form are not empirical abstractions. The analysis is understood as self-evident : that the object has a given factor and an ungiven factor is taken by Kant as not requiring proof.* That the ungiven factor is Space, Time and Causality has indeed to be appreciated and exhibited step by step, but it is not really inferred or argued out. The formal arguments that are presented to bring out the apriority of space, time etc. are more directions for transcendental reflection than logical demonstration. This reflection may be described as a sort of experimentation with the knowing activity, a subjective exercise that can be specifically regulated. Objective reasoning is only a seeing of objective connections and does not involve an explicit introspective exercise. Transcendental knowledge—epistemology, to take a form of it—is not reached by logical reasoning without this conscious introspective deepening. In fact, reasoning is here one among other indications of the kind of subjective exercise that is demanded. The knowledge that we get through such introspective exercise does not come after the exercise (as in the case of reasoning) but is an aspect of the exercise itself. So willing is in itself knowledge of the willing or the willed content. Like the knowledge of willing epistemological knowledge is self-evident without being intuitive.

34. The external world under transcendental reflection i.e., in such introspective exercise with the knowing of it along the line of logical reasoning gets stratified into sensed matter and the forms of Space, Time and Causality. It is stratification rather than analysis into co-ordinate factors. The sensed matter is apprehended as involved in space, the spatial matter as involved in time and this spatio-temporal matter as further involved in causality. Causality as known fact implies change, change as known fact implies the spatial object in change and spatial object as fact implies a given matter. The matter at every stage is known only as the filling of its form : whether apart from the form, it is anything is not known though it cannot be denied. The form however is understood everywhere as what can be empty, empty

* CPR—p. 16.

form being not fact but a possibility i.e., transcendently *known*. We have an *anoetic* consciousness of matter apart from space (manifold of intuition^a), of spatial object not in time and of non-causal succession of spatial objects. A spatial object may not be explicitly known to be in time, but we may have explicit consciousness of such object as *not* in time^b—a sort of aesthetic consciousness which does not amount to knowledge. So a succession of spatial events may not be known as causal but there may be consciousness of their succession^c as non-causal which is not knowledge of it as fact. The spaceless manifold of sense, the timeless spatial object and non-causal succession are not known as fact, though apparently they may be content of a non-theoretic consciousness. Empty form, however, is transcendently *known* as a possibility. Empty space can be imagined as the possibility of sensed matter, empty time can be symbolised as the possibility of spatial object, and empty causality can be schematised as the possibility of an objective succession. The three empty forms are imagined in three stages. Empty space is picturable i.e., imaginable by itself. Empty time is only vicariously imagined or symbolised, being not picturable but representable (necessarily and completely) by the analogy of space; while empty causality is not only not picturable but not even symbolisable by any space-picture, being only sketched out or schematised by a half-formed time-figure or a direction of timing. None of these are known as facts but are not therefore chimeras; they are imagined and imagination here is knowledge of an objective possibility. This possibility is a kind of subsistent entity which to Kant is distinguished from mere chimera by being identified with a transcendently evident subjective function. Empty space is the receptive function of the self called the external sense, empty time the receptive function called the internal sense, and empty causality the active function called thinking. All these functions are evident to transcendental or critical reflection.

35. The external object as being perceived is imagined, viewed

^a The manifold is *known* as implied in perception, but whether it is psychologically given prior to perception is not denied by Kant.

^b What is not known to be in time may yet be fact but *not* what is known not in time. A changeless spatial object is contemplated in an aesthetic intuition without being claimed to be fact. It can however be known as implied by time, in the knowledge of change.

^c Whatever succession is believed to be objective fact is explicitly or implicitly believed to be causal. Even causal sequence is causal, the terms being members of a pervasive causal context. It is only what is taken as merely causal sequence between the terms taken by themselves that we are aware of as not objective fact. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

through the internal sense ['apprehended'], such viewing from within being transcendental relatively to the positive (or forward) perception. As thus viewed, the object shows itself as space which might be empty as involving or engulfing sensed matter. Space, in other words, detaches itself from the spatial object and becomes a distinguishable content of the apprehension, which may be called the possibility of spatial objects. This subsistent form of space — which may be now called an image or mental object — is next viewed from within i.e., sought to be thought as it is being imagined, and presently it shows itself as time detached from the mental object, time that can be empty but is filled with the matter of the mental object, viz., the spatial object. This detached time as the content of thought appears as a reference to space, only *as though* it were space, as space in the making, as the tracing out of space. Time as such symbolic space is again viewed from within, i.e., sought to be apperceived as it is being constructed and thus itself appears as in the making, as the sketching out or figuring of a possible image. Picturing, symbolising and schematising are the three consecutive grades of imaginative viewing of the external object, of viewing it from within or transcendental reflection on it through which its forms space, time and causality get successively detached from it and show themselves as the subsistent possibilities of the object. The grades of imaginative viewing are respectively the viewing of the object of the external sense from the level of the inner sense, of the object of internal senses from the level of thought and of the object of thought from the level of the apperception itself.

36. Form in the wide sense as comprising space, time and causality means qualitative unity or self-identity of the objective world, being just its known aspect or knownness. Space is this unity as presented, time as imagined to be presented and causality as thought to be presented. Space is pictured as object, time symbolised as object and causality schematised as object. Everywhere the form is taken as a single content, the world being understood as a unity and is contemplated as a detached subsistent. The detachment is transcendental and may be likened to aesthetic detachment. The object is in the first instance what is practically dealt with, intended for use. To the mind in the aesthetic, imaginative or contemplative attitude, the object floats up like an appearance and gets loosened from the practical context. Still the aesthetic attitude is objective; there is no suggestion of the appearance being *in point of truth* internal to the practical reality, being more essential

than, or constitutive of this reality. In transcendental reflection, there is this suggestion: the form by being detached from the object contemplated appears constitutive of the object. The detached form is understood in the first instance as standing by itself as empty, and then it is appreciated as having formed or constituted the object, contained or engulfed the matter. The formative form next appears as self-limiting and self-constructing and as thus self-repeating.

37. To illustrate it in respect of space. The first grade of transcendental reflection is that in which space gets detached from the spatial object. The arguments for the apriority of space are really modes of this reflection on the spatial object, of viewing it from within, of imagining it as being perceived. The aim is not so much to *prove* the apriority of space as to some to *see* space as a detachable form, that form is apriori being taken to be self-evident. The five arguments point out the character of space as a detachable form paraphrased in different ways. The aspect of detachable space that first emerges is its conceivable emptiness, the ground relied on in the second argument. Emptiness is the negative aspect, and the corresponding positive aspect is what is brought out in the first argument, viz., space as having constituted the object, space as the mutual externality of objects (including one's body) to the internal sense, as a single all-comprehensive system of their positions, blown out in anticipation from the internal centre*. To be transcendently aware of space as detached from objects is to be aware of its being their pervasive location and to organically feel oneself pervading them. To appreciate space as what can be empty i.e., a pure percept (intuition) is to appreciate it as a pure perceiving (form of intuition) or to feel oneself pervading out. Space as at once intuition and form of intuition (intuiting) appears as a living entity limiting or contracting itself into finite shapes, constructing or expanding itself also into finite sizes and thus perpetually reproducing itself. The argument about the oneness of space asks one to view space as having finite spaces emerging in it through self-limitation. Finite space is a shaped size. Shape rather than size should be taken to be meant by this argument as appearing through limitation, for there is no question yet of the spread of space out of which finite sizes are carved out, the limitation being thus a contraction of the one formless space rather than a division of one pervasive spread. In the argument about infinity, the size-aspect is pointed out as emerging

* An object is nothing without a perceivable position. To perceive an object in a position is to perceive—or (imaginatively) apprehend—its relativity to every other position including the position of the perceiver's body. It is to apprehend the entire system of positions as constituting the object.

through expansion. 'Infinity' of space here means not a helplessly pervasive spread but "infinity in the progression of intuition", every finite size presenting this infinite progression or construction through an infinite number of expansive spurts.

38. Whether in the contraction or in the expansion, space is understood as reproducing itself, and thus each finite space-size may be said to be a repetition of every other, to be a type or paradigm of the whole of space. This character is brought out in the argument presented in the transcendental exposition of space. The typical or self-reproducing character of space which might be objectively viewed after Plato as the process of an Idea is understood in the subjective or transcendental way by Kant "as a form of the external sense in general", as an external intuition "having its seat in the subject only" "anterior to the objects themselves." The apodictic character of geometric propositions implies the assurance that the properties of any parts of space hold good of all space. Thus the arguments for the apriority of space amount to a *seeing* of space as a form in its varying aspects.

39. As time is necessarily and adequately symbolizable by space, the arguments for the apriority of time are exactly parallel to the arguments for space and indicate similar modes of transcendental viewing of time as a form. What difference there is between the forms of space and time is intelligible as the difference in the mode of imagining empty space and empty time. Empty space, we said, is picturable while empty time is only symbolizable. The former is represented as possibility of spatial objects and is subjectively evident as the external sense itself (form of intuition) or as one big image (intuition). The latter is representable by actual spatial object as simply persistent or "continuant" and is evident as internal sense, felt duration or what may be called self-feeling.

40. We have, for the sake of convenience, used the term 'form' to indicate not only space and time but also the categories as comprised under the one heading, causality. Kant uses the term of space and time only, of the former literally and of the latter analogically or symbolically, restricting the term to such unity or self-identity of the object as is presented. Causality is also a mode of unity but is not presented. Of space and time, it is said that they are not only forms of intuition but also intuitions. As forms of intuition, they are indeed transcendently felt as subjective, but as subjective receptivity and not as subjective activity. "The form of . . . intuition may lie *apriori* in our faculty of representation, without being anything but the man-

ner in which a subject is affected" (C.P.R. p. 744). The manner of being affected is not even an implicit act of the subject.* It would in fact be taken only as unconscious capacity (a bodily function—organic or internal and special or external sense) but for the fact that space and time are themselves conscious intuitions (images as we may call them directly or indirectly referring to experience). Causality is a 'connection' or 'synthesis' of presented objects (p. 744 above) that is not presented or intuited, though the objective *fact* as we believe it necessarily implies it. This necessary implication is not inferred but is evident to transcendental reflection (on time) as a conscious *act* of the subject and not as a sense or receptivity or the manner of being affected.

41. The forms of sense have sometimes been loosely characterised as subjective acts. They are indeed *apriori* conditions of objective knowledge and as such anticipations of experience. But the anticipation is subjectively a feeling rather than an act. From the practical standpoint they may be regarded as expectations of the fulfilment of moral willing and not as moral self-assertion. They would be evident as practical assertion or as put forth by the will if, as was pointed out previously, we had intellectual intuition. As we have no such intuition, we have to take them as passive expectations of sensuous intuition. We may connect it with the Kantian statement that space and time are only known as the forms of *human* intuition: if we have to know, some form of intuition is necessary but that it should be space or time i.e., in reference to *sense*-experience only is no necessity but an ultimate transcendental fact for us. Space and time are as a matter of fact constitutive of the object that we know, necessary only in this sense and not necessary in the sense in which category or apperception is necessary, i.e., as self-justifying like willing which is indubitably real to itself. Even apperceptive consciousness of *the object*—that we should know object at all—is not a certitude like that of willing. As we practically *expect* a knowing of the fulfilment of willing and as we therefore *happen* to know object, the categories are self-evidently necessary to knowledge of object.

42. Causality is an unrepresented act and as such no 'form' in the Kantian sense, although we may take it as 'form' in the wide sense of form of unity of the object. As Kant says "the concept of connection includes, besides the concept of the manifold and the

* Kant admits implicit act, not in the sense of unconsciousness (for apperceptive act is to him self-evident) but only in the sense of faint consciousness connected with the effect only and not with the act itself (C. P. R. p. 86).

^b CPR—p. 745.

synthesis of it, the concept of the unity of the manifold also'. Synthesis is the act of relating, relation as a transition from one intuitable object to another. But the external world that we know is not merely a related plurality but is a standing unity. It is in this sense that causality can be called a form.

43. As in the case of space and time, we may understand the form of causality as empty. Connection as empty is the form of unity, being variously called 'qualitative unity', 'synthetical unity of the manifold' and 'objective unity of self-consciousness'. Apperceptive unity by itself is but 'self-identity: 'the principle of the necessary unity of apperception', 'says Kant' 'is itself identical, and therefore an analytical proposition'. 'But', he continues, 'it shows, nevertheless, the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold which is given in intuition, without which synthesis it would be impossible to think the unbroken identity of self-consciousness'. As the possibility of such synthesis, the apperceptive unity is called objective as 'distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness which is a form of the internal sense'. Transcendental reflection on the object of the understanding viz., causal succession dissociates its form of causality as the empty form of unity which as empty is but the subjective unity of consciousness or what we have called self-feeling (of the mind or internal sense). But the empty form is now recognised as the positive possibility of the objective *world* or the unity of experience. 'The same transcendental unity of apperception constitutes, in all possible phenomena which may come together in our experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws'.^a [Cf. the relation of the second argument for space to the first argument—the general principle being that in the reflective detachment of a form (which is the representation of it as empty) there is the recognition of the positive constitution or constructive character of the form. The whole of the theoretic critique may be regarded as the recognition of the possibility of the object, i.e., of the construction of the object in and through the reflective dissociation of form from the object].

^a Ibid.—p. 747.

^b Ibid.—p. 89.

CHAPTER V

CAUSALITY

44. Kant enunciates the second Analogy of Experience in the Second Edition in the form : "all changes take place according to the law of connection between cause and effect". By "change" here he means objective change, change in the spatial world, as distinct from the mere succession of mental states which cannot, except symbolically, be said to be in causal connection. In fact, not merely the laws of succession among the objects of the internal sense, but apparently any specification in it e.g., the distinction of the succession of two mental objects A and B from that of A and C or of the order A-B from the order B-A would be taken by him to be known only through the knowledge of causal dependences in the spatial world. Space to Kant is, as has been pointed out, known before time is known; and connected with it is the fact that causal change—in the spatial world, for causality is (theoretically) known nowhere else—is known prior to mental change^a. Succession as imagined^b presupposes succession as perceived, objective succession, or succession as fact—factual or given (perceived) succession being the same as causal succession. Given succession is irreversible succession, irreversibility being not the criterion but only the analytic description of causal succession. When one looks from one end of a house to another and back again, one is not aware of a *given* succession of two perceived objects; but only of the succession of their apprehensions. Every perceived succession in the spatial world is at the same time a succession of apprehensions of two objects but the perceived succession is not necessarily a fact *as between* those objects. What is called a causal sequence of A and B is indeed a given or causal sequence, but of X and Y (which may be undiscovered yet), not of A and B, A and B being somehow bound up with X and Y so that the causal sequence is represented subjectively as between the apprehensions of A and B.^c There is no question here of reversibility, so that causality—as here between A and B—is not denied on the ground of rever-

^a Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Maxmüller)—pp. 161-62.

^b Succession of images (internal presentations) is—apart from succession of spatial objects—imagined succession.

^c AX—BY may, as succession of presentations be called indifferently succession A-B, A-Y, X-B or X-Y; as of spatial objects it is only X-Y.

sibility. A given or perceived sequence then is always causal and irreversible though the precise terms of the sequence may not be the terms, the apprehensions of which we are aware of as successive in the internal sense. All perceived succession is irreversible succession of two (spatial) facts which may not be known and which can be ascertained by the criterion that the antecedent among them should contain the condition of the rule by which the consequent follows at all times and necessarily. Thus two characters are given of causal succession—irreversibility and inevitability, each a sufficient character—the former presenting the problem of finding the precise terms of the succession through the application of the latter as a criterion.

45. That every given or perceived succession is causal succession of *some* objective facts is not capable of objective proof. It, however, follows immediately from the transcendental reflection that if succession which should not be perceived (by the external sense) is yet perceived, it can only be through the imaginative production of the perception.^a The internal sense is necessarily anticipative of the continuous extension onward of time, and since whatever is to be known would be represented in the internal sense as presentable to external sense, it would necessarily be known as a series of phenomena in space in which each succeeding necessarily depended on the preceding.

46. To explain. Time is not externally perceivable and yet we apparently perceive a change in the external or spatial world. Succession is believed as an intuited fact and is not taken as an imaginary content. It cannot be intuited by the external sense nor by the internal sense which can intuit only an external percept. So succession in the external object and the intuition of the succession in the mind must be apriori or timelessly constructed by the sense. Apriori construction of succession is timeless construction of time in space. Time is not given before this synthesis.

47. But it may be asked, why may not a change be perceived in the ordinary way? To apprehend a change as change, it is necessary not only to have the idea of different states together but to have the idea of their being in order of succession. The time-order cannot be said to be remembered unless it was perceived. Now it cannot be said to be perceived for the first time at the time of sensing, for then it would be perceiving without a sense-basis. Elsewhere e.g., in the visual perception of the orange where the colour is sensed and the touch aspect ideated, the latter is sup-

^a CPR—p. 171.

posed to have been sensed along with the colour in the past. Here, however, the prior and the posterior moments of the change could not have been sensed together. If the succession is taken to be only perceived now, it is non-sensuously *intuited* by the mind. The mind then has to be credited with an original power to know the pastness of the external object without the help of sense. One has to choose between this view and the Kantian view of the mind's constructive anticipation of the posterior moments of a change at the time of sensing the prior moments—or—what is called “production of the perception” of change—which, we may suppose, is completed in the sensing of the posterior moments. The latter would be consonant with the view that the mind (internal sense) can apprehend only what is or appears given to sense perception (external sense). The anticipatory apprehension of the coming moment of the change is possible through the apprehension of the direction of the change or motion that is presented in space. This initial *direction* appears at least to be externally perceived. In the other theory there is no such apparent external content to guide us from the present to the past, and one has to admit a purely internal intuition of the pastness of the external object.

48. The production of the perception of change is anticipative, starting from the sense-perception of the external state on which the change supervenes. To apprehend the state in the internal sense is at once to expect and to perceive a state of depending on it, to necessarily produce the percept of it in advance. Now, since we can know the external world only by floating the representation of the external sense in the internal sense—that being the condition of apperception, the external world is known as intrinsically involved in change, as a continuous succession of spatial facts in which the consequent followed the antecedent necessarily, that is, according to a rule.

49. It is thus that Kant transcendently deduces the possibility of the factual world being spatio-temporal. On our ordinary notions of space and time, of perception and imagination, spatio-temporal facts as well as the perception of time would be a mystery. The mystery has been sought to be made intelligible in other ways—e.g., by the conception of a single entity that is somehow both space and time, though called either space or time. But apparently such a conception is not feasible except as a mere problem, being unrepresentable as presented or intuited, since the distinction of space from time is the inalienable distinction of perception from imagination.*

* The very condition of perception is a distinction of space from time.

Yet, since as a matter of fact we *do believe* in the world being spatio-temporal—without which belief too, the merely temporal (or mental) cannot be believed, we have to overcome the ordinary notion of space and time as a duality of co-ordinate entities in a different way. Kant's solution is apparently that space is involved in time and yet distinct from it—or to put it otherwise, space is distinct from time but not vice versa. The solution he presents in the transcendental or epistemological way rather than as an objective metaphysical view. Space and time are no doubt to him transcendently ideal but the identity is understood in contrast with the transcendental reality of the free self as practically apprehended. Within phenomenal objectivity, they are real and we can have *apriori* a metaphysical view of the relation of space and time, such metaphysic being never repudiated by Kant but only postponed after the critical enquiry. Now his metaphysical view as indicated by his epistemology of the perception of change may be imagined to be that space is within time but is not time; the external world is real within the mental but is not itself mental. The object is within the mind in the sense that while the object appears given to, and therefore distinct from the mind, one is aware of the mind not as distinct from the object but as constituting the object in so far (primarily) as it appears in change (and motion, and secondarily as a determinate shape-size). Change is an explicitly equivocal presentation: it is not spatial and yet it is in space. To distinguish space from time and yet to perceive time in space as change is to be transcendently aware of this immanence as the immanence of the mind in the object.* So one is aware of the changing object as what has mind immanent in it and aware of it, yet as perceived by the mind and as such distinct from it, and reflected in a mental presentation.

50. Thus apparently the law of causality as presented in the Second Analogy of Experience is legitimated by the epistemology of the perception of change. The concept of objective change requires to be elucidated. Change is a transition from one mode of existence to another mode of existence of the same object. Further 'every transition . . . from one mode of existence into another takes place in a certain time between two moments, the first of which determines the state from which the thing arises, the second that at which it arrives. Both . . . are the temporal limits of a change or of an intermediate state between two states and belong as such to the whole of the change. Every change, however, has a cause which proves its causality during the whole of the time in

* Cf. Alexander on time as the mind of space. Only take mind literally and all within phenomena.

which the change takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change suddenly (in one moment) but during a certain time All change, therefore, is possible only through a continuous action of causality which so far as it is uniform is called a momentum. A change does not consist of such momenta but is produced by them as their effect'.^a

51. Change then means change of state, and not merely difference of certain relations which we have even in a uniform movement which is no change.^b It does not mean the state which arises (or an event) but the passage from one state to another of the same object. Between the states, there is always an intermediate state: 'neither time nor a phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible; nevertheless, the state of a thing which is being changed passes through all these parts, as elements, to its new state', this being the law of continuity in all change. The 'thing' or the spatial object in change emerges out of a state which is apparently at once the initial state of the object and the terminal state of another object. 'Arising or perishing absolutely, and not referring merely to a determination of the permanent, can never become a possible perception'.^d But a spatial thing would not be said to arise out of a state that belonged to it only. 'Every substance . . . must contain in itself the causality of certain determinations in another substance'; ' . . . according to the principle of causality, actions are always the first ground of all change of phenomena and cannot exist therefore in a subject that itself changes'.^e Now the action through which a change or a changing thing arises cannot belong to the same thing. This action or influence of one thing on another implies 'a relation of the subject of the causality to the effect.' The 'subject of the causality' is a substance other than that in which the effect is produced. The relation of the two substances must appear in a single mode of their coexistence in space, this being the state out of which the spatial object in change, which is the presented form of the substance influenced, arises.

52. The question may be asked about the status of these substances and of the causality of which the influencing substance is said to be 'the last subject'.^f These substances cannot be metaphysical in the sense in which the free self is metaphysical, nor are they unknow-

^a CPR—p. 170;

^b Ibid. p. 169n;

^c Ibid. p. 170;

^d Ibid. p. 153-4;

^e Ibid. p. 173;

^f Ibid. p. 167.

^g Ibid. p. 167;

able things in themselves. Kant calls them substances in phenomenon: they are not presentable in external or internal sense and yet are the contents of *perceptions*, perceptions that are produced by imagination only. They are metaphysical in the sense of not being given in sense, in the sense the fundamental principles of natural science are called by him metaphysical. These substances are embodied in spatial object in change, are indicated by them, but are not themselves spatial. As to the causality of which the acting substance is said to be the last subject, it is not the temporal action but what is embodied in it and is determinative of the change that follows it. It is what he calls "real powers, which can be given empirically, . . . motive powers" which "certain successive phenomena (as movements) indicate".* These then are the causes: the previous spatial *event*, the last state of the influencing substance is not the cause. The effect too is not an event in the sense of a stage of change, but the whole change which may be called a unitary continuous series of events. The cause that is said to operate "during the whole of the time in which the effect takes place" is thus a motive power or force, a metaphysical entity in the sense explained. Thus Kant's conception of causality differs from Hume's not merely in the recognition of necessary connection, but also in the recognition of the metaphysical entities of substance and force as necessarily in phenomena. (So too, as was pointed out previously, he admits not only mental phenomena but a substantial empirical mind in which a pure self is embodied).

53. It is important to note here that why one substance should cause a change in another we do not know; and it is permissible here to suppose that the ground of the causality is something noumenal.^a The connection of such "metaphysical entities in phenomena" with free causality is thus easily suggested as a problem.

54. Causality to Kant implies the category of substance though substance need not imply causality. Causality is understood in respect of a change of a substance, of change as implying a static permanent. But after the recognition of causality, there arises the concept of action which implies again the concept of the "subject" of the action, the "last subject of the causality" which must be permanent. As time necessarily refers to space which without reference to time is not known as fact, and cannot yet be denied, so causality presupposes substance which as a merely static permanent cannot be denied. Thus though, according to Kant, nothing is known as objective fact

^a Ibid. p. 169;

^b Ibid. p. 441.

unless it is causally related, the terms of this relation are not therefore taken to be constituted in their facthood by the relation: causality is a regulative and not a constitutive category. The effect must be outside the cause and dependent on it: causality means an order of time, a rule of succession. There would, however, be no rule or necessity represented in phenomenon if there was a *lapse* of time between the cause and effect. The effect must be co-existent with the causality of its cause, though the cause cannot produce its whole effect in one moment.* The dependence of effect on a co-existent in which the causality resides—or *action* which is the same thing in another way—is symbolically, necessarily though, represented spatially e.g. by a line of motion. This symbolizing is a constructing so that we may say that causal influence is the construction of a pure motion. The subject of the action and the subject of the change that follows are understood as two substances. The time-order of the action and change can be only known as an objective fact if the corresponding substances are embodied in co-existent spatial objects. But spatial co-existence is fact only if *each* object acts on the other i.e., if the subject of the change also acted on the subject of the action. In other words, causality as a fact entails reciprocity between two substances, i.e., phenomenally presented as a spatial co-existence of spatial objects. Time is an objective fact only as a change in space and space is a fact only as changes dependent on each other which would be a contradiction unless understood as substances acting on each other and having a change in each dependent on the others. Change is only of the unchanging and is accordingly only a sensible phenomenon of an intelligible reality. Here we have an analogue within the knowable object of the practical dualism of the self as free and determined, as noumenal and phenomenal.

55. The Second Analogy of Experience states only that change takes place according to the law of causality or in other words, that it does not happen by *chance*. It does not exclude the possibility of a causal transition (from an action to a change) being itself only a fact, being conditional on nothing else, or—as it may be put—being unintelligibly *fated*. This fate is excluded as a knowable object by the Third Postulate of Empirical Thought. There might be, one can argue, unconnected causal laws (or reciprocity system) in which the cause is not caused and at least the effect does not cause. The Third Postulate may be taken to assert that uncaused cause and uncausing effect cannot be known objects, that whatever is known as object is knowable

* Ibid. p. 166.

as at once the effect of something and the cause of something else. No object is known that is not in change and no change that is not caused. This may indeed be taken to be implied even in the Second Analogy, (though it is explicit only in its formulation in the first edition—"everything that happens presupposes something on which it follows as a rule"). But in any case an uncausing effect is not excluded by it. An effect or rather the last stage of a change, that terminates of itself may be still admitted, for its existence or its cessation after the last moment of the change would be no happening and, therefore, does not fall under the Analogy. But, as has been shown at the beginning, the perception of a change is *anticipatory*: given a perceived situation, one *a priori* expects some existence (in change) to emerge out of it.* Since the last stage of a change is a perceived situation, the anticipation of the perception of a change after it is necessary. Some such deduction of the impossibility of an uncaused effect (as an empirical object) may be supposed to be implied in the Third Postulate, though it is not explicitly stated.

* Ibid. pp. 184-185.

CHAPTER VI

JUDGMENTS OF FACT, VALUE, AND OUGHT-TO-BE

56. Kant discusses the judgment in all the three critiques. Theoretic judgment is judgment of fact, and there is no theoretic knowledge to Kant outside the judgment. But judgment to him need not be knowledge: the third Critique is of judgment considered as a faculty co-ordinate with knowing and willing and identified with feeling. This is judgment of value or, as he calls it, of purposiveness, purposiveness being value in its relational aspect. Moral judgments such as he deals with in the second Critique are judgments of something being 'good', the good being understood as presupposing the 'ought' or the moral imperative. A judgment is expressible as a sentence indicative and so prescriptions of 'ought to will' are not judgments. But 'good' means what ought to *be*: to say that an action is good is to state a judgment, to assert that it fulfils the moral law or the 'ought to will', is such as ought to exist as an object. Neither 'ought-to-will' nor 'ought-to-be' is a value: value is nothing if not at least partially actualised in an object, while 'ought' means what completely transcends the actual. In Kantian ethics at any rate, there is no moral value, for the 'good' means nothing apart from 'ought to will', no *self-subsistent* value which the will is to realise. *Value*, however, may be possessed by what is morally, good, beauty or teleology being explicitly taken by Kant in the third Critique as symbol of morality.* Fact as a concept would be to Kant positively opposed to value, and goodness too is not value, though it may be symbolised by value.

57. Judgment in all these cases refers to a phenomenal object and is the appreciation of a concept or an intelligible being somehow immanent in it. The appreciation amounts to theoretic or practical knowledge about the object in judgments of facts and of ought-to-be, which accordingly are called *determinative judgments*. It does not amount to knowledge but only to an imaginative or subjective satisfaction in judgments of value which are called by contrast *reflective judgments*. In all judgment, however, the content viz., the immanence of the intelligible in phenomenon is actual or accomplished to imagination, though it is assertorially believed only in reflective judgment, not in determinative judgment where it is only taken to be necessary. It

* CJ. p. 248, p. 370.

is (in any case) what is imagined with certitude and not merely what is sought to be or might be imagined.

58. The subject of a judgment is always a phenomenon and the predicate an intelligible. The phenomenon may be actual or possible, perceived or perceivable, but never what we are conscious of as imaginary or illusory or problematic (*might be* imagined). The possible phenomenon means here that which *is* imagined as what *can* be, not merely *might* be. The subject again is not nothing without the predicate, though it may be nothing *known*; and as having the predicate immanent in it, it is still phenomenon and not phenomenon-cum-noumenon. The subject must be presented in intuition, empirical or pure: there is no judgment about the purely intelligible. The immanence of the predicate in the subject also cannot be purely rational, the copula being apprehended in an apriori imaginative synthesis as phenomenon in the making, as the *forming* of the subject phenomenon.

59. Phenomenon is at once the other of the intelligible and what is constituted by it, a term of the relation of immanence and the relation of immanence itself. In the first chapter, phenomenon was explained from the moral standpoint as less real than the (free) self, from the theoretic standpoint as somehow mixed up with the self, and from the imaginative (reflective) standpoint as yet self-subsistent. These three aspects of phenomenon are brought out in the three types of judgment—moral, theoretic and reflective—, and in the three types of imagination that they involve. It may be stated in advance that the moral judgment takes the subject as a *symbol* (typic) of the predicate (*ought*, 'final purpose', good), the theoretic judgment understands the predicate (concept) as *approximation* to (or schematically figured by) the subject, and the reflective judgment regards the subject as the *expression* (self-specification) of the predicate (reason, 'purposiveness').

60. To begin with the theoretic judgment. Every judgment is understood in the form 'S is P', where S is a perceived content, actual or possible, P a thought-content or concept, and the copula *is* the immanence of the concept in the percept. The subject is an object of the external sense or of the internal sense, and each may be actual or possible. An actual object of the external sense is a spatial (spatio-temporal) object, and a possible object is some pure determination of space as mere form (external object in general), the judgment being either physical or geometrical (phenomenal-mathematical). An actual object of the internal sense is a temporal presentation of a spatial object, actual or possible; and a possible object of the internal sense

is some pure determination of time as mere form, of presentation in general. A judgment about the former would be psychological or pure—mathematical (according as the subject is presentation of an actual or of a possible spatial object); and a judgment about the latter would be transcendental—what Kant called ‘principle of the understanding’ (comprising apparently two grades—the metaphysical principles of natural science making up what is called ‘pure Physics’ and the transcendental principles dealt with in the first Critique). The predicate is a concept which may be empirical (like ‘dog’), pure-intuitional or mathematical (like ‘triangle’) or a category (form of concept or necessary connection). The different grades of the subject may be grouped conformably to the predicate into the three heads of individuals—empirical object, particular determinations of space—time and space—time; the corresponding judgments being called physical, mathematical and metaphysical judgments in a generalised sense.

61. The transcendental equivalent of the copula in these three classes of theoretic judgments is the schema, a generic form in the making as half-presented form of the spatial (spatio-temporal), vicariously or symbolically presented form of the (purely) temporal and un-presented (but intended to be presented) form of the intelligible. The schema is not a complete image but is what is intended to be completed in an image. It is not image at all in the case of the category, but in the case of the other concepts, there is some actual indefinite image which is sought to be further defined. The defining out of the image is in every case a conscious act and not merely an unconscious process in which one finds the image progressively defined. The schema being of a universal is a generic or typical image which is only in the making and unlike an individual image which is found complete so far as it goes and found, it may be, to be presented with increasing definiteness, is being defined by a conscious continuous act. The act is with a definite intention i.e., thought of the perceived object to be comprehended or apperceived. The manifold of sense as received primarily in space and secondarily in time is only arranged, not yet related, is only a given whole of elements which are not yet *necessarily* connected, connected in such a way that each is known to be a fact only as implying the whole, that the implication itself is believed to be as real as the given whole. When a given or perceived whole is thus known to be interconnected, it is said to be comprehended or apperceived. Implication is the universal form of objectivity which being unknown, the given whole is only undeniable but not assertable as objective fact. The categories are the different modes of logical implication, the primary

differentiations of the universal form of objectivity or of the apperceptive unity. These again comprise the modes of mathematical and physical implication which may be regarded as secondary universals. Schema in general then may be defined as implication in the conscious process of being imaged.

62. Judgment as a transcendental function implies the schematisation of the universal. The universal in Kant is understood in a very wide sense. There are universals of quantity, quality, relation and modality, each including category, mathematical concept and physical concept. The ultimate universal in the theoretic sphere is objectivity, implication or apperceptive unity. In both theoretic and non-theoretic judgment, the universal is the self as asserting itself in reference to the phenomenal object. In the theoretic sphere, the self in such reference is logical implication or the implication called truth; in the practical sphere, it is the good or the objective obverse of freedom; and in the imaginative sphere, it is self-subsistent value. In all spheres, the self in reference to the given phenomena is a thinkable which is in the process of being phenomenalised as an anticipatory image of the phenomenon. In the theoretic sphere, the self thus becoming flesh is called schema.

63. In theoretic judgment, the concept to apply to the percept seeks to imaginatively anticipate it. The question has been asked if this is not a gratuitously mystical account of the judgment. We start, it is said, with the fact of knowledge which is judgment, the concept and the percept being only unreal abstractions from it. To Kant, in the practical sphere at any rate, the free self and the inclinations with which the known objective world is bound up are no mere abstractions, the dualism being of two hard concretes. The latter is, no doubt, a phenomenal reality, less real than freedom, which, if holiness could be attained and intellectual intuition were possible, would be realised as an emanation from the one reality of the self. As a matter of fact, holiness is an absolute imperative and we have no positive conception of intellectual intuition, though the being of the former and the fact-hood of the latter, cannot be denied. In actual consciousness then, phenomenal reality has to be admitted as opposed to transcendental reality. Some sort of unification is taken to be attained in the reflective concept of value, but the unity is self-subsistent only as phenomenal object or nature, not as a beautiful soul; and even in nature, the union of mechanism and teleology is not actually imagined but only what may be imagined, being no content of *reflective judgment*. The dualism of spirit and nature then remains and in the theoretic sphere, it appears

as the dualism of the infinite (Idea of Reason) and the finite (content of judgment), and as its shadow within the judgment—the dualism of concept and percept. Had the sphere of object-knowledge (theoretic judgment) stood by itself, the view of concept and percept as mere abstractions would be plausible, and the two unknowns at the background—viz., the self as a pure logical entity and the thing-in-itself might have been dismissed as chimeras. As a matter of fact, we have actual belief in, though not knowledge, of the self and the thing-in-itself as concretes, in the setting of which belief the transcendental analysis (which is knowledge) of the judgment into concept and percept is understood. Hence it is that there is a problem as to how the concrete concept and percept meet in the judgment. The cognitive questions ‘what is it? (the given)’ before a judgment and ‘Is this judgment true?’ after a judgment point to the judgment as a union of factors that can be dissolved. If it can be dissolved, the uniting has to be recognised as a function.

64. The uniting function is constructive imagination, imagination that produces belief, produces the perception of the given spatial object as figured by it. The figure is not given in passive or receptive perception but it appears consciously as though it were given i.e., as the content of perceptual judgment. The spatial object as passively perceived is still distinguishable from this content which however appears one with it. In contrast with the passive percept, the figure appears in the internal sense as in the making and is from the point of view of thought or apperception the conscious making or figuring. This figuring that is at the same time an incomplete figure is called a schema. In the case of concepts lower than the category, the incomplete figure is partially or symbolically pictorial, but in the case of the category, the figure is purely temporal, just barely intended to be pictorial. In the former case, the judgment is not purely theoretical but partly *reflective* or aesthetic, there being a feeling of actual or realised immanence of the concept in the percept. In the case of the category and the purely theoretic judgment, this feeling is absent, the percept being accordingly completely distinguishable from the judgment. The schema proper is a process of the concept that barely touches the percept i.e., is represented in the internal sense as what is not but is to be or must be represented in the external sense.

65. Since the schema is intrinsically non-pictorial (at least partly) or in other words the percept is distinguishable from it, the theoretic judgment or object-knowledge is realised only in an *internal* percept in figured *apprehension*. The concept thus only approxi-

mates to the percept, its immanence in the external or spatial object being only intended, not accomplished. Such knowledge, therefore, as we actually have is always unsatisfying, is only necessary and not self-evident. The known phenomenon is only a mixture of concept and percept, of thought and the given and is not self-subsistent like the phenomenon of the reflective judgment or judgment of value. To the reflective judgment, the phenomenon is living nature, external percept inter-penetrated with the concept, a sort of spatialised mind. But just because the concept is here spatialised, there is no longer knowledge. The perceived phenomenon is no longer apprehended in inner sense and therefore no longer apperceived. Knowledge implies apperception of the apprehended or internally perceived phenomenon.

. 66. To elaborate the account of the reflective judgment or judgment of value. The phenomenon to it is self-subsistent, a spatialised mind that specificates itself. Its figuring by the concept appears as its own elaboration or expression. The union of the concept and the percept is not here a schema, a presentation in the making but the accomplished presentation of expression—what is called ‘specification of nature’.^a The concept here appears immanent in nature as *its* purposiveness, the specification being of the purpose. In the theoretic critique, the understanding is said to make nature: the object is no known fact unless it is figured through the schemata by the categories. But what is thus constructed by the understanding is the bare form of nature, the object so far as it can be apriori anticipated in the *principles*. The object must have *some* extensive or intensive quantity, *some* causal law etc., but we do not know the *particular* quantity or law apriori. We know this by experience i.e., nature gives it. There is no necessity that nature should give us specific forms and forms that are connectable into a system. As a matter of fact, however, nature does give us such. Each specific form or specific connection of forms is such as can be known by us, fits in with our general apriori anticipation or principles, appears purposively designed not for our desire but for our cognitive faculty. It is as though there was an objective mind speaking to our mind in a language intelligible to us. That we can know aposteriori, that the matter of knowledge which we could never anticipate happens to wear the apriori forms of our knowledge is a wonder that we can never theoretically explain—for that would be apriori knowing the given particular. We have only to accept it as a fact and feel the problem and reflectively interpret it as the purposiveness of nature. Such interpretation would be a judgment of

^a CJ—p. 26.

impersonal value—an altogether new kind of judgment. A judgment of personal value or purposiveness for desire would be only a theoretic judgment.

67. The purposiveness of nature is purposiveness to our knowing, not to our desire, and is imagined as such in the expression or interpretation of an actual or given feeling of pleasure of a disinterested kind. The imagination is, as compelled by an actual feeling, necessary, and the principle of purposiveness (to knowing) is a transcendental principle of the faculty of judgment. Judgment has to be recognised as a faculty distinct from knowing, for this imaginative interpretation of a feeling of knowing as purposiveness is necessary without being inferential. It is necessary for reflection or understanding of the subjective faculty of knowing, of the union of the two factors of knowing—*a priori* and *a posteriori*—reached in transcendental reflection but not necessary for the understanding of the object known, for the union is not given as a perceivable character of the object but only a felt content. Judgment such as we have within cognition is not other than the faculty of understanding which is indifferently described as a faculty of conceiving (categories) and of judging (principles or rules), the two being distinguished at all in view of this extra-cognitive reflective judgment which has a specific transcendental principle. Within knowing, concept that is not for judgment is but subjective apperception and has no objective meaning. At the same time it may wait for application in a judgment and is in this sense prior to it. This reflective judgment however is prior to the concept of purposiveness; the immanence of the concept (of purpose) in the percept,—the judgment function—is given in feeling in the first instance, and the concept is then sought to be formulated through the reflective elaboration of the feeling. In judgment of fact, the concept seeks application but in judgment of value, the application seeks the concept.

68. The purposiveness of nature is felt and imagined in two ways—the aesthetic and the logical (teleological). In the former, the purpose is imagined in reference to the cognitive faculty in general while in the latter, it is imagined in reference to the cognition of something objective. What the specific purpose is we do not know in either case: but while in the teleological judgment, it is known as some *intrinsic* purpose of the object that is yet to seek, in the aesthetic judgment, it is not so known, the object being only imagined as fitting the *a priori* conditions of knowability. In the teleologic judgment, the purpose or the ideal is not merely imagined but thought as objective, being imagined as the completion of some thinkable and not merely

felt character of the object. In the judgment of an object as living i.e., with "an inner end" the end is explicitly thought as formative of the object*, though it is not known in specific detail. In other words, while the aesthetic judgment starts with an empirical percept, the teleologic judgment starts with an empirical judgment, the starting cognition being reflectively sought to be specificated in either case. In both, the purposiveness is imagined as an interpretation of empirical knowability, of what is only felt to be knowable in the former and of what is both felt as knowable and partly thinkingly known in the latter.

69. The judgment of ought-to-be like the judgment of value is the expression of a felt immanence of the concept of the good in perceivable object, though the feeling is a practical feeling, not one of enjoyment. At the same time it is a determinative judgment amounting to practical knowledge. The predicate as in theoretic judgment is fully formulated and transcends the subject, determining only the apprehension or the internal perception of it. Its immanence in external nature is indeed felt: nature is felt as the body of the holy law, though a mystic and not a manifest body, not as informed by the law of freedom, but as its distant symbolism (typic). In the theoretic judgment, the transcendence of the concept is expressed by its indefinite approximation to the percept in the *schema*. In the practical judgment however, the transcendence is expressed as the approximation of the percept to the concept, of the felt perceivable nature to freedom, such approximation being understood as symbolism or 'typic'.

* Judgment of external end is not reflective but theoretic judgment.

CHAPTER VII

FREEDOM AND MORALITY

70. Kant starts with the appetitive faculty (which to him is life itself), being the faculty of desire and aversion, which he understands as 'the faculty of being by means of one's ideas the cause of the objects of those ideas'. Desire (or aversion) is an act (as distinct from a sensible state) of the appetitive faculty, an effort (*nisus*) to be and is a causality at least within the subject. It is conscious as idea of an object to be caused and may or may not be conscious in the actual causation, and even where it is so conscious, may or may not pass out to the object itself. In any case it is conscious as an anticipation of causality. Where it is conscious in the actual causation, it is called will or wish (both being sometimes called *will*), according as it passes out or not to the object. Free will is taken as a particular form of the will.^a

71. Desire is connected by a subjective rule with pleasure either as its cause or effect, such connection by rule being called interest. Pleasure that is so connected is practical pleasure as distinct from contemplative pleasure. As the cause of desire, it is called appetite, the habitual form of which is inclination. Desire is said to be caused by pleasure or the interest of inclination when the causal idea is of pleasure to oneself.^b But the causal idea may be of an object only irrespective of pleasure: one may desire an object for its own sake, in which case the desire is said to be caused by an interest of reason, which as habitual may be called interest of sense-free inclination. There is, however, pleasure here as the effect of desire which is apparently not the pleasure of gratification but pleasure felt in the idea of the object to be caused, the 'felicific aspect' of the object ideated.

72. Pleasure as the effect of desire in this sense appears in the process, where it is conscious, of the causality of the idea of the object desired in the form of pleasing or choosing to act.^c The causal process

^a Kant uses the term *will* in two senses—(i) elective will which may be free or unfree, (ii) free or rational will. Sometimes *will* means also wish: the most general sense would be *pleasing* to act (or forbear).

^b Its connection with desire being by a subjective and not objective rule, pleasure causes only an *idea* of pleasure and hence there is no question of an actual feeling of pleasure taking form as desire for more pleasure.

^c Pleasure as necessarily and subjectively connected with desire determined by the interest of reason as its effect cannot be the pleasure due to the objective

of the idea is conscious when the desire depends on concepts; when, in other words, one is conscious of the object as desired on a general ground, as a case of a subjective rule or *maxim* of action. To be conscious of desiring an object because of a maxim is necessarily to be conscious of pressing towards gratification, of pleasing or choosing to act. Desire or aversion as such, 'doing or forbearing as we please', is called *wish*, and it is called *elective will* when there is the further 'consciousness of the power of its action to produce its object', consciousness of its causality passing out to the object.

73. This pleasing or choosing need not be choosing between alternatives. It is not necessary for willing that one should be conscious of an alternative course of action, and even where one is so conscious, that the idea of it should be an effort or *nisus* towards materialisation, conflicting with the idea of the object chosen. The rejected alternative may be an idea that only *might be* acted on without actually soliciting the will. In good willing, for example, there is the consciousness of the wrong course rejected; but this consciousness is not a rueful contemplation of a good opportunity of gratification *being* missed.^a Choice need not mean conflict: the bearing of this on Kant's rejection of indeterministic freedom will appear presently.

74. The elective will is not necessarily free. There is animal elective will which is determined by inclination. Man in individual elective will is conscious of being only affected by inclination, being not determined by it. Both are determined by the subject, choice^b being an act of the subject, the subject as embodied in the empirical

fruition of the desire. The effect here comes before the objective fruition which may or may not come. Because an object is desired, the contemplation of it is a pleasure. Desire in such a case cannot directly pass into objective action: it must develop first into a consciousness of causing, a subjective activity. This conscious activity can be only a choosing i.e. adoption into a maxim. Such adoption cannot but be a pleasure. All fitting of an object into a general subjective rule is a pleasure, and since the fitting is here practical, the pleasure is a pleasing. To find an object pleasant as the result of desiring it is to please to adopt it into one's general will-attitude.

^a Where there is such contemplation, the choice is determined not by pure reason but only by a 'sense-free inclination', is not properly free. Kant's morality is not *reluctant* choice but only choice not determined by feeling though accompanied by feeling in the form of a *pure pleasing* to act. In the case of willing that falls short of good willing, the choice is determined by feeling (as in wrong willing) or by reason incorporating feeling in it (as in being honest by policy); and the *pleasing* to act is not a pure pleasure of self-approbation, where the rejected temptation still retains its tempting character, the *pleasing* to reject cannot be pure pleasure and cannot have been motivated by the law but at best by the habit of acting according to it.

^b Even the animal chooses, though apparently the concept or maxim of the choice *can* be only an attitude of specific adaptation to a class of circumstances in the environment, the adoption of an object into this attitude being represented by a pleasing to act.

mind. The animal subject does not distinguish itself from the mind or inclination, i.e., is not self-conscious.^a The human subject is self-conscious, aware of itself as only solicited by the inclination. The human will may be still determined by inclination, but the subject is then conscious of *letting* the inclination determine it. But even this act of letting on the part of the subject does not mean free willing. Human elective will is said to be free when the subject that determines it is not only self-conscious or aware of the inclination being distinct from it but does not also let the inclination determine the will, and is conscious of itself as *pure* reason determining it. 'Freedom of the elective will is just that independence of its determination on sensible impulses: this is the negative concept of it. The positive is the power of pure reason to be itself practical'.^b

75. Even in free willing, the determining subject is embodied in a mental attitude, motive or maxim which as distinct from the transcendental or 'objective' law of reason (moral law) is said to be a *subjective* principle of action, which the subject makes a rule to himself (viz., 'how he chooses to act').^c Free will is still elective will: moral willing though proceeding from pure reason is still a conscious rejection of inclination and has, therefore, a necessary reference to the life of sense. Kant conceives a rational will beyond free will. 'The rational will which is directed to nothing but the law cannot be called either free or unfree, because it is not directed to actions but immediately to the legislation for the maxims of actions (and is therefore practical reason itself). Consequently it is absolutely necessary and even incapable of restraint. It is therefore only the elective will that can be free'.^d The rational will here means the super-moral holy will which is beyond freedom and to which the human will as free is a perpetual approximation, being presented to man only as the moral law. '... Holiness of will is practical Idea which must necessarily serve as a type to which finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely and which the pure moral law which is itself on this account called holy constantly and rightly holds before their eyes'.^e

76. This freedom is not indeterministic. 'Freedom of elective will however cannot be defined as the power of choosing to act for or against the law (*libertas indifferentiae*) as some have attempted to

^a Apparently there is a lower stage of animal desire not amounting to will, where there is no choice but only an idea of the object, not only not self-consciously but not even consciously, causing its existence.

^b Critique of Practical Reason (Tr. Abbott), pp. 268-9.

^c Ibid. p. 282.

^d Ibid. p. 282.

^e Ibid. p. 121.

define it, although the elective will as a phenomenon gives many examples of this in experience'.^a Choice in itself is only phenomenon, while freedom of choice is noumenal. Empirical causality is necessary connection between phenomena. Why there should be a causal law connecting two particular phenomena we do not theoretically know, and it is quite permissible to suppose that the law itself has its ground in a noumenal cause.^b Such a supposition of noumenal causality which would in no way conflict with phenomenal causality but which cannot be verified elsewhere is turned into a certainty in our moral consciousness. Free causality may or may not be the only form of noumenal causality but it is the only form that is known. It is known to us only through the moral law: *ought* implies *can*. A person acting from the moral law as motive and not merely according to it is practically cognisant of being a free cause, noumenal i.e., independent of sensible elective will and yet inexplicably constraining it. The phenomenal will^c theoretically known as cause of the outward action is here practically known to be itself caused by or grounded in noumenal freedom. This is known only in good willing or willing of the moral law. We are not aware of being free cause in wrong willing so that there is no neutral or indeterministic freedom known to be a cause choosing to obey or disobey the moral law. We are indeed theoretically cognisant of obedience or disobedience as alternatively possible phenomenal directions of the elective will. But we know obedience only as free noumenal causality which cannot accordingly be defined as the power to choose between alternatives.

77. Wrong willing requires further discussion. Wrong willing is choosing to act from a maxim of inclination and consciously against the moral law. Choice is an event in time, a phenomenal causation, and human choice may be between reason and unreason (sense or inclination) as possible motives. Where the choice is of reason or *ought* or the moral law as motive, the phenomenal causality itself is known to be noumenally determined or caused by the supra-mental free subject. Where the choice is of inclination in rejection of the law, it must also be noumenally determined by the subject but as not supramental or free. Inclination is a mental phenomenon, and the subject as choosing it is aware of being identified with or embodied in the mental, is consciously unfree. The subject is noumenal cause but it is not aware of becoming unfree by any *act* of freedom but only knows

^a Ibid. p. 282.

^b Critique of Pure Reason (Tr. Maxmüller), p. 441.

^c Not as merely mental but as involving body.

itself to be unfree. It *lets* itself be embodied in the empirical motive in the sense that it is *aware* of not acting independently of it, such inaction being itself a known phenomenal fact. At the same time, since the subject is self-conscious, the inaction or unfreedom is known to belong to the noumenal self and constitutes a noumenal and not merely a phenomenal evil. Wrong willing though not a noumenal *act* is a noumenal fact embodied in a phenomenal fact. The self as the noumenal but consciously unfree determinant of the wrong choice is the *intelligible character*. It is to our practical knowing a being and not an act: the self is practically aware of itself as essentially moral act and yet somehow as a determinate being also, just as it is theoretically aware of itself as essentially apperceptive and accidentally (though inalienably) receptive at the same time. This duality within the self is to Kant an ultimate fact presupposed by transcendental philosophy.

78. Like freedom, this intelligible character is known only practically as the implication of the moral quality of willing (as good or evil). The noumenal or transcendental duality of the self as free act and the self as intelligible being or character is known in self-conscious good willing and evil willing. This intelligible character, though actually evil, may have potentiality for good, originating, it may be, from previous good or free willing. There may be accordingly a willing that is not good or free i.e., *from* the moral law but not also against the law; one may be honest, for example, not because honesty is commanded but because it is the best policy. Here one not only knows theoretically that his action conforms to the moral law but also practically i.e., in spirit conforms—though only conforms—to it, is practically aware of *not dropping respect* for the law though not acting out of respect for it. Kant would say in such a case that 'the empirical character is good but the intelligible character is bad'.^a Strictly speaking, to him the intelligible character is perverse rather than morally bad. Moral badness to him would imply evil not only in the intelligible but also in the empirical character, evil passing from the noumenal self to the phenomenal choice or elective will. Although the transcendental evil is still *imputable*—being therefore called *innate guilt*^b—it is still not an imputable choice. The man is evil, not his willing. Kant speaks of three degrees of transcendental evil or rather propensities to evil^c—frailty (i.e., not following adopted maxims), impurity (not distinguishing between good and evil springs) and perversity; a man being properly called evil when:

^a Critique of Practical Reason (Tr. Abbott), p. 344.

^b Ibid. p. 345.

^c Ibid. p. 344.

frailty and impurity mature' into perversity, the perversity of *subordinating* reason to sense^b, the moral motive to inclination, of 'reversing the moral order in respect of the springs of elective will.'^c The case of a person acting from the maxim of honesty being the best policy is a case of transcendental perversity which has not vitiated the phenomenal choice or elective will. Here there is a subjective mixture of two motives—rational and sensible, although the will is objectively determined by one only—in this case, the sensible motive. The willing here is not wrong though not good also: good willing as well as wrong willing implies the passing over of the transcendental determinant—adoption of a motive or maxim in the spirit—into the empirical choice.

79. The intelligible character is practically known in the first instance in (transcendental reflection on) wrong willing where there is a consciousness of rational motive as antagonised by sensible motive. The adoption in spirit of the sensible motive in transgression of the moral law implies a determinant other than *but co-ordinate with freedom* and therefore transcendental. The intelligible character is next known as operative in the case considered of willing that is right but not good where there is transcendental evil which does not vitiate the empirical will. That the empirical character here is good shows that although the intelligible character is actually evil, it is still potentially good. This potential goodness may be taken to have matured into the actual goodness of the empirical character. In fact, even in the case of wrong willing, one has to admit a potential goodness in the intelligible character which however does not mature or matures only as acceptance of natural law. There may be however a diabolical willing in which though there is no *free* transgression, there is non-acceptance of natural law through the stress of inclination. Belief that my inclination has a claim superior to that of reason implies disbelief not only in moral but also in natural law, disbelief in all constraint to inclination. This is conscious acceptance of insanity or 'stupidity'. Here the potential goodness of the intelligible character does not mature at all. 'Man (even the worst) does not in any maxim, as it were, *rebelliously* abandon the moral law.'^d There is no *free* transgression, so far as we practically know, obedience to the moral law being alone practically known to be free. Why the self is sometimes free and sometimes unfree, and why the unfree condition or evil of the noumenal character sometimes passes over to the empirical character and some-

^a Ibid. p. 344.

^b Ibid. p. 343.

^c Ibid. p. 336.

^d Ibid. p. 343.

times not we do not know: the fact is however practically known, known only assertorically. At the same time the question *why* cannot be stifled and there is the faith (not practical cognition and much less theoretic cognition) that, 'what man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must make or must have made himself.' What is to our cognition an ultimate transcendental fact *demand*s explanation by an antecedent free act: the evil or good in the noumenal character, as imputable, cannot be simply given but must be somehow through one's free causality, though it need not be through an act in time. This freedom cannot be a freedom appearing in an empirical choice and as such cannot be known (the freedom that we know—good freedom—appears in choice). Nor do we know *how* evil antecedent to free or good choice leaves a trace (in the form of a potentiality for good) in the noumenal character:^b we only know that it does. The freedom that does not appear in a choice is a matter of faith, the being or character of the self being to us not only an ultimate fact but also a mystery to our practical consciousness. This freedom is not only the ground of the intelligible character which is itself the ground of wrong willing and right willing that is not good: it is also the ultimate ground of good willing. Even in good willing, reason determines the choice in *conscious* supersession of inclination. That the inclination should at all emerge as an alternative motive to reason to be rejected shows that the intelligible character (from which the inclination rises) is a necessary condition of the causality of reason. Our free will is not holy will: holiness is in us not in will but in the moral law as the transcendent determinant of the will.^c The freedom which is to our faith behind intelligible character and behind even good freedom of which this character is a condition is what Kant calls the radical evil in human nature, a mystery co-ordinate with holy will (being the same as the primal viparyaya as avidyā which to the Yoga is even behind viveka and which matures into the more concrete degrees of evil like asmitā etc.) It is the free principle of evil which like the holy will is a matter of faith, not of practical cognition. As such it is not co-ordinate with our good freedom and hence it is that within moral philosophy proper as founded on practical cognition, we have to deny a bad freedom and therefore also a neutral freedom.

^a Ibid. p. 352.

^b Compare the question how *asamprajñāta-samādhi* leaves a *saṃskāra*.

^c We could conceive a divine will which would be holy but not a choosing phenomenal will—what can not be called free or unfree. It would be freedom creating its own being and not having it somehow given to it, an intelligible character that never gets phenomenalised. It would be like the *Īśvara* of Yoga philosophy, *sadaiva mukta* and with *prakṛṣṭa-sattva*.

80. We can have a metaphysic of morals only on the basis of practical cognition, not of faith. Practical cognition is consciousness of the reality of freedom and of moral law in one process of good willing. The master principle of Kant's transcendental philosophy is good will or free will which is necessarily self-cognisant, knowing itself as free in the knowledge of the moral law and as the condition of the moral law. *Ought* is known as real, not merely thought or felt—as the rational self *actually* constraining the sensible self, freedom being this actual act, not a *may* nor a theoretic *can* but a practically assertorial *can*. Freedom is the condition of the *ought* in the sense that *ought* is real only in being acted, not in being merely felt or thought* (before good willing or wrong willing): *ought* is only as it is causal, being not an eternal truth or value. There is to our *faith* freedom beyond *ought*, the freedom to sin, the radical evil in man, although it is not known. There is no faith however in *ought* beyond freedom. The faith in holiness is faith in holy *will*, no faith in *ought*, which is only the holy *law* as that is known by us (and not as a matter of faith) *as being acted*. Thus in the single cognition of good willing, freedom is known as the (transcendent) condition of the moral law.

81. *Ought* is known only as being knowingly (freely) acted and as therefore wearing the form of knowability or reason. The form of reason is universality and so *ought* is known as the law and is formulable as a prescription to act only on the form of universality. Reason is primarily practical or imperative, and theoretic reason may be taken to presuppose it not as constitutive of objective knownness, but as constitutive of the *fact of knowing*. Hence if we started with theoretic reason, how it becomes practical would be unintelligible. Practical reason then is the form of universality or imperative in general as causal (categorical imperative). The form as causal is real: it is not merely a thought-possibility.

82. It has been sometimes objected that Kant gives us only a formula of morality, the mere form and not the content of morality. As will be presently seen, in his three-fold formulation of the moral law, the last two give some kind of matter, though it is pure matter. In the *Groundwork* and the *Critique*, again, he is mainly concerned with the form:^b he reserves the division of concrete duties for a future metaphysic of morals. The main reason why he deals with the form in the *Groundwork* and the *Critique* appears to be that to him the form of morality is not mere form but the essence, the real spiritual

* *Ought* felt or thought as real without being acted is not (practically) known and may be taken to be imaginary.

^b CPrR p. 93.

attitude that matters, morality being to him noumenally real only as this attitude.

83. The attitude is differently formulated as that of one legislating for all or treating humanity as the end or regarding oneself as a member of a possible kingdom of ends, i.e., regarding every person to be a universal legislator. The formulae refer primarily to the attitude: it is not meant, for example, that one should before acting try to find out the *consequence* of his maxim of action being followed by all. The consequence cannot be and need not be fully known: one has only to assure oneself that there is no contradiction in the inner spirit, no making of an exception in one's favour, no treatment of other persons as less than a person and a universal legislator. The rationality of the attitude prescribed is practical rationality which is not merely the implementing of a principle known first theoretically (i.e., in the consequence) to be generalisable without contradiction. The form of practical rationality unlike that of the theoretical is concrete and real in itself independently of application. The imperative universal is the concrete Idea of humanity as the legislative self of every individual self. Practical reason is of itself concrete as a person: the concretion or matter is here not other than the form and is called pure matter. The universal in the moral sphere is the *real* rational self which is real not as found common to many individual selves but as the noumenal individuality of every individual self. The self knows itself as a real individual only by practically asserting itself as legislative towards itself as somehow embodied in empirical inclination; and to be in this legislative attitude is to recognise other such individual legislators and to be in conscious harmony (and not identity) with them. To be in the attitude is to be aware of oneself as not consciously ignoring other individuals as in wrong willing. Good willing is conscious repudiation of wrong willing i.e., of conscious exclusion of other individuals: it is the practical apprehension of harmony with other individuals. Inclination is the principle of exclusiveness which is not however, the principle of real individuality, being itself only known by a moral self as unaccountably its body, a moral self that already knows itself as individual in harmony with other individuals. So the practical universal—humanity—means many individual selves in harmony, a society of spirits ('kingdom of ends') which is in inner attitude asserted by every individual spirit. The self that is free is, indeed, universal, but the universal self is not, as undertood by some, the *singular* Absolute or divine self working in us but is *each* individual self as in harmony with other selves.

84. The moral formulae can all be reduced to the form; act *as if* the maxium of the action were to become by the will a universal law of nature. Nature is theoretically known as the sphere of universal (causal) law. The practical idea of a kingdom of ends is necessarily symbolised as nature—necessarily, because to will morally i.e., to will the kingdom of ends is to have faith that the kingdom is being realised in a life of sense and in sensible nature. The *as if* here is a make-belief so far as this realisation in nature is not known even practically, but it is practically real not only as an attitude, but also as a contemplative act. The imaginative contemplation is not indeed prescribed but free willing as self-conscious is in itself a theoretic thinking (that is not knowing) of the form or meaning of the willing. The contemplation is practical in the sense of the willing being self-expressing, using theoretic thought as the medium of its expression, its self-consciousness being not a theoretic self-knowing but a self-symbolising by the theoretic concept of law of nature.

85. The imperative is called a law by way of symbolism, being envisaged *as though* it were a judgment indicative. The moral judgment of an object e.g. an action being good is a literal judgment, but the object here symbolises the concept 'good' through the typic of system of nature. Moral good means sensible nature as realising the moral law, as what ought to *be* corresponding to the ought to *will*. If a particular action is judged to be good, it is so far as it is known to realise the *ought-to-be* or rational or purposive system of nature. Such a system is understood as an infinite time or perpetual life in which the good will may be perfected into holy will (immortality) and as a nature organic to the happiness of the virtuous (and the opposite)*. The good as the predicate of moral judgment—this system of nature—is here envisaged *as though* it were the prescribed 'kingdom of ends' realised. The particular object, judged to be good is so practically known but the good itself or the ethico-teleological system of nature is not known but is necessarily entertained in faith. Such a system involves the concepts of immortality and of God (as the cause of the synthetic connection of virtue with happiness embodied in nature). This faith means a further symbolism: to believe in the reality of the *ought* (ought-to-be corresponding to ought-to-will) is to believe *as though* immortality and God were facts. Thus there are three stages of practical symbolism or consciousness of *as though*: in the formulation of the moral law, in the concept of the good, and in the postulates of God and immortality.

* The 'good' is understood as my own perfection and the happiness of others.

ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY (SEC. 1-7)

(1) The Critical philosophy is a form of Transcendental philosophy. The 'transcendental' may be taken to mean the non-objective or that which is not distinct from the consciousness of it. To Kant, the transcendental is the self as conscious act or freedom—whether in knowing or in willing. This self is, according to him, formative of the object known but it is formative only as the purely logical unity of the object. The Kantian theory is thus different both from Vedāntism and Voluntarism.

(2) There are two different kinds of certitude or knowledge, viz., the practical and the theoretic. The former which is about the reality of the self is found in moral willing and the latter which is about the existence of the object is found in theoretic consciousness. In theoretic knowledge of the object, belief comes through the factor of intuition; but in the practical knowledge of the self; intuition is not present and the belief is through the willing or the realising of the thought. To will or to freely cause is to think and effect a causal change in the world. There is thus a fitting of free causality with objective causality and a meeting of the two certitudes in the thought of causality. It is difficult, however, to understand this. The difficulty arouses critical or transcendental reflection which effects an adjustment by taking the known object as only phenomenal.

(3) The relation between the theoretic and the practical reason is much more intimate than what is ordinarily assumed. The conception of apriori thinking as a factor of knowledge appears to be connected with the moral apprehension of free causality. Causality in the known object is intelligible only in reference to free causality as practically cognised. (4) The very problem of the first Critique would be gratuitous unless the object were already suspect in the light of a certitude higher than that about the object. That certitude is, to Kant, the certitude of the moral consciousness. The standard of reality can only be suggested by the apprehension, in the subjective attitude, of the self as utterly unobjective. (5-7) When Kant describes the object as only a 'phenomenon', the word has to be understood from three points of view—the theoretic, the practical and the aesthetic or reflec-

tive—elaborated respectively in the three Critiques. From the theoretic standpoint, the objective is taken as phenomenal because its forms—space, time and causality—are taken to be not objects but indistinguishable from the self : from the practical standpoint, the object is known to be an emanation of self as freedom; from the aesthetic standpoint, the spatio-temporal object is just a self-subsistent value.

CHAPTER II

MIND AS PHENOMENON (SEC. 8-18)

(8) A mental fact is in time only and what is in time is change. A mental fact is thus to be taken as change. But this change is not like a change in a spatial object and is not objectively taken to be in a persistent. This contrast suggests the question as to how it is to be regarded as a *fact*. (9) As a change for which no persistent is known and of which the facthood is undeniable, the mental appears to be a problem. The solution of the problem lies in the theory that it is a phenomenal fact. That the mental as the purely temporal is known as a phenomenon of the free self is grounded in the fact that we *practically* know the self as free causality. (10) The external object is taken by Kant to be the phenomenon of an unknowable reality and the mental object of the self as real. As objective knowledge depends on the affection of our sensibility, the knowledge of the mental fact must depend on some affection of the mind. But the question as to how the self 'affects the mind' cannot be answered. We are assured, however, that it does and this cannot be theoretic assurance through inner sense. (11) That we are affected in our external sense is theoretically known in our internal sense. But that we are affected in our internal sense cannot be known in the internal sense again.

(12) The internal sense, like the external, has its form and its matter, time constituting the form and the 'representations of the external senses' the matter. This matter involves time and the involution is apprehended not by the internal sense but by apperception. The matter of the internal sense is thus the spatial percept as floated in time or as referred to in an image. The mental object is the image which is not so much in time as a figure of time. Just as the different space-figures are through the imagination of possible motion in space, so are the varying images or time-figures through the working of apperception in time of the self or the mind. (13) The 'mental' is thus understood by Kant to be image constructed by the self in time and

referring to spatial percepts. The internal sense as thus figured not merely in knowing but also in willing and feeling is the empirical mind. A mental fact is thus an image as formed out of time by the self and as informed by the self. Kant's view of the empirical mind as time itself as a permanent unity would thus be very different from the Humian view of the mind as a mere series of mental states.

(14-15) The time-relation of mental facts is not a succession within a spatial permanent and, therefore, not a causal succession. It is yet an objective fact and not a merely imagined content. For Kant, Empirical psychology is not a science of the soul only because mathematics is inapplicable to mental facts. The inapplicability of mathematics means really inapplicability of causality. (16) According to Kant, succession is objective only as causal. The succession of mental states is not thus objective. But it is not, therefore, merely subjective. The paradox can be resolved only by imagining that, to Kant, the time-relation of two mental states is the time-relation of the external situations with which they are bound up. It is only thus that it is objective fact without being causal. (17) There is no causal relation among mental facts. Kant, however, held that the self as phenomenal is causally determined. This would be intelligible on the assumption that the belief in the operation of causality within the mind is only practical, being bound up with the practical belief in or the knowledge of free causality. (18) The external world as phenomenal is reflectively judged to be self-subsistent. But the mental world would only be symbolised and not judged to be so.

CHAPTER III

SENSE AND SENSATION (SEC. 19-32)

(19) Kant defines 'sense' as 'the faculty of receiving representations' by being 'affected', and the primary dualism is of the thinking act and the faculty of representation. (20) The self is essentially the conscious thinking act having three directions—the theoretic, the practical and the aesthetic. We have representation in each of these three directions. Representation is received in knowing, put forth in willing and entertained in feeling. Representation is the first content of thinking. (21) In cognitive thinking, the representation is given. As distinguished from thinking in reflective knowledge, it is at once imaging and the image of the existent object. (22) Representation as the faculty of imagination is the mind as distinct from the

self. (23) The mind is the faculty of sensibility when the representation emerges through an affection of the self. We are conscious of this 'affection' not merely as receiving but also as a limitation to free imagination. (24) To be aware of a limitation of free imagining is to be aware of something other than the free act—viz., a given object—as limiting the act and conditioning the emergence of the conscious representation of the object. The emergence of the mental event, which is not an event or representation, is just the sensation. (25) Though it is not an event, it is not therefore a mere abstraction. It is a state or affection of the self that is timelessly real.

(26) There is no harm in saying that the affection of the self is caused by the phenomenal object, for to say that is really to say that it is caused by the thing-in-itself. (27) The sensation is neither a mental event in time nor a quality of the spatial object. The so-called sense-quality is only the content of the space occupied by the object. (28) To Kant, the relation of thing and quality has no application to objective existence. The object has the apparent quality as within it much as the mirror has the image within it and not as its real determination. (29) The sensation then is neither mental object nor external object but what is 'involved' in the external object. (30) The external object is 'involved' in the percept as sensation is involved in the external object. (31) The self is the excitant of the internal sense precisely in the sense in which the thing-in-itself is the excitant of the external sense. (32) Sense as the transcendental ground or potentiality of sensations is called the apriori form of the sensations.

CHAPTER IV

SPACE, TIME AND CAUSALITY (SEC. 33-43)

(33) The analysis of known object into matter and form emerges in transcendental reflection which is a form of introspective activity and which is quite other than the act of reasoning. The knowledge that we get through such introspective exercise is an aspect of the exercise itself and does not come after the exercise as in the case of reasoning. (34) Under such reflection, the external world gets stratified into sensed matter and the forms of Space, Time and Causality. The sensed matter is apprehended as involved in space, the spatial matter as involved in time and this spatio-temporal matter as further involved in causality. The matter at every stage is known only

as the filling of its form, but form is understood everywhere as what can be empty. Matter without form is not known, but it may be the content of a non-theoretic consciousness. Form without matter is, however, transcendently known as a possibility. This possibility is a kind of subsistent entity which is distinguished from mere chimera by being identified with a transcendently evident subjective function. (35) There are three consecutive grades of transcendental reflection or imaginative viewing of the external object: (a) Picturing—where the object as being perceived is imagined through the internal sense and shows itself as the space-form which might be empty; (b) Symbolising—where this subsistent form of space as being thought is viewed from within and shows itself as the time-form which can be empty. Here time appears as symbolic space or space in the making; (c) Schematising—where this detached time, as viewed from within, appears itself as the figuring of a possible image.

(36) In the non-reflective attitude, the object is what is practically dealt with; in the aesthetic attitude, the object floats up like an appearance; in the transcendental attitude, the form by being detached from the object appears constitutive of the object. The detached form is understood in the consecutive stages of transcendental reflection (i) as standing by itself as empty, (ii) as having constituted the object and (iii) as self-limiting and self-constructing and thus self-repeating. (37-39) The three grades illustrated in respect of space and time. (40) Unlike the forms of space and time which are presented, the form of causality (comprising all the categories) is never intuited, though objective fact necessarily implies it. (41) The forms of sense are not subjective acts. Though they are anticipations of experience, the anticipation is subjectively a feeling rather than an act. (42) Causality is a form in the wide sense of form of unity of the object. (43) Transcendental reflection on the object of the understanding, viz., causal succession dissociates its form of causality as the empty form of unity. This empty form is recognised as the positive possibility of the objective world.

CHAPTER V

CAUSALITY (SEC. 44-55)

(44) Causal succession possesses two characters—irreversibility and inevitability. The former presents the problem of finding the precise terms of the succession through the application of the latter. (45)

Every perceived succession is causal succession of *some* objective facts, but this is not capable of objective proof. It follows only from the transcendental reflection that if succession which should not be perceived (by the external sense) is yet perceived, it can only be through the imaginative production of the perception. (46) Succession in the object is believed as an intuitable fact, but it cannot be intuited either by the outer or by the inner sense. It follows that the apparent intuition of succession is only an apriori or timeless construction of time. (47) The only alternative to this Kantian view would be to admit that succession is nonsensuously intuited by the mind. But the Kantian theory would be consonant with the view that the mind can apprehend only what is given to sense-perception.

(48) The production of the perception of change is anticipative and the external world is known as intrinsically involved in change. (49) On our ordinary notions of space and time, of perception and imagination, spatio-temporal facts and the perception of time would be a mystery. The mystery has been sought to be solved by the conception of a single entity—space-time. That conception is, however, inadmissible. But since the ordinary conception of space and time as a duality of co-ordinate entities cannot be maintained, the true solution appears to lie in the Kantian view that space is within time but is not time. Space is thus distinguished from time and time is yet perceived in space as change. In the transcendental consciousness, this immanence of time in space is nothing but the immanence of mind in the object. (50) Thus the law of causality is legitimated by the epistemology of the perception of change.

(51-53) Kant's conception of causality differs from Hume's not merely in the recognition of necessary connection but also in the recognition of the metaphysical entities of substance and force as necessarily in phenomena. (54) Causality presupposes substance. According to Kant, nothing is known as objective fact unless it is causally related; but the terms of the causal relation are not, therefore, taken to be constituted in their facthood by the relation. Again, causality as a fact entails reciprocity between two substances.

(55) Uncaused cause and uncausing effect cannot be known objects. Whatever is known as object is knowable as at once the effect of something and the cause of something else.

CHAPTER VI

JUDGMENTS OF FACT, VALUE AND OUGHT-TO-BE (SEC. 56-69)

(56) Kant recognises three types of judgments. A theoretic

judgment is a judgment of fact and embodies knowledge. A feeling-judgment is a judgment of value and embodies imaginative satisfaction. A moral judgment is a judgment of ought-to-be and like the theoretic judgment it embodies knowledge. (57) Judgment in all these cases refers to a phenomenal object and is the appreciation of a concept somehow immanent in it. (58) The subject of a judgment is always a phenomenon—whether actual or possible—but never the imaginary or the illusory or the problematic. The predicate is always an intelligible. The copula represents the immanence of the predicate in the subject and is apprehended in an imaginative synthesis as phenomenon in the making.

(59) The three types of judgment bring out the three aspects of phenomenon mentioned in Chapter I. (60) The different grades of the subject in the theoretic judgment may be grouped conformably to the predicate into the three heads of individuals—empirical objects, particular determinations of space and time and space-time. The corresponding judgments are called physical, mathematical and metaphysical. (61) The transcendental equivalents of the copula in the three classes of theoretic judgments are respectively the schema or the half-presented form of the spatial, the symbolically presented form of the purely temporal and the unrepresented form of the intelligible. The nature of schema elucidated.

(62) Judgment as a transcendental function implies the schematism of the universal. In both theoretic and non-theoretic judgments, the universal is the self as asserting itself in reference to the phenomenal object. In the theoretic sphere, the self in such reference is truth; in the practical sphere, it is the good; and in the imaginative sphere it is the self-subsistent value. In all spheres, the self in reference to the given phenomena is a thinkable which is in the process of being phenomenalised as an anticipatory image of the phenomenal. (63) In theoretic judgment, the concept to apply to the percept seeks to imaginatively anticipate it. The objection that the concept and the percept are only unreal abstractions from the concrete fact of judgment cannot be accepted in the light of the transcendental analysis of the judgment into concept and percept. There is a problem as to how the concrete concept and percept meet in the judgment. The judgment is a union of factors that can be dissolved. If it can be dissolved, the uniting has to be recognised as a function. (64) This uniting function is constructive imagination or the imagination that produces the perception of the given spatial object as figured by it. The figure is not given in passive perception. In contrast

with the passive percept, the figure appears in the internal sense as in the making. (65) Since the percept is distinguishable from this schematic figure, object-knowledge is realised only in an internal percept in figured apprehension. The concept only approximates to the percept and its immanence in the spatial object is not accomplished. Such knowledge as we actually have is, therefore, only necessary and not self-evident.

(66) To the reflective judgment, the phenomenon is self-subsistent. Its figuring by the concept appears as its own expression. The union of the concept and the percept is not here a schema but the accomplished presentation of expression. The concept here appears immanent in nature as its purposiveness. (67) The purposiveness of nature is purposiveness to our knowing and is imagined as such in the interpretation of an actual feeling of pleasure of a disinterested kind. The reflective judgment is prior to the concept of purposiveness. The immanence of the concept of purpose in the percept is given in feeling in the first instance, and the concept is then sought to be formulated through the reflective elaboration of the feeling. In judgment of fact the concept seeks application; but in judgment of value, the application seeks the concept. (68) The purposiveness of nature is felt and imagined in two ways—the aesthetic and the teleological. In both the purposiveness is imagined as an interpretation of empirical knowability—of what is only felt to be knowable in the former and of what is both felt as knowable and partly thinkingly known in the latter.

(69) The judgment of ought-to-be, like the judgment of value, is the expression of a felt immanence of the concept of the good in perceivable object, though the feeling is a practical feeling amounting to practical knowledge. The predicate is fully formulated and transcends the subject. The transcendence is, however, expressed as the approximation of the percept to the concept, of the felt perceivable nature to freedom and the approximation is understood as symbolism or 'typic'.

CHAPTER VII

FREEDOM AND MORALITY (SEC. 70-85)

(70) Desire is conscious as an anticipation of causality. Where it is conscious in the actual causation, it is called will or wish. Free will is a particular form of the will. (71) Desire is connected by a subjective rule with pleasure either as its cause or as effect. As the

cause, it is called appetite or inclination. As the effect it is the 'felicitic aspect' of the object ideated. (72) Desire or aversion as such i.e., doing or forbearing as we please, is called 'wish'. When there is the further consciousness of its causality passing out to the object, it is called 'elective will'. (73) This pleasing or choosing need not be choosing between alternatives and choice need not mean conflict.

(74) The elective will is not necessarily free. Human elective will is said to be free when the subject that determines it is conscious of itself as pure reason determining it. (75) Free will is still elective will. There is, however, a rational will beyond free will. This rational will is the supermoral holy will. (76) Freedom of elective will is not indeterministic. Choice in itself is only phenomenon, while freedom of choice is noumenal. The phenomenal will which is theoretically known as cause of the outward action is practically known to be itself caused by noumenal freedom. This is known only in good willing or willing of the moral law.

(77) Wrong willing is choosing to act from a maxim of inclination and consciously against the moral law. In both good willing and wrong willing, the phenomenal causality is known to be noumenally determined by the subject. But while in good willing the subject that noumenally determines the choice is the supra-mental free subject, in wrong willing the subject is consciously identified with the mental and is consciously unfree. In the latter case, the subject is not, however, aware of becoming unfree by any act of freedom. The self as the consciously unfree determinant of choice is the *intelligible* character.

(78-79) This intelligible character, like freedom, is known only practically as the implication of the moral quality of willing. There is to our faith a freedom behind this intelligible character, and behind even good freedom of which this character is a condition. This is what Kant calls the 'radical evil in human nature'. (80) Practical cognition is consciousness of the reality of freedom and moral law in the single process of good willing. (81) 'Ought' is known only as being fully acted and as weaving the form of reason. Practical reason is the form of universality or imperative in general as causal.

(82) The charge of 'formalism' is not wholly justified. In his three-fold formulation of the moral law, the last two give some kind of matter. The main reason, again, why he deals with the form appears to be that, to him, the form of morality is not mere form but the essence as well. (83-85) Kant's standpoint and his moral formulae analysed in detail.

APPENDIX

'TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD'

Kant's method of philosophic investigation is a method of transcendental reflection. Ordinarily in philosophy, we reason or argue as in science from data to conclusion. Kant also seems to reason, but a closer consideration shows that his procedure is very different from objective reasoning as in science. In objective reasoning, the conclusion is taken as what must be and not as what is, and the subjective operation of passing to it from the data is not understood as constituting the connection between data and conclusion. The content of the conclusion is only expected to be perceived, experienced or realised and is not felt to be realised in the reasoning itself; and that the conclusion follows from the data is taken to be an eternal fact no way depending on the work of the reasoner's mind. In the transcendental procedure of Kant, there is the exhibition of data and conclusion; but the conclusion is not merely expected to be realised but is felt to be realised and felt not after the reasoning but in the very consciousness of the reasoning. The reasoning is like willing, the fulfilment or success of which is felt in the willing itself which, in fact, is expectation and fulfilment in one, realisation of the end in the consciously expectant operation. Within knowledge, we have this kind of immediately successful operation below reasoning also in intuitive construction: the line is there before us as we draw it. So in the presentation of a motion, there miraculously emerges the presentation of the path of motion. Transcendental reasoning is similarly a realising of the conclusion in the very operation of reasoning. Everywhere it is a sort of seeing in the doing: the transcendental procedure is an experimental knowing, the experiment being consciously made with the self itself. Ordinarily we take knowing as what *comes* to us. There might be voluntary regulation before the knowing—e.g., knowing of the conclusion in a reasoning where one regulates one's thinking through a certain mode of arranging the data in one's mind. But the knowing comes after the arranging and does not shine in the arranging itself: even then it does not amount to a seeing or assertory certitude but only to the faith that it will be verified. In the apprehension, however, of the line emerging into being in the imaginative drawing of it, there is assertory certitude about the line in the conscious process of reaching it. So in all the apparent reasoning in the demonstration

of the apriority of time, space etc. in the Critique, we have an assertory certitude about the conclusion in the conscious procedure. It is not a matter of proving so much as of inwardising the knowledge of time, space etc., of what may be called an introspective knowledge of the object, of realising of the objective fact as being bodied forth by the subject. We may see a line simply as there or we may apprehend it as being seen by being imaginatively traced. The apprehension may be helped by a distinguishing of the objectivity of the line from that of a perceived empirical fact, and the distinguishing may be expressed in the form of a reasoning—*because* the geometric entity has such distinctive characters, *therefore* it cannot be a merely seen fact as it appears to be. Really however the distinguishing is the whole cognition and the reasoning is but a scaffolding. The distinguishing here again is not a comparison, the mere consciousness of an objective point of distinction. It implies the emergence of a new grade of subjectivity, viz., imaginative seeing, the line being perceived by being given like the empirical object but by being imagined. The point of distinction between the line and the empirical object occupying it is not objective fact but a content corresponding to the introspective distinction between imagination and perception. The distinction between an objective fact as perceived and the same as imagined cannot be said to be objective nor merely subjective. The fact as imaginatively apprehended can only be described as internal to or constitutive of the fact as simply perceived, this internality being a transcendental (and not an objective) grade of the objective fact. Everywhere, reasoning in transcendental investigation is seeing the conclusion as the internality of the data through a methodical subjective deepening of the cognition of the data. The deepening is a doing, a specific experimentation with the subjective level of knowing. To adduce proof of the line being there through imaginative tracing is in fact a prescription to others to subject the perception to imagination or a recalling of one's own act of thus having constructed a line. So everywhere, transcendental proof is the indication of a subjective experiment with the knowing activity. To find the proof from oneself is to retrace the process by which one constructed or put forth the data. Transcendental reflection is the reverse of the process of transcendental construction. It is a form of aesthetic contemplation of the object through which the object is seen as being or having been expressed or bodied forth from within. It is like reflecting on a poem and to retrace the steps by which the original formless feeling in the poet's mind came to take its present articulated shape.

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